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
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
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THE

ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE



THE
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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PREFACE

THE present edition of the *Ethics* was planned on a more ambitious scale twelve years ago, and most of it was written before 1891. At that time I was unaware that Mr Bywater was so soon to give us a revised text, and that Mr Stewart was about to publish his "Notes on the Neomachean *Ethics*." When these facts came to my knowledge I laid my own work aside, as I could not suppose it would any longer be required. But, when the publishers informed me that they intended to bring out an edition of a more elaborate kind and asked me to undertake it, I felt that it might be worth while to bring the work I had already done into a more moderate compass, especially as I was conscious that my method of interpretation was a somewhat novel one, and might possess a certain interest for students of Aristotle. I had come to the conclusion that most of the difficulties that have been raised about the *Ethics* were due to the fact that, though the dialectical character of many passages had long been admitted, commentators had never thoroughly recognized that the treatise was dialectical throughout. They had tried to find in it the scientific and metaphysical basis of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy, and when they discovered instead that the foundations of the doctrine here set forth were of the most shifting character, taken as they are at one time from the opinions of ordinary people, at another from

popular Platonism, they have been ready to accuse Aristotle of inconsistency, or to doubt the authenticity of the treatise in its present form. There are indications in the writings of Dicks and W. L. Nowitz-Moellendorff referred to in the Introduction that a different view is gaining ground in Germany, and this edition is a humble contribution to its advancement.

From the nature of the case, the text I have given is a somewhat eclectic affair, and is not intended as a contribution to Aristotelian criticism. It would doubtless have been more convenient for the student if I had simply repainted Professor Bywater's text as it stands, but such a proceeding would hardly have been justifiable. I have therefore taken as a basis my own revision of Bekker's text, made with the help of Susemihl's edition ten years ago. As was to be expected, it presents some points of resemblance to Professor Bywater's text, though I have been less decided in preferring K¹ to L¹ where these MSS. differ. I had published a few of my notes on the text in the *Classical Review* before the publication of Professor Bywater's edition, and had hit upon some of the corrections he has introduced, a fact which he has most generously acknowledged. It is, however, in matters of punctuation that I owe most to Professor Bywater. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the improved punctuation he has given us is as good as an exegetical commentary, based as it is on an unrivalled knowledge of Aristotle's use of language. It will be understood that I have not hesitated to adopt many of Mr Bywater's readings, including a considerable number that he has not received into the text himself. The text of the Eudemian extracts which for reasons given in the Introduction, I have printed at the bottom of the page is mainly Susemihl's. I regret that I have not been able to make more use of the notes which Dr Henry Jackson is now contributing to the *Journal of Philology*, though I have been able to incorporate a few of

his suggestions, and especially the admirable conjecture by which he has restored to us a new fragment of Eunikos (p. 375).

It is inevitable that, in a commentary like the present, most of the illustrations should be old, though I think I may claim to have added some new ones. I have, of course, made constant use of Bonitz's Index, and that indeed is the source of the greater part of my quotations. My own contribution to the illustration of the Ethics lies chiefly in the direction of tracing the originals of many passages in Plato and Isokrates. This was closely connected with my general method of interpretation, and I may fairly claim that some of the material has been collected for the first time; but no one can be more conscious than I am how much still remains to be done in this field.

I owe much to conversations with my friends, especially Mr J. A. Smith and Mr Joachim, on difficult points, and it has not always been easy for me to distinguish what is mine and what is theirs. Dr Latta gave me the quotation from Leibniz which illustrates 1166 a, 20-22. The Index is mainly the work of Miss E. M. Samson.

J. B.

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INTRODUCTION

I.

§1. AMONG the writings that have come down to us as Aristotle's, there are three that bear the title "Ethics." This makes it necessary to state at the outset the critical assumptions on which the present essay in interpretation is based, and which, so far as it is successful, it tends to confirm. Every interpretation implies some critical hypothesis, and our acceptance or rejection of that hypothesis must in turn depend mainly on its adequacy as a basis for interpretation.

§2. We may fairly take it for granted that the so-called *Magna Moralia* is a Peripatetic hand-book written after Aristotle's time; for all competent judges are now agreed on this. Still, as it shows no trace of Stoic influence or of opposition to Stoic views, it cannot well be later than the third century B.C., and is therefore evidence of the school tradition at a time when there was still a school with a living tradition¹. The other two treatises present a more difficult problem. They both profess to be Aristotle's, but the first of them is called after Nikomachos, his natural son; the other after one of his most illustrious scholars, Eudemos of Rhodes. It is true that these titles first occur in a quotation from the Pseudo-Atticus, who lived in the time of the Antonines, but they are certainly much older. Cicero knew the *Nikomachean Ethics* by its present title; for he is inclined to think Nikomachos was actually its author. Aspasios, the earliest of the Aristotelian commentators, has already to face the question whether the discussion of Pleasure in Book VII is the work of Aristotle or Eudemos². We may be sure, then, that these titles go back to Alexandrian times at least, and that they were found in the edition of Andronikos; but there

is no authoritative tradition as to their meaning. We can hardly accept the statement that the present work is that of Nikomachos, for, according to the biographical tradition which is founded on contemporary documents he died while still a lad¹. He would be too young then, to write the Ethics, though he may have been old enough to edit his father's lectures under the guidance of Theophrastos. On the other hand, we cannot adopt the view of the later Greek commentators that the treatises were dedicated to Nikomachos and Eudemos respectively. This would imply that Aristotle himself prepared his lectures for publication, which is contrary to everything that can reasonably be inferred from the books themselves and others like them. Following the analogy of the Theophrastean and Eudemean Physics and Metaphysics, most modern scholars agree in regarding the Nikomachean Ethics as substantially the work of Aristotle himself and in assigning the Eudemean to Eudemos, but the meaning of this conclusion differs widely according as the critic holds that the three central books are rightly placed in the one treatise or in the other. For the most serious difficulty is just this that according to our tradition, Books V-VII of the Nikomachean Ethics are identical with Books IV-VI of the Eudemean.

¹ Zeller's Aristotle, Eng. Trans. vol. iii. p. 49*.

² Cicero de Finibus, v. 5, 12. Quare eneitatis Aristodem et eius filium Nikomacham, cuius decessu e scripti de moribus libri tantis id quaten esse Aristotelis, sed non video quare non potuerit patris nomine esse filius. Aspasios, p. 151, 21. Hryh. (i) *ταυτὸν γὰρ τοῦ Νικομαχεῶν, ὅσα διαλήψεις αὐτὸν περὶ ἠθικῆς Ἀριστοτέλης σαφὲς εἴρηκεν αὐτὸν μὴ γὰρ εἶναι τῇ εἰδωσαντικῇ ἀλλὰ παραλαβούσῃ* "ὥσπερ τοῖς δαμνύουσιν τὴν ἡλικίαν" σημείον δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀλλ' Εὐδήμου τὸ ἐν τῷ = δεκάτῳ = ἡγίως περὶ ἠθικῆς ὡς οὐδέπω περὶ αὐτῆς διελεγεμένον. *τὸ δὲ εἰς Εὐδήμου γὰρ εἶναι εἰς Ἀριστοτέλους, ἐνδόξως εἴρηται.* For the other references, see Zeller, vol. i. p. 97, No. 1.

³ He died in battle as a *μεγακτιστός* according to the biographers. Cf. the will of Theophrastos in D. L. v. 31. We must remember that the wills of Aristotle and Theophrastos were preserved in the school as charters of foundation. A Greek philosophical school was a corporation like a college, and had to keep its titles.

§ 3. From the nature of the case most arguments on this subject are apt to involve a *petitio principii*. If we suppose

that these three books are in any sense the work of Aristotle, or even a fair reproduction of his thought, it becomes very hard to maintain that there is such a thing as a distinctively 'Eudemian' doctrine, for the undoubtedly Eudemian books only differ from their Nikomachean counterparts in matters of detail and emphasis. On the other hand, if we hold that the three books are the original and independent work of Aristotle, we have to admit that we know nothing of Aristotle's views on some of the most important subjects, and that we have therefore no means of telling whether Eudemos gives us a faithful account of them or not. Of course it would be a different matter if, as some critics hold, any real inconsistency could be detected between the teaching of the doubtful books and the remainder of either treatise. I have tried to interpret them on the assumption that there is none, with what success the commentary must show. It would also alter the case if it could be shown that the central books contain expressions and thoughts not to be found in the undoubtedly Nikomachean books but easily paralleled from the undoubtedly Eudemian. But this argument loses its force when it is shown that these suspicious phrases and ideas can be matched from other works of which the Aristotelian origin has never been called in question, and that some of them even go back to Plato. This I believe I have shown in all important cases.

The assumption made in this edition, then, is that the edited books are really Aristotle's, an assumption which may be provisionally commended by two general considerations. The interpretation of Book V is notoriously difficult owing to the use made in it of mathematical formulas which are not always clear and which seem to give the writer more trouble than they have given to his editors. Now Mathematics was just the one province of human knowledge in which Aristotle did not show himself a master, while Eudemos was one of the foremost mathematicians of an age in which that science made more progress than it ever did again till the seventeenth century. We can understand that Aristotle felt bound by the Platonic tradition to treat

Justice mathematically, but we can hardly understand Eudemos of Rhodes discussing so simple a matter as proportion in a way which, whatever we may think of it, has certainly produced an astonishing divergence in the interpretations of the most competent editors. The other point is this. The difficulties of Books VI and VII arise as we shall see, from the presence in them of a dialectical element and a neglect of formal symmetry far more characteristic of the master than the scholar. If we look at the way in which Eudemos has reproduced the substance of Books VIII—IX, we shall find it very hard to believe that he would not have given us a more neatly formulated account of the "intellectual virtues," and a less puzzling discussion of the relations between thought and feeling. There is a higher art in Aristotle's apparent confusion, and the spirit of the Platonic dialogue with its tentative arguments and provisional conclusions still lives in his dialectic procedure. He is seeking the truth along with his hearers and not expounding a ready-made system. We do not expect this from Eudemos, whose chief interest would be in giving a faithful reproduction of his master's thought, and who would not feel in the same way the need of leading his audience step by step from the Academic standpoint to his own: but we do expect a more dogmatic and perspicuous exposition.

§ 4. Now, if this is the true account of the relation of Eudemos to Aristotle, it follows at once that we have in the Eudemian Ethics the most authoritative commentary on the *Nicomachean*. I have assumed that Eudemos gives us the thought of Aristotle, as he understood it, as faithfully as he can, though it is plain enough that he has added a good deal from other Aristotelian sources in order to bring out more clearly what he took to be the meaning, and even that he has here and there given a turn of his own to what Aristotle had said. The burden of proof certainly lies with those who maintain anything else, for it is clear that this is what Theophrastos and Eudemos did in the case of the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*. They followed the main lines, passing

ably over those parts where Aristotle was full and clear, but formulating more precisely and discussing more minutely those subjects he had left with a less finished treatment. This statement, which is made on good authority of Theophrastus, is true also of the Lucretian Physics, as we can see from the numerous quotations in Simplicius'. The Ethics of Theophrastus is unfortunately lost, but the few fragments we possess confirm the general impression so far as they go. It is significant that one of these fragments is distinctly an amplification of a sentence in one of the disputed books'.

In view of all this I have thought it right to print the relevant passages of Eudæmos under the text to which they refer, and I have always hesitated to adopt an interpretation different from his. We must remember that he was in all probability there when the lectures were given, and that he would take over all the difficulties with the master. We really cannot expect to know what Aristotle meant much better than he did, and we should always make the most of first hand evidence. The superficial paraphrases of Byzantine commentators are quoted today as if those Greeks had any authority in the matter, but the Eudæmos Ethics, which takes us back to the Peripatetic itself, has been too much neglected.

¹ *Expositio Hieronymi* 1. 17. 3 In omni die in quo dicitur quod deputat post
magis tunc dicitur et singulis quibus ab Antiochia et in Asia congregant, unde videtur
magis et non post ab Antiochia tractatus comparatur. Hieronymus Epistolae 33. 6
Irenaeus adhaerens ad Antiochenam ecclesiam et ad episcopos eius comparat eos.

4. The second passage is again a fragment of a correspondence between Leibniz and Theophrastus, taken from the text of the *Phisicae Zeteticæ*, vol. 1, p. 136. Further, Theophrastus, who had the Platonian Physics before him, says in one place (p. 411, § 7) that *μικροί ποταμοί διὰ τὴν ἀσπίδα τῆς γῆς ποταμὸν ποιεῖ* (small rivers, because of the shield of the earth, make a river). There can indeed be no doubt that it is identical with the teaching of Aristotle's Physics, which reads distinctly that the heavens are not only necessary to nature, but that they do anything else (than this) in the case of the Physics. The last two words of the foregoing paragraph are not his account of the "life of the community."

¹ Cf. the *Index of Librarians*, sec. 6, 1, entry in the *Annex*, vol. 1, 1944, and the notes on 1100 b, 19, 1131 a, 19, 1143 b, 33, 1145 a, 6, 1153 b, 19, 1164 b, 12.

[illegible]

II.

§ 3. All this is of course inconsistent with the widely-spread view that the Aristotelian corpus has come down to us in a more or less unauthentic form. Some recent scholars have gone great lengths in the assumption of "dislocations" and "duplicate passages," so far indeed that if they were right we could hardly say we possessed the works of Aristotle at all in any natural sense of the words. In its crudest form, this theory has been used to justify wholesale transpositions of sentences, paragraphs, and chapters to any place where, in the editor's opinion, they would be more appropriate. But it is very hard to see how the process of shuffling which this implies could actually have occurred! Even the story of the cellar at Skepsis does not suggest that the works of Aristotle were picked up in little bits like an Egyptian papyrus at the present day and pieced together as well as might be. And the external evidence that the works of Aristotle were known substantially in their present form from the time of Theophrastus to that of Andronikos is overwhelming. The rise of Stoicism would be inconceivable unless we might assume that the more important works of Aristotle were easily accessible. In this extreme form, then, the theory may be dismissed*. But, in the form given to it by Professor Cook Wilson after Torstrik*, the theory of "duplicate passages" requires more serious consideration. According to this, the Aristotelian matter with which the early editors had to deal was regarded as sacred, and their chief aim was to prevent the loss of any of it. So several different versions of the same discussion were combined into a single treatise just as a "harmony of the gospels" might be. The possibility of this is undeniable and the facts upon which the theory is based are certain. It is the case that, in certain parts of the work, Aristotle appears to discuss the same subject several times over, and that these discussions are frequently inconsistent and apparently quite independent of each other. But I have tried to show that this fact admits of another explanation. The

Ethics is, and from the nature of the case must be, a dialectical and not a demonstrative work, and it is, as we shall see entirely in accordance with Aristotle's own view of the method which is appropriate in such a case to give as many solutions of the difficulties which arise as can be given, without any regard to the real philosophical validity of those solutions. If it can be shown that these apparent duplicates are really successive applications of the different dialectical *lógoi* appropriate to the subject, the critical problem does not arise. Aristotle is not committed to all or any of the solutions he gives any more than Plato is committed to the successive definitions of knowledge given in the *Theaitetos*. Nor can we even assume that the true solution is necessarily given at all. It often is given; but it was contrary to Aristotle's own principles to base the exposition of *Politics* on his metaphysical system.

* I do not mean to deny that there are traces of editing and clumsy editing in the *Ethics*. In particular, many of the summaries and transitions break the argument in a way that can hardly be attributed to Aristotle himself, and which we do not observe in his more finished works. But this does not detract seriously from the integrity of the text. We may add these connecting topics to *Notes* as if we please.

† It is really impossible to resist the arguments adduced by Zeller (*Aristotle*, Chapter III) in favour of the view that the works of Aristotle as we have them were known and used all through the period from his death down to the recension of Andronicus. The statement that the successors of Theophrastus were ignorant of the physical and metaphysical treatises is simply untrue, as is proved by the whole history of philosophy in the third century B.C.

‡ *Aristotelian Studies*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press).

§ 6. The plausibility of all these theories is enhanced by certain undeniable peculiarities of style, and these must be explained at once if we are to judge the work fairly. It is clear to begin with that we have not before us a book intended for publication in the ordinary sense of the word. Primarily it is the manuscript of a course of lectures intended for the lecturer's own use, and also doubtless for consultation by members of the school. In any case the writings of Theophrastus and Eudemos had, so far as we can see, exactly the same character, and no account of that character

which applies only to the Aristotelian corpus can be accepted. What we have to explain is not the form in which Aristotle's works have come down to us, but the nature of the Peripatetic *diapósis*. "Now," as Wilamowitz-Moellendorf puts it¹, "there has been no lack of people who have tried to force upon Aristotle the pedantry of a well-paragraphed lecture note-book that sends the audience to sleep. We must allow, indeed, that as an oral teacher he had the vice of recapitulations and of declarations that now one subject has been exhausted and it is the turn of the next. But that is just the public speaker's vice, and if we take the *akroamatic* writings as spoken discourses, they lose much of what certainly annoys the reader. It is clear however, that Aristotle was eloquent only with the pen, or he would not have written out all the indifferent stuff as well." The point of view here indicated appears to me the right one, and we may be glad that Aristotle found it necessary to write down what he was going to say word for word, and that his pupils, as was natural, caught the trick from him.

¹ *Aristoteles und Athen*, vol. 1, p. 66, n. 37.

§ 7. But there is a further peculiarity in the style of such works as the *Ethics* which is of great importance for their right understanding, and which has been most distinctly brought out by Diels¹. He has called attention to the curious fact that "we read on through long tracts of his ordinary dry prose and are suddenly surprised by a charming oasis. It is observable too that in those more literary and popular passages we usually find a Platonic element, a reference to Platonic 'divisions' and Platonic dialogues. In this respect the *Ethics* holds a middle place between the purely scientific writings and the wholly popular such as the *Rhetoric*." How natural this is we shall see when we come to consider Aristotle's method in the *Ethics*; here it will be sufficient to quote the explanation given by Diels himself. He says:—

"I can think of no other ground for this alternation, to speak for the present only of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, than

a paedagogic one. Aristotle saw before him at the lecture on Ethics of which this treatise is the reflexion, hearers of over years (1025 A. 1) whose minute familiarity with the Platonic dialogues he could count upon unconditionally, just as the audience at his course on Rhetoric must have had a number of model speeches, especially those of Isocrates, in their heads. So he gave them first the skeleton of his doctrine, and then tried to cloth it with flesh and blood by explanations in a more popular style and by instructive digressions, to bring it nearer to the understanding of his scholars by attaching it to what was familiar and exoteric. This certainly introduces some unevenness into the terminology and treatment, which has often had a confusing effect and has led some to assume a discrepancy of doctrine where there is really nothing but an accommodation of the expression to his Platonically schooled public.¹

Dielz goes on to show the truth of this by a most skilful analysis of the opening of Book I, of which I have made free use in my notes. If I have succeeded in showing that the rest of the Ethics lends itself just as easily to the same treatment, the substantial unity and integrity of the work will become much more credible.

¹ *Artikeln für Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. 1, pp. 474-475.

III

§ 8. Besides the *Parvularum Ethicarum* and the *Magis Moralia*, there are several ancient commentaries on Aristotle's Ethics. Only two of these are of real value, the commentary of Aspasius (2nd century A.D.) and the relevant parts of the *Arrotaia kai Anagoria* of Alexander of Aphrodisias. These two works contain genuine Peripatetic tradition and are often of service in interpreting the treatise. They also throw very considerable light upon the text by preserving readings older than those of our MSS. The commentaries of Michael (11th century A.D.) and Eustratios (12th century A.D.) with the 14th century Paraphrase now attributed to Heliodoros of

Prusa are of the usual Byzantine type and add little or nothing to our knowledge¹.

¹ The commentaries on the Ethics have been edited by Hegbut for the Royal Prussian Academy (Berlin, 1889). For Alexander's *Arroptou and Moeris* see the edition of Ivo Bruns in the *Supplementum Aristotelicum* vol. II.

§ 9. The modern commentaries on the Ethics of earlier date than the present century may be divided into two classes, those that throw light upon the argument and those that illustrate the language. Of the former class, the most valuable is the commentary of Giphanius, while the edition of Zell is a most useful summary of the latter. Michelet's edition (Berlin 1829) contains many good things, though his method of interpretation is somewhat arbitrary. Sir Alexander Grant's commentary was the first attempt to explain Aristotle's real meaning in accordance with the methods of historical criticism. However much we may differ from it in detail, it is a work of permanent value. Ramsauer's edition is difficult to work with and hardly marks an advance. Professor Stewart's "Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics" is a work of great learning and provides a store of matter from which all subsequent writers on the subject will continue to draw. Dr Henry Jackson has given us an edition of Book V, and there is an admirable little edition of Book X by Monsieur G. Rodier (Paris, Delagrave, 1897). Fritzsche's editions of the Eudemian Ethics and of Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics contain much interesting matter, and the tracts of Rassow and Susemihl may always be consulted with profit.

IV.

§ 10. With the Ethics we enter upon that part of Aristotle's system which has to do with Man, "the philosophy of things human," as he once calls it¹ in the popular phraseology of his time. From the nature of the case, the philosophy of Man as studied by men must be a practical and not a theoretical science; for that is the true division of the sciences and is rightly put in the forefront by Eudemos². It is true, as Zeller has pointed out³, that this particular

classification is nowhere expressly made by Aristotle himself, but that is only because it was a Platonic "division" and might therefore be assumed. It is the only one recognised by the early Peripatetics and it is certainly implied by very many passages in Aristotle. Thought has only two forms; it is always either (1) theoretical or (2) practical and productive, and the difference between these is that the former has to do with things which are either immovable or have their source of motion in themselves, while the latter deals with such things as require an external cause to set them in motion, things which have their efficient or motive cause in something else, that is to say in human will or skill. We must not be misled by the minor distinction between practical and productive. Now and then it becomes desirable for dialectical purposes to mark the difference between those sciences which have some action as their end and those which produce some external product, and then the latter are more properly called arts than sciences. But this distinction is referred by Aristotle himself to "extraneous discussions," and he seldom or never makes serious use of it. As a general rule the terms "practical science," "productive science" and "art" are used quite indiscriminately.

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¹ EE. 1214 n. 10 quoted on p. 1.

¹ *Eng. Trans.*, vol. 1, pp. 181-939.

[illegible][illegible]

⁴ If 1140 a 3. It is characteristic that the appearance of a threefold division is accompanied in the Tropics. Cf. 145 a, 15 Demetrius γὰρ οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται καὶ ποιεῖται λέγειν (1 ἐπιπαινεῖται), 157 a, 16 τὴν εὐσεβειῶν αἰ μὲν ἐμπροσθεν αἱ δι' ἐπαινεῖται αἱ δὲ ποιεῖται. That the true doctrine is given in EN 1139 b, is αὐτὴ γὰρ (i.e. ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ σέβη) οὐκ εἰς ποιεῖται ἀλλὰ δόξα.

§ 11 A practical science or art, then, such as that of the statesman is essentially a source of change in something else.

the efficient cause of motion in something which has no motive cause in itself. Some things are wholly immoveable, and these are the objects of First Philosophy and Mathematics, other things, though moveable, have their source of motion and rest in themselves¹. A tree grows of itself, a house is brought into being by the art of the housebuilder. Those things which have their motive cause in themselves are the sphere of Nature. Art or Practical Science has to do with things which have to be moved from outside. It is true, as we shall see, that in some cases the same result may be produced by Nature and by Art. Health, for instance, may be the result of the natural growth of the body, or it may be artificially produced by the doctor. There are other things, again, that can only be produced by art and do not come into existence by nature at all². Any classification based solely on the nature of the objects would, therefore, be endlessly complicated. We must hold fast to the simple distinction based on the fundamental difference between the theoretical and practical or productive intelligence.

¹ Plato had referred the science of the king or statesman to the cognitive class (Polit. 289a, Aristotle, on the contrary, never tires of insisting on its practical character. This is a fundamental distinction, and is well brought out by Eudemus. Cf. I E 1216 b, 3. Ζωωρᾶτης μὲν οὖν ὁ προσβύτης ψεῖς εἶναι θέλει το γινώσκων τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐπειγᾶται τί ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς, ἐπιοίει γὰρ ταῦτ' ἐκδύνας· ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ψεῖς εἶναι τάς τε ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. Δύο μὲν γὰρ μαθηθῆκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἔσμεν οἰκοδομοὶ καὶ γεωμέτραι, διότι ἐλθέται τί ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἀλλ' οὐ πῶς γίνεται καὶ τί γίνεται· τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρητικῶν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕτερον ἐστὶ τῆς ἀπομνημονεύσεως οὐδὲ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲ γεωμετρίας ἢ τῆς περὶ γυνώσεως καὶ θεωρίας τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ἐποικιμένων ταῖς ἐπιστήμας οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός οὐδέτις οὐλοῖται ὥστε πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι χρήσιμους αὐτοῖς ἡμεῖς) τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἕτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως, εἶναι ἡγεῖσθαι μὲν λαμπρῆς, εὐνομίας δὲ ἢ τε τοιαυτῆς ἕτερον τῆς ποιητικῆς, πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐ το γινώσκων δικαιοσύνην τῶν καλῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οἱ πρὸ εἰδέναι νομισσάντων τί ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκων δε τῶν ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βεβλήμεθα τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρείου, οὐδέ τί ἐστι δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιον, καθόπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνει μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκων τί ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ θρῆναι.

² Μετ. 1016 a, 13. ὁ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνητα, τῇ δὲ μαθηματικῇ ἐνία περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ' ἐκείνη, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ἐκτῇ ἢ δὲ πρῶτῃ καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. ὥστε τρεῖς ἀν εἶναι φιλοσοφία θεωρητική, καὶ μαθηματική, φυσική, θεολογική.

* Cf. 1140 a. 18. Part. An. 640 a. 28 *ἔνα γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖσι μαθηματικῶν γινώσκειν τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης*. Met. 1034 a. 6 *ἀντιφύκει δ' αὖ τοῖς καὶ τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν καὶ τὴν τέχνην καὶ ἀπὸ τοῖσι μαθηματικῶν, οἷον ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' οὐδ' οἷον εἶναι, κ. τ. λ.*

§ 12 Each of these kinds of science has its own good or end, something that makes it worth knowing; but this will be different in each case. The end of theoretical science cannot be to make any change in its object, for that object is either incapable of change altogether or at least of all change from an external source. In theoretical science we are, therefore, simply in the position of spectators, and this is the original signification of the word θεωρία. The end or good of such science lies in conformity to reality, and this conformity is truth. When we have reached this we have reached the completion (τέλος) of the science, and there is nothing beyond it for us to attain¹.

If, however, the object of a science is something which has not its source of motion in itself, our relation to it at once becomes different. If the efficient cause is in ourselves, it becomes possible for us to realise the object of our science, and this realisation becomes the "end" or completion of the science. The object of it is no longer "what is" (τὸ ἔστι), but the γινώσκειν of "what is to be" (τὸ ἐσομένον), we are no longer spectators but actors². Popular language already uses the word δεικναι for such a science³, and this is quite correct, for the definition of δεικναι is just ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς εἰς ἄλλω⁴.

Met. 983 b. 22 θεωρητικὴ μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἀλήθεια, πρακτικὴ δ' ἔργον. τὴν τοῦτο δ' ὁ ἀληθεύειν μὲν εἰ τὸ διηρημένον αἰσιν αἰσιν διακηρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγχεμένον συγκερῆσθαι, εὐφραίνεται δὲ εἰ δεικνύειν ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα.

¹ An. Post. 1002 a. 9 *ἔνα μὲν περὶ γένεω τέχνης ἐάν τις περὶ τὸ εἶναι εἰσηγήσῃ*. Part. An. 640 a. 2 *ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ τοῦ εἶναι*.

² Part. An. 640 d. 7 *τοῦ πολυτεχνίου ἵκνουσι*. Isid. 1. 1. 1. 1. 30 *τοῦ περὶ τὰς τέχνης τοῦ καὶ διδάσκειν διακρίνεται*. St. Ar. Met. 1046 a. 2 *διὰ πάσαις αἰ τέχνης καὶ αἰ μαθηματικαῖς ἐπιστήμασι δυνάμει εἶσιν ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβολητικαὶ εἶσιν ἐν ἄλλω ἢ ἑαυτῷ*.

³ Met. 1020 a. 6 *ὥστε δ' ἐάν τις ὅστις πρῶτον δυνάμει δὲ εἴη ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς εἰς ἄλλω ἢ ἑαυτῷ*. Isid. 1. 1. 1. 1. 30 *τοῦ περὶ τὰς τέχνης τοῦ καὶ διδάσκειν ἀρχὴ, δυνάμει δ' ἢ ἐν ἄλλω ἢ ἑαυτῷ*. The addition of ἢ ἑαυτῷ is intended to provide for such cases as the physician healing himself.

V.

§ 13 We see that there are many practical and productive sciences or arts, just as there are many things that are good for Man; but we see also that the ends of some of those arts are subordinate to those of others. Plato had already divided arts into those that "make" and those that "use," those that make the tools and those that make the thing itself. The art of weaving uses the art of shuttle-making, and therefore the shuttle-maker must take his instructions as to the proper form of shuttles from the weaver, just as the weaver in turn takes his instructions as to cloth from the tailor. In the same way, to take an illustration which was in Aristotle's mind when he wrote the first chapter of the "Ethics," the maker of bridles must take his instructions from the horseman who uses them¹. This relation of the higher to the lower arts is otherwise expressed by saying that the former are "architectonic" with regard to the lower, a term also of Platonic origin².

Now, for reasons which will be explained presently, there must be some one good which is in a pre-eminent sense the Good for Man, and to which all other goods are subservient, and it is the art of producing this we are to study now. Clearly, if we wish to know what this art is, we must ask what is the art that "uses" all the other arts, the most "architectonic" of the practical sciences, the science that has the plan of human life as the master-builder has the plan of the house. This point too has been settled by Plato; for he has shown that the two sciences which are most apt to claim the chief place, namely Rhetoric and Strategy, are both subordinate to Politics³. This, then, is the art or science we must study if we wish to produce the Good for Man⁴.

¹ Plato, *Krat.* 350c (in the *separatim*) τίς οὖν ὁ γνωσόμενος αἱ τὰ προσήκουσιν ἀναλίσσει ἀποιχομένη (αὐτῷ κείνῳ, ὁ ποιεῖται, ὁ τέκτων, ἢ ὁ χρησόμενος ὁ ὑφάστης). Τῆς χρησόμενης τέχνης ἡ καὶ ἐκτεταμένη τῇ ποιήσει. In *Polit.* 181d the distinction is expressed as one between *αἰτίας* and *ἐκτεταμένη τέχνη*. We read there ὅτι, μὴ τὰ πρῶτα αὐτὰ μὴ δημιουργεῖται, ταῖς δὲ δημιουργήσεσιν ὁργανὰ παρασκευάζουσιν ταῦτα μὲν ἐκτεταμένη, ταῖς δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα ἀπὸ τῶν ὁργανῶν αἰτίας. The

statement of *χρησιμότης* in EN. 1094 a, 11 is a clear allusion to Rep. 601 c where Aristotle says the philosopher is called *ὡφελῆς*, φάσιν, ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ ἡλιθίους. Now, however, if we remember that *χρησιμὸς*, Πλάτῳ γὰρ "ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν καὶ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἡλιθίου ὁ φάσιν, ὁ οὐδ' ὁ φιλόσοφος, ὁ τοῦ ἡλιθίου αἰσθητικὸς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δεῖται τοῦτοῦ ἐπισταμένου καὶ ὡφελῆς: ἡλιθίους γάρ." *Ἄρ' οὐκ αὖτε περὶ τοῦ οὐκ ὡφελῆος ἔχει;* Πλάτῳ: Πλάτῳ ἰσακούειν τοῦτο αὐτὸς οὐκ ὡφελῆος ἔδει, καὶ ἄλλοι, ταπεινοὶ, μαυροῦντες. Now.

¹ The term *ἀρχιτεχνικὸς* is derived from Plat. Phil. 185 c καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτεχνικὸς γὰρ οὐκ οὐδὲν ἐργάζεσθαι ἀλλὰ ἐργάζεσθαι ἄλλων. He furnishes *τέχνην* and not *χρησιμότητα*. On the other hand he is not merely operative but *ἐπιστάμενος*. So in the Laws, 124 a, 56 we have him ὅτι αὐτὸς ἀρχιτεχνικὸς τῆς θύτης καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποφύλακός τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ ἀρχιτεχνικὸς.

² The problem of Plato's *ἠθικὰ* is distinguished by the use of dialectics from the *ἠθικὰ* of Aristotle from the common-sense elements of the time. After the *ἠθικὰ* of Aristotle has been distinguished from the other arts of tending the animals in *βόσκαι*, we have still to distinguish it from the other arts within the state, both those which produce the things themselves (*αἰσθητικὰ*) and those which produce the means for making them (*οὐκ αἰσθητικὰ*). After enumerating seven classes of arts which produce material possessions, we come to the *ἀρχιτεχνικὸς*. We pass in order *ἀρχιτεχνικὸς*, *ἐκτεχνικὸς*, *βόσκαι*, *σοφιστικὰ* and *πολεμικά*, till at last we have left only the *ἀρχιτεχνικὸς* namely *ἀρχιτεχνικὸς*, *δικαστικὸς* and the highest kind of *πολεμικὸς* (EN. 1094 b, 3).

Now, if we take any art, we find that there is a higher art which prescribes whether we are to claim it or not (Phil. 104 b, cf. EN. 1094 b, 1), and the other art must yield precedence to this. So Rhetoric, the art of persuasion, must yield precedence to the art which decides whether persons or force is to be used, and Strategy, the art of war, must yield to the art which determines whether we are to make a war or at peace. That Aristotle had all this in mind when he wrote the first chapter of the Ethics is plain, not only from its general tenor, but from its *ἠθικὴ ἀρχὴ* which is *ἀρχὴ τελευτῆς ἀγαθῆς* (1094 a, 12 ff.), the use of *ἀρχὴ* (1094 a, 12 ff.) the phrase *αὐτὸς ἀρχιτεχνικὸς καὶ ἀποφασίζων* and the like. The argument was familiar in the Platonic school and is found also in the *Kathymenon* (117a-118a).

³ The interpretation of the first chapter of the Ethics here implied is so far as I know a new one. It is generally supposed that the passage deals with ends in general and not simply with the distinction between the ends of the ethical and the natural sciences and the proof that the end of the most intellectual of the natural sciences will be the good for Man. The external evidence for the interpretation I have adopted consists of (1) the obvious fact that Aristotle is in complete harmony with the argument of Plato given above, p. 3, (2) the fact that the summary of the argument in the Ethics, 1281 b, 14 quoted on p. 7, is the restatement of the whole as represented by MM. 1181 a, 32-33, quoted on p. 6.

§ 14. A modern writer who wished to draw a distinction between Ethics and Politics would probably rest his case on the view that the good of the individual is something different

Such an idea, however, is wholly foreign to Aristotle's way of thinking. No one knew better than he did that a happiness which is not the happiness of individual souls is nothing at all. The state as such has no good that can be secured at the expense of the individuals who compose it. What Aristotle did hold was that, if we wish to find the Good for Man, we must seek it in a community of some sort; for man is by nature a being who finds his good only in a community, and can only find it completely in the most "full-grown" or complete community, that is, in the city-state. Lesser communities like the family and the village are enough for the needs of bare life; but Man's nature requires more than this for its full development and it is the state alone that can secure for him the good life¹.

On the other hand, it is true that the organisation of the state involves a restriction of happiness in the fullest sense to certain of its members. The state exists for the sake of the comparatively few rare souls that are able to lead the highest life, and it is undeniable that the rest are to some extent sacrificed to these. But in reply to this Aristotle would say that in a well-ordered state all the citizens have such happiness as they are capable of, and we cannot ask for more. Even slavery, which Aristotle regarded as necessary and natural, he at least attempted to justify on the ground that it is best for the slave himself to be the "living too," which enables his master to lead the good life. Were it not that some men are "slaves by nature," slavery would be unjustifiable altogether².

¹ Pol., 1253 b 28 (after a description of the *oikia* and the *kóμη*) ἡ δὲ πλειοψηφία αὐτῶν κοινῶς τέλειος πόλις, ἡ δὲ πάσι εἰκονα πέρας τῆς αὐτοκρατίας ὡς ἔπος εἴπειν, γινώσκουσι μὲν οὖν τοὺς γὰρ ἐνεκεν, αἵτις δὲ τοῦ εἶναι τὴν διὰ πάντα εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, αἴτιον καὶ αἱ πρώται κοινότητες· τέλος γὰρ αὐτῶν εὐδαιμονία, ἡ δὲ πρώτη τέλειος ἐστὶν· οὗτοι γὰρ ἐλευθέρων ἐστί τῇ γένεσιν τελευθεύουσι, ταύτης φανερὸν εἶναι φύσιν εἶναι ἐλευθέρων, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστος οἰκίας (cf. below § 27).

² Aristotle therefore condemns the indiscriminate treatment of prisoners of war as slaves (Pol., 1255 a, 24, τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀπώριον δουλεύειν ὁδοῦναι δὲ φαίνεται εὐδαιμονία εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, συμβήσεται τοῖς εὐγενεστάτοις εἶναι δουλεύειν καὶ τοὺς δουλοῦντας, οὐδὲ συμβῆναι πρὸς τὴν ἀφαιρέσειν. διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν βούλονται λέγειν δουλοῦντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. αὐτοὶ οὖν ταῦτο λέγουσι, οὐδὲν ἄλλο συγγένειαν ἢ τὴν φύσιν δουλοῦντας.

§ 17. There is another mistaken view of the identification of Ethics and Politics which we have to guard against. We feel that somehow the ideal of a community is not always the same as that of the individuals who compose it. It may occasionally be higher, as most Greeks would have said was the case at Sparta; usually it is a good deal lower. Now Aristotle was keenly alive to this fact and the problems to which it gives rise. To the Greeks such questions were apt to present themselves in a personal form—a peculiarity which saved them from much confused thinking—and Aristotle therefore asks himself "Is the good man the same as the good citizen?" The answer which he gives to this is quite clear. The good man and the good citizen are not the same except in the case of the man who is leading the highest life in the ideal state.¹ Here we certainly have no lowering of the moral ideal to suit the middling practice of the ordinary state; for we may make our ideal state as ideal as we please. The only thing we must insist on is that, except in a community of some kind, man can never be complete, can never be all that he has it in him to be.

¹ Cf. EN., 1130 b, 26-27, with the notes, and the full discussion in *Politics*, 1276 b, 15-23. Newman's *Politics*, vol. 1, pp. 234-239.

§ 18. Aristotle then, was quite aware of the fact that the ideal was nowhere realised and he knew that, as things were, there was a discrepancy between individual and social morality. But he did not separate Ethics and Politics because he did not despair yet of the Greek city-state. No one who reads these lectures can doubt that they were delivered as a serious contribution to the realisation of the ideal state as Aristotle conceived it. There is a hopeful tone in all he says which shows he really thought the thing could be done if only people would go about it in the right way. He is no idle speculator, but a man in all earnestness making practical proposals which he has hopes of getting adopted. We feel the contrast between this and the far less sanguine view that was natural to Plato's deeper nature. The fact is that Aristotle with all his intellectual greatness, was a child to his

master in the understanding of human life. On the other hand, it may be noted that his strong sense of reality prevented him from ignoring altogether, as Plato was sometimes apt to do, the relative worth of the various imperfect ideas realised by the Hellenic states as he found them, and this enabled him to become the founder of Politics in the modern sense of the word.

§ 19 It is only another consequence of the personal way in which such problems presented themselves to the Greek mind that the question of how to save the city state took the shape "How can we best train a lawgiver?" The whole course of Greek history illustrates the importance of personality. The laws of most states had been framed by legislators whose names were known, and where none was known a mythical one was soon invented. This was the only form in which a Greek could imagine a reformation, and we need not wonder if Aristotle thought he might be able to train a new Solon. The discovery of the long-lost "Constitution of the Athenians" has proved that the historical works of Aristotle were composed with the same idea. They were no mere collections of facts on which a generalisation of purely scientific importance might be based, but also political pamphlets intended to commend certain definite views to practical statesmen. As it has been well put by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, 'Aristotle wished to train a generation that should be enabled, by insight into the nature and end of the state and into the forms it assumes to have a practical effect in the right sense among the thousandfold different conditions which the Hellenic states presented....To this task he addressed his efforts, and he thought not a little of his performance!'

The strange thing is, as has often been pointed out, that Aristotle, himself a man without a city and closely connected with the Macedonian court, should never have suspected that the days of the city state were numbered and that the Diadochoi were creating a new political unity, the Empire, which was not indeed to reach its full developement on Greek

son but was to act as the most powerful of the influences that led an Italian city-state to become the capital of the world.

¹ *Ar. Metaph. and Athen.*, vol. 1, p. 361.

VI.

§ 20 The question of method is always vital to Aristotle, and he seems to have found his hearers very deficient in a due sense of its importance. He complains in one place that people dislike any method of exposition they are not accustomed to, and mean by intelligible no more than familiar. It is just the same as with the ancient laws, which are often childish, but have been sanctified by long custom. Thus it is that some will not listen to a lecture unless it is put into mathematical form, while others demand examples and illustrations, and others again require the evidence of some poet. One class want everything put with minute exactitude; others are annoyed by precision, either because they are incapable of connected thought, or because they think it is mean and petty. There is something about it, in philosophy as well as in business, that repels them. What is wanted to remedy all this is Culture. We cannot be always looking for the method of knowledge and for knowledge itself at the same time. Neither is easy to find. It is clearly necessary, then, that we should have some preliminary training in these matters, so that we may know where we are entitled to demand mathematical precision and where anything of the sort would be entirely out of place¹.

¹ Μετὰ γὰρ 2, 3 αὐτὸ ἀρκεῖται κατὰ τὴν 1^{ην} συνθετικὴν· ὡς γὰρ εἰπωμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἐξήκοντο λέγεσθαι, οὐκ ἐν παντί ταῦτα οὐκ ὀρθῶς φαίνεται ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐκτενέστερον ἀπαιτούμενην καὶ ἐκτενέστερον τὴν γὰρ συνθετὴν γρηγορώτερον, ἢ ἡλικίαν δ' ἡλικίαν ἔχει τὸ εὐνοεῖν εἰ δοκῇ δηλοῦναι, ἐν οἷς τὰ μαθητῶν καὶ παιδαγωγῶν μέτρον λαμβάνεται· γρηγορώτερον περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ εἶδος· οἱ μὲν οὖν, ὡς καὶ μαθηματικῶν λόγων, οὐκ ἀπαρτίζονται τῶν λογισμῶν, οἱ δ' ἴσως καὶ μαθηματικῶν, οἱ δὲ μαθητῶν ἀπαιτοῦνται ἐκτενέστερον· καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀκριβῶς, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς τὸ ἀκριβές εἰς τὸ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συστήνεται ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν. ἔχειται γὰρ τὸ ἀκριβές τιμωρὸν, ὡς καὶ εἰρηστέον ἐν τῷ παιδαγωγίᾳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελευθερότερον εἶναι τισὶ δοκεῖ. οἱ δὲ συστατικῶν καὶ συστατικῶν ἀπαιτοῦνται, καὶ ἀπαιτοῦνται ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδέτερον ὀρθῶς λαμβάνεται, τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τῇ μαθηματικῇ καὶ τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ ἐκτενέστερον, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ μὴ ἐκτενείᾳ ὄλην.

§ 21 We see that Aristotle calls this preliminary training *paideia*. This word in the fourth century B.C. was very commonly contrasted with *τέχνη*, to express the idea of culture as opposed to professional knowledge or skill. It was the proudest boast of Isokrates that he, alone among the teachers of his time, kept this end steadily in view for to him it seemed that Plato and Aristotle taught a mere specialism, and that of no very exalted kind. In the *Protagoras* of Plato the young Hippokrates actually blushes at the suggestion that he is going to take lessons with any other view than to get that unprofessional culture which alone becomes a gentleman. It is clear, however, that Aristotle means something far more definite than this. With him the man of culture is above all things the arbiter of method. He is the judge of how much precision is fairly to be expected in any inquiry (*EN.* 1094 b, 23), and in the *Metaphysics* we are told that it shows want of culture not to know what can be demonstrated and what can not¹.

The clearest account of the matter, however, is to be found in a remarkable passage at the beginning of the treatise on the *Parts of Animals*. There we read that there are two ways of possessing any science whether it be humble or exalted, one of which may be called knowledge of the subject and the other a sort of culture. It shows culture to be able to form a right judgment instinctively as to where the speaker's exposition of a subject is methodically correct and where it is amiss. This is general culture, the power of judging all scientific method correctly. But there is another kind of culture which has to do with some definite part of knowledge only. In Natural History as in other branches of study there is a culture of this kind which enables us to approve or condemn the form of the exposition quite apart from the question of the truth or falsehood of the matter².

We have to do, then, with two distinct kinds of culture, general and special, and we must ask what precisely each of these is. Now there is a passage in the *Metaphysics* where want of culture is identified with ignorance of "*Analytics*."

This seems to be the key. Giphanius said long ago "*Vocat ille $\pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ habitum quendam recte iudicandi de rebus omnibus quod docet doctrina Analytica, contra $\alpha\pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$ contrarius ab illo habitus dicitur, hoc est ignotatio doctrinae Analyticae.*" This is quite correct, for "general culture" is evidently what we call Aristotelian Logic, a knowledge of which is, therefore, essential to a right understanding of the Ethics.

But, in addition to this, Aristotle demands a special kind of culture from the student of Politics, just as he demanded a special culture from the student of Natural History. In the Politics we are told that, just as a doctor must render his account to doctors, so must all others be judged by their peers. But by a doctor we mean not only the practitioner, but also the architectonic doctor and thirdly the man of culture; for, we are told, there are people of that class in nearly all the arts. We must allow the right of judgment to men of culture as fully as to men of knowledge.

The kind of culture referred to here is clearly not Aristotelian Logic. The "architectonic" doctor is the great physiologist or pathologist, to whom the practitioner is related as the builder is to the architect, and the man of culture must be the man who has an intelligent, but non-professional knowledge of medicine, enough let us say to know a quack when he sees one. Just so in Politics. The architectonic politician is, as we have seen already, the lawgiver, the "practical politician" corresponds to the medical practitioner, and the man of culture to the citizen who, without necessarily taking an active part in political life, can form an intelligent judgment on political questions, and who knows what sort of treatment is applicable to so complex a thing as human society. Just as the man of medical culture will see at once through the quack's nostrum, even though he may be unable to justify his rejection of it on scientific grounds, so the man of whom we are speaking will at once distrust any talk upon such subjects which seems to suggest that good citizens can be made by theoretical instruction in the duties of citizenship, and any attempt to regulate the

state on the basis of rigid and abstract formulas like the axioms of the mathematician.

¹ Mot. 100b 2, ὁ δὲ αἰσῶνι δὴ καὶ τούτῳ (the principle of causality) ἀποδεικνύεται τινὲς δι' ἀπαδείξεωσιν ἔσθαι γὰρ ἀπαδείξεωσιν τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκειν τίς τινος δεῖ γίγναι ἀποδείξεωσιν καὶ τινὸς οὐ δεῖ.

² Παρ. Αἰ. β' γ' α, ε' λέγει πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινωτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, διὸ φανόντες πάντες τῇ δέξει εἶναι, ὡς τῇ μὲν ἐπιστήμῃ τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τῇ δ' αἰὼν σοφίας τινι περὶ λαμβάνειν γὰρ ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸν τρόπον τὸ δινασθαι κρίναι ἐκτόχως τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδείξεωσιν οὐ λεγόντων. τοιαῦτα γὰρ δὴ τινὰ καὶ τὸν ὁλῶς πεπαιδευμένον οἴμεθ' εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδευσθαι, τὴ διανοικταί τοιόν τι ἐκρημένον. πλὴν τοῦτο μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἴπωσι κριτικὸν εἶναι νομίζοντες εἶναι τοῦ ἀμείνου βίου, τὸν δὲ περὶ τινος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένην εἶναι γὰρ ὅτι τις ἴστωσι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ εἰρημένῳ διακειμένους περὶ μέγιστον. ὥστε δηλονότι ἐστὶ καὶ τῇ περὶ φύσιν ιστορίᾳ δεῖ τινὰς ὁπαρχίας ἔχειν τοιαύτους, πρὸς οὓς ἀναφέροντες ἀποδείξεωσιν τὸν τρόπον τῶν θεωρημάτων, χωρὶς τοῦ πᾶσι ἔχειν ταυθεῖαι, οἷον οὕτως εἶναι ἄλλως.

³ Mot. 100g h, γ' δι' ἀπαδείξεωσιν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν νοήτων δοῦναι.

⁴ Col. 12k 2, ε' ὥστερ' αὖτε ἰατροὶ δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύναις ἃν ἰατροὶ, οὐκ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἰατροὶ δ' ὅτε δημιουργοὶ καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην εἶσι γὰρ τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσης ὡς εἴπωσι καὶ τέχνης ἀποδείξεωσιν δεῖ τοῦ αἰσῶνι πᾶσι γίγναι τῇ πεπαιδευμένῳ ὅτι τοῖς εἰδῶσι

VII.

§ 22. The first lesson we have to learn from our man of culture is that every science must have a starting-point (*ἀρχή*). Geometry, for instance, starts from certain definitions and axioms which define the nature of space, and we must have a similar starting-point for Politics.

From what has been said as to the nature of practical science, however, it follows that the starting-point of Politics will be a definition, not of something that is, but of something that is to be. It will not resemble the definitions from which deductive geometry starts, but rather the enunciation of a problem in geometrical construction, what in the older Greek geometry was called a *ὑπόθεσις*¹. Now the method by which we solve a problem of this kind is analysis, that is to say, we assume that the construction is made, and then ask what are the conditions of its being made until we come to something that is in our power, just as in a theoretical analysis we go on until we come to something we know to be true.

In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle gives us an example of a theoretical analysis. Figures are resolved by making actual the divisions into other figures which are there potentially. If they were already actually divided the proof would be plain; as it is we must make a construction which is always in the long run some form of division. For instance why are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? It is because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If the line parallel to the side were already drawn, the truth would be plain at first sight. Again, why is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? It is because, if you have three lines, the two segments of the base and the perpendicular raised on the centre, and if you know the previous proposition, the thing is clear at first sight.

The theoretical sciences cannot prove their starting-points or first principles. In the long run these must simply be perceived, and it is equally true that the practical sciences cannot deliberate about the end which forms their starting-point. The reason is that analysis, whether it takes the form of demonstration or deliberation, has to do only with the series of middle terms which appear in the theoretical sciences as causes, in the practical sciences as means. For instance, if we have to "demonstrate" an eclipse of the moon, we do so by finding the middle term *ἀντίρροπος γῆς*, and when we have found this, we know the cause of the eclipse. In the same way, if we have to deliberate about health, we do so by seeking for middle terms or "means" till we come to one that it is in our power to produce. And, on this side too we are dependent on a simple "perception" or "intuition." If we are analysing a rectilinear figure, we simply "perceive" that triangles are the ultimate figures into which we can analyse it, a perception which is really identical with that of the axiom that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. So too in practice. An act is always a particular act, and no particular can ever be reached by a process of reasoning. We simply "see" that this particular act which is within our power is a case of the general rule which we have found by deliberation. The whole process of analytic deliberation has

to do only with the middle terms which are intermediate between the definition of the end to be attained and the particular act, which is also an object of simple intuition. We start from an "immediate proposition" (*ἄμεσος πρότασις*), that is, a proposition which does not admit of any middle term between its subject and its predicate¹, and we end with a particular act, which in turn cannot be connected with the rule under which it falls by a middle term. At each end of the scale we are dependent on immediate perception.

¹ The precise significance of *ἐνδοξον* is *δ' ἐπιδόξαι* i.e. that which one sets before oneself as a thing to be done or proved; for the meaning of *ἐπιδόξαι* is not very different from that of *προτίθεσθαι*. The *ἐνδοξον* is properly the *Q.A.D.* or *Q.B.D.* of a geometrical problem. It is a conclusion assumed for purposes of analysis to be true, or an end assumed for purposes of demonstration to be realized. The method and terminology are alike Platonic, though in the Sixth Book of the *Republic* Plato insists that knowledge in the highest sense cannot be of this character, but must deduce everything from the form of the Good. The analytic method proceeds *ἐξ ἐπιδόξεων οὐκ ἐκ' ἀρχῆς ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτῇ* (410 b), the true method would not regard these *ἐπιδόξεις* as *ἀρχαί*. It is evidence of the Academic origin of the theory that we have in [Plat.] *Def.* 4.18 *ἡ ἐπιδόξις ἀρχὴ ἀνωδοκίαν*. See Jewett and Campbell's *Republic*, vol. II, pp. 333-334.

Met. 1035 a, 21 *ἐπιδόκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐντροχίᾳ διαιρούμεν γὰρ εὐμετρίαν. εἰ δ' ἢ διηρημένα, φανερόν ὅτι ἢ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιτρέχει διαίρεσις. διὰ τί δύο ὄντας τὸ ἐρίγωνον. ὅτι αἱ περὶ αὐτὰς στήλῃς ἢ γωνίαι ἴσαι διὰ ὁμοίας. εἰ οὖν αὐτὰς ἢ παρὰ τὴν πλευρὰν, ἴδοντι ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῦ δὴλον. διὰ τί ἢ ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὁρθὴ καθύλου. διότι αὐτὸ ἴσαι γωνίαι. ἢ τὰ βάσις δύο καὶ ἢ ἐὰ μέρους ἐπισταθεῖας ὁρθῇ, ἴδοντι ὁρθὴν τὴν ἐκείνην αἰδόντι.*

² *An.* *Post.* 93 a, 30 *ἐκλείπει ἑφ' οὗ τὸ Δ, σελήνη δ' ὡς Γ, ἀντίφραξις γὰρ ἑφ' οὗ Β. 1b. 25 b, 23 ἀποδείξις μὲν ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς δεκτικὸς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί. Met.* 1041 a, 10 *σητεῖται δὲ τὸ διὰ τί καὶ αἰτίαν. ἀπὸ εἰ ἄλλο ἄλλω τινὶ ἐπιδόκει. An.* *Post.* [loc. cit.] *ἔπει δὲ ἐπιτετασθαι εὐδοκίαν ὅταν εἰδόμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, αἰτία, δὲ τέτταρες, ... πᾶσαι αἰτίαι διὰ τοῦ μέσου δεικνύμεναι.*

³ See *FR.* 1127 b, 28-29 q, quoted on pp. 323-24. Cf. *Met.* 1032 b, 18 *καὶ δὲ γενέσθων καὶ κινήσων ἢ μὲν νοήσει καλεῖται (the deliberative analysis), ἢ δὲ ποιήσεως, ἢ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ εἶναι (the ἐπιδόξις consisting of a formal cause or definition) νόησις, ἢ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου τῆς νοήσεως (the ὁρατός or ἡ ἀποδείξις) ποιήσις. λέγω δ' αἶον εἰ ὁργανικήν, δὲ ὁμαλυσμένην. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμαλυνθῆναι τοῦ. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν εἰ θερμανθῆσθαι. τούτου δὲ τί ἐστι; τοῦ. ἐπιδόκει δὲ τοῦ διειδέμεν τοῦτο δ' ἦδη ἐκ' αὐτοῦ.*

⁴ Cf. *EN.* 1145 a, 28 n. The passage, which has caused some difficulty, is well elucidated by Gomizand, *Aristoteles und die Mathematik*, pp. 59-60. The *πρῶτον μαθηματικὸν σχῆμα*, into which all recalcitrant figures could be resolved, was the triangle. Cf. *Met.* 1054 a, 3 *καὶ εἰ σχήματα εὐκλείδειον (i.e. τὰ ὄντα ἢ), σχημάτων δὲ τὸ ἀριθμῶδες καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ τριγώνῳ. De An.* 414 b, 21 *ὅτι γὰρ ἐκείνῳ σχήματι ποιεῖ τὸ τριγώνον ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐπιζῆναι κυμακλήριον δ' ἔχει τὴν περὶ τούτου*

σχῆμα καὶ ὁ κατὰ ψαλμὸν καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔφεστι παρὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ πρότερον ἐπὶ
τῷ αὐτῷ σχῆματι ἡ ἀρχὴ, τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, ὅθεν ἐκ τούτων τῶν τριῶν αἰ. λ.

[illegible]

§ 23 How then do we know these "first principles," these ultimate definitions from which every science must start? The answer given by Aristotle in the *Ethics* (1098 b. 3) is that some are apprehended by means of induction (*ἐπαγωγή*), some by perception (*αἰσθήσεις*), and some by "habitation" (*ἐπιτηδεύειν*). It is by perception or intuition that the first principles of mathematics, for instance, are apprehended. The definition of a triangle is reached simply by looking at a triangle. No one can prove to us that a figure with three angles will also have three sides; we must simply see that for ourselves. If we cannot imagine a triangle, no one can help us to do so. When, however, we have once got the definition, we can go on to demonstrate mediate propositions about triangles to any extent by finding middle terms which lead to new conclusions. This process is analysis, but without the definition of the triangle as a starting-point we should have nothing to analyse.

In most cases, however, the subject is more complex, and a single act of intuition does not suffice to make the definition clear to us. In such cases we must be made to see the truth of the immediate proposition by being called upon to recognise it in a number of instances adduced for the purpose. It is this process which Aristotle calls *ἐπαγωγή*, a word which literally signifies the citation of witnesses in a court of law. It is not a method of proof; for the propositions which we arrive at by its help are not capable of proof in the proper sense of the word. It is simply a way of making us see for ourselves what we cannot know in any other way. If we have not the "sense" to see the truth of an immediate proposition

for ourselves, no number of instances will make us sure of it, and this is what Aristotle means when he says *νοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν*, and identifies *νοῦς* with *αἰσθησις*, which is the most general term for immediate perception whether sensuous or intellectual¹.

But there are still more complicated cases, and these include, for reasons we shall see presently, the greater part of human affairs, which require something more than this inductive process, the chief sphere of which is the study of nature. The operations of nature are always in the same direction, whereas human action is always the result of a capacity of opposites, and therefore implies a choice between alternatives. Now, if we are to see for ourselves the first principle of which all human action ought to be the application, we must be habituated in such a way as always to choose the right alternative of the two which are possible in every act. If we were habituated in such a way as always to choose the wrong alternative, we should arrive at some sort of a first principle too, but it would be a false one; while if we were to choose now the one and now the other, our "moral sense" would be blunted and confused. And this explains why we must attend to the unproved statements and beliefs of experienced and elderly people (1143 b, 11). Their experience has given them an eye for such things and they see aright. But we must remember also that it is the "eye" and not the experience that really secures the truth of these statements. The first principles of the science of human conduct are as incapable of demonstration as those of any other science. They too must in the long run be "perceived" immediately, and if we cannot see them for ourselves, no one can make us see them.

¹ This is the *ἐπιστημονικὴ αἰσθησις* of Speusippos, ἡ μεταλαμβάνουσα τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας (Sext. Math. vii, 145). Cf. EN. 1042 a, 27, where it is contrasted with ἡ τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθησις and compared with the perception of the "common sensibles," i.e. those *αἰσθητά* which are not the object of any special

VIII

§ 24 Assuming, then, that the necessary habitation has been secured, how are we to get at the starting-point of our science in a form that admits of deliberative analysis? In other words, how are we to find the definition of the Good for Man? The answer is that we must adopt the method of *Dialectic*. The word *διαλεκτική* properly means nothing more than the art of dialogue or discussion: it signifies the theoretical formulation of the practice of Sokrates. Little as we know with certainty of the teaching of the historical Sokrates, we do know very accurately the method which he adopted. It was to make people see the truth by talking to them, to elicit by means of question and answer that knowledge which they possessed without being clearly conscious of it, the truth which was in them already in the sense that they could be made to see it as soon as it was put before them in a clear and distinct way. Plato developed this method and, by the help of the theory of Reminiscence, made *Dialectic* the science of the Forms or "Ideas." In his hands it became the only instrument of all philosophical thinking, the ideal of a completed science. To this Aristotle could not agree. A dialectic proof was to him no proof at all, for it had no middle term¹. It could not be the right instrument for arriving at mediate propositions, for we can only be said to know these in the true sense of the word when we know them as the conclusions of a syllogism. This was Aristotle's contribution to Logic, and he is never weary of showing us that the syllogism is the only adequate form for the mediate truths of science. But it remains as true for him as it was for Plato that the dialectic method is the only way of arriving at immediate propositions, propositions which can have no middle term between their subject and their predicate, and we have seen that it is from such propositions that all science must start.

¹ The truth of the dialectic method as employed by Plato is just that it represents mediate truth in a form which is only right for immediate. Cf. *An. Pr.*

46 a. 31 ὅτι δ' ἡ διὰ τῶν γενῶν διαίρεσις ἴσα ἐν Plato's *Sophist and Statesman*) μικρὰ τι κέρειν ἔστι τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου, ρῆθιον ἰδεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ διαίρεσις οἷον ἀσθενὴς συλλογισμὸς· ὁ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ διζῆαι αἰετῶσαι, συλλογίζεται δὲ δεῖ τι τῶν θανάτων· ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν, ὅταν δεῖ τι συλλογισσάσθαι νύκαρχειν. δεῖ τὸ μέσον, δι' οὗ γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμὸς, καὶ ἥττον δεῖ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀσθενῶν τοῦ πρώτου τῶν ἀκρων. ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις ταύτα πάντως βούλεται· τὸ γὰρ καθόλου λαμβάνει μέσον.

§ 25 Dialectic is the subject of that part of the *Organon* called the *Topics*, and it is there that we shall find the theoretical justification of the method employed in the *Ethics*. The object of the science, we are told, is to enable us to draw conclusions from received beliefs on any subject that may be proposed. The dialectic syllogism differs from the demonstrative syllogism in having for its premisses, not scientific truths but received beliefs. These beliefs are those either of the majority or of the wise. It is useful to cultivate this science first as an intellectual exercise, secondly as a preparation for discussions with those who do not accept our premisses, and it has a place even in sciences that admit of philosophic treatment. If we are able to raise all the difficulties on both sides, we shall more easily distinguish truth from error. But above all it is of use for the discovery of the first principles or starting-points of the different sciences, since it is impossible for any science to give an account of its own starting-point. That can only be discussed in the light of received beliefs on the subject. This, then, is the proper function of dialectic, which is a method of examination and affords a path to the first principles of all the sciences¹.

We begin, then, by "taking" (*λαμβάνειν*)² premisses from the beliefs of the many and the wise to serve as premisses (*ἐξέδοξο, προτάσεις*)³. But our attitude towards these beliefs is by no means uncritical. We start from them, indeed, but we at once go on to raise all the difficulties which they suggest. As a general rule, we find that they are contradictory, and when we find such a contradiction between received beliefs, we have what is called an *ἀπορία* (literally "no thoroughfare"). Our thought is, as it were, fettered and we are obliged to look for some means of freeing it from its

chains. The technical name for a pair of contradictory $\epsilon\rho\theta\omicron\zeta\alpha$ is $\pi\rho\acute{o}\theta\nu\eta\mu\alpha$ and the solution of it is called the $\lambda\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$.

Our belief in the possibility of solving the contradictions between $\epsilon\rho\theta\omicron\zeta\alpha$ depends upon the conviction that neither the masses of men from ancient times down to the present nor the great thinkers of mankind are likely to be altogether wrong. We usually find that if we develop their beliefs by criticism, if we make them "take a step further" ($\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\delta\iota\alpha\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\epsilon$), they come into agreement readily enough. "It is of advantage," we read in the *Metaphysics*, "to advance step by step to what is more known," that is, more known "by nature." "It is thus that all learning takes place, by an advance from what is less known by nature to what is more so. This is our real task, to turn what is more known to us into what is more known by nature, just as in action it is to turn what is good for us into what is good universally. What is first known to a given person is often very falsely known, but for all that it is from things known to oneself, however inadequately that we must try to apprehend universal knowledge, shifting our ground and advancing step by step, as has been said, through these very things."

The task of the dialectician, then, is to draw on the opposing parties to a consciousness of their real meaning, and thus to make them see their fundamental agreement. It is to lead them on, to use a phrase which has strangely been called "Eudemian," but which is really Platonic, from what is "true but not clear" to what is "true and clear." This he does by assailing these beliefs ($\epsilon\mu\chi\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\epsilon$) from a number of positions or points of vantage ($\tau\omicron\pi\omicron\iota$), which are applicable to every kind of subject, the positions of "the more and less," "the essential and the accidental," and so forth, which the skilled dialectician is always ready to occupy. They are in fact a number of ways in which the beliefs under discussion can be qualified so that the contradiction, which only arises from their being stated without qualification, will disappear.

It is sometimes said that the method just described amounts to taking our first principles on trust; but this criticism leaves out of account the other side of the doctrine,

namely that the ἀρχὴ is really apprehended immediately. To this extent we must always remember that Aristotle is a convinced "intuitionalist" in the true sense of that much abused word. Just as we must simply see by "looking at it" that a figure with three sides will have three angles, so in the long run we must simply "see" the truth of our definition of the Good for Man. But that is no reason for refusing the help of any method that will put us in a position to see more easily what is too complex a thing to be grasped at once like the axioms of geometry. Our belief in the truth of this definition rests on no other ground than our conviction of these axioms and if any one chooses to deny it, we can have nothing further to say to him. We cannot prove it to him; he can only be converted, as Eudemos says, by the experience of advancing years or by being put under restraint. (EE. 1214 b, 28 sqq.)

¹ Top. 101 a, 23 ἐπομένον δ' ὅτι διὰ τοῖς εἰρημέναις εἰπέειν πρὸς πόσα τε καὶ τίνα χρῆται ἡ πραγματεία. ὅτι δὴ πρὸς τρία, πρὸς γυναικας αἰ, πρὸς τὰς τέχναις, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμης· ὅτι μὴ οὐ πρὸς γυμνασίας χρῆται, ἐξ αἷμας πασιφανές ἐστι· μεθόδω γὰρ ἔχοντες ἴδμεν περὶ τοῦ προτελλέμενου διαχειρῆσθαι διανοομένα. πρὸς δὲ ὅς ἐπεξεργεί, βίβη· τὰς τῶν πολλῶν κατηγορημάτων δοῦναι οὐκ ἐν τῶν αλλοτρῶν ἀλλ' ἐν τῶν οἰσίων δογμάτων ομιλήσαντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς, μεταβαλλόμενοι εἰς τὸ ὅτι δὴ μὴ ἐλλὴν φανώμεται· λέγειν ἡμῖν πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμης, ὅτι δινοόμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα διακορήσαι ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κατονομάμεθα τὰ λεγόμενα τε καὶ τὰ γενομένα· ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἐκείνην ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν, ὅς μιν γὰρ τῶν οἰσίων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτελλέμεν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀδυνατοῦν αἰσῶν τε περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ δὲ πρῶτοι αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀπαιτῶν ἐσὶν, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἐκείνην ἐπιστήμην ἀσέβησιν συμ-
αδῶν διελέειν. τοῦτο δ' ἴδιον ἡ μέγιστα οἰκίον τῇ διαλεκτικῇ ἐστὶν· ἐπεὶ αὐτῇ γὰρ οὐσα πρὸς τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχαὶ εἶδεν ἔχει.

² The use of λαμβάνειν as a technical term of dialectics in Platonic and Aristotle is derived from the current phrase λόγον λαμβάνειν παρὰ τινος. See note on Aristotle's introduction to the *Topica* (Top. 101 a, 21), λαμβάνειν ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως (Top. 103 a, 9). Cf. also Aristotle's use of λαμβάνειν in the *Metaphysics* (Met. 101 a, 21). The *Topica* is a treatise on the art of dialectics, and the *Topica* is a treatise on the art of dialectics.

³ Cf. EN. 1028 b, 27. Top. 100 b, 21 ἐνδοξόν δὲ τὰ δοκούντα πᾶσι ἢ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ οὕτως ἡ πίστις ἢ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς γινώσκουσιν αὐτὰ ἐνδοξα. The name of an *endoxon* πρότασις is the verb δοκέω "to believe" "to think," which must always be carefully distinguished from φαίνομαι "to appear" "to seem." (Cf. Boetius, *In*. 203 a, 27 "unde docet, deinde etiam inquit in ordinibus quibus communis hominum sensus comprehenditur τὰ δοκούντα ἢ τὰ ἐνδοξα, τὰ φαινόμενα".)

* In some cl. 15, 16 a 22 and the notes. A syllable (συνέλλω) is derived from a compound (συνελλω) in form of σ.σ.σ. cl. 17 101 b, 29. The best commentary on the term λυσις is by Henry Heide (15 Dec. 1961).

* This conviction of Amalek's guilt through expressed in such passages as Ps. 136 b, 33 where it is written we had to have mercy on them. It is common from Psalms, Leviticus 24 b, Deuteronomy 25 c, etc., etc., etc.

[illegible]

² Ημε αληθείς μὲν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς σφαιροῖς ἐλθόντες ἐγὼ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν. The formula is common = Πᾶσι τὸ ἀληθεύειν διαμαρτυρεῖται. Cf. e.g. P¹²⁸ : γὰρ τὸ μὴ λαχθεῖν ἀληθινόν, οὐ μὴν ἡ σφαῖρα ἀληθεύει. ἐπεὶ ἐν τῇ λέγουσιν μὴ ἂν περ ἀληθείας, οὐ μὴν σφαιρὴ γάρ;

§ 26 Once we have got our definition, however, the procedure becomes quite different. Our analysis of it, though it is deliberative and not demonstrative, will proceed through middle terms and can only be expressed adequately in the form of a series of practical syllogisms. But here again the "man of culture" has an important warning for us. There cannot be more in the conclusion than there is in the premisses. We can make deductions from the axioms with absolute precision, because these axioms are eternal and necessary and even the mediate truths which we derive from them are quite free from matter. But the premisses of practical science are not of this kind. They are statements, not of immutable truth, but simply of what holds good "for the most part," and our conclusions will therefore have the same approximate character. It shows total lack of culture to ask for mathematical accuracy¹ in the discussion of human affairs. That is only to be looked for in sciences which deal with simple and primary truths².

It formed no part of Aristotle's programme to justify this distinction in a course on practical science, but it is really based on metaphysical grounds. We must carefully distinguish two classes of facts which may be the objects of science. First we have those that are of necessity and always,

such as the truths of mathematics. Then there are the things that happen "for the most part" or as a general rule. Thirdly, as this implies exceptions to the rule, there are those things that follow no rule, and are said to happen by "chance." These cannot be the objects of science¹

In the Topics, the fact that reason rules over temper and desire is given as an instance of a thing that is true for the most part, and in the Prior Analytics, the fact that men grow gray². The first is an *ἡθικὴ πρότασις*, the second a *φυσικὴ πρότασις*. Most investigations, we are told, have to do with facts of this kind, and this is especially true of the practical sciences. Rhetoric, for instance, deals with actions (*τὰ πρακτά*), and these all have this character. None of them are necessary, and "things which happen for the most part and admit of being otherwise must be inferred from premisses of a like nature³." This is just the other side of the proposition with which we started above. Again we are told in another passage of the Prior Analytics that "problems as to what is for the most part must be answered from premisses that are true for the most part. The conclusion of each is similar to its starting-point⁴."

From all this it follows that the starting-point of Politics cannot be anything more than a general truth; we cannot hope to find a universal and necessary axiom such as those from which the geometer starts. And it will be absolutely impossible to lay down universal rules of action. Every act is a particular act and for that reason cannot be brought under a universal rule. As in medicine and navigation, we must always take into account the particular circumstances of the case, and these cannot be formulated or predicted⁵.

¹ The words which express the presence or absence of this precision are all metaphors taken from the arts, and this is the primary application of the adjective *ἀκριβής*, though we can only guess what a *κράβης* was. The opposite of *ἀκριβής* is *εὐπύς*, a word which expresses the outline of a solid, as *εὐγράφη* or *παραγραφή* expresses the outline of a plane. As Muretus says, 'quæd in picturæ ὑπογραφή, in sculpsionum simulumque artificum operibus εὐπύς.' The adverb *παχολός* is used of the thick, rough lines of a sketch in contrast with the fine outline of the vessels *στεργασία*. Cf. Plato, *Polit.* 294 c. 295 a, where *τὰν κοττωνῶν παχότατον* is opposed to *ἀκριβὲς* and the verb *λεπτομερῶς*.

X.

§ 28. There is nothing, however, in the conception of the Final Cause to justify us in saying that there is only one end of all existence, a universal good to which all others lead up. On the contrary, we seem rather to see that there are very many different forms, each of which has its own completion, a stage at which it is full-grown. A plant is complete when it flowers; an animal when it has reached the full stature of its kind, and we do not see that in this they are contributing to the completion of any universal form. There appear to be as many final causes as there are forms capable of completion, and if this is so, we can hardly agree with Plato who held that the Good for Man could not be studied apart from the good for all creatures and of the world as a whole. It follows at once from Aristotle's teleology that the good of each form must be studied by itself.

It must, however, be admitted that this is not exactly the ground on which Plato's universal good is rejected in the *Ethics*. We have instead a number of subtle arguments based on the doctrine of the "Categories" and a few remarks which look like appeals to the prejudices of "common sense." The latter we can understand at once; for it is in accordance with the method of the *Ethics* to go for premisses to the beliefs of the many. But what are we to make of the arguments drawn from the priority of one category to the others and the impossibility of anything being a common predicate in all the figures of predication? Are we to say that Aristotle for once has violated the rules of his own method and argued directly from his own scientific premisses, and then not even from those that really determined his views?

To understand this point, it is necessary to be quite clear as to what these "categories" are, a subject upon which much new light has recently been thrown. There are various names for the categories, but the most correct and technical is *αἰρέματα τῆς κατηγορίας*, 'figures of predication.' The most obvious way of interpreting this term is to look at it in

the light of the analogous phrase σχήματα τοῖ συλλογισμῶν or "figures of inference." Now what the figures of the syllogism really give us is the different relations in which two terms can stand to a third or "middle" term, and it would therefore seem natural that the figures of predication should give us the various relations that can exist between a subject and a predicate. The analogy is not quite perfect, however; for we should rather expect in that case to find the categories or "predicaments" identical with the "predicables," namely genus, species, property and accident, whereas they are really such things as quality, quantity and relation. This little discrepancy, we may note at once, is suggestive of a non-Aristotelian origin for the doctrine.

The whole theory, as Apelt has shown¹, is intended to solve the difficulties about predication which had caused so much trouble to "the more recent of the ancients," as Aristotle calls them. They were disturbed by the thought that a thing might turn out to be both a one and a many, and resorted to various devices to avoid this. Some, like Lycephron, abolished the "is" (the copula), some altered the form of speech and said ἀνθρώπος λευκώταται, to avoid having to admit the proposition ἄνθρωπός ἐστι λευκός, which seems to violate the principle of contradiction. Man is man and white is white, and we must not say that man is white. Now all these difficulties arise from a confusion between what we may call the substantial, the qualitative, the quantitative judgment and the rest. When we say that Koriskos is musical we are not making the same kind of judgment as we make when we say that Koriskos is in the Lykeion or that Koriskos is sitting. We can quite well ask what Koriskos is, what he is like, how tall he is, and what he is doing, without implying that he "is" anything else than Koriskos. In this sense, the), Koriskos is a "one and a many," and the difficulties about predication disappear as soon as we recognize that it has many forms.

All these difficulties, however, were very ancient history indeed by Aristotle's time, and we can hardly suppose that he invented a theory of categories in order to meet them,

especially as that theory is something of an excrescence alongside of his own characteristic theory of the predicables. Not only so, but by the time Plato wrote the *Philebos*, this particular spectre had been finally laid to rest. This is what Plato himself said about it:—

So.—To say that the many is one and the one many sounds a strange statement, and it is easy to raise objections against anyone who lays down either of these propositions.

Protarchos—Do you mean when anyone says that I Protarchos, who am one by nature, am again quite a number of "ones" and opposite to one another, and puts me down as tall and small and heavy and light and countless other things?

So.—What you ment on Protarchos, are only the vulgar marvels of the one and the many, and practically everyone is agreed now a days that it is better not to meddle with them. They are childish and easy and stand in the way of all reasonable argument¹.

Now, if once we realise the full meaning of this, we shall have no hesitation in admitting with Rose and Gercke² that the table of the categories is not Aristotle's at all, but simply part of his heritage from the Academy, and we shall have no difficulty in accepting the positive statement that Xenokrates reduced the categories to two only, Substance and Relation³. If that is so, we shall see that, in accordance with his method, Aristotle was bound to argue against the Platonic view from some position admitted by the Academy, and that it is this which has prevented him from doing what would doubtless have been more interesting to us, namely, from contrasting his own view of teleology with that of Plato.

Now that we can look at them in this light, the arguments themselves are not nearly so captious and unreal as they might appear at first sight. Aristotle is pointing out a real inconsistency in the Academic position, namely that the theory of the "one and many" is quite inconsistent with the doctrine of "forms," at least in its original shape.

All these arguments depend upon the fundamental position that the categories cannot be reduced either to one another or to any common genus⁴. It may be possible with Xenokrates to reduce all but Substance to the single category of Relation, it may be possible to class them all as accidents of

substance, but there is no common measure of a substance and of a relation or accident. Now the Platonic forms are substances, if they are anything, and cannot have any application beyond the first of the categories. A thing which could be predicated in all the categories can for that very reason have no substantial existence, it can form no true genus. But the form of the Good professes to be just such a common predicate, we say that a thing is good in any category we please, and therefore good is no true universal. In particular it is impossible that the same universal should be predicated of two things, one of which is posterior to the other, for species are never prior or posterior to one another. Now all the other categories are clearly posterior to substance and they cannot therefore be coordinate species of the same genus. This is an *argumentum ad hominem*, certainly, but it goes to the root of the difference between Plato and Aristotle.

¹ O. Apelt, *Beitrage zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, pp. 201, 202.

² Πλάτ. τ. 2: «το θεωρούμενο δὲ εἰσι τοῖς ὑπέρτοι των ἀρχαίων ὅπως μὴ ἀπὸ γένους ὑπὲρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται πολλά. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ ἔστιν ἀνέλκον, ὥσπερ Ἀναξόμαν, οἱ δὲ τῆς φύσεως ἀντιθέτου ὄντος, οἱ οὐκ ἄνθρωποι οὐ λευκοὶ εἰσιν ἀλλὰ λευκώματα, οὐδὲ βαδίζοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίται, ὅσα μὴ ποτε τὸ ἔστι προσάπτοντες πολλά εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἐν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον λεγόμενοι τοῦ τοῦτο ὅ τοι ὄντος. The phrase μοναχῶς λεγόμενον (singly called λεγόμενον) is exactly equivalent to τὸ μὴ κατηγορεῖται κατηγορούμενον. The doctrine of genera was maintained by Aristarchus and the schools of Megara and Eretria.

³ Πλάτ. τ. 4 c 22. «το γὰρ ὅτι τὰ πολλά εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαυμάσιον λέγεται, καὶ πολλὰ ἀφωρροῦνται τῷ τοῦτον σπουδαιότερον τιθεμένων. ΠΡΩ. "Ἀρδὲν λεγέμεναι τίς τις ὅτι Πρωταρχὸν ἐστὶ γενομένη φασὶ πολλοὶ εἶναι τάλιν τοῦτο ἐμὲ καὶ ἐκείνους ἀλλήλους, μάγαν καὶ φαίρον τιθεμένοι καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦρον τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, ΣΩ. Σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πρωταρχε, ἐρησας τὰ θαυμάσιμα των θαυμασίων, ὅτις τίς ἐσσι καὶ πολλά συγκεχυμένα ἀπὸ ὧς ἔπος ἔπεισιν ὅσοι πάντων ἤδη καὶ διὰ των τοῦτων ἀπορροῦσι, ἀνιδρυγῶν καὶ ἡδὴ καὶ σφύδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπέδια ὅποια βαδίζοντες γίγνεσθαι. Plato first published the solution of the problem in Soph. τ. 1 a. 1 c 1, where see Apelt's note. The "category" of πρὸς τίς gives rid of this particular difficulty.

⁴ *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. 17, p. 114.

⁵ Σωφιστικὰ καὶ Κατ. Ν. δὲ τ. 17 b, 26 οἱ γὰρ περὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Λοδάρκου πάντα οὗ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὅτι τίς περιληπτικῶς δοκοῦσι.

⁶ Πλάτ. 200 b, 34 αὐτοὶ δ' ἐπὶ πούτων οὐδὲν ἔστι κοινόν, ὡς φαμέν, δὲ ὅτι τὸδε ὅτι ποσὸν ὅτι ποῦν ὅτι των ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐδέν. Μει. 107 a b, το ἑτερον δὲ τὴν γένει λεγεται καὶ ὅσα καθ' ἑτερον σχῆμα κατηγορεῖται τῷ ὄντι λέγεται.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δὲ ποῖόν τι, τὰ δ' ὡς διήρηται πρότερον οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀναλύεται οὐτ' εἰς ἀλλήλα οὐτ' εἰς ἕν τι. ib. 1070 a, 33 ἀπορήσκει γὰρ ἕν τις πρότερον ἕτεραί ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην δὴ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἁμοίως. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον εἰ ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται τὰ πρὸς τι καὶ ἡ οὐσία. τί οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται; παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὰλλα τὰ κατηγορούμενα οὐδέτις ἐστι κοινόν, πρότερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὡς στοιχεῖον ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ οὐσία στοιχεῖον τῶν πρὸς τι, οὐδὲ τοῦτων οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας.

BOOK I.

HAPPINESS.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. To find the definition which is to be the starting point in our science we must discuss the beliefs of the many and the opinions of the wise (Introd. § 15). Now all are agreed that the Good for Man is Happiness, but there is a great divergence between the many and the wise as to what happiness really means. We must therefore discuss their views, whether these are merely implied in the lives they lead, or formulated as theories of the good. This discussion will show us what sides of the truth each has laid hold of, and the definition of happiness will then emerge.

We need not hesitate to translate the word εὐδαιμονία by the English "happiness," but we must be careful not to ascribe to Aristotle any theory of "Eudaemonism." If we do, we make the mistake of supposing him to be setting up Happiness as the end of life in opposition to some other theory of that end. Now his whole point is that there is no other. Plato and his followers are quite at one with Sardanapallos as to this, and the only question is what we are to understand by it. In popular Greek εὐδαιμονία meant having a good δαίμων, and δαίμων means fortune or luck. Generally speaking then, it meant an abundance of worldly goods, and this sense is given in Aristotle's Rhetoric along with others which seem to come from the Academy.¹ For the Greek philosophers had long been trying to deepen

¹ Rhet. 1360 b. 14 εἶναι δὲ εὐδαιμονία (1) εὐπραγία μὴ ἀρετή, ἢ (2) εὐταπεινὸς βίωσις, ἢ (3) ὁ μὲν δὲ μὴ ἀρετῆς ἀφαιρέσις, ἢ (4) εὐφροσύνη ἀρετῆς.

μᾶλλον καὶ σπουδύτερον περὶ δευδαίμωνος φιλομαχίῃ καὶ πρακτικῇ τοῦτων. These definitions bear the stamp of the Academy. The first is a definition

the significance of the old term. Herakleitos had said "Man's character is his δαίμων," and Demokritos declared that "Happiness lieth not in flocks and herds: the soul is the dwelling-place of the δαίμων." This was of course the view of Plato too, and the final step in the ennoblement of the word was taken by Xenokrates. To him the soul itself was a δαίμων, and the term εὐδαιμονία thus acquired a new shade of meaning².

§ 2. If we look at the lives men lead, we see that they may be reduced to three. First there is the life of pleasure or enjoyment, then there is the life of action, which aims at honour or fame, and there is the life of the spectator, the artistic, scientific or religious life. The first two are easily disposed of, and so is the view which the seeker of honour may readily be made to adopt, that goodness is the real object of his life. A man may be good and never do anything with his goodness, he might as well be asleep or be a vegetable. We are getting nearer the truth, but we have not reached it yet. We are not now in a position to discuss the life of artistic and scientific contemplation, the life of the onlooker, and besides it can hardly be called a popular one; but we shall have to show later on that its aim is not mere amusement. All these views of life, then, are partial; but our definition must do justice to them all. Popular opinion cannot be altogether wide of the mark.

§ 3. Turning next to the opinions of the wise, we are met at once by the Platonic theory of the Good. This we are forced to reject, because it is based upon the impossible idea of a universal good. (Introd. § 28.) But, when we pass on from this, we find that Plato has expressed several views about Happiness which lend themselves to the purposes of our dialectic. For instance, in the *Philebos*, he has made it quite clear that Happiness must be complete, self-sufficient and more worth having than anything else. It must be something which is desired for itself

by *εἰς τὴν μέγα τὴν* (cf. 1146 a, 27 n.). The second is to be explained from [Plato] *Def.* 413 b *αὐτάρκεια τελευτήτης κτήσεως ἀγαθῶν* (cf. Plato, *Philebos* 20 c 11), and the definitions of Speusippus and Xenokrates in note 3). The third is possibly that of Eudoxos, while the fourth alludes to the *δωδεκάηχη δωδεκάς* of Xenokrates (see note 5).

² Herakleitos fr. 121 *ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ δαίμων*. Demokritos fr. 10, 11 (*Νύκτερι*) *εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐν ποταμοῖσι οὐκ ἐν δόδοις ἐν χυνοῖσι· ψυχὴ δαιμόνιος δαίμωνος*. Ar. *Top.* 112 a, 30 *εὐδαιμονία, οἱ δὲ οὗτος δαίμων ὃ σπείδεται καθάπερ Ζηνόκρηντες φησὶν εὐδαιμονία εἶναι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἕκαστος εἶναι δαίμονα*.

and never as a means to something else. We cannot ask the question why we desire to be happy, and if that is so, Happiness cannot be identified with any partial form of life, but only with the good life as a whole.

But what is the good life? Here again the views of Plato help us. In the Republic he has shown that the good life and consequently the happiness of anything is identical with the good performance of its own proper task or function. Accordingly if we wish to find in what a good human life consists we must ask what is the proper function of man. Now man is an animal, a living creature, so his function will be life. But life merely as such cannot be his proper function; for a plant lives as well as a man. Nor can it be merely sentient and appetitive life, for every animal shares in that. The only kind of life which is peculiar to man is the life of rational activity, that is the life which knows the ground (*λογος*) of its activities and can give an account of them (*λογος εχει*).

The Good for Man, then, is to perform this function well, but what do we mean by "well"? We can only mean that the function is performed in such a manner as to exhibit the form of goodness proper to it. To be happy we must, then, be in such a condition that we can perform our proper function well.

§ 4. So far, we are in substantial agreement with the Academy. Spensippus defined Happiness as "the complete or perfect condition of beings in a natural state," and Xenokrates says it is the "possession of our proper goodness along with the power that ministers to it." These definitions are, however, inadequate. If we ask Spensippus whether the good life is best defined as a

¹ The Academic definition of εὐδαιμονία as an εἶδος first appears in Plato's *Timæus* 91 d. *ἡμῶν εὐδαιμονία δὲ οὐ φαίνεται καὶ ἡδονῶν ἀποφάνεσθαι τὴν ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡδονή· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ποιεῖται τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίᾳ τὸ ἀγαθόν.* The definitions of Spensippus and Xenokrates are preserved by Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* II, 21 p. 300 (Pöschger). *Σπευσίππος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶ εἶναι τελειότητα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντος, ἢ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ὃ ἐν ἡμετέρας αἰσθητικῆς μὲν ἀνθρώπου φύσει ἔχει. στοιχειώδης δὲ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ τῇ ἀεχθρίᾳ· εἰς δ' ἀναδραμεῖται*

τῇ εὐδαιμονίας ἀπεργασίᾳ. II, 22 *Ζενοκράτης τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι εἶναι τὴν οὐκ ἐκείνου ἀρετῆς καὶ τῇ ὑπερτερῆς αὐτῇ διδόμεν· εἰς αὐτὴν μὲν ἐν ᾗ γίνεσθαι φαίνεται λόγος τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς δ' ὅτι ὡς τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὡς δὲ εἰς ὅτι μέρος τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας εἰς τὴν καὶ διαθεσὶς καὶ εὐνοίη καὶ σθένος, ὡς τοῦτο αὐτὸ δὲον περὶ ὡς δ' ὡς οὐκ εἶναι αὐτὴν τελειότητα καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.* We cannot understand the dialectic by which Aristotle reaches his own definition without keeping all this clearly before us.

condition or as the activity arising from that condition, he must allow that a life is strictly speaking an activity rather than the condition which gives rise to it. And, if we ask Xenokrates whether he means by Happiness the mere "possession" of goodness or rather its exercise and use, he must certainly admit that he really means the latter.

§ 5 After this discussion, the following definition will appear self-evident. In the first place, Happiness is "an activity of the soul," that is, as we have seen, of that part of the soul which "knows what it is doing" (*λόγον ἔχει*). But not every such activity is related to the function of man, but only good activities. For the purpose of our analysis it will be clearer to express this formally as the differentia, and say "an activity according to goodness." And, if there are more forms of goodness than one, we must say "according to the best and most complete form of goodness." We must add further, since an activity is always something complete, that it must be "in a complete life," meaning by that a life which has developed to its full stature, which has reached the form appointed for it by nature. The body is complete when it has reached the limit which nature fixes for the growth of its species, and the rational soul too is full grown at a certain stage of its development. But we must not imagine that when it has reached this completion, its life comes to an end; that was the mistake made by Solon, who confused the "end" of life in the sense of its full development with the "end" of life in the sense of death. It would be truer to say that life is only beginning when the "end" in the former sense is reached, for now it is a complete or full-grown activity, or, to put the thing in a way which Aristotle is fond of in other connexions, though he does not refer to it here, we are dealing with an activity and therefore we can use the present and the perfect tenses at the same time of the same thing*. Seeing it is such an activity, and we can say "he sees" and "he has seen" and they may both be true. In like manner, Aristotle might have said, we can say of the man who is active according to goodness both *εἶναι* and *εἶβιβῆναι*, for the goodness of his life is fully present in every moment of it. And, in spite of Solon, we may say also *εἶβιωσεται*, for such activities have an element of permanence in

* On this way of expressing the complete presence in any given moment of an *ἐντελέχεια*, cf. 1174a. 13-23 and he notes.

tem, and are not wholly at the mercy of fortune. But we must not push this to an extreme; for an old age like that of Priam or King Lear is possible in a world not wholly independent of chance. The world is such that "on the whole" Happiness once achieved is permanent, but there are exceptions to this just as there are monstrosities and portents in nature.

§ 6. We see, then, that we must allow to a certain extent for chance, and this is precisely what we should expect from the account given above² of the subject-matter of Politics. But that is no reason for identifying happiness with good luck or embodying "external goods" in our definition of it as Xenokrates does. It is, of course, quite clear that Happiness, like everything else in this world, is dependent on certain material conditions, but that is no reason for including those conditions in its definition. It is true that a tragedy, however fine it may be, cannot be produced at all without a chorus and costumes and scenery, but these things are no part of the tragedy itself; they are the province of the choregos and not of the poet. We must admit, then, that Happiness is dependent on something which is not in our power at all, while on the other hand we must refuse to admit that these external conditions are any part of the happiness itself. In this respect the relation of Happiness to external goods is quite different from its relation to pleasure. Pleasure is not something external, but something in the soul itself, and therefore belongs to Happiness not accidentally but essentially. This indeed is the justification of the one-sided popular view that happiness is pleasure, just as the view of men of action that it is honour is fully satisfied by the doctrine that it is an activity according to goodness. For honour implies goodness in the honoured, or the belief in it by those who honour, and is only a secondary end.

We see, then, that the definition we have given meets all the requirements we can fairly make of it, and it can have no other proof than this.

² *Introduct.* § 16.

πρόξενον οἰσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν, πολλὰ γίνεται
 καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἱατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ
 πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. **δοσεῖ** 4
 10 δ' εἰς τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινα δύναμιν—καθάπερ ὑπὸ
 τὴν ἱππικὴν χαλανοποικὴ καὶ δοσεῖ ἄλλαι τῶν ἱππικῶν
 ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ
 τὴν στρατηγικὴν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ'
 ἑτέρας—ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάν-
 15 των ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν
 κἀκείνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς 5
 εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πρῶξεν ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθά-
 περ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

II. Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν δ' δι' αὐτὸ
 βουλόμεθα, τὰλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἑτερον
 20 αἰρούμεθα—πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι

ἑκείνα ναυπηγίας; So *πάσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις* is from *Polit.* 304 a *στρατηγικῇ καὶ πᾶσιν ἡ πολεμικῇ πρᾶξιν*. Eudemus (*loc. cit.*) adds that the purely theoretical problems arising from practical science are to be treated also so far as they are relevant. This is Aristotle's practice too.

§ 4. **δοσεῖ** 4 *κ.τ.λ.* This sentence is an anacoluthon, for *δοσεῖ* δὲ is resumed after an intricate parenthesis by *ἐν ἀπάσαις* δὲ as if *ἐν δοσεῖ* had preceded. This form of anacoluthon is very characteristic of the *akroamatic* style. In the parenthesis itself, as Professor Bywater points out (*Contr.* p. 12), *κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον* introduces the apodictic to *καθάπερ κ.τ.λ.* We might substitute *ὥστε...* *ὅπως* to bring out the sense.

τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. *πρακτικῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν*.

ἐνέμιν, practically equivalent to *τέχνη* or *πρακτικὴ ἐπιστήμη* as in Plato, *Polit.* *loc. cit.* Cf. *Introd.* § 12.

ἄλλαι ἑτέρας. The pronouns are alternated for variety. Cf. 1158 a, 18, 1166 b, 7.

τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν *Introd.* § 13. The term is assumed to be familiar from Plato.

§ 5. *διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ.* In the case of the sciences just mentioned (*ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν*) the end is some *ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*. But the principle just stated will apply also in cases where the end is the *ἐνέργεια* itself. So, at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* it is shown that *σοφία* is *ἀρχὴ σοφιστικῆς* with regard to all sciences, and its end is simply an *ἐνέργεια*. In the *Ethics*, too, we shall find that the end of *σοφία* is 'better' than that of any practical science.

II. § 1 *τῶν πρακτῶν* By *τὰ πρακτὰ* Aristotle means the objects of *πρᾶξις*, the things we do, just as by *τὰ αἰσθητὰ* he means the things we perceive by the senses. For another sense of *πρακτός*, cf. below 106 b, 34.

πρόεισι, impersonal. 'There will be a process *ad infinitum*.' Cf. 1097 b.

13. The phrases *εἰς ἄπειρον ἵκειν*, *πρὸναι*, *τερεῖσθαι*, *βαδίζειν* are opposed to *ἵστασθαι*, *σῆμαι*. Cf. 1142 a, 19n. For the argument, cf. *Introd.* § 17.

εἴη καὶ ματαίαν τὴν δρεξίν.—δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῷ γὰρ
 1 τοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἢ γὰρ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις
 αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπον
 3 ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἢν τιγχανοίμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ' οὕτω,
 πειρατίον τύττω γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίτος 25
 4 τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ δυνάμειον. δόξεις δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης
 5 καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται.

1094 a, 22. EE 1214 b, 6 ἅπαντα τὸν δυνάμενον ζῆν κατὰ τὴν
 αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τὴν σκοπὸν τῶν καλῶς ζῆν, ... πρὸς δὲ ἀπο-
 βλήτων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις, ὡς τό γε μὴ συνετάχθαι τὸν
 βίον πρὸς τὴν εἰλὸς ἀφυσμένη πολλῇ σημείων ἴσθιν.

κατῆν, 'intellectual,' like the *λογική*
 ἀπὸ τῆς II. 49. So often *κατὰ*
εὐχαι, *εὐκαί*, *εὐκαί* and the *ἀδελφὸς*
κατὰ.

ματαίαν, 'in vain.' A thing is
ματῆν, *ματῆν*, which does not attain
 its proper end. So *ματῆν* τὸν νόμον
 — οὐ μὴ ἐστὶν ἐνδοξοῖς: δὲ δὲ οὐδὲ καὶ
 ὁ φῶς αὐτὸς ματῆν ποιῶν (II. 1214
 27 a, 31). We use the word *ματῆν*
 when a thing which has a final cause
 does not attain it. *Πλάτ.* 197 b, 73
σφαιρὸν δὲ τὸ 'ματῆν,' ὅτι λέγεται
 ὅτι μὴ γίνεσθαι τῷ σκοπῷ ἄλλοι καὶ οὐ
 οὐδὲν — ὡς τοῦτο δὲ τὸ 'ματῆν,' τὸ
 περὶ τοῦ ἄλλου σκοπῷ, ὅτι μὴ περὶ τοῦ
 σκοπῷ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐνδοξοῖς.

τάγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. 'the good
 and indeed the best.'

§ 2. ἀρ' οὖν κ. ε. λ. This is one of
 Aristotle's literary passages and is
 reminiscent of Plato and Isocrates.
 Cf. *Isoc.* § 7. Such passages are
 often introduced by the conventional
 ἀρ' οὖν, cf. 1163 a, 16 1164 b, 3.
 1171 b, 29. The subjects discussed
 in this section are, as Diels says, such
 as we should treat in a preface; but
 with Aristotle they "form a resting-
 point after the first fatiguing ascent."

καθάπερ τοξόται κ. ε. λ. This is
 made known both in Plato and Is-
 ocrates. Cf. *Rep.* 519 c *οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ*

βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐκείνους τοξοφύλους
 ἀπὸ πάντων πραγμάτων δὲ ἂν πραγματεύων
 ὅλα τε καὶ δημοσιᾶ. *Ερ.* ad *Isoc.*
Isoc. § 10 τοῦτων μὲν τὸν τρόπον
 ζητοῦντες καὶ φιλοσοφῶντες, ὥστε
 οὐκ οὐκ αὐτῶν σπουδάζουσιν τῇ ψυχῇ,
 καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτελεῖσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος.
 Cf. *Isoc.* 1097 a, 3. 1109 b, 26. 1138 b,
 21 n.

τοῦ δέοντος, 'the right thing,' what
 is wanted in given circumstances, not
 our duty' which would rather be τοῦ
 προσήκοντος. No when Democritus
 urged the Athenians τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν
 he did not mean they were to 'do
 their duty,' but that they were to take
 the steps required by the situation.

§ 3. τύττω γε περιλαβεῖν. A Platonic
 phrase, cf. *Rep.* 412 a ὡς ἂν τύττω μὴ
 δὲ δορυβέτας εἰρησθαι, 559 a ὡς τὸν
 λόβωμεν αὐτὰς, *Laws* 718 c οὐδὲν οὐκ
 ὁδὸς ἐν τῇ περιλαβόντι εὐκὴν αὐτῇ
 οὐδὲν τὴν τύττω. For the terminology
 of this passage cf. *Isoc.* § 26 with the
 notes.

§ 4. δόξαι δ' ἂν 'it will be ad-
 mitted,' the usual phrase in a dialectic
 ἄξιον. By κυριωτάτης *Ατ.*
 means 'most authoritative' as the
 context shows. Cf. also *Pol.* 1283 b,
 14 quoted on p. 7

τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ 6
 1094^b ποίας ἐκάστους μαρθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει·
 ὁρᾶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην
 οὔσας, ὅταν στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικὴν· χωρμένης 7
 δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς [πρακτικαῖς] τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δι
 5 νομαθεταύτης τί δέῃ πράττειν καὶ τίμῳ ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης
 τέλος περιέχει· ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰνθρώ-
 πινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μείζον 8
 γε καὶ τελειότερον τοῦ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ
 σφῆξιν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ
 10 θεϊότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων 9
 ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα·

§ 6. τίνας γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Politics is most 'authoritative,' for it regulates what sciences, theoretical or practical, are to exist in the state, what each class of citizens (*ἐκάστους*) are to learn and up to what point (or up to what age). Ar. is referring to such regulations as those laid down by Plato. *Rep.* 429 d, 239. Diels notes *χρῶν* as a literary touch.

ὁρᾶμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is from Plato, *Polit.* 303 e, 279. Cf. *Introd.* § 13.

§ 7. χωρμένης δὲ κ.τ.λ. Politics 'makes use of' the practical sciences, such as strategy and rhetoric; it does not 'make use of' the theoretical sciences, though it regulates them, cf. 1145 n, 5. I believe with Professor Wynter (*Contr.* p. 33) that *πρακτικὰς* is a gloss from Aspasius, but I think it gives the true sense. Politics does not 'use' mathematics or astronomy.

§ 8. εἰ γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This is not an apology for 'confining ethics and politics,' but rather for appearing to separate them (*Introd.* § 14). The science of the Good is the same whether for one, few, or many, but it is called Politics a *polis*ari. To secure the good of one is 'better than no-

thing' (*ἀγαπητέν*), but it is not the full realization of the end of our science.

Ἰθνα καὶ πόλεσιν, 'for a people,' such as the Macedonians, or for free Hellenic 'states.' The word *ἴθνα* is regularly used of peoples who had not developed so far as the city state.

§ 9. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος κ.τ.λ. 'This' (*viz.* to secure and preserve the good for man) 'is what our branch of science aims at.' Here we have a clear reference back to the beginning: *Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος ἀγαθόν τινος ἐπιδεῖσθαι δοκεῖ*, and a confirmation of the view that that passage refers to the ends of sciences alone, and not to ends in general.

ἐφίεται οὖσα. As Zell points out the meaning really is 'Now the science which aims at this is Politics.' The Greek idiom allows of the leading idea being expressed by the participle (so regularly with *τιγχανω* etc.).

πολιτικὴ τις. The *τις* is added merely because popular usage confined the word to 'practical politics' and ignored the 'architectonic' art of the lawgiver (cf. 1141 b, 18). We must not translate 'a species of Politics'; for it is the whole of Politics.

III. Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἰκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην
 διασαφηνθῇ· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ὅπασιν τοῖς
 2 λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ
 δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, 15
 πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλὴνῃν, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμον μόνον
 3 εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μὴ τοιαύτην δι τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ
 διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλαβὰς ἀπ' αἰτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες
 4 ἀπωλοῦτο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν

III § 1 Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν π. 1. "This discussion of agent he ἀκριβὲς distinguished itself from the great uncertainty of Aristotle's style by its concise phrasing and words (πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλὴνῃν παχύνει, χρωῖν, τετατολογεῖν)." *Notes in Archiv* 1, 473

κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην. "as far as the subject-matter allows." *Phil.* 1035^a 2, 3 λέγω δὲ ὅλην τὴν ὑποκειμένην ἐξ ὧν τι ἀποτελεῖται, ἔργον, οὐκ ὑφ' ὅτι μὲν ἔστι, ἀνδρείαν τοιαύτῃ δὲ χαλεκῇ. *Met.* 1024^a, 2 λέγω δὲ τὴν μὲν ὅλην, οἷον τὸν χαλεκόν, τὸν δὲ μέρημι τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ δὲ τοιαύτου, τὸ ἀνδρῆν. τὸ οἰκῶν. This is not only an Aristotelian technocracy, but a Platonic image and therefore in place here (*cf. Phil.* 24 b φημι δὲ γινώσκον μὲν ἕκαστα φημι δὲ καὶ πᾶσι δὲ γινώσκον καὶ νόμον ὅλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσι π. 1. *Tim.* 69 a 31' οὐδ' ἂν τὴν οὐκ ἐκείνου ἡμῶν παρακεῖται ἐξ ὧν τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον δεῖ σινοφρονεῖν, (where note the shifting of the metaphor). Aristotle substitutes ὑποκειμένη for the Platonic παρατίθεσθαι (*cf. also* 1104^a, 20 n.) because ἡ ὅλην ἐπὶ ἡμῶν τῷ οὐδὲν is a more important aspect of the thing to him than ἡ ὅλην παρακεῖται τῷ δημιουργῷ. The metaphor is kept up by ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις below. We do not expect the same finish in wood as in marble. It is worth noting that there is no property attached instance in earlier literature of ὅλην meaning any

other material than wood. This quoted in *Lexicon* and Scott from *Sophocles* is a mistake. The word ὅλην there belongs to Plutarch.

§ 2 τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια π. 1. Aristotle does not mean to say that τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια are in themselves liable to variation and fluctuation,—this point is discussed below 1134 b, 15 sqq.—but that they give rise to variation and fluctuation in men's judgments. For the meaning of ἔχει, cf. *ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχειν*, *ἀπορίαν ἔχειν* and the like.

ὥστε δοκεῖν. "that they are believed" by virtue of the sophists. For the history of the contrast between *εἶδος* and *φύσις*, see my article in the *International Journal of Ethics* for April, 1897.

§ 3 καὶ τὰγαθὰ, i.e. the recognized good things of life, described later on (1119 b, 3) as τὰ ἀγαθὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ, καὶ δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὰ. For a characteristic Greek list of Plato, *Rep.* 491 c εὐχάρις καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς σώματος καὶ σωφροσύνη ἡρμῆς καὶ ψυχῆς. See too *Menu* 87 c ἐνείκη, φρόνη καὶ ἰσχύς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὲ, ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα.

διὰ πλοῦτον δι' ἀνδρείαν. For the first *Notes* compares Xen. *Kyr.* 1, 6, 44 πολλοὶ τὰν πλοῦτον πλοῦτον κατατηθεμένοι διὰ τοῦτον ἀνέχοντο. Difficulties have been felt about the inclusion of ἀνδρεία among goods that may be had. But the point is what the popular view is and certainly it

20 οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ
 τύπῳ τὰληθές ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
 καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι. τὸν
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρῆναι ἕκαστα τῶν λεγο-
 μένων· πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἴστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τῆςκριβείας
 25 ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος

1094 b. 22. EE. 1216 b. 35 διαφέρουσι ὃ οἱ λόγοι περὶ
 ἐκάστην μέθοδον, οἱ τε φιλοσόφως λεγόμενοι καὶ μὴ φιλοσόφως.
 διόπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐ χρὴ νομίζειν περιέρχον εἶναι τὴν τοι-
 αύτην θεωρίαν δι' ἧς οὐ μόνον τὸ τί φανερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διὰ
 τί· φιλόσοφον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον. οὕτως μέντοι
 τοῦτο πολλῆς εὐλαβείας. εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν φιλοσόφοι
 εἶναι τὰ μὴ εἶναι εἰπὴ λέγειν ἀλλὰ μετὰ λόγον, πολλὰτε λαμβανούσι
 λέγοντες ἀλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κενούς. τοῦτο δὲ
 ποιοῦσιν ὅτι μὲν δι' ἄγνοιαν, ὅτι δὲ δι' ἀλαζονείαν, ἐφ' ᾧ ὡς ἀλύκασθαι
 συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς ἱμπείρους καὶ δυναμένους πράττειν ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν
 μὴτ' ἐχόντων μῆτε δυναμένων διανοίαν ἀρχιτεκτονικὴν ἢ τρακτικὴν.

admits this. Diels points out that the reference is to Plato's *Menon* 87c κη. After enumerating the ἀγαθά, he says (88a) ταῦτά δι ταῦτά φαμεν εὐλογοῦν καὶ βλάττειν, οἷον ἀνθρώποι, εἰ μὴ ἴσσι, φράνῃσι ἢ ἀνθρώποι, ἀλλ' οἷον θάρροι τι κ.τ.λ.

§ 4. περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων. For the phrase cf. 1095 a. 3. 1143 b. 10. According to the doctrine of the *Analytics* there are three things in every proof: (1) *πρὶν δὲ δεῖξαι*, (2) *δὲ δεῖξαι*, (3) *ἐξ ᾧ δὲ δεῖξαι* (*An. Post.* 72 a. 39-40). The *πρὶν δ* (1) is the *ὑποκείμενον γένος* or the *ὑποκείμενη εἰς*, that about which something is proved. In the present case this is τὰ πρακτὰ or τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια. The *ἐξ ᾧ* (3) are the *ἐξιώματα*, the principles from which we argue. In the present case, as neither (1) nor (3) is universal or necessary, it follows that (2) *δὲ δεῖξαι*, i. e. the conclusion, τὸ συμπεράσμα, cannot be so either. The 'on such a subject and with such premises.'

περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. Phyl. 1094 b. — οὐ δυνάμεν τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως γινόμενα τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδετέρου τούτων αἰτία ἢ τιχῆ λέγεται οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης. If chance were the cause there could be no science of them; *επιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα τοῦ αἰεὶ ὄντος ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ* (*Met.* 1065 a. 4). Nature and Man are the two causes which act ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ and stand between Necessity and Chance. Cf. *Introd.* § 36.

τοιαῦτα, κ.τ. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. The conclusion (*συμπεράσμα*) must have the same character as the premises (τὰ ἐξ ᾧ ὁ λόγος).

ἀποδέχεσθαι. Correlative to ἀποδοῦναι. We pass from the lecturer to the student.

πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ κ.τ.λ. On Aristotle's conception of *παιδεία*, see *Introd.* § 31.

καθ' ἕκαστον γένος. The clear distinction of *γένος* is the mark of *παιδεία*.

φύσιν ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ
τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχισθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξειν
5 ἀπαιτεῖν. ἕκαστος δι' κρίνει καλῶς ἢ γειώσκει, καὶ τοῦτων
ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, 1095
ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πάντων πεπαιδευμένος.

Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκείως ἀκροατὴς ὁ εἰς
ἀπειρὰ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ
6 τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῖς πάθουσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς
αὖν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ὠναφελῆς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν 5
7 εὖ γινώσκει ἀλλὰ πράξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν
ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρόν· εὖ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ
διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιού-
τοις ἀνοήτοις ἢ γινώσκει γίνεται καθυπερ τοῖς ἀκράτεις·
τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρίξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι 10

πύσχονται διὰ τοῦτο δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἀπαιδευσία γὰρ ἔστι περὶ ἕκαστων
πρῶγμα τὸ μὴ οἰεῖσθαι κρίνειν τούτ' οὐκείως λόγους τοῦ πράγματος
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.
This is taken from Patz. Theat.
1782c ἀποδείξειν ἢ καὶ ἀπαιτεῖν οὐδ'
τοῦτο αὐτὸ λέγει, ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰσὶν χρήσις,
ὡς εἰ τὸν αὐτὸν Θεόδωρον ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν
γεννηθέντων χρόνοντος γεννηθέντων, ἕκαστος
αὐτὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀνείκει. ἀποδείξειν οὐδ' οὐ
τε καὶ Θεόδωρος ὁ ἀποδείξειν πιθανολογῶν
τε καὶ εἰσὶν περὶ τῆς αὐτῆς λέξεως
λογισμὸς αὐτῶν. On the other hand
we have no right to ask more than τὸ
πῶς αὐτὸν τὸν ῥητορικόν. What.
1352 b, 10-119. ῥητορικῆς [ῥητορ] τὸ
ἰδὲν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πιθανολογῶν
ἀποδείξειν. The ἐν ἑνὶ μέρει or the
logical argument from evidence or σημαία
is sometimes called ῥητορικὴ ἀπόδειξις
(What 1352 a 6), but that is only καθ'
δυσωπία, "by analogy."

§ 6. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα κ.τ.λ.
The qualification καθ' ἕκαστον does
double duty. Fully expressed the
meaning is καθ' ἕκαστον κατὰ. καλῶς ὁ
καθ' ἕκαστον συνεκτικότερος. For the

tachylogy cf. Kühner § 397 f, and for
the distinction between general and
special παιδεία, Introd. § 21.

ἀπλῶς. The word ἀπλῶς, *simpliciter*, means without any πρόσθεσις or
qualification. The πρόσθεσις which
is dropped here is καθ' ἕκαστον. For
the totum of πρόσθεσις and ἀφαίρεσις,
cf. 1140 a 18 n. It is a feminine
form of ἐπαγωγή.

Διὸ κ.τ.λ. This is because he has
not the special παιδεία required as
a preliminary training. The logical
παιδεία is more within his reach.

ἐκ τούτων. περὶ τούτων. Cf. 1024 b,
20 n.

§ 6. τὸ τέλος. κ.τ.λ. πολιτικῆς, which
is a practical science. Cf. 1023 b, 27.

§ 7. καθυπερ τοῖς ἀκράτεις. As we
shall see in Book VII, the ἀκρατής is
the morally weak man who does not
παῖδα πράττει διὰ πάθος.

κατὰ λόγον, 'by rule,' 'uniformly,'
'consistently.' In 1169 a, § τὸ κατὰ

πολυωφελές ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἶδεναι, καὶ περὶ μὲν δ' ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτεθέντα, πεφρο-
μιάσθω ταῦτα.

IV. Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνώσις καὶ
15 προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν
πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν
ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλειστων ὁμολο- 2
γείται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες

1095 a. 14. EE. 1217 2, 18 πεπρομιασμένων δὲ ταύτων,
λέγωμεν ἀρξάμεναι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, εἰ σαφῶς
λεγομένων, ζητούντες ἐπὶ τὸ σαφῶς «προϋόντες» εἰρεῖν τί ἐστὶν ἡ
εὐδαιμονία. ὁμολογείται δὴ μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ ἄριστον τοῦτο τῶν
ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀνθρώπινον δὲ λέγομεν, ὅτι τάχ' ἂν εἴη
καὶ βελτίονος ἄλλου τῶν ὄντων εὐδαιμονία, ὅλον θεοῦ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ
ἄλλων ζῶων, ὅσα χεῖρον τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲν κοινὸν εἶ
ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων ἵππος οὐδ' ὄρνις οὐδ'
ἰχθὺς οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐθεν, ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐκωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει
μετέχει θεῖου τινός, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετοχὴν τὸ μὲν
βέλτιον ζῇ τὸ δὲ χεῖρον αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον
ὑστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν
ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτὰ τὰ δ' οὐ πρακτὰ· τοῦτο δὲ λέγομεν οὕτως, διότι ἐναι
τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν μετέχει κινήσεως, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν (? πράξεων).
καὶ ταῦτ' ἴσως ἄρρωτα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν. ἐναι δὲ πρακτὰ μὲν, ἀλλὰ
πρακτὰ κρείττωσιν ἡμῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ διχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρακτόν (καὶ
γὰρ ὡς ἐναικα πράττομεν καὶ ἄ τούτων ἕνεκα μετέχει πράξεως, εἶον καὶ
τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον τίθεμεν τῶν πρακτῶν, καὶ τὰ τοιούτων
πραττόμενα χάριν, τὰ δ' ὑγεινὰ καὶ τὰ χρηματιστικά), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν ὄριστον θετίον.

λογον ἔην is opposed to τὰ ἐκὰς τάδε.
Cf. Plato, Laws 689 d 4, ἐκὰς λόγον
ἔην. Tim. 89 d 7 τὰ ἐκὰς ἀλλοῖσ' ἂν
ἐκὰς λόγον ἔην. What is meant is
that the appetitions must be consis-
tently directed so that they may be
counted on, they must not be word-
logos or such as to defy calculation.
The phrase does not mean 'according
to reason,' cf. 1100 a, 23 n.

IV. § 1. Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλα-

βόντες κ.τ.λ. This shows clearly
how we are to understand 1094 a,
1 sqq. Δις περὶ αὐτῶν τελειότης is both a
γνώσις and a προαίρεσις.

§ 2 τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν κ.τ.λ.
See Introductory Note. We now
find a nominal agreement but a very
real disagreement between the beliefs
of the many and those of the wise.
This ἀπορία must be solved by the
dialectic method. The fact that

λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ἔην καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦτόν ὑπα-
λαβάνουσι τῇ εἰδαιμονίᾳ· περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰδαιμονίας τί ἐ-
στὶν ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς
3 ἀποδιδάσκειν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανεράν, οἷον
ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο—πολλῶς δὲ
καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίαιαν, πενόμενος δὲ
πλοῦτον—συνειδότες δ' ἐαυτοῖς ἀγνοίαν τοὺς μῆλα τε καὶ 25
ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. ἐγὼ δ' ὥντο παρὰ τὰ

a. 22—26. EE. 1214 b, 7 θέσθαι τιὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς εἶναι.
ἦτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν.

a. 26. EE. 1217 b, 2 φασὶ γὰρ ἀριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων
αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸ δ' εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν ὃ ὑπάρχει τὸ τε πρῶτον εἶναι
τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ αἰτίῃ τῇ παρουσίᾳ τούτοις ἄλλοις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι.
ταῦτα δ' ἐπ' ἀρχῇ ἀμφότερα τῇ ἰδίᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. λέγω δὲ ἀμφότερα
τὸ τε πρῶτον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰτίον ἀγαθοῦ τῇ παρουσίᾳ

'most people' regarded εἰδαιμονία as the final for man raises a presumption that it is the ἀρχή we are seeking for. Introd. § 5.

οἱ χαρίεντες. This is the urbane equivalent of εἰσφορῆς, the name which is given to them below. The reference is mainly to the Platonists, who had already adopted the name εἰδαιμονία for man's highest good. See Introductory Note, § 1.

τὸ δ' εὖ ἔην. In the *Politica* Aristotle uses and more tends to substitute this phrase for the name εἰδαιμονία which he had borrowed from the Academy. It emphasises the view that a good life is an *εὖ ζῆναι*.

τὸ εὖ πράττειν. In [Plato] *Alcibi.* i. 116 b the ambiguity of this phrase is primarily turned to account. Οὐκ ἐπὶ καλῶς πράττειν οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττειν;—Ναι. Οὐ δ' εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εἰδαιμόνους.—Ἦναι γὰρ εὖ. We must remember that Aristotle is here giving the views of others and is not answerable for the fallacy. He himself gives a very complete proof below 1098 a,

7 1199. Cf. also the definition of εἰδαιμονία as εὐπραγία μετ' ἀρετῆς (Introductory Note, p. 11).

οἱ πολλοί, here opposed to οἱ σοφοί. But cf. 1095 b, 16 a.

§ 2. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is not answered till a. 16 ἐγὼ δ' ὥντο.

νοσήσας κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Γαίω. Κερ.* 383 c ἄρα οὐ νοσησάμενος ἦν δ' ὄρω, τοὺς νομ. νομήσαντες λόγου;—ὡς εἶδεν ἄρα ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σοφοὶ διελέθειν πρὶν κάμνειν ἡδιστον δε. συνειδότες θαυμάζουσιν. We get

this from EE. 1214 b, 7 (θέσθαι τιὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς εἶναι, ἦτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν) what these regarded as happiness. For ἐπὶρ αὐτοῖς, 'over their heads' cf. *Gen. An.* 721 a, 23 διὰς ἐστὶν ἐπὶρ ἡμῶν τὸ λεγόμενον, Isokr. *Paneg.* § 11 ἐπιτιμῶσι τῶν λόγων τοὺς ὑπερταῖς ἰδὼτας ἔχοντες.

ἐγὼ δ' ὥντο, i.e. the Platonists. The imperfect tense is used because Aristotle is speaking from personal recollection of the school. So *ἄποροι* a. 32. He sums up the Platonic view

πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τούτοις
 πᾶσιν αἰτίον ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν
 τὰς δοξὰς ματαιώτερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα
 30 ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λανθανέταις

τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι μάλιστα τε γὰρ τὰγαθὸν λέγεσθαι κατ' ἐκείνης
 ἀληθείας (κατὰ μετοχὴν γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητα τὰλλα ἀγαθὰ ἐκείνης εἶναι),
 καὶ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ μετεχομένου ἀναιρεῖσθαι
 καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῆς ιδέας, ἃ λέγεται, τῇ μετέχῃ ἐκείνης, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον
 τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον. ὥστ' εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν
 τὴν ιδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ γὰρ χωριστὴν εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων, ὥσπερ
 καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ιδέας.

1095 a. 28. EE. 1214 b, 28 πῶτας μὲν οὖν τὰς δοξὰς ἐπισκο-
 πῶ, ὅσας ἔχουσιν ἄνθρωποι περὶ αὐτῆς, περιέρχον (πολλὰ γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ
 τοῖς παιδαρίοις καὶ τοῖς κάμνουσι καὶ παραφρονοῦσι, περὶ ὧν ἂν οἴθεις
 νοεῖν ἔχων διαπορήσειαν· δέονται γὰρ οὐ λόγων, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ ἐν
 ἢ μεταβαλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ κολάσεως ἰατρικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς· κολάσεις γὰρ
 ἢ φαρμακεία τῶν πληγῶν οἷα ἐλάττων ἐστίν), ὁμοῦς δὲ ταῖς οὖτοις οἰδὲ
 τὰς τῶν πολλῶν (cf. 1095 b, 19 sq.) ἐπισκεπτέον (εἰπῇ γὰρ λεγούσι
 σχεδὸν περὶ ἑαυτῶν, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ εὐδαμονίας· ἀπὸ τοῦ γὰρ
 προσφέρειν λόγον τοῖς λόγοις μὴτὲν δεόμενοι ἀλλὰ πάθοντες). ὅτε δ'
 εἰσὶν ἀπαραίτητοι περὶ ἐκάστην πραγματείας οἰκίαι, δηλονότι καὶ περὶ
 βίον τοῦ κρατίστου καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἀρίστης εἰσὶν, ταύτας οὖν καλῶς
 ἔχει τὰς δοξὰς ἐξετάζειν· οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων ἀρχαὶ τῶν
 ἐναντιουμένων αἰτιοῖς λόγων ἀποδείξεις εἰσὶν. (Cf. Top. 104 b,
 1—105 a, 9.)

thus: 'Over and above the many
 good things we know there is another
 Good which is good in itself and the
 cause of the goodness of all the good
 things we know.'

καθ' αὐτό. One of the marks of
 τὸ καθόλου, An. Post. 73 b, 26 sqq.

ὃ καὶ ἀγαθόν. This implies κατὰ
 τὴν αἰτίαν, the other mark of τὸ καθόλου.

§ 2. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We
 need not discuss mere *thesis* of the
 wise (cf. 1006 a, 3 a.), nor contradic-
 tions of τὰ δοκούντα by ἡ συχῶν (cf.
 Top. 104 b, 33).

τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας, 'the
 most prevalent' (lit. 'those that come

to the surface'), the common meaning
 of the word. Cf. *προσχερής*, b, 18.

ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον, or
 are thought plausible.' The phrase
 λόγον ἔχειν regularly means 'to have
 something to say for themselves,' or
 'in view of something being said for
 them' and is exactly equivalent to
 εὐλογον εἶναι. It can have no other
 meaning here.

§ 3. μὴ λανθανέτω δι κ.τ.λ. A
 note justifying the dialectical method
 which is here used. This is not a
 case for syllogistic reasoning from the
ἀρχή, but for dialectical search after
 the *ἀρχή*.

ὃ ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὐ γὰρ καὶ [ὁ] Πλάτων ἤπρεε τοῦτο καὶ εἰῆται τώτερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδὸς. ὥστε ὁ τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. 1095^b ἀρετέων μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. ἴσους οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρετέων ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἡθεσιν ἡχθᾶν καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὁλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμε- 3 γεν ἱκανῶς· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρ-

οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ διαιτησιῶν.

οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ οἱ διαιτησιῶν.

εὐ γὰρ καὶ [ὁ] Πλάτων κ.τ.λ. The imperfect tense shows that Aristotle is still speaking from personal recollection of the Academy. He means this, before commencing any inquiry. Plato used to ask whether, in the given case, they were in a position to descend from the ἀρχή by διαιρέσις, or whether it was first necessary to ascend to it by συναγωγή. I prefer to omit ὁ with L^b; the article is generally added when Plato in his writings is meant.

ὥστε κ.τ.λ. This is not to be found in the published works of Plato, but the simile is clearly taken from the *Alcibiades*. Are we in such a position that we have only *καταὰ διαδίου* ἑαυτῶν οὐδὲν ὅλως (Alcib. II. 364), or have we first to run the *ὁδὸς* ὅλως? The *ὁδὸς* is not the winning post, but the course.

ἀρετέων μὲν γάρ. The reading (K^b) is preferable to ἀρετέων μὲν οὖν (L^b). It makes what follows an explication of the explanation, while *μὲν οὖν* would set it aside.

ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων. This cannot mean 'from the known,' as Mueller and others have thought. In Greek *γνωρίμων* is the opposite of ἀγνωστος and means 'known.'

ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς, i.e. γινώσκοντες λόγοντας. This is the true Aristotelian

distinction between reasoning *α priori* and *α posteriori*. The ἀρχή is the logical *factum* of all legislation and action, but current moral judgments and existing institutions are 'more known to us.' Cf. Top. 141 b, 3 ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν γνωριμότερον τὸ πᾶντες τοῦ ὑστέρου, οἷον στιγμή γραμμῆς καὶ γραμμῆς ἐπιπέδου καὶ ἐπιπέδου στερεοῦ. ἡμῖν δὲ ἀνάπαλιν ὁρίστε συμβαίνει· μάκροτα γὰρ τὸ στερεόν ὅσο τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς στιγμῆς.

§ 6. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. The man who has been trained in good habits has the ἀρχή implicitly, and it can be made explicit by a dialectical process. For ἡχθᾶν cf. *ἀγωγή* 1179 b, 35.

ἡθεσιν, the meaning of L^b, seems preferable to *ἡθεσιν* K^a. We have not settled yet that *ἡθεσ* comes from *ἡθεσ*.

§ 7. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. The word ἀρχή is used in its regular sense, for which see Introd. § 27. Since the starting-point or first principle of Politics is 'the fact,' i.e. the fact that the definition of Happiness is whatever we may find it to be, and since any one who has been well brought up either has that definition or can easily get it by a dialectical process, the one thing needful for the intending student is a good upbringing. He need not know anything of First Philosophy or Physics; for in Politics we treat the definition of Happiness as ultimate

κοίτως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι, ὁ δὲ ταιούτος ἔχει ἢ
λαβοὶ ἂν ἀρχὰς βιάδω. ὃ δὲ μηδετερον ὑπάρχει τούτων
ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου—

- 10 οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος θε αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἰσθλὸς δ' αὖ πᾶσι τοῖς θεοῖς εἰπύοντι πίθηται
θεοὶ δὲ πε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοήσῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, δ' δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήσιος αἰτήρ.

V. Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξίβημεν. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν
15 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων
ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονὴν· 2
διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν—τρεις γὰρ εἰσι

1095 b, 14. EE. 1215 a, 26 διηρημένων δὲ τῶν βίων, καὶ τῶν
μὲν <οὐδ' > ἀμφισβητούντων τῆς τῶν αὐτῆς εὐημερίας, ἀλλ' ὡς τῶν
ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φιλικὰς
καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ τὰς βαιοσύνας (λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν
τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον, βαναύσους δὲ τὰς ἰδραίους καὶ
μισθαρνικάς, χρηματιστικάς δὲ τὰς πρὸς ὠνέδαν [ἀγοράς] καὶ πράσεις
καπηλικὰς), τῶν δ' εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταπτομένων, τριῶν ὄντων

(cf. *Introd.* § 23). Aristotle uses τὸ
εἶναι ('the that') as opposed to τὸ
διότι ('the why'—*dioti* is the indirect
form of *διὰ τί*?) especially of the
definitions which form the *akrota*,
axioms of any science, which assert
existence but are not capable of
demonstration by that science.

ὁ δὲ ταιούτος κ.τ.λ. sc. ὁ τοῦ
ἡσίου ἡμέτερος καλῶς.

λαβοὶ δὲν. For λαβεῖν used to ex-
press the result of the dialectical
process, the *lōgōs* of a *prōtasis*, see
Introd. § 25.

μηδετερον, sc. τὸ ἔχει ἢ τὸ λαβεῖν
ἀν ἀρχὰς βιάδω. If a man neither
uses that the Good for Man is what
we shall find it to be, nor can be
made to see it dialectically, we can
have nothing more to say to him.
He is, as it were, morally colour-
blind.

τοῦ Ἡσιόδου. *Ἔργα* 192 sqq.

V. § 2. Ἡμεῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. The dia-
lectical examination of the *doxai* now
begins. First we discuss the beliefs
of the many.

ὅθεν παρεξίβημεν, 1095 a, 30.

οὐκ ἀλόγως, 'as might be expected
of οἱ πολλοί. The phrase is equivalent
to εὐλόγως or εἰκότως.

εἰκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων, 'appear from
their lives,' 'to judge by their lives.'

§ 2. οἱ μὲν πολλοί, resumed by οἱ
μὲν οὖν πολλοί (b, 19) and opposed by
οἱ δὲ χαρίωντες (b, 22).

ὅς καὶ, 'which is just why'! It
can be the only reason, though of
course they do not formulate it as
a theory of life.

τρεις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This classification
of the 'three lives' was current at
the time; for we find it both in Plato
and Isocrates. (cf. *Rep.* 451 c *Δια*
τακτα δὲ καὶ ἀνατάκτως λέγονται τὰ
τρία ταῦτα ἢ καὶ ἀτάκτως, φιλόσοφοι,

περί μὲν τούτων ἄλλος· ἰκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις
εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν. τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ 7
ἐν τῇ ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομενοῖς ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ χρημα- 8
τιστὴς βίῃ ὅστις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλούτος δῆλον ὅτι οἱ τὸ ζητού-

τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τινὰ διαπο-
ρῶντι τοιαῦτ' ἄγτι καὶ διαρωπῶντα τίνας ἵνακ' ἂν τις ἴλοιο γενέσθαι
μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι, Τυφ, φαίει, θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τῇ περὶ
τὸν ὅλον κόσμον εἰς τὴν οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπατήρηται τινὲς ἵνεκα τὴν
αἴρεσιν ἥ τετιμῆται εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν· οἱ δὲ Σαρδανάπολλον μακαρίζουσι
ἢ Σμινδουκῶν τὸν Σιβηρίην (IIdi. v, 127) ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς τῶν
ζώντων τὸν ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οἱ τοὶ δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται
ταῦται τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· ἕτεροι δὲ τινες οὗτ' ἂν φρόνησιν οὐδεμίαν οὔτε

παράδεικον τῶν γυναικῶν τινὲς αὐτὰ
φιλοσοφίας ὡς ἐπὶ οὗς ἐστιν ἀντιλέ-
γειν, καθάπερ εἶρη Ἀποθνήσκου, ἢ ὅτι
ταῦτα κινεῖται καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, ἢ ὅτι
ἐν τῷ δὲ, καθάπερ Μένανδρος φησιν.
IIdi. Cetera, 306 a, 12 εἰσάγει τοὺς τὰς
θεορίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διαφυλάττουσι.

ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις. There can be
no doubt that in Aristotle's time
ἐγκύκλιος was a word applied to things
that were a matter of 'routine,' that
belonged to the 'trivial round.' Iso-
krates. De Pace § 47) says that during
the war ἐν τῇ τοῦτο τῶν ἐγκυκλίων
τοσούτοις οὐδ' ἔμελλον τὸν νομιστὴν.
Aristotle himself speaks of ἐγκύκλια
δαικονήματα (Ibid. 1255 b, 24) and
ἐγκύκλιοι διακοναί, (Ibid. 1263 a, 11)
(cf. also the ἐγκύκλιος λειτουργία).
With the present use of the word we
may compare De Caelo 279 a, 30 ἐν
τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφίαισι. The
passage will therefore be 'in every-
day discussions or writings,' and will
not be very different from that of
ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, on which see 1100 a,
16 n.

§ 7. ὅπερ εἶ. Like Demosthenes,
Aristotle uses *ὅπερ* to avoid the repeti-
tion of *περὶ* (cf. Sandys on Phil. i, § 1).
We find it used five times in the
Ethics, viz. here and 1096 b, 30.

1119 a, 30. 1155 b, 16. 1171 a, 26.
According to Eucken, this usage is
commonest in the Topica, Ehetica
and Ethica, which means that it is an
elegance belonging to Aristotle's more
popular style (Ibid. § 7). There is,
therefore, no occasion to doubt the
genuineness of passages where it oc-
curs.

ἐν τοῖς ἐπομέτοις in the Tenth Book.
The K^a reading ἐν τοῖς ἐπομέτοις may
be based on the notion (strangely re-
vived by Ramsauer) that the discussion
of the Platonic theory which follows is
a discussion of the θεωρητικὴ βίος.
Aristotle can discuss this life without
violating his argument; for we have
to do just now only with the beliefs of
the many.

§ 8. βίῃ ὅστις ἐστίν. I owe this
emendation to Mr James Watt of
Bristol College, Oxford. The MSS.
have βίῃς τίς ἐστιν, but we may read
ΒΙΑΙΟΣΤΙΣΣΕΣΤΙΝ as we please. It
has long been seen that the meaning
must be that the money-maker is not
a free agent, and so his opinion does
not count. But can a χρηματιστής be
even a χρηματιστής βίος, be called
biotic in this sense? Elsewhere the
word is only used of πορὰ, κέρματα
and the like; and though we can say βίος

μενον αγαθόν· χρήσιμον γάρ καὶ ἄλλον χάριν. διὰ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκείνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβιβάζονται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω. 10

VI. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου βελτίον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ πρὸς αὐτούς τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης ὅτι τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τῇ εἰδῇ δοξοίε δ' ἂν ἴσως βελτίον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς

τῆς σῶμαί καὶ ἡδονῆς εἶναιτο μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἐπ' ἀρετῇ. οἰοῦνται γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἵναι δόξης χάριν αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ μελλοντες εἰδωκλήσθαι. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς συγκατανοοῦσι τῆς προσήγορίας· οὐ γὰρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἴσθι πράξεων προσηγορικῶς αὐτῶν χάριν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἵκεται ὅπποτα τοῦ ζῆν οὕτως.

ἔκ μιν οὖν τῶν εἰρημῶν φανερόν ὅτι πάντες ἐπὶ τρεῖς βίους φέρουσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πολιτικὴν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικὴν.

φαίνεται and βεβαιῶται, we can hardly say βεβ. (β) 'The conjecture is confirmed by a reading of the Verus Verus', *περιποιεῖται αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀπολαύσει* etc. Cf. E.E. loc. cit. p. 8.

καταβιβάζονται. Cf. Plato *Soph.* 252c διδραμοῖσι μὲν τὸν καταβιβάζειν γεγραμμένα ὅφ' βουλευμένων μαθεῖν. The metaphor as Cornford has pointed out is that of scattering seeds. So Herod. 1. 122 φάτιν καταβιβάζειν, *εὐπορεῖται· προέχει, διανεμίζεται*. In the *καταβιβάζονται μαθήσει* of *Pol.* 1337 b, 22 are the popular subjects of instruction. Of course *πρὸς* means 'against'. Though the thing is clear, yet satirists against them like the *Προσπεσμένοι* are widely circulated.

VI. §1. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου i.e. *ἀγαθόν*. It has not yet been mentioned by this name, but the two marks of τὸ καθόλου are given above, 1094 a. 1; a. We should now go on to the beliefs of the *πολιτικῶν* but we must apply our dialectic to showing that Plato was wrong in speaking of a universal good. *Introd.* § 28.

καίπερ πρὸς αὐτούς κ.τ.λ. The word *πρὸς αὐτούς* literally means 'up hill'. This apology is thoroughly Platonic in tone and even in style. Cf. *Rep.* 595 b 'Ῥητιον· ἦ δ' ἐγώ, καί πο φίλια γέ ἐσσι με καὶ αὐδῶς ἐς παιδοὺς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὀμήρου ἀπορωλεῖαι λόγων.

εἰσαγαγεῖν, 'have imported'. The word is commonly used of introducing novelties, and suggests something arbitrary. Cf. *Isoc.* *Caelo* 171 b, 11 τοσούτων εἰσαγαγόν, 'by importing the notion of a least magnitude into mathematics.'

δοξοίε δ' ἂν ἴσως, 'it will surely be admitted' even by those who think it ungraceful of us to attack Plato. That Aristotle was sensitive to this charge appears from *frag.* 10, thus quoted by Proclus, καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις σαφέστατα κεκαργυς μὴ δυνασθαι τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμποθεῖν αὐὸς τις αὐτὸν αἰσθῆναι διὰ φιλομαχίας ἀντιλέγειν.

ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας, another Platonic touch. Cf. *Theait.* 164 a εἰ σώσομεν τὸν πρὸς θεῷ λόγον δὲ 1104 a, 10 περὶ αὐτοῦ βοηθεῖν.

15 ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους
δυτας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιιν φίλοιιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλή-
θειαν.

Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δοξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ἰδέας ἐν 2
οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ αὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν
ιδέαν κατασκευάζουσιν· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
20 καὶ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ

1096 a. 17. EE. 1218 a, 1 ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ
ὕστερον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινόν τι παρὰ τοῖτα, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν. εἴη γὰρ
ἂν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον· πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστόν διὰ
τὸ ἀναιρουμένον τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρῶτον, οἷον εἰ τὸ διτλάσιον

καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν. Aristotle
here as elsewhere partly identifies
himself with the Platonic school. Cf.
Met. 990 b, 8 ἐν καθ' οὗ ἐρέμεν
δείκνυμεν ὅτι ἐστι τὰ εἶδη, κατ' αὐθρία
φανταίται τοῦτων... ἐξ ἐνίων δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἂν
οἰόμεθα τοῦτων εἶδη γίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ.
997 b, 3 οὐ μὲν οὖν λέγομεν τὰ εἶδη αἰετὰ
τε καὶ οὐσία· εἶναι καθ' αὐτά. Note that
ἀναιρεῖν is used of cancelling a will.

ὅσιον προτιμᾶν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rep.
103 c ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμη-
τὴς ἀνῆρ, and, for δαίσιον, 386 d ἐξ ἡμεῶν
γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἢ παραγόμενον
δικαίον καὶ κατηγορούμενον ἀπαγορεύειν,
307 d ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ
ἴσταν προδίδουσι. So in Met. 1073 b,
16 φίλοι μιν ἀμφοτέρους, πείθεσθαι δὲ
τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις.

§ 2. Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες κ.τ.λ. This
word has the same associations as
εἰσαγωγὴν above. Cf. Top. 159 b, 30
οἱ κομίσαντες ἀλλοτρίαν δόξαν, Met.
990 b, 1 ἑτέρα τοῖσι ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν
ἐόμενοι (said of the ἰδέαι).

ἵστασιν. This word also suggests
something arbitrarily 'set up.' Cf.
Met. 995 b, 16 οἱ θεοῖναι τὰ εἶδη.
So ἀποσυνέβαλον below. For the tense
see note on ποῖον 1095 a, 26.

ἐν οἷς τὰ πρότερον κ.τ.λ. In a
numerical series we have priority and
posteriority. For instance 2 is prior

to 3 because if there is 3 there must be
2, but not vice versa. For this reason
of πρότερον cf. Cat. 14 b, 34 where
the second kind of priority is given as
τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι
ἀκολουθήσει, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ δυ ἀρ-
τέρον· δυὸν μὲν γὰρ ὅτων ἀκολουθεῖ
αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐν εἶναι, δυὸς δὲ ὅτων οὐκ
ἀκολουθεῖ δυὸ εἶναι, ὥστε οἷς ἀντι-
στρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνδεῆ ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ
τοῦ εἶναι τὸ λοιπόν.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν. If there were a
'form' of numbers, it would be prior
to the first number of the series.
Which is absurd. Met. 999 a, 6 ἐπεὶ
ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐστίν,
οὐχ οἷον τι τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖσιον εἶναι τι παρὰ
ταῦτα, οἷον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ
δυάς, οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὴν
πρῶτην τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, 'in the category of
essence.' For the doctrine of the Cate-
gories see Introd. § 26. They too
form a series the terms of which are
'not convertible according to sequence
of being.' If there is quantity there
must be substance, but not vice versa.
Substance is the *prior* of them all;
but, if there were a common 'form'
of which they all partook, it would be
prior to substance. Which is absurd.
τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία, 'the
essential, i.e. substance.' τὸ καθ' οὐτὸ

- 30 "Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ 4
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπείντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ
πολλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ
μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρικὴ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν
τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική
- 35 Ἀπορήσεις δ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν 5
1096^b αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἐν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς
καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστίν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἡ γὰρ ἀνθρωπότης,
οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ἡ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὲν 6

1096 a. 30. EE. 1217 b, 34 οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ μία οὔτε τοῦ
ὄντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ ὁμοιοσχημόνως λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ μῶς
ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι, οἷον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ μέτριον, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα ἑτέρον καιρὸν
θεωρεῖ καὶ ἑτέρα ἑτέρον μέτριον, οἷον περὶ τροφῆς μὲν τὸν καιρὸν καὶ
τὸ μέτριον θεωρεῖ ἰατρικὴ καὶ γυμναστικὴ, περὶ δὲ τὰς πολιμιαδὰς
πρᾶξεις στρατηγία, καὶ οὕτως ἑτέρα περὶ ἑτέρων πρᾶξεων, ὥστε σχαλῇ
αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρῆσαι μῶς.

a. 35. EE. 1218 a, 10 ἐστὶ τοίνυν, φασίν, αὐτὸ τι ἀγαθόν τὸ
οἷν αὐτὸ πρόκειται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν κοινόν· τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη
πλὴν ὅτι εἰδὼν καὶ χωριστόν, ἀλλ' οὐθὲν μᾶλλον λευκὸν τὸ πολλὰς
ἡμέρας λευκὸν τοῦ μίαν ἡμέραν· ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν
τῷ εἰδῶν εἶναι· οὐδὲν δὲ τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ταῦτο τῇ ἰδέᾳ· πᾶσι γὰρ
ὑπάρχει τὸ κοινόν.

b, 5. EE. 1218 a, 15 ἀνάπαυιν δὲ καὶ δεκτικὸν ἢ ὡς νῦν δεκ-
κίονσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀνομολογουμένων εἴχει

§ 4. καὶ οὖν ἐπὶ μίαν κ.τ.λ.
Endemias (loc. cit.) calls these τὰ
ὁμοιοσχημόνως λεγόμενα.

οἷον καιροῦ. Kairos is ἀγαθόν ἐν
χρόνῳ. For its use in strategy cf.
Thucydides and Demosthenes *loc. cit.*,
and for its use in medicine cf. Hippo-
krates Aph. I 'Ὁ βίος βραχὺς ἢ δὲ
τόχρη μακρὴ· ἢ δὲ καιρὸς ὀξύς, ἢ δὲ
παῖρα σφαλερὴ, ἢ δὲ κρίσις χαλεπὴ.
τὸ μέτριον, i.e. τοῦ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ
ἀγαθοῦ.

ἐν πόνοις. Cf. 1136 b, 28 n.

§ 5. Ἀπορήσεις δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ.
We have had three arguments to show
that this good is not καθόλου, we now

have two to show that it is not
χωριστόν.

τί ποτε καὶ ἡ ὑπακοή. 'What
ever they can mean by adding the
prefix αὐτο- to this.' Cf. Met.
1040 b, 32 τοιοῦτον οὐκ εἰσὶν αὐτὰ
εἶδη (sc. οὐσίας) τοῖς φησιν—ταῦται
γὰρ ἐσμεν αὐτοάνθρωπον καὶ αὐτὴ
ἵππων, προστιθέντι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ
ῥῆμα τὸ αὐτό.

οὐδ' ἡ ἀγαθόν, sc. διότι τὸ ἀγαθὸν
οὐ τὸ αὐτοαγαθόν. Mr. Bury proposes
to read αὐτὸ <τάγαθόν> ἢ ἀγαθόν,
but the brachylogy is quite Apulian.

οὐδὲ τῷ αἰεῖν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, ἢ τερ μὲν
 1 λεικότερον τὸ πολυχρόμιον τοῦ ἐφημέριου. πιθανώτερον δ' 5
 εἰκάσιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ τιθέντες ἐν τῇ
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἐν· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος
 ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ.

τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὰ ὑμνηγούμενα εἶναι ἀγαθὰ δεικνύουσιν, ἐξ
 αὐθιμῶν δὲ ἡ διακωνότης καὶ ἡ ὑγιεία ἀγαθὰ· τάξεις γὰρ καὶ ἀριθμοί,
 ὥς τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ταῖς μονάξιν ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἐν
 αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν. διὰ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογούμενων, ὅσον ὑγιείας ἰσχύος
 σωφροσύνης, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνιήτοις μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺν. πάντα γὰρ
 ταῦτα τάξεις καὶ ἡρεμία· εἰ ἄρα, ἐκείνα μᾶλλον· ἐκείνοις γὰρ ὑπάρχει
 ταῦτα μᾶλλον. παράβαλος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀποδείξις ὅτι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ
 ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἐφίενται· οὔτε γὰρ ὥς ἐφίενται λέγουσι φανε-
 ρῶς, ἀλλὰ λίαν ἀπλῶς τοῦτο φασί, καὶ ὁρίζειν εἶναι πῶς ἂν τις
 ἰσχυρίζηται ἐν οἷς ζωὴ μὴ ὑπάρχει, δεῖ δὲ περὶ τοῦτου πραγματευθῆναι,
 καὶ μὴ ἀξιοῦν μῆτιν ἀλέγως, ἀ καὶ μετὰ λόγον πιστεῖσαι οὐ ῥᾶδιον.
 τὸ τε φαίμεν πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεσθαι ἐνός τινος ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἀληθές·
 ἑαυτοὺς γὰρ ἰδίῳ ἀγαθῷ ἀίρεται, ὑβριζόμενοι ὡς οὐκ, σῶμα ὑγιείας,
 οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου.

§ 7 πιθανώτερον δὲ τὸ ἑκαστοῦ
 (see esp. 11c below on this, but we do
 not know enough about it to be quite
 sure of the interpretation. Speu-
 sippos is criticised (1) for trying to
 reduce things to be good because they
 are numbers instead of showing that
 number is good because something
 good, things are not simply number,
 (2) for saying that the One is the good
 because all numbers are at unity. At
 the same time, Aristotle says that,
 strange as this theory may be, it is
 more possible to say the One is the
 good than to say the Good is one.
 For there must also be some reference
 to the theory of Speusippus that the
 good is not eternal. Cf Met. 1072 b,
 ὡς ἔστι τὸ ἀπολυμαίνεσθαι, ὡς τὸ
 Πυθαγόρειος καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ καλ-
 λώτερον καὶ ἀριστόν μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι.
 See in 1091 a 33 we are told that
 some thought them ὑπερβολικὰ and said
 that ἐκείθεν τῇ τῶν ὄντων φύσει

καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐμφανέσθαι.
 His superior plausibility consists, then,
 in this, that, instead of starting from
 one universal eternal good and de-
 ducing all other goods from it, he
 makes the One the good to which all
 things tend and places it not in the
 beginning, but in the end. A uni-
 versal good seems more conceivable
 as a yet unrealised idea than as a
 first cause.

ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ. Met.
 986 a, 11 τὰς ἀρχὰς οἷον λίγους
 εἶναι τὰς αὐτὰς συστοιχίας λεγόμεναι—

- | | |
|----------------|--------------|
| 1. πέντες | καὶ ἑπτὰ. |
| 2. περὶ τὸν | ἄριστον |
| 3. ἐν | πληθὺς. |
| 4. δεξιὸν | ἀριστοτέρον. |
| 5. ἄριστον | θῆλην. |
| 6. ἡρεμότερον | κινεώμενον. |
| 7. οὐδὲ | καμπύλον. |
| 8. φῶς | σκότος. |
| 9. ἀγαθόν | κακόν. |
| 10. τετράγωνον | ἐτερόμηκτον. |

Ἄλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἐστὶν λόγος· τοῖς δὲ 8
 λεχθεῖσιν ἡμφισβήτησις τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ
 10 παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρησθαι, λήγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν
 εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ
 τούτων ἢ φυλακτικὰ πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ εἰς ταῦτα
 λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι εἰπὼν λέγοισι' 9
 ἂν τὰγαθῷ, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα.
 15 χωρίσαστες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αἷτα σκεψάμεθα
 εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδίαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; 10
 ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὄρᾶν καὶ
 ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δὲ ἄλλο τι διώ-
 κομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. ἢ οὐδ'
 20 ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας; ὥστε μῖταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος.
 εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τὰγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν 11
 ἅπασιν αὐταῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν
 χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκοτητος τιμῆς δὲ καὶ
 φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἑτεροὶ καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτη

§ 8 τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν κ.τ.λ., 'We can destroy a possible objection to our arguments on the ground that Plato's words do not apply to every good.' For ὑποφαίνεσθαι cf. Plato, Soph. 245 b τὰ οὖν ὑποφαίνοντα.

καθ' ἐν εἶδος, 'are so called because they are the same in species.' Aristotle opposes τὰ καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα to τὰ πρὸς ἐν which include τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ and τὰ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ. See further b, 27 n. In Rhet. 1365 a, 27 we find among received definitions of the good καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ ἢ φυλακτικὰ τῶν τοιαύτων... καὶ τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ.

§ 10. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The argument is put in the form of a dilemma, the two horns of which are introduced by ἢ (b, 27 and b, 29). Things good *pro se* either include something more than the Form of Good or they do not. If they do not, what is the use of the Form? If they

do, in what does their specific identity consist?

μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. 'The species (of things good *pro se*) will be purposeless, seeing that there are no good things of which it is the εἶδος. It will be a species to which nothing belongs, a form of which nothing partakes, a type which is nowhere realised. This is one horn of the dilemma.

§ 11. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. The other horn. If these too (i.e. ὅσα μονούμενα διώκεται) are good *pro se* and καθ' ἐν εἶδος λεγόμενα (b, 10) the definition of good must be the same in all of them, or they will not be a real species at all. Snow and white lead are both called white καθ' ἐν εἶδος and therefore the definition of whiteness (χρῶμα διακρινόμενον ὁνείη Top. 119a, 30) is the same in both. Is this true of the Good?

τιμῆς . φρονήσεως ἡδονῆς. These are the ends of the 'three lives.' Of

ἡ ἀγαθία οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινὸν τι κατὰ μίαν 25
ιδίαν

- 12 Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ φαίει τοῖς γε ἀπὸ
τύχης ὁμοιούμεναι ἀλλ' ἀρτί γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς
ἐν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὥς γάρ
ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ.
13 ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφαιτέον το εὔν' ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ 30
αἰτῶν ἄλλης ἀν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκείωτερον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

1096 b, 30. LE 1217 b, 16 ἵσται μὲν οὖν τὸ ὁμοιοποιεῖν περι-
τάλητος τῆς διχῆς ἑτέρας γε διατριβῆς καὶ τὰ πολλὰ λογικωτέραι ἐξ

οὗτοι φρόνουν is used in its wide
Platonic sense to include 'wisdom'
of all kinds.

ταύτη ἡ ἀγαθία. These are the com-
mon words. The definitions of know-
and white (and) are different too, but
not ταύτη ἡ ἀγαθία in so far as they
are regarded as belonging to the
series of white things.

κατὰ μίαν ιδίαν. Note the pre-
position. Cf. § 12 and the notes.

§ 12 πῶς δὴ λέγεται; κ. ἀγαθία.
If they are not said to λεγόμενα, in what
sense are they all called by one name?

τοῖς ὁμοιούμεναι. ὁμοιούμεναι are de-
fined as ἐν ὅμοιᾳ μὲν οὐσίᾳ, οὐ δὲ
κατὰ τοῦτο λεγόμενα τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἑτέροι.
Cf. 1179 a, 30. The usage of the
term, however, fluctuates somewhat.
Here 'similitudo ὁμοιούμεναι,' where there
is absolutely nothing in common but
an accidental identity of name, are
distinguished from certain other ὁμο-
ιούμεναι, for which see next note.

τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς πρὸς ἐν. This is the
same causal proposition as Cn. 1 a, 12,
a name which merely implies moti-
cation of the name by some inflexion
or suffix (πρὸς ἐν). They form an in-
termediate class between ὁμοιούμεναι and
ὁνομαζόμενα, the latter of which are also
κατὰ μίαν ἰδίαν λεγόμενα. For example,
ἐν γυναικὶ σικαν 'the healthy' in the
sense (i) of what produces and pre-

serves health (πρὸς ἐν), e.g. heal by
exercise (i) of what is a sign of health
(ἀφ' ἐνὸς), e.g. a healthy complexion,
(3) of what is capable (δυνάμει) of
health, e.g. a heal by man. Cf. Met.
1003 a, 33. So in Met 1050 b, 37
we speak of one ἰατρικὴ λόγος (ἀφ'
ἐνὸς) and an ἰατρικὴ μαχαίρα (πρὸς
ἐν). As Professor Stewart well says
"A knife and a lecture may both be
called 'iurgata.' They are both called
'surgical' not as an ox and a horse
are both called 'animals' (συναριθμοί),
nor yet as a key and the collar bone
are both called κλείς (συμμετρώσι)."

κατ' ἀναλογίαν. This is Aristotle's
own view. Things predicated in dif-
ferent categories can only be the same
κατ' ἀναλογίαν, that is their sameness
can be represented as a proportion.
This meaning of ἀναλογία is illustrated
by the example ὄντις : σῶμα :: νοῦς :
ψυχῇ. This illustration would at once
appeal to Aristotle's audience, as it
comes from Plato Rep. vi. To take
another illustration from the matter
immediately in hand, we may say
καίτοι : χυμὸν :: τὸ μέτρον : ποσότης.

§ 13 ὑπὲρ οὕτων Cf. 1096 a,
4 b.

Ἄλλης φιλοσοφίας, κ. τῆς πρώτης.
As Ramsauer points out, we have hints
of such a treatment in Met 1078 a, 31
τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αἰγιὸν ἑτέροι : τὸ μὲν

περὶ τῆς ἰδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ κοινῇ κατηγορού-
μενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν αὐτό τι καθ' αὐτό, δῖλον ὅτι οἷα
ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι
35 ζητεῖται. τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν 14
1007* αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ
παρίδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσδύμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν
ἀγαθὰ καὶν εἰδόμεν, ἐπιτευξομεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μιν 15
οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, εἰκε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμας διαφωνεῖν·
5 πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφείμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεῖς ἐπιζητοῦσαι
παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλι-
κούτου τοὺς τεχνίτας ἅπαντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδ' ἐπιζητεῖν
οἷα εὐλογον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφελήθησεται ὑφάντης ἢ 16
τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν,

ἀνάγκης (οἱ γὰρ ἅμα ἀναγκαστικοὶ τε καὶ κοινοὶ λόγοι κατ' οὐδεμίαν εἰσὶν
ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην). αἱ δὲ δεῖ στυγέως εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, λέγομεν ὅτι
πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἶναι ἰδίαν μὴ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι ὁποῖον
λεγεται λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς. ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

1098 b, 32. EE. 1217 b, 23 εἴπειτ' εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα εἰσὶν αἱ
ἰδέαι καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίαι, μὴ ποτ' οὐδὲ χρησίμος πρὸς ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν εἰδὼς
πρὸς τὴν πράξειν.

γὰρ δεῖ ἐν πράξει τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἐν
τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, 996 a, 17 ὥστ' ἐν τοῖς ἀκι-
νήτοις οὐκ ἂν ἐνδεχέσθαι ταύτην εἶναι τὴν
ἀρχήν, οὐδ' εἶναι τι αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. But
we have no full discussion.

ἐν τῇ κοινῇ κ.τ.λ. So Bekker
with I.^b. Bynae compares EE. 1218 a, 7 οὐκ ἐνδεχέσθαι τὸ πολλαπλάσιον
τὸ κοινὸν κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν.
See 1100 Top. 179 a, 8 φανερόν οὖν ὅτι
οὐδὲ ὁρίεον τόδε τι εἶναι τὸ κοινὸν κατηγο-
ρούμενον ἐπὶ πάντων, ἀλλ' ὅταν ποιῶν ἢ
πρὸς τι ἢ πορὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τι ση-
μαίνειν. K^b has καὶ for τό.

αὐτὸ τι καθ' αὐτό. For the order
Bynae compares EE. 1218 a, 10
αὐτὸ τι ἀγαθόν and Met. 1045 a, 16
αὐτὸ τι εἶδος.

§ 14. οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα κ.τ.λ.
Plato often substitutes the type to

which things approximate for the forms
in which they partake. The meaning
is not really different. Cf. Rep. 505 c,
519 c, 591 b.

§ 15. ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφείμεναι. Cf.
1094 a, 1 a.

τὸ ὠφέλιον κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1337 a, 1
πάντα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ τέχνη τὸ προσλει-
πον βούλεται τῇ φύσει ἀναληφρῶν.
This is only the other side of ἀγαθόν
τίκειν εἶπεται.

§ 16. ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων. The
regular Platonic instances. The tea-
cher makes the example for the ὑφάντης
(Krat. 288 c seq.), and Plato himself
had said that he looks to the ideas of
the senses, without bringing in the
ἀποαγαθόν, just as the ὑφάντης looks
to the ideas of the ἰδέαι.

ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἴσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν¹⁰ αὐτὴν τιθεαίμενος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσαύτον εἰρήσθω.

VII. Πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν,¹⁵ τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη φαίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τίχῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ἁμαίαις. τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῃ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν²⁰ ἁπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρήσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπαιτῶν ἴστί τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν ἀφικται· τοῦτο²⁵ 1δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἔπει δὴ πλείω φαί-

τεαίμενος, the Platonic word, οὕτως, π. 1000d.

μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε. This is not one of the doctor's art but of the politician. Cf. Met. 981a, 24 μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῦ γένους ὁρᾷμεν τοὺς κριταίους τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔχουσιν. 2. 17 αὐτὸν πρᾶξι καὶ α. γινέσθαι πάσαις τοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἐκτέλεσιν οἰκίαν· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἑαυτοῦ γινέσθαι οἰκίαν, πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Κελλίων ἢ Σωκράτης ἢ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀνθρώπων, ὃ συμβεβηκός ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν.

VII § 2. Πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν π. 71. Having disposed of the universal good, we may now consider the kinds of the wise i.e. (Plato) about the good, restricting it to the single kind, τέχνη or προαίρεσις of politics. ἐπισκοπεῖν, π. 700d. This particular is the question. Even if we reject the universal good, the Platonists will still give answers about the kind of a particular art, of which we may make use.

οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ. Cf. Top. 146b, 10 οὐ χάριν τὰλλα.

§ 2. μεταβαίνων. 'shifting its ground'. The verb μεταβαίνειν is technically used of the dialectic process. Cf. Top. 101a, 33 μεταβαλλόμενοι, ὅτι ἂν μὴ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ φαίνονται λέγειν. So EE. 1216b, 30 μεταβαλλόμενοι, ἐνομολογούμενοι (Innoc. § 12). Adopting the Platonic personification of the λόγος, we can say ὁ λόγος μεταβαίνει in the same sense. The meaning, then, is this, if the Platonists are 'moved on' or forced by criticism to take a fresh step, that is, to limit the good which we are seeking to that of some one art, their account of it comes into agreement with that from which we ourselves started.

διασαφῆσαι. This refers to another formula of dialectics, for which see 1238b, 25 ἀληθεῖ μὲν οὐδὲν δε σφίσι and the note.

§ 3. ἐπιτέλει. So Met. 1026a for the ἐπετελεῖ of the text. Professor Bywater, regarding μεταβαίνων πειρατέον as

νεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθ' αἵ τινα δι' ἕτερον, οἷον
 πλούτον αἰλοῦς καὶ ὄλως τὰ ὄργανα, δηλον ὡς οἷα ἔστι
 πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειον τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ
 μὲν ἔστιν ἐν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον,
 30 εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων τελειώτερον δὲ λέγομεν
 τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερου καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο
 αἰρετὸν τῶν <καί> καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετῶν, καὶ
 ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε
 δι' ἄλλο, τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ· 5
 1007^b ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα αἰεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο,
 τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα
 μὴν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοιμέθ' ἂν
 ἔκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν.
 5 διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμο-
 νίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται· τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὄλως δι' ἄλλα
 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αἰταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ δ'
 γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκές εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὐταρκές
 λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονωτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ

"intrusive" (Contr. p. 24), thinks the reading *ἔσαν* "attempt to disguise a structural flaw in the text"

αἰλοῦς. The soundness of this reading has been suspected, but, it now appears, without reason. Pseudo-Aristotle Bywater points out that in Plato Rep. 601 d the *αἰλός* is taken as a typical instance of the *ὄργανον*.

τέλειον τι. The account of the good now given comes from Plato's *Philebus* (see Appendix 6) τέλειον ἱκανόν, αἰρετὸν in Bury's edition). We are still discussing τὰ οὐκ ὀφθαλμοῖς δοκούντα. Cf. Phileb. 20 c Τὴν τὰγαθὸν μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλειον ἢ μὴ τέλειον εἶναι; — Πάντως ὁρθὸν τελειώτατον.

§ 9. καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ, i.e. without the proviso implied by the *πρωταί* of the comparative degree. For the *τά* of τὸ μέλλον καὶ ἦτορ here employed cf. Top. 113 b, 3 *τά*τις αἰ τι μέλλον καὶ ἦτορ λέγεται, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὑπάρχει.

§ 3. τιμὴν ἡδονὴν νοῦν, *εἰς* the ends of the 'three lives.'

§ 6. αὐταρκές, cf. Eth. eth. 10 c Ti δέ; ἱκανὸν τὰγαθόν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς αὐτὸ διαφέρει τὸν βίον τῶν, ἵν' ἴσῃ δὲ γὰρ ἕτερον πότερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἐστὶ προσδεῖσθαι.

οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, i.e. ἀρκεῖν *united* stood from *αὐταρκεί*. Aristotelic is explaining the sense in which he takes the *αὐτο*- of *αὐταρκεί*.

βίον μονωτην. The word *μονωτή* is peculiar to Aristotle (cf. 1099 b, 4, 1127 b, 21, 1169 b, 16, 1170 a, 31). It seems to be based on the *παιδεία* of ἰδιωτης. Cf. Demetr. περί εἰρημίας 144 καὶ ἐξ ἰδιωτισμοῦ ἀνθρώπου γίνεται (i.e. χάρις) ὡς δ' Ἀριστοτέλης "λογὸν γάρ," φησί, "μονωτὴς αἰμι, φιλαμειότερος γίνεται" καὶ ἐκ πεποιθμένων, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ "ὅσον γὰρ αὐτῶν καὶ μονωτῆς τιμῆς, φιλομειότερος γίνεται" τὸ μὲν γὰρ *μονωτή* ἰδιωτικώτερον ἔστιν

γονεύσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναίκεσσι καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ 10
 7 πολίταις, ἵππειδ' ὅς τ' ἐπεκτείνοντε γὰρ ἐπὶ ταῖς γονεῦσι <τῶν
 γονέων> καὶ τοῖς ὑπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων ταῖς φίλαις εἰς
 ἀπειρον πρόεισιν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυδὲς ἐπισκεπτόμεν· τὸ
 8 αὐτάρκες τίθεμεν· ὃ μονοῖ μιν αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ 13
 μηδέποτε εἰδέειν· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσέβαλεν·
 9 εἰς δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην· συναριθ-
 μουμένην δὲ δήλον ὡς αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν
 ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον.

44a-1, τὸ δὲ αὐτὴν πεποιημένον δε-
 νῶ αὐτὸν. Cf. Boet. 147^b a, 21 23q
 φέρεται πολιτικὸς ἀνθρώπος. Cf.
 Boet. 147^b a, 2 ὁ ἀνθρώπος φέρεται
 πολιτικὸν ὡς ἐστίν. I have given
 the reading of 1^b for I think most
 likely that the K^b reading πολιτικὸν
 ὁ ἀνθρώπος has been accommodated
 to the Politics.

§ 7 τούτων κ' ἔστιν ὅλως κ.τ.λ.
 ἐπὶ τοῖς γονεῦσι. This is not con-
 sistent with 10, even if γονεῖς can
 stand for προγόνους. Rensou's γονεῖς
 ὑπογόνους Forch. p. 111) is a highly
 probable conjecture.

ἐν ἀπειρὸν πρόεισιν. Cf. 1004 a,
 π. 2.

ἀποδείξω, sc. in the discussion of
 Nic. 1170 b, 20-24q

τὸ δ' αὐτάρκες κ.τ.λ. By αὐτάρκες
 we do not mean τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρκεῖν but
 τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρκεῖν 'what suffices by
 itself'. The αὐτὸ is explained by
 μονοῖ μιν. Most MSS (not K^b) have
 ἑαυτοῖς αὐτὸν as αὐτὸν καὶ ἑαυτοῖς,
 which seems to be the true explanation.

§ 8 ἐν αἰρετωτάτην. Cf. Philob.
 20 d εἰς τὴν ἀγαθὴν αὐτὸν ἀρετὴν καὶ
 φέρεται βελτίονος εἶδος κ.τ.λ.

μὴ συναριθμουμένην, 'not included
 in the enumeration' (of good things),
 'not as one good thing among others',
 'must include all things as good
 things, and therefore cannot be put
 on the same line with or made co-

ordinate with them (συναριθμεῖται τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς. He 1. 20 in the
 Philobos Putsch had shown that neither
 φέρεται nor ὁδὸς could be the good
 because φέρεται + ὁδὸς is better
 than εἶδος αὐτοῦ. Cf. 171 b, 28 a
 The best commentary is Klet. 147^b b,
 18 ἀπόδειξ' ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ
 ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκείνων, συναριθμουμένου
 τοῦ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐκείνων, μετὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γὰρ τὸ δ' ἐκπαρχέον
 ὑπερέχεται. It is only if all other
 goods are contained in it (ἐκπαρχέει),
 that we can be sure the enumeration is
 possible. If ἀγαθὰ συναριθμεῖται τῇ
 εὐδαιμονίᾳ, τίς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν + γνῶσιν
 πᾶσι 'exceed' εὐδαιμονία αὐτοῦ. Cf.
 also Jop. 117 a, 18 ἐπὶ τὰ πλείω ἀγαθὰ
 τῶν ἐκείνων (αἰρετωτέρα), ἢ ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ,
 ἢ ὅτι τὰ ἑτερα ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνοις ὑπάρχει,
 τὰ ἐλάττω ἐν τοῖς πλείοσι, τὸν πᾶσι
 Alexander (p. 247) Wahlen notes as an
 exception ἀλλ' οὐδὲ εὐδαιμονία μετὰ
 τῶν ἀρετῶν αἰρετωτέρα τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ
 μέγας, ἐπὶ ἐν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ περιέχεται
 καὶ αὐτὴ αὐτὴ· οὐ γὰρ συναριθμεῖται αὐτῇ
 περιέχεται εἰς τὰ περιεχόμενα ὑπ'
 αὐτῶν, αὐτὴ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν ἡθικῶν
 ἀρετῶν, ταύτ' ἐστὶν οὐ περιέχεται δὲ
 δεῖ προσδοκῆσθαι τὸ ἐν ταύτῃ εἶναι
 εἰς πλείω καὶ περιέχοντα ἀγαθὰ αἰρετω-
 τέρα τῶν ἐλαττόνων καὶ περιεχομένων,
 ἐν τοῖς συναριθμοῦσθαι πεφύκεσθαι.
 This prosodismos is made in Klet.
 loc. cit.

20 ἀγαθὸν δὲ τὸ μείζον αἰρετώτερον αἰεὶ τελειον δὴ τι φαίνεται
καὶ αὐτάρκει· ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος.

Ἄλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμο- 9
λογοίμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναρξέστερον τί ἐστίν
ἐτι λεχθῆναι· τίχα δὲ γενοῖτ' ἂν τοῦτ' εἰ ληφθῇ τὸ ἔργον 10
25 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ
παντι τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως οὐ ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν
τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τάχαθόν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δοξεῖν ἂν καὶ
ἀνθρώπῳ· εἴπερ ἐστί τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος; 11
μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἐστὶν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξις, ἀνθρώπου δ'
10 οἰδέν ἐστὶν ἄλλ' ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἡ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ
χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται
τι ἔργον, οὔτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις
ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οἶν ἐν τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ 12
ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ
1098 ἴδιον, ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αἰζητικὴν ζωήν.

1097 b, 24. FE. 1219 a, 3 ὥστε ἀπὸ ψυχῆς (sc. ἡ βελτίστη
ἐξ ἀρετῆς)· ἐστὶ γὰρ τι ἔργον αὐτῆς. καὶ τῆς βελτίονος δὴ ἐξ αὐτῆς ὅπως
βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἐξελίξεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, οὕτω καὶ
τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἔχουσιν, καὶ τέλος ἐκάστου τὸ
ἔργον.

τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος. Here
again the leading statement is ex-
pressed by the participle (cf. 1094 b,
21 a). 'Happiness, then, is complete
and self-sufficient, and is the end of
action.'

§ 9 τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον
λέγειν. 'To identify Happiness and
the best.' The addition of the article
to both terms shows that it is in-
different which is subject and which
is predicate.

ἐναρξέστερον...ἔτι. Cf. ἀλλότῃς μέν,
οὐκ ἐν δὲ σφαίρῃ 1138 b, 26 a.

§ 10. λεχθῆναι. Cf. Intro. § 53.
We are still 'taking' ἐνδοξον προτάσεις
from 'the wise.'

τὸ ἔργον. The following ἐνδοξον
comes from Plato, Rep. 353 d, 24 q.

where the *ergon* of anything is defined
as ὅ ἐν ᾧ μόνον τελειοῦται τι ὁ ἄριστος.

ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is an ana-
γωγή. Its conclusion is 'If Man
has an *ergon*, his good will depend
on that *ergon*.'

§ 11. πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ. An-
other αναγωγή. We see that (1) every
class of men has an *ergon*, (2) that
every part of man has an *ergon*. It
is therefore obvious that Man as such
should have an *ergon*.

§ 12. ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. The
'proper' function of man cannot be
anything 'common' to him and to
vegetables.

τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αἰζητικὴν ζωήν.
The life of nutrition and growth, the
presence of which differentiates the

ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ
 13 καὶ ἵππου καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῇ. λείπεται δὲ πρακτικὴ τις
 τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος [τοῦτου δὲ το μεν ὡς ἐκπαιδευθε λόγων, τὸ
 δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοοῦμενον] διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης
 τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγε-

1098 a, 5. EE 1114 a, 9 φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι βέλτιον
 τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἐξέως· τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἀριστον ὡς τέλος· ὑπάρχει γὰρ τέλος
 τὸ ἀριστον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, οὐδεὶς γὰρ εἴληκε πάντα. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν τὸ
 ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς ἐξέως καὶ τῆς διαθίσεως, ὁμολοῖ· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔργον
 ἀρετῆς ὁμοῦς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἑτερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν,
 ὡς οὐκ ὁμοειδὲς οἰκία ἀλλ' οἰκονομῆσι καὶ ἰατρικῆς ἐργεῖα ἀλλ'
 ἢ χυμῶνσι, τῶν δ' ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, οἷον ὕψους ἡμῶν καὶ μυθηματικῆς
 ἐπιστήμης θεωρίαν. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη, ὡς ἔργον ἢ χρῆσις, τὴν χρῆσιν
 βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἐξέως.

passage from the inanimate, life at its
 height. Cf. De An. 413 b, 7 θεωρητικὴν
 ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦ τοιαύτου μέγιστος ἐστὶ ψυχῆς
 ὁ δὲ καὶ τὰ φύσιν μετέχει. See the
 whole passage.

ἐπομένη τῆς, the 'subsequent life,'
 which, according to Aristotle, is the
 Cf. De An. 413 b, 1 το μεν οὖν εἴη διδ
 τὸ ἀριστον τούτων (i.e. το ἀριστον
 ἔσχατον τῶν ζῴων, το δὲ εἶδος διὰ τὴν
 θεωρητικὴν ἀρετήν. The sentient life
 cannot be the ἔργον of man. The
 'sentient life' here includes the life of
 mere sensation (θεωρητικὴ ζωὴ).

§ 13. πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγου
 ἔχοντος. The active life of the
 rational part. Τὸ λόγον ἔχον is that
 part of the soul which 'can give an
 account of itself and is therefore
 capable of wisdom (incapable of wisdom
 directed to an end. Observe that,
 though λόγον ἔχον may be translated
 rational, λογικός does not mean 'rational'
 any more than in ordinary Greek.
 τοῦτου δὲ διανοοῦμενον. This re-
 mark interrupts the argument and
 destroys the grammar. The language

too is late. The adjective ἐκπαιδευθε
 can hardly have been used by Ari-
 stotle. The note on the end of Book I,
 the distinction made at the end of Book I,
 and is quite irrelevant here.

διττῶς λεγομένης. It may be
 either a *διττὸς* or an *ἐνέργεια* (in the
 language of the Academy a *χρησις*).
 The distinction between the two is
 the same as that laid down in the
 De An. 414 a, 4 114. See especially
 417 a, 21 117, where the distinction
 is illustrated by the contrast of τὸ
 ἔχειν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν.

κυριώτερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reason
 is that the ἔργον is the end of the life
 and therefore better. Where there is
 an ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν that is
 better than the ἐνέργεια (1094 a, 5;
 but, when the end is the ἐνέργεια it-
 self, it is the final cause, and the life
 is only a *δυναμὴ* in relation to it.
 Now the *δυναμὴ* is referable to the
 ἐνέργεια (1170 a, 16 117) as that
 which determines it and makes it
 what it is (το κυρίον). Cf. Met.
 1020 b, 6-34.

σθαι· εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον· καὶ ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φάμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ καθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου
 10 καθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ ταύτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὁρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον καθαριστοῦ· μὲν γὰρ καθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δ' οὕτως, -ἀνθρώπου δὲ τιθεμεν ἔργον ζωὴν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν

1098 a, 7. EE. 1219 a, 13 ταύτων δὲ τούτων τὸν τρόπον διαρρισμῶν, λέγομεν ὅτι ταῦτὸ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ' οἷα ὡσαύτως. οἷον σκυτοποιικῆς καὶ σκυτεύσεως ὑπόδημα· εἰ δὴ (1. δὲ) τίς ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ σκυτικῆς καὶ σπουδαίου σκυτεύς, τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαίου ὑπόδημα, τοῖς αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

a, 12. EE. 1219 a, 23 ἐπεὶ ἐστὶν ψυχῆς ἔργον το ζῆν ποιεῖν, τοῦ δὲ χρήσις καὶ ἀγρήγορσις· ὁ γὰρ ὕπνος ἀργία τις καὶ ἡσυχία (1099 a, 2). ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ταῦτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς

§ 14. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. The definition of Happiness now emerges from the dialectic process.

κατὰ λόγον. This follows from its being ἐνέργεια τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. The activity of that part of the soul which 'has a ground' for its activity, will be explicable from that ground, and therefore 'according to rule.'

ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου. The phrase λόγον ἔχον may mean 'to be able to give an account of oneself' but it may also mean 'to admit of an account being given, 'to be explicable. If the λόγον ἔχον is only so in the latter sense, κατὰ λόγον may be too strong an expression, but, even in that case, a λόγος or 'ground' is implied, though it may not be explicit.

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ, τῷ γένει. 'generically the same.' Aristotle is meeting the objection that to pass from the function of an individual of a given class (ταῦδε) to that of a good individual of the class (ταῦδε σπουδαίου), from the ἔργον of Man to the ἔργον of the good man, is a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. Eudemos takes the Socratic example

of the shoemaker. If σκυτοποιικῆς (the ζῆν) and σκυτεύσει (the ἐνέργεια) have an ἀρετή, then (the ἔργον of the shoemaker being a shoe) the ἔργον of a good shoemaker will be a good shoe.

καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ κ.τ.λ. These words mark the ἐξαγωγή, like καὶ οὖν 1097 b, 16. The only difference is that καὶ ἀπλῶς lays stress upon the elimination (ἀφαίρεσις) of the particular instances, while καὶ οὖν lays stress on the inclusion of all other particulars.

προστιθεμένης κ.τ.λ., 'the excess in goodness (of the good individual over the individual simply) being added to the function.' We must make the same πρόσθεσις in both cases. If we say 'good shoemaker,' we must say 'good shoe.' Here ὑπεροχή is used in its usual mathematical sense of 'excess' or 'superfluity.' Cf. Index s.v.

ἀνθρώπου δὲ εἰ δ' οὕτως. Professor Wywater (loc. cit. p. 24) thinks this is clearly a duplicate of what precedes. I confess that I hardly like to put a limit to the capacity of Aris-

καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, ποιδαίου δ' αὐδρὸς εἰ πάντα καὶ
 15 καλῶς, ἕκαστοι δ' εἰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ὑποτελείται 15
 —εἰ δ' οὔτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται
 κατ' ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ
 16 τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελειῶν. μία γὰρ χειλιῶν ἔαρ οὐ
 ποιεῖ, οὔδ' εἰς ἡμέραν· οὔτω δὲ οὔδ' μακαριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα
 μία ἡμέρα οἶδ' ὀλίγου χρόνου.

20

καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔργον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀρετῆς ζωὴ σπουδαία. τοῦτ' ἄρα ἐστὶ
 τὸ τέλειον ἀγαθόν, ὅτερον ἢ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων
 (ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον, καὶ δὲ τελὴ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ ἀρίστα
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν, * * * αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ εἰς ἡ ἐνέργεια), ἐπεὶ βέλτιον ἢ ἐνέργεια
 τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τῆς βελτιότητος ἔχειται ἢ βελτιότητι ἐνέργειας, ἡ δ'
 ἀρετὴ βελτιότητι εἴη, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀριστον εἶναι
 ἦν δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον. ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς
 ἀγαθὴ ἐνέργεια.

α. 18. EE. 1219 a. 35 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλειον τι,
 καὶ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ τελεία καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὡπαύτως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 ἀλγ. ἡ δὲ μόριον) ἡ δὲ πῶν ἀτελεῶν ἐνέργεια ἀ-τελής, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία
 (ὡς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελειαν.

τοῦτο καὶ καὶ ἀντικεινόμενα protases
 exist when they involve τελεία, i. e.
 and γενικὴ ἀντικεινόμενα. He
 notes τέλει to be sure that he has
 said all he meant to say and can
 easily 'come back'. Cf. Del.'s note.

μετὰ λόγον. Like κατὰ λόγον
 (1098 a. 10 f.), this phrase belongs
 to ordinary Greek speech, where it
 means almost the same thing. It
 is, like, however, that the agent is
 coming out of the race he follows, that
 he acts not merely 'by rule' but 'with
 a view, and so that we later (1144
 b. 23 sqq.) that Aristotle insists
 on this distinction. For the phrase
 κατὰ λόγον τέλειον is opposed to
 ἀκαταλόγως τέλειον, i. e. without purpose
 and deliberately introduced for a certain
 purpose clearly realized.

§ 16. ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ, 'in a complete

life.' The authoritative commentary
 on this is EE. 1219 b. 3 τὸ μῆτε μίαν
 ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαίμονα μῆτε πάντα μὴθ'
 ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν ('ἐπὶ') ἀλλ' ὅταν καθ' ὅλην
 τὴν οὐσίαν γὰρ ἀνέλθῃ εὐδαιμον, οὐ γὰρ
 ὅλον (The parenthetical about Sotion
 has obscured the meaning of this, cf.
 p. 48.) Cf. also 1201 a. 13 ἐν πολλῷ
 τινι καὶ τελείῳ (cf. χάρις), i. e. ἢ μὴ
 τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον,
 1277 b. 23 λαβόντα μῆκος βίου τελείον.
 It certainly refers, then, to duration,
 and the later Peripatetic way of
 putting it (cf. MM 1183 n. 3 τέλειος
 δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος ὅσον ἀνθρώπου βίου,
 Stob. Ecl. ii. p. 133, Wachsmuth
 τέλειος δ' εἶναι τοῦτον ὅσον ὥσπερ ἡμῶν
 -τελὸς - πλείοντος ὁ θεός) is not really
 wrong. For, if we bear in mind that
 nature as a rule is ἐν τῷ πᾶσι τῷ βίῳ
 her end, it will not seem amiss to
 describe a 'complete' life-time, one in

Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τάγαθὸν ταύτη· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως 17
 ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἴθ' ἕτερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ' ἂν
 παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαμθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα
 τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εἰρετῆς ἢ συνεργόν
 25 ἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγύνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις·
 παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλείπον. μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν 11
 προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν
 ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ
 ἐπὶ τοσούτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων 1
 30 καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφεροντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἡ ποιὸν τι·

which the end of human life is attained, as the average life-time of man. If the θρεπτικὴ καὶ εὐζητικὴ ζωὴ were the truly human life, a bios τελείος would be one in which we had time to grow nearly 72 feet.

§ 17. Περιγεγράφθω μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Gen. An. 743 b, 30 ἅπαντα δὲ ταῖς περιγραφαῖς διορίζεται πρότερον. ὅτερον δὲ λαμβάνει τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰς μαλακότητας καὶ τὰς σκληρότητας, ἀτεχνῶς ὡς περ ἂν ἐπὶ ζωγράφου τῆς φύσεως δημιουργούμενα· καὶ γὰρ οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς εὐθὺς ἐναλαφίζουν τοὺς χρώμασι τὸ ἔργον. ὡσαυτοῦσαι ἀναγράψαι. The first word is a metaphor from sculpture, the second from painting. Introd. § 16.

προαγαγεῖν, 'to carry out,' 'advantage.' Cf. Met. 985 b, 23 οἱ καλοῦμενοι Πιθαγόρειοι τῶν μαθημάτων ἀψόμωτοι κρῖνται ταῦτα προήγαγον. Soph. El. 183 b, 28 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοὶ ἀρχαῖ (τῶν τεχνῶν) εὐροντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκίμοι κτλ παραλαμβάνοντες παρὰ πολλῶν εἰς ἓν διὰδοχῇ κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως πύξηναι. Poet. 1449 a, 13 κατὰ μικρὸν πύξῃη προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγγίγνεται θάνατον αὐτοῦ. ib. 1448 b, 23 κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες ἐγέννησαν τὴν πόλιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων.

In fact προαγαγεῖν is the transitive verb corresponding to ἐπιδιδόναι.

διαμθρῶσαι, i. q. διαμετρῶσαι.
 τὰ . τῇ περιγραφῇ. 'what is well outlined.' For the dative with καλῶς ἔχειν, cf. Kühner-Gerth § 419.

παντὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Soph. El. 183 b, 17 τῶν γὰρ εὐρισκόμενων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ' ἑτέρου ληφθέντα πρότερον πεποιημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδιδυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὁσπερ· τὰ δ' ἔξ ὑπαρχῆς εὐρισκόμενα μικρὸν τὸ πρότερον ἐπιδόσει λαμβάνοντες αὐτοῖς, χρησιμώτερον μὲντοι πολλῷ τῆς ὁσπερ ἐκ τούτων αὐτήσων. μήποτε γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ πάντος, ὡς περ λέγεται· διὰ καὶ χαλεπώτατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἀρδύστεον τῇ διδῶμαι, τοσούτω μικρότατον ὅς τῳ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατον ἐστὶ ἀφθῆναι. ταύτης δ' εὐρημένης ῥῆον τὸ προστιθεῖναι καὶ συναίεσις τὸ λοιπὸν ἐστὶν· ὅσῳ καὶ περὶ τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς λόγου συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι τέχναις.

§ 18. μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Rausow brackets from here to the end of the chapter. But see Introd. § 6.

§ 19. τὴν ὀρθήν, sc. γωνίαν. The verb ἐπιζητεῖν seems to be ambiguously used here. With ὁ γίνεσθαι it means *deinde fieri*, with ὁ γεωμετρῆσαι, *construere*.

εσατῆς γὰρ τάληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάριργα τῶν ἐργῶν πλείω
 10 γίνηται. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' αὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἡπασιν
 οὐσίαις, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἐν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς οἶον καὶ 1098
 11 περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν ἀρχῶν δ'
 αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει· αἱ δ' ἐθισμῷ τινι,
 22 καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. μετῆναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας ὅ πεφύ-
 23 κασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην 5

1098 a, 33. EE. 1218 b, 17 ὀρισθῶμενοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος τᾶλλα
 διανοίσασιν, ὅτι ἴσατον αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν· αἰτίαν γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἴσακα. οἶον
 ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἡγίαιεν τοῦ, ἀνάγκη τὸδε εἶναι τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς αὐτήν·
 τὸ δ' ἡγίαιεν ἡγίας αἰτίαν ὡς ἐκινήσαν, καὶ τότε τοῦ εἶναι ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦ
 ἀγαθόν εἶναι τὴν ἡγίαν. ἔτι οὐδὲ δείκνυσιν οὐδεὶς ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἢ
 ἡγία, ἂν μὴ σοφιστῆς ἢ καὶ μὴ ἱατρὸς (οὔτοι γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις
 λόγους σοφίζονται), ὥσπερ εἰδὲ ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οἰδεμέναν

δοκτῆς γὰρ τάληθοῦς, from Plato,
 Theat. 475 c τινος τῆς ἀληθείας μέλου
 θεωρεῖσθαι.

ἔστω μὴ α τ λ, from Plato, Theat.
 177 b νομῶ μὲν εἶναι τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ
 πᾶσι τοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς λεγόμενα, ἀποσπᾶ-
 σται α δὲ μὴ, πᾶσι δὲ ἐκτρέφοντα
 ἀποσπᾶσθαι ἡμῶν τὸν εἶ ἀρχὴν λόγον,
 καὶ ἴσως ἂν εἴποιτο γὰρ αὐτὸν δεῖ
 τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων διασώζοντα γίνεσθαι.
 Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 1098 a 21

τὸ μὲν πάριργον ἔργον ὡς ποιεῖται
 τὸ δ' ἔργον ὡς πάριργον ἐκτελεσθῆναι.

§ 20. τὴν αἰτίαν, i.e. τὸ διότι
 (1098 a 21). We should not ask to
 have the definition of Happiness,
 which is the ἀρχὴ of Politics, deduced
 from a thing higher. We must only
 expect to have τὸ ὅτι, the fact that it
 is so, exhibited to us (δειχθῆναι here
 seems to denote exhibiting dialectically

τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. Cf.
 1094 b, 6 ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι. We
 cannot demonstrate the definition of
 Happiness, we cannot show why the
 Good for Man is what it is. All we
 can do is to make clear what it is by
 a dialectical treatment of the beliefs

of those who have been trained in
 good habits.

§ 21. ἐπαγωγῇ 'by induction.'
 See Introduct. § 23. The ἀρχαί of
 physical science are apprehended by
 induction.

αἰσθήσει, 'by intuition.' See In-
 troduct. § 23. The ἀρχαί of mathematics
 are apprehended by intuition.

ἐθισμῷ τινι, 'by habituation.' The
 ἀρχὴ of Politics must be apprehended
 by habituation. The citizen whose
 character has been formed by habitual
 obedience to the laws of his state is
 the man who can apprehend it. Krieger,
 then, is a sort of practical peda-
 gogue.

§ 22. μετῆναι, 'to go in the track
 of,' 'in quest of,' 'to investigate,' a
 Platonic metaphor taken from hunt-
 ing, cf. Theat. 187 a πάλιν ὥστερ
 ἔχουσ μετὰ τοῦ, Poet. 263 b καθάπερ
 ἔχουσ τοὺς μέλισσας. So introduce in-
 vestigate. Hence the ποικίλος μέθοδος
 1094 a, 1 n.

§ 23. μεγάλην γὰρ α τ λ. Cf. the
 Introduct. 271 b, 8 τὸ μικρὸν παραβῆναι
 τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπιστομένους γίνεσθαι

γὰρ ἔχουσιν ῥῆσιν πρὸς τὰ ἐπομένα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείων ἢ ἡμῖν τοῦ παύτος εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

VIII. Σκεπτεόν δε περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμ-
10 περάσματος καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων
περὶ αὐτῆς τῶ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συντάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα,
τῇ δὲ ψευδοὶ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθεῖς. καταμετρήσων δὲ τῶν 2

1098 b. 11. FE. 1216 b, 26 παρατίειν δὲ περὶ πάντων τούτων
ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίαις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον
τοῖς φαινομένοις. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεται
συνομαλῶσαι τοὺς τοὺς ῥηθρησόμεναις, εἰ δὲ μή, πῶς γέ τινα πάντας,
ὥστε μεταβιβάζονται τοιαῦται· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκείον τι πρὸς
τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ ἧς ἀναγκάων ἐκείναις πως περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν
ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφὲς δέ, τραϊοῖσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφὲς,
μεταλαμβάνουσιν αὖτις τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν αἰσθητῶν λέγεσθαι συγ-
κεχυμένως. 1217 a, 10 ἐπὶ αὐτῷ δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ χωρὶς εἰπεῖν τὸν
τῆς αἰτίας λόγον καὶ τὸ διευκρινεῖν, διὰ τε τὸ ῥηθῆναι ἀρίστην, ὅτι
προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοὺς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μᾶλλον
τοῖς φαινομένοις (ὅν δ' ὁπότ' ἂν λυεῖν μὴ ἔχωσιν, ἀναγκάζονται
πιστεῖν τοῖς εἰρημένοις) καὶ διότι πολλάκις τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου
διόχευται δοκεῖν ἀληθὲς μὲν εἶναι, οὐ μόνον διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν
δι' ἧν φησὶν ὁ λόγος. ἔστι γὰρ διὰ ψευδὸς ἀληθὲς δείξαι· ὅλον
δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.

b. 12. EE. 1218 b, 33 πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτός ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ,
καὶ τούτων αἰρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διακριόμενα καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις.

ἐὸν μυστοπλάσιον... τοῦτο δ' αἰεὶ
ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ διτάμει μέγαν ἢ μικρὸν,
διότι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ μικρὸν ἐν τῇ τέλει
γίνεται ταυτογενὲς.

VIII. § 1. περὶ αὐτῆς, sc. τῆς
ἀρχῆς, i.e. the definition of the Good
for Man. The next step in the dia-
lectical process is to show that the
definition will explain all the λεγόμενα.
ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος κ.τ.λ. The
συμπέρασμα is the conclusion (i.e.
the definition of εὐδαιμονία), the ἐξ αὐτοῦ
ὁ λόγος are the premises. We have

reached our ἀρχή by inductive syl-
logism. There is no inconsistency
between this and the statement that
we must not ask for the διότι. The
inductive syllogism συλλογίζεται τὸ
ὅτι παρὰ τοῦ διότι. Its premises are not
αἰτία τοῦ συμπεράσματος.

τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, 'the data.' Here
τὰ λεγόμενα, current moral judgments,
are the data we have to deal with.

§ 2. γνωριμώτων... τριχῶν Πλάτων,
Laws 793e ὅτι τῶν γὰρ τριῶν τῶν ἀνδ-
ρων περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν σπουδάζει,

ἐπαθὼν τριχῶ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ
 ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ
 μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ, τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς 15
 ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. οἷστε καλῶς ἂν λέροίτο κατὰ
 γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἐξάν πηλαιῶν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογημένην ὑπὸ
 3 τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. ὁρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινες λέγον-
 ται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγα-
 4 θῶν γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτὸς. συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ 20
 εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἰ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σκίζον γὰρ εἰζωΐα
 5 τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα
 6 τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπαρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς
 μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δο-
 7 καί, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ ταύτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· 25

b. 16. EL. 1:19 a, 40 ὅτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὄρον αὐτῆς
 λέγομεν καλῶς μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. τὸ τε γὰρ εὖ
 πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὡς ἐπείστον χρῆναι
 εἶναι καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζῆσι καὶ ἡ πράξις (καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρακτικὴ
 χρηστικὴ, ἵσταν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλαρεῖ ποιεῖ χαλινόν, χρῆται δ' ὁ
 ἱστικός). Cf. Introduct. § 13.

b. 23. FE. 1214 a, 30 τὸ δ' εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως
 καὶ καλῶς εἶη ἂν ἐν τρισὶ μάλιστα τοῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσι ἀμετασφάτοις.
 αἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρόνησιν μέγιστον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθόν, αἱ δὲ τὴν
 ἀρετὴν, αἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν· καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, περὶ τοῦ
 μεγέθους αἰτῶν διαμφισβητούσι, συμβάλλεσθαι φέσκοντες θύτερον
 βυτέρου μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτήν. αἱ μὲν ὡς οἶσαν μείζον ἀγαθὸν τὴν
 φρόνησιν τὴν ἀρετὴν, αἱ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἀρετὴν, αἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρων
 ταύτων τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων, τοῖς δ' ἐκ
 8 διού, τοῖς δ' ἐν ἐν τινι τούτων εἶναι τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως.

τελευτῶν καὶ ἔμμεν εἶναι ἢ τῶν χρη-
 ματιῶν δοκεῖ ἀπευδαζόμεναι σπουδῇ,
 εὐμαρτοὶ δὲ πέρα μίσση, πρώτη δὲ ἡ πη-
 γυχή. A similar division is implied
 in Euthyd. 279 b and Phileb. 48 o.

αὐριώτατα. Cf. 1098 a, 6 o.

καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο, 'one definition
 will be equal.'

§ 4. τὸ εὖ ζῆν κτλ., 'the belief
 that the happy man lives well and

lives well,' which was referred to
 above 1094 a, 19.

§ 5. τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα, 'the desider-
 rata.'

§ 6. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ κτλ.
 Here again the reference is mainly to
 the Platonists. ἴσταν δὲ κτλ. This
 refers to Neoharites who included
 ἀθηρητικὴ δύναμις in his definition (cf.
 Introductory Note, n. 3).

ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαλαμβάνουσιν.
 τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι γ
 καὶ ἑνδοξοὶ αἰῶνες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν
 τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείεστα καταρβοῖν.
 30 τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα συνφθόος ἐστίν· ὁ
 λόγος· ταύτης γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει 9
 δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν,
 καὶ ἐν ἔξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδέχεται
 1099^a μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσιν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ
 καὶ ἄλλως πῶς ἐξηγηκότες, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οἷον οἷον τε.
 πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμ-
 πιασιν οὐχ οἱ κέλαιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ'
 5 οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι—τούτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν—αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν
 ἐν τῇ βίῳ καλῶν ἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὁρθῶς ἐπιβόλοι
 γίνονται. ἴσται δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ 10
 μὲν γὰρ ἡδισθαὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἐκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς δ

1098 b, 31. E.E. 1215 a, 20 ἔστιν δὲ φανερά τὰ πλείεστα τῶν
 ἀμφισβητουμένων καὶ δισπορουμένων, ἀν' ὧς ὁρίσθη τί χρὴ νομίζειν
 εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πότερον ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν τινα μόνον εἶναι τὴν ψυχῆς
 καθάπερ τινὲς φήθησαν τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων, ἢ οἱ μὲν καὶ
 ποιοῖ τινα ὑπάρχαι αὐτοί, μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖ τὸς πράξαι εἶναι τοιαύτας.

1099 a, 3. E.E. 1219 b, 9 καὶ στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ'
 οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες δέ.

εὐετηρίαν. Aristotle affects pastoral
 and agricultural words in his con-
 text. For εὐετηρία (from εὖ and
 ἔτος) cf. 1155 a, 8. So εὐημερία 1099 b,
 7 and εὐθετεῖν 1100 a, 7.

§ 7. πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοί... ὀλίγοι
 καὶ ἑνδοξοί. Introduct. § 15.

§ 8. συνφθόος. Cf. συνφθός 1098 b,
 10. On the reading see Bywater,
Cont. p. 25.

§ 9. διαφέρει δ' ὥς οὖν κ.τ.λ. This
 is where Aristotle parts company with
 Speusippus who defined εὐδαιμονία as
 εἶναι τελεία and Xenocrates who defined
 it as εὖ εἶναι τῇ αἰσίᾳ ἀρετῇ (Intro-
 ductory Note, 2. 3). His advance

on the Academy consisted in the sub-
 stitution of ἐνέργεια for εἶναι, or what
 comes to the same thing, χρῆσις
 for αἴσθησις. Cf. 1120 a, 8. 1119 b,
 31.

πράξει γάρ, sc. δ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργῶν.

§ 10. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδισθαὶ τῶν
 ψυχικῶν. "Pleasure belongs to the
 claim of psychical states." The point
 is as follows. All pleasure is a state
 of the soul, whether it arises from
 things external or from the activities
 of the soul itself. But pleasure, being
 a state of the soul, is more closely
 bound up with the activities of the

- λέγεται φιλοτιμοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα
 δὲ τῷ φιλοθώρῳ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ 10
 11 φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ἕλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρετῇ τοῖς
 μεν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδία μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ'
 εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκαλοῖς ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται
 ὁ αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πρῆξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσιν ἡδεῖαι καὶ
 12 καθ' αὐτάς. οὐδὲν δὲ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν 15
 ὥσπερ περιώπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.
 πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένειν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς
 καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ
 χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οἷτ' ἐλευθέρῳ τὸν μὴ χαίροντα
 ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 20
 13 τί ὁ οὕτω, καθ' αὐτὰς ἵν' εἴεν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι.
 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων
 ἑλασσοῦ, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει
 14 ἔ' ὡς εἶπομεν ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδιστον ἢ

α. 24-30. EE. *init.* 'Ο μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὐτοῦ
 γυνῆν ἀποφηνάμενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προτύλαιον τοῦ Αἰσώου,

and which feels it, than with anything
 external. The life of 'the good man'
 is therefore pleasant 'in itself' (καθ'
 αὐτῶν), not accidentally (κατὰ συμβε-
 βηκός). Goodness is pleasant to him
 because he is a man, whereas beauty
 is not pleasant to the φιλιππος qua
 man, but ὁ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ φιλιππῷ
 ὡς αἰ.

φιλοτιμοῦτος 'φιλο-τιμ' and so. This
 generic name for all compounds be-
 coming with φιλο- occurs below 1118 b,
 71. 1125 b, 14. It has been restored
 by Vahlen in Rhel. 1363 b, 3.

οἷον... καὶ ὁμοίως, αἱ ἐξαγωγῇ. Cf.
 1093 a, 10 B.

§ 11. τὰ ἡδία μάχεται. Cf. 1166 b,
 ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ αὐτῶν ἢ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸ
 καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλοίᾳ ἀνεχόμενος
 τῶν, τοὺς δὲ ἡδονῶν. See the whole
 chapter. As the pleasures are κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός they may be in conflict, οὐ

γὰρ πάντες συνδυάζονται τὰ κατὰ συμβε-
 βηκός (1127 a, 35).

τοιαῦτα, αἱ ἡδία.

τοιαῦται, αἱ φύσει ἡδεῖαι.

§ 12. περιώπτου. Camerarius quotes
 the Peripatetic Kritolaos (ap. Philon.
 2, 492) καταγοητεύουσιν ἀφ' αἰσθημάτων αἱ
 ἀμαρτίαι καὶ εἰς εὐχέλεια ἑταίραι περιώπτουσι
 καὶ εὐδὴν πόσι, χρεῖς γνησίαι. The
 idea here is surely rather that of a
prostitute than that of an *amulet* (for
 which sense cf. 1100 b, 39 a.).

πρὸς τοῖς ἀρεμένους. This com-
 pletes the proof of the essential plea-
 santness of good activities. Not only
 (1) does the good man take pleasure in
 them, but (2) he is not good unless he
 does so.

§ 13. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. They fulfil
 the requirements not only of τὸ ἡδύ,
 but also of τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ καλόν, and
 each of these in the highest degree.

25 εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ δαίριται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπι-
γράμμα—

κάλιστον τὸ διακρίτεον, λῆστον δ' ἡγαίειν·
ῥῆιστον δὲ πείθεσθ' οὐ τις ἐφ' τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταῖς ἐκτεργείαις· ταύτας
30 δέ, ἣ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φασὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

Φαίνεται δ' ὁμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένην, 15
καθάπερ εἶπμεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ βέβαιον τὰ καλὰ
πράττειν ἀχωρήγητον δοῦναι. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται,

διελὼν οὐκ ὑπάρχοντα πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ, τὸ τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ
τὸ ἡδὺ, τοῖσδε

κάλιστον τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι, λῆστον δ' ἡγιαίνειν·
τάττων ῥῆιστον δ' οὐ τις ἐφ' τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτῷ μὴ σιγχιωρήμεν· ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία κάλιστον καὶ ἀρίστην
ἐπ' αὐτῶν οὕσα ῥῆιστον ἐστίν.

§ 14. κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπι-
γράμμα. Eudemus makes this the be-
ginning of his Ethics with good literary
effect. The γνώμη as also found in
Theophrastus, 121, where, however, the
pentameter runs πρῶτον δὲ τερπνό-
τατον, τοῦ τὰ ἑμὲ, το τυχεῖν ὑποβο-
ήκει in his Kresousa (fr. 396) worked
it up in his own way.
Κάλιστόν ἐστι τοῖσδε καὶ πεφυκόσαι,
λῆστον δὲ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ῥῆιστον δ'
ἄνω

ἐπάρειν λῆστον ὡς ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἡμέτερον.
The authority of Aristotle is sufficient
to prove that it was really inscribed
on Leto's temple at Delos in the same
way as the γνώμη of the 'Seven Wise
Men' were set up at Delphi. Cf.
Freyer, *Inscr. Mus.* p. 165.

§ 15. Φαίνεται... προσδεομένην. We
now turn to the question of 'external
goods.' In spite of its being an
ἐξέργημα ψυχῆς, the good life evidently
stands in need of something over and
above τὰ ψυχικά. The word προσ-
δεομένη is appropriate because external
goods cannot be said to inhere (ὑπάρ-
χειν) essentially (καθ' αὐτὰ) in the good
life as pleasure does. Cf. *Cont.* 109a,
15 οἷόν τι δὴ προσδεῖται τοῦ ἡδέους
καθαρῶς εἶναι. No such state-
ment has been explicitly made, but we
have seen (109b b, 26) that some say
ἐντέος εὐτηρίας συμπαραλαμβάνεσθαι,
and that they are not likely to be
wholly wrong. We are still testing
our definition by τὰ λεγόμενα.

ἀχωρήγητον δοῦναι, just as a tragedy
cannot be produced unless its cost is
defrayed by a χορηγός, though all he
can do is really external to it and in
no way affects its excellence as a
tragedy (Poet. 1453 b, 7 το διὰ τῆς
δυνεως ἀτεχέστερον καὶ χορηγίας δεό-
μενόν ἐστι). The metaphor is a fa-
vourable one with Aristotle (cf. 1101a,
15, 1177 a, 30, 1178 a, 24, 1179 a,
11, Pol. 1298 b, 30 ἀχωρήγητον τῶν
ἀνθρώπων, 1305 a, 28 φανερόν δέστιν
καὶ χορηγίας τυχερά. In the *cont.* it
was no longer felt as a metaphor.
Polybius uses χορηγία for material aid
in war, what Thucydides and Demo-
sthenes call παρασκευή.

καθατέρ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς 1099^b
 16 εὐνομεως· εἰδὼν δὲ τηταίμενοι ρυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον
 εὐγενείας εὐτελείας καλλοῖν· οὐ πονν γὰρ εἰδαιμονικούς ὁ
 τὴν ιδίαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος,
 ἐτι δ' ἴσως ἦττον, εἰ τῶ παγκακοὶ παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ 5
 17 ἀγαθοὶ θυγῆς τιθῆναι. καθηπερ οὖν εἵπομεν, τοῖσι προσδέ-
 σθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτ' οὐκ οὐκ
 εἶναι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν.

1099 b. 7. EE. 1214 a. 24 πολλὰ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἐναι τὴν
 εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν. ἐκ 18 μάλιστα δὴ οἱ πρῶτοι ἐν αὐτῷ
 ἐκρίνασθαι μήτε προπετῶς μήτε βαθύως, ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ
 εἶναι αἰ, καὶ τινος εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐκδέχεται τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν.
 οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν, ὅν τ' ἄνευ οὐχ εἶναι τε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν·
 ἔκτος δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι καλῶς
 καὶ ὅν εἶναι οἱ δυνατόν εἶναι καλῶς (ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν αἰ
 εἶναι τῆς ὑγείας οὐδὲ τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν
 εἶναι καὶ τῶν πρᾶξεων, οἷον αἰετὶς τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἢ ἀγρηγορίας ἢ
 αἰσθητικῆς μετέχειν οὐδὲν ἂν ὑπάρξειεν ἡμῖν οἷς ἀγαθὸν οἷς καλόν,
 τὰ δ' ἴδια μᾶλλον περὶ ἐκείνων ψέουσιν· αἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν· οὐ γὰρ
 ὁμοίως οἰκίσιν πρὸς εἰσόδον τοῖς εἰρημένοις εὐνομεῖν καὶ τῶν περι-
 τάτων αἰ μετὰ διπλῶν). ὅτι γὰρ ταῦτ' αἰτία τῆς ἀμφισβήτησεως
 τῆς τοῦ εὐδαιμονίου, εἰ ἔστι καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων· ὡς εἶναι γὰρ οὐκ
 ὡς τε εὐδαιμονίαν, εἶναι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσι.

πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ κ τ λ. The first
 class of external goods consist of the
 instruments (ὀργανα) of happiness.

§ 18. ἰσὺν δὲ κ τ λ. The second
 class of external goods are the neces-
 sary conditions (ὡς οὐκ ἄνευ) of happi-
 ness. The same division occurs below
 1099 b. 27.

τηταίμενοι. A single word occurring
 nowhere else in Aristotle. The use
 of such words in passages like this is
 characteristic of his style. So we have
 κ τ λ. ἰσὺν δὲ καὶ ἀνὰ τὴν ταπεινότητα
 μὲν καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν.

ρυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον. Another
 general touch. Cf. 1100 b. 28 θάψει
 καὶ λησάνεται τὸ μακάριον.

οἷον εὐγενείας κ τ λ. Cf. the list of

what are called in a popular sense,
 μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας in Eket. 1230 b.
 18 εὐγενείας, εὐτελείας, χρηστοφιλία,
 πλοῦτος, εὐτελεία, εὐγενεία, εὐλογία,
 εὐχέλεια, μακάριον, δύναμις ἀγρηγορίας,
 δόξα, τιμή, εὐτυχία, ἀρετή. It is from
 such lists we may best gather the
 Hellenic ideal of life.

μονώτης. Cf. 1097 b. 20. Here
 it is contrasted with πολυφιλία etc. in
 the Eketonic (see last note). Aristotle
 has a strong sense of the part of the
 monastic life. Cf. 1097 b. 16-17.

§ 19. εὐημερίας. Cf. 1098 b. 26 n.
 The word became hackneyed in the
 sense.

τὴν εὐτυχίαν. The proper word
 in connexion with external goods.

ΙΧ. Ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ εἰσι-
 10 τὸν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πῶς ἀσκητὸν, ἢ κατὰ τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ
 καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οἷν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶ
 θεῶν δῶρημα ἀνθρώποις, εἰλογου καὶ τὴν εἰδαιμονίαν θεός-
 δοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον.
 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἢν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότεροι, 3
 15 φαίνεται δὲ κῦν εἰ μὴ θεύπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρίστην

1099 b, 9. EE. 1214 a, 14 πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτίον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν
 καὶ πῶς αἰτητὸν, πότερον φύσει γίνονται πάντες εἰδαίμονες οἱ τε γλα-
 νοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, ὥστερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χρόνιν
 διαφέροντες, ἢ διὰ μαθησεως, ὡς οὐκ ἐπισημῆς τινὸς τῆς εἰδαιμονίας,
 ἢ διὰ τινος ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ οὕτε κατὰ φύσιν οὕτε μαθούσιν ἀλλ'
 εἰσθεῖσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαῖλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐβουλεύσας
 χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς), ἢ τοιούτων μὲν κατ' οὐδένα τῶν τρόπων, ὁσὶν
 δὲ θύτερον, ἦτοι καθάπερ οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θείληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
 ἐπιπνοῖα δαιμονίου τινὸς ὥστερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην... ὅτι
 μὲν οὖν ἡ παρουσία διὰ τούτων πάντων ἢ τινὸς ἢ τινὸς ὑπάρχει τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἀσπλον (ὑπάρχει γὰρ αἱ γενέσεις σχεδὸν πάντων ἐν
 ταύταις τὰς ἀρχαῖς· καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς θαντοῦς ἀπάσας πρὸς τὰς αὐτὴν
 ἐπισημῆς ὅν τις συναγάγει πράξεις).

Cl. Rhet. 1363 a, 5 θλατὶ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὅτιν ἀπὸ τύχης ἐφ' οἷ
 ἐστὶν ὁ φῶνός.

ἔπειτα δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν. These words
 depend very loosely on *ὅθεν*, but that
 is no reason for expunging them. The
 meaning is 'while others identify it
 with goodness.' The remark is rele-
 vant as giving the two extreme views.
 And it is necessary to connect the
 argument with the next section.

IX. § 1. Ὅθεν καὶ π.τ.λ. 'It is
 just this (viz. the fact that some
 identify Happiness with *εὐτυχία* others
 with *ἀρετή*) which gives rise to the
 difficulty.'

πότερον.. ἀσκητὸν. These are the
 views of those who identify Happiness
 with goodness. Cf. EE. loc. cit.

ἢ... παραγίνεται. These are the

views of those who identify it with
εὐτυχία. Cf. EE. loc. cit. For
 the two views cf. Archilochoz fr. 15
 Πάντα τύχη καὶ μοῖρα, Ηορὰκλῆς, ἀνδρὶ
 δίδωσι, and fr. 16 Πάντα σῶσις τοῖς κα-
 θητοῖς μελέτη καὶ βροτοῖς.

§ 2. εἰ μὲν οὖν π.τ.λ. Aristotle
 attacks the *prima facie* plausibility of
 the naive religious view that *εἰδαιμονία*
 is good fortune sent by dispensation
 of divine providence. *Θεῶν μοῖρα* is
 the religious equivalent of *τύχη*, and
 is common y so used by Plato.

§ 3. ἄλλη σκέψις, i.e. *τῆς θεολο-
 γίας*. "Hæc magna sunt acie nantes
 quam pollicentia. Ubi enim ad de-
 demusque vel naturam vel volun-
 tatem pervenimus etc. Aristotelem
 constat perstrinxisse *εὐχίαν*." Kam-
 sauer.

καὶ τισι μάθῃσιν ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται τῶν θειοτάτων
 εἶπει τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι
 φαίνεται καὶ θεῖον τι καὶ μακάριον· τῇ δ' αὖ καὶ πολὺ-
 κοινοῦ· δυνατόν γάρ ὑπάρχει πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηραμένοις
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τινος μαθησεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας· εἰ δ' ἐστὶν
 οὕτω βέλτερον ἢ το ὅτι τυχὴν εἰδαιμονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν οὕτω
 πεφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν,
 καὶ μάλιστα <τὰ> κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. το δὲ μέγιστον καὶ
 γὰρ κάλλιστον ἐπιτερεῖται τυχῇ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἀνεῖν. συμφανὲς

b. 18. FE. 1215 a, 8 ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸ ξίγουν τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ
 λαμβάνειν, μάλιστα πρὸς δὲ δεῖ συντελεῖται πᾶσαν σκέψιν, ἐν τίνων
 εἰσέχεται μετὰσχέιν τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ζῆν, εἰ τῷ μακαρίως ἐπιφθονο-
 τερῶν εἶται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν περὶ ἕλαστα γενομένην ἀν τῶν
 ἐπιχειρῶν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῇ τυχῇ γινόμεναις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ
 καλῶς ζῆν ἐστὶν, ἀτελεστωτοὶ ἀν εἴη κυλλοῖς (οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ δὲ ἐπιμελείας
 ἢ ἐτῆσι ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας)· εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ οὐτὸν
 ἡμῶν ταῦτα εἶπαι καὶ τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πρᾶξεις, καὶ κενὸν ἀν εἴη τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ θεωτέρον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείονι ἐνδεχέσθαι ὑπάρχειν,
 ἐκότερον δὲ τῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς αἰτοῖς παρασκευάζουσι
 τοιοῦς τινὰς καὶ τὰς πρᾶξεις.

§ 4. ἀν δ' ἐν καὶ α α λ. 'But at
 the same time, it must be . . . ' This
 is not an accident, but a reservation.
 Aristotle wishes to guard against a
 common and easy perversion of the
 text. We may call happiness
 εὖ ζῆν and τὸ καλόν, but we must
 regard it as in the reach of all, not as
 confined to the favourites of heaven,
 a Privileged of Cæsars, as Stewart
 well says.

τοῖς μὴ πεπηραμένοις. Nature
 aims at the best, but is sometimes
 forced by Matter to remain at a
 lower stage of perfection. This Aristote-
 lic εἰς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Cf. Zeller (Eng
 Trans.) vol. i, p. 466.

§ 5. εὐλογον. Aristotle simply
 compares one plain duty to another

in accordance with the dialectical
 character of the passage.

§ 5. ἀπερ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν κ.τ.λ.
 The higher we ascend in the scale of
 causes, the more evidence do we find
 of teleology. The four chief causes
 are Chance, Nature, Mind (Man) and
 Necessity (1212 a, 31). The works
 of Nature are as good as they can be
 (cf. Phys. 260 b, 29 τὸ δὲ βέλτερον αὐτῷ
 βυλαρπάζομεν ἐν τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχειν,
 ἀν δ' ἀνθρώπου). Much more will this
 be true of the works of Man.

§ 6. α α δ - κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην, κ.
 αἰτίαν, i.e. διάνοιαν, Intelligence or
 Man.

πλημμελὲς ἀνεῖν. This is a simple
 appeal to cultivated feeling. The
 word is Platonic.

- 15 δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια [κατ' ἀρετὴν] ποιά τις, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὴν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρησιμα πεφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. ὑμολογοίμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ 8 τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἀριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αἷτη δὲ 30 πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆται τοῦ ποιοῦς τινος καὶ ἀγαθοῦς τοῖς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικούς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως 9 οὐν οὔτε βούν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲν εἰδαιμόν 1100^a λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὅλον τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οἷδε παῖς εὐδαιμόν ἐστι· 10 οὐπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν ταιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ 5 εἴπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλὰ γάρ 11 μεταβολαί γίνονται καὶ παντοδαπαὶ τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστα εὐθηνούντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρῳ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριίμου

1100 a, l. EE. 1219 b, 5 καὶ τὸ μήτε μὴν ἡμίραν εἶναι εὐδαιμόντα μήτε παῖδα μήτ' ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν (διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς, τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν), ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτέλεις εὐδαιμόν· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον.

§ 7 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου, 'as a consequence of the definition,' as well as dialectically. Note how the style changes at once from the literary to the scientific. Fund. § 7.

ποῖα τις, i.e. κατ' ἀρετῆς, which I take to be a gloss.

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν, sc. τῶν ἀπείρων.

τὰ μὲν.. ὀργανικῶς. A scientific description of the two classes of goods described in a literary way above, 1099 b, 1 sqq. They are (1) ἐξ ὁποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα (1) as *as such* ἀναί, (2) as *ἀναί*.

§ 8. τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ. 1094 a, 27 sqq. αἷτη δὲ α.τ.λ. As an *ἐπιστήμη*. Politics must know the best way of attaining its own end. We may therefore draw inferences from the actual

practice of lawgivers. As they try to make the citizens good, it is evident that they think it possible to produce Happiness thus.

ποιοῦς τις καὶ ἀγαθός, of a certain quality, i.e. good.

§ 9. εἰκότως οὐν κ.τ.λ. Some additions of a dialectical character loosely appended.

τοιαύτην, sc. πρακτικὴν τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσαν.

§ 10. ἀρετῆς τελείας, goodness fully developed in a complete life.

§ 11. πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The question of τύχη brings us back naturally to that of the βίος τελεῖος. εὐθηνούντα. Cf. 1098 b, 26 a. Theophrastus. Hist. Plant. 2, 3, 7 (of trees) τότε γὰρ εὐθηνὸν μέλισσα.

μαρτυρεῖται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τίχαις καὶ τελευτῇ-
 σαίτα ἀφ' ἑλπίος οἰδεῖς εὐδαιμονίζει.

Χ. Πότερον οὖν οἷδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμο- 10
 νιστέον ὥς ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρόνῳ τέλος ὄραν; εἰ δὲ
 ὁῦ καὶ θετέον οὔτως, ἀρὰ γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαιμών τότε ἐπειδὴν
 ἀποθνήσκει; ἢ τοῦτο γε παντελῶς ἀτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς
 3 λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ; εἰ δὲ μὴ
 λέγομεν τὸν τεθνήκῃτα εὐδαιμόνα, μὴδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, 15
 ἀλλ' ὅτι τηλικαῦτα ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον
 ὥς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει
 μιν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ
 τεθνήκῃτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἔπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ
 αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ 20
 4 ὅλων ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν δὲ

Χ. § 1. Πότερον οὖν κτλ. The
 best way of bringing out the relation
 of *εὖ-χε* and external goods to the good
 life is by discussing Solon's lesson.
 We shall find that the true solution
 of it is that, though we must have a
 τέλος *βίος*, we are only bound to
 accept Solon's view in its extreme
 form if we identify *εὐδαιμονία* with
εὐτυχία.

οἷδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, 'not even any
 one else' though he may not meet
 with *ἱππεύων τοῖς*.

κατὰ Σόλωνα. FRG I, 32 σκοπεῖν
 δι' αὐτὴν παρὰ τοῖς χρόνοις τῆς τελευτῆς
 εἰ ἀποθνήσκει. The discussion was a
 commonplace of the Age of the Seven
 Wise Men and passed into a proverbial
 maxim, like so many other γνώμαι.
 Socr. Trach. i. 1113. λόγος ἀρχαῖος
 ἀνθρώπων φανερὸς

§ 2. ἀτοπον. The word marks
 the dialectical character of the argu-
 ment. It is the opposite of *εὐλογον*.
ἱππεύων οἷον would at once reject
 the idea that a man is happy after he
 has died.

§ 3. ἐννεαίτη, 'then and not till
 then.' Usually *ἐννεαίτη* *ἢ* *ὅτε* or *τότε*

δὲ, *cum demum*.

ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν. 'admits of
 dispute.' Cf. Index s.v. *ἔχει*.

δοκεῖ γὰρ κτλ. There is no
 question here as to the departed
 being aware of what goes on in this
 world. On the contrary, the point is
 that what happens after a man's death
 may affect our estimate of his life in
 just the same way as what happens in
 his life affects our estimate of it. Neither
 makes any difference
 to the man himself, but the popular
 belief is (*δοκεῖ*) that it must affect our
 estimate of it. We cannot call that
 life a success which leads to failure,
 even though the man himself may
 never know of his failure, or may die
 in time to escape it. So with the
 fortunes of children. Even now we
 say 'what would his poor father think,
 if he were alive?'

ὡς καὶ καὶ, 'just as much and just
 as little.' If Happiness consists in
 external goods, a man may very well
 lose it without being aware of his loss
 δι' ἀποθνήσκειν *ὥς* *ἢ* *διὰ* χρόνῳ καὶ
σφοδρῶν ἀσυχολίας *πρὸς* *ἑνὲρα* (Eu-
 stratos).

καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῇ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι
 γήρας καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μετα-
 βαλὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν
 25 ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐν-
 αντίας· ὁ δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς
 παντοδαπὰς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. ἄτοπον δὲ γίνεοιτ' ἂν
 εἰ συμμιταβαλλοὶ καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς καὶ γίνεοιτο ὅτε μὲν εἰδαίμων
 πάλιν δ' ἄθλιος, ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον 5
 30 συνικνίσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον 6
 ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθεῖν· ταχὺ γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθεῖ καὶ τὸ
 νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. εἰ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ 7
 τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οἷχ' ὥς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι
 πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εἰδαίμων μὴ
 35 ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι
 1100¹ τοὺς ζῶντας εἰδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς, καὶ διὰ τὸ
 μονιμὸν τι τὴν εἰδαιμοσίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐ-

§ 4. κατὰ λόγον, 'accordingly,'
 'consistently with his life.' The editors
 as a rule see that 'according to
 reason' will not do here, but it has
 not always been seen that this use
 of the phrase determines its meaning
 in such passages as 1095 a, 10. The
 original sense of the phrase is 'in
 proportion' and hence it is used of
 anything that, being 'according to
 rule,' can be calculated upon and is
 uniform or consistent. The opposite
 of τὸ κατὰ λόγον is τὸ παράλογον, that
 which violates all rules of probability
 and is therefore incalculable. Cf.
 Plato, Polit. 283 c ἵνα κατὰ λόγον
 ἐπανῶμεν κ.τ.λ. Rep. 300 c πόρρω...
 πάντες καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα.

τοῖς ἀποστήμασι, the different de-
 grees in which the descendants are
 'removed' from their ancestor.

ἄτοπον. Cf. 1100 a, 13 n. This
 sentence shows clearly that there is
 no question of the dead man being
 aware of what takes place. If he
 were, there would be no absurdity in

his being at one time happy, at
 another wretched. What is absurd
 is that our estimate of the success or
 failure of his life as a whole should be
 indefinitely subject to revision.

§ 5. συνικνίσθαι. The use of this
 word is, of course, flatly inconsistent
 with the view that the dead man οὐκ
 αἰσθάνεται. The inconsistency, how-
 ever, is not Aristotle's. We may
 learn from Kahde's 'Psyche' how
 very inconsistent and illogical popular
 views on this subject were. Cf.
 e.g. Isokr. Aligin. § 42 αὐτὸ ἔστιν
 αἰσθῆναι τοῖς τεθνεώσι τὼς ἐπὶ αὐτῷ
 γινόμεναι.

§ 6. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον κ.τ.λ. The
 locus of the first ἀπορία, viz. πρότερον
 οὐδὲν εἰδαιμονίζειν ἔωι ἂν [7]:
 (1100 a, 31...1101 a, 21).

τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον, sc. the ἀπορία
 raised in § 3. Cf. § 4 ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ
 ταῦτα παρῆχαι.

§ 7. ἀληθεύσεται, passive. Cf.
 Bonitz, Index s.v. ἀληθεύω.

τὸ ὑπάρχον, 'the fact'

μετάβολον. τὰς δὲ τύχης πολλάκις ἀνακνελίσθαι περὶ τοῖς
 βεβυτούς; ὁῦλον γὰρ ὥς εἰ συνακολουθοῖμεν ταῖς τιχαῖς,
 τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἔροῦμεν πολλάκις, 5
 "χαμαιλιόντα" τινὰ τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαινόντες "καὶ
 θσαθρῶς ἔδρυμένον." ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαῖς ἐπακολουθεῖν
 ἡδαιμῶν ὄρθην; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ
 προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἶπομεν,
 εὐρίαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ τὸ
 10 δ' ἐναιτιαὶ τοῦ ἐναιτιῶν μαρτυρεῖ δι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εἶν
 διαποριθεῖν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπί-
 νων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὥς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν,
 μοιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἷται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.
 τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμωτάται μονιμώτεραι διὰ τὸ μάλι- 15
 στα καὶ συνεχίστατα καταξῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοῖς μακρυαῖς.
 τοῦτο γὰρ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς λήθην.
 20 ὑπάρξει ἐν τῷ ζητούμενῳ τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ εἶναι διὰ βίου
 τοιοῦτος· οὗ γὰρ ἡ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει
 τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἶσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντη 20
 πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὁ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ "τετράγωνος
 25 ἀνὴρ ψόγον." πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφε-
 ρόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχη-
 μιστῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ἐξήλυν ὥς οὐ ποιεῖ

§ 8. χαμαιλιόντα κ.τ.λ., changing
 colour with the changing ground of
 external circumstances. The words
 χαμαιλιόντα κ.τ.λ. εὐδαίμονα εἶναι
 to come from some poet.

§ 10 τῷ λόγῳ, i.e. that activities
 according to goodness and not fortune
 determine happiness. The difficulty
 just discussed is now διαποριθεῖν
 is shown this, for it has been said
 ὁμοίως τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν περιλαμβάνει.
 Now fortune does not decide good-
 ness alone.

καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. CL 1149 b,
 18

δ' ἐμμελῶς, i.e. as we shall learn later on.
 συνεχίστατα. Cf 1173 a, 31.

§ 11. τὸ ζητούμενον, i.e. the βεβαι-
 οῦς.

τοιοῦτος, i.e. εὐδαίμων
 πάντων. Macculhine. The reason
 why it is more because τὰ ἀνθρωπί-
 να εἶναι ἀντικειμένων ἐνεργειῶν.

καὶ θεωρήσει. A1 through this
 passage, Aristotle has the θεωρητικὸς
 life that not γ' in view.

ὁ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς κ.τ.λ. from Simon
 idea. The passage is quoted and
 discussed in Plato, Protag. 339 b.

Ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλλοτρίως γαστρίαι
 χαλεπὸν

χερσὶν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόγῳ
 τετράγωνον ἀνὴρ ψόγον τε-
 τυγμένον.

25 ὁππῇ τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ ἐκ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν
 εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει—καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπι-
 κοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία
 γίνεται—ἀνύπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλάβει καὶ λυμαιοῦται
 τὸ μακίριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς
 30 ἐνεργεταῖς ὁμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις διαλαμβάνει τὸ καλόν,
 ἐπειδὴν φέρη τις εὐκίλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας,
 μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ἂν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος.
 εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνεργεταὶ κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἶπομεν 13
 οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ
 35 πράττει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς
 1101* ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐμφρονά πᾶσας οἰόμεθα τὴς τύχης εὐσχημόνως
 φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰεὶ τὰ κολλίστα πράττειν,
 καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγοῦ ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ
 χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων
 5 σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἀπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν X
 οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὲν μακάριός γε, ἂν
 Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. οἶδε δὲ ποικίλος γὰρ καὶ
 εἰς μετίβολος οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εἰδαιμονίας κινήσεται ῥα-
 10 δίας, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγά-
 λων καὶ πολλῶν, ἐκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οἷε ἂν γένοιτο παλιν

§ 12. *λύπας τε γὰρ κτλ.* A frag-
 ment of Theophrastus preserved by
 Plutarch seems to belong to the dis-
 cussion. Cf. V. Per. c. 38 ὁ γὰρ
 Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς διαπορᾷ
 εἰ πρὸς τὰς τύχας πρῶτον, τὰ ἥθη καὶ
 κινήματα τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων πάθεσιν ἐξ-
 ἵσταται, τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἀσάρρηκτον δὲ νοῦν δὲ
 Περικλῆς ἐπισκοποῦμεν τὴν τῶν φίλων
 διεξίτιν περιπατεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν
 τῷ τραχέει περιηρημένον, ὡς σφόδρα
 κακοῖς ἔχον ὅπως καὶ ταύτην ἱστοῦνται
 τῇ ἀλκιερίᾳ. Cf. U. venter, *Analecta*
Theophrastae, p. 13 and 153 b, 19 n.

μὴ δ' ἀναλγησίαν. The ἀναλγησις
 (1115 b, 16) is the man of stupid in-
 sensibility, insensibility to pain being

regarded as the mark of a coarse
 nature. He is closely akin to the
 ἀναισθητός (1104 a, 14 n.), but the
 insensibility of the latter is intellectual
 rather than moral. Kleon bids the
 Athenians not to show themselves
 ἀναλγητότεροι than the Mityleneans
 (Thuc. ii. 40, and Demosthenes De-
 Cor. 31) quotes Alcibiades as speaking
 of the ἀναλγησις of the Theban power.
 See also 1116 a, 3 n.

§ 13 οὐδέποτε γὰρ κτλ. His
 ἐνεργεταὶ will never be of the kind
 called αἱ θανάτια supra 1100 b, 11,
 and it is these alone which can make
 a man positively ἀθλιός.

εἰδαιμόνῳ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ
τελείῳ, μεγάλῳ καὶ καλῷ ἐν αὐτῷ γενομένος ἐπήβολος.
τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εἰδαιμόνα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν
ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἰκανῶς κεχορηγημένον 15
μὴ τὸν τιχόντα χρόνιον ἀλλὰ τελειον βίον, ἢ προσθετίον
καὶ βιωσόμενον οἷτω καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ
τὸ μέλλον ὁφθαλμῶς ἡμῖν ἐστίν, τὴν εἰδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ
10 τελειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως; εἰ δ' οἷτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν
τῶν ζωντῶν οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους το
δ' ἀπεθνήκοντες καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρισθῶ.

XI. Τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων
το μὲν μηδιστοῦν συμβῆλ्लεσθαι λίαν ἄβηλον φαίνεται καὶ
1 ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων δια-
φορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνηκούν- 25
των τῶν δ' ἄντων, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαίρειν μακρὸν καὶ
ἀτίεραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθεὶν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν
3 ἰκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δὲ, καθ' ἑκάστην καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχ-
ματων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βερίθες καὶ βροτήν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ
δ' εὐαφροτεροὺς εἰσικεν, οὔτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως 30

§ 15. ἢ προσθετίον κ.τ.λ. It seems
thought that a later Peripatetic ad-
dition, inconsistent with the rest of
Aristotle's account, though in har-
mony with the view of MM 1183 a, 5
that a τελείος βίος is ὁσον ἀνθρώπου
βίος. If we make this addition, it
seems we might as well accept Solon's
dictum at once, as Eudemos argues
to do. 219 b, 61. But the difficulty
disappears if we keep what is said
about Γρησίου τύχα, & say in view
there are here mentioned (1100 a,
5 seq.) before the discussion of Solon's
dictum, has begun, so that discussion
includes, not only the question whether
we may or may not call any other
man—other than the man who meets
with Πρωταιρι τύχαι happy so long
as he lives. We must, then, make
this particular reservation whatever

conclusion we come to on the main
question.

κατὰ λόγον. Cf. 1100 a, 15 a.

§ 16 μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους, ἀπ-
οῦτος reservation. Happiness is an
ἐνέργεια and therefore complete at
any moment or in the whole (1174 a,
13 seq.), but τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ
συνεχῶς ενεργεῖν.

XI. § 1 τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων
κ.τ.λ. The latter of the second aporia,
viz πότμον συμβάλλονται αἱ τῶν ἀπο-
γόνων τύχαι; 1101 a, 23—b, 9.

συμβάλλεσθαι, sc. πρὸς τὸ εἶδειν
μορεῖν ἢ μή.

§ 3 αἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. A complex pro-
position, the two members of which are
καθ' ἑκάστην ἀπορίας ἀντιρροφίαν ἐμ-
πίσθη. The apodosis begins αὐ-
λογιστέον δέ. The answer to this
question is made to depend upon

ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγηδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι συλλογιστίον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν, μᾶλλον δ' Ἰσως 35
 1101^b τοῦτο διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινο-
 νοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων. ἔοικε γοῦν ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ δικαιο-
 ται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοῖναντιον, ἀφανρόν
 τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσούτον
 γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας
 5 μὴδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβαλλεσθαι 6
 μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ ἐπ' αἰτίας τῶν φί-
 λων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα
 ὥστε μῆτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εἰδαίμονας ποιεῖν μὴτ' ἄλλο
 τῶν τοιούτων μὴδέν.

10 XII. Διορισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς
 εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν

1101 b, 10. EE. 1219 b, 11 διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται; διὰ ταύτην γὰρ, ἢ τῇ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφίρεσθαι ἢ τῇ μόρᾳ εἶναι αἰτίας. διὰ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἐπαινος καὶ ἡγεμόμων.

what is laid down above 1100 b, 23-25

§ 4. ἕκαστον, accusat ve with συμβαίνειν.

προϋπάρχειν, 'to be assumed' (cf. τοῦ δράματος (Poet. 1460 a, 29 sqq.) To take place 'behind the scenes' or 'before the curtain rises'. The murder of Laios, for instance, does not affect us as it would do if it formed part of the action. The regular word for 'action' in this sense is πράττεσθαι.

§ 5. συλλογιστίον. 'We must estimate' or 'allow for this difference too.' The word is not used in its technical sense. L^b and the Vetus Versio (12a) read ταύτῃ for ταύτην which would mean 'we must allow for the difference in this way too.'

τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι, sc. συλλογιστίον.

* We must allow for the fact that a difficulty is felt. Lambinus conjectured τοῦδε δεῖ διαπορεῖσθαι. Rizzo now reads τοῦδε δεῖ διαπορεῖσθαι. But the difficulty has been already alluded to above 1100 a, 11.

γοῦν. This seems to be implied by the γάρ of K^b and the οὖν of L^b.

ἐκ τούτων, sc. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέτων.

ἀφανρόν. Professor Bywater (Conts p. 26) points out that this is a poetic word and suggests ὄμωρον, 'obscure,' cf. De An. 403 a, 19.

ἢ ἐκείνοις, sc. ἢ κεκμηκόσις.

εἰ δὲ μή, sc. δικαιοῦναι. This shows clearly that the question is not mainly one of the dead man's own feelings but only of our estimate of his life.

XII. § 1. ἐπισκεψώμεθα π. τ. λ. Happiness is not a mere δόξα. Is

1 τ. μίον· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. φαίνονται
 ἢ τῶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιοῦν τι εἶναι καὶ πρὶς τί πως ἔχειν
 κταινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν
 ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ 15
 ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν δρυμικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἕκαστον τῷ ποιοῦν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγα-
 3 θ. ν. τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς
 θεοὺς ἐπαινῶν· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερο-
 μενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαινους δι' 20
 4 ἀναφορὰς, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν. εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὁ ἐπαινος τῶν τοιοῦ-
 των, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλ' ἢ μείζον
 τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθότι καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς
 μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θεοιο-
 τίτους [μακαρίζομεν] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἵδεῖς 25
 γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὥς

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον· ὁ δ' ἔπαινος
 τοῦ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου· ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.

κ ἐπαινετὸν or τιμὸν, i.e. has it a
 relative or an absolute value?

τιμῶν, precursors. (Cf. MM.
 1103 a 20-24. ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 τὸ μὲν τιμῶν, τὸ δ' ἐπαινετὸν, τὰ δὲ
 τιμῶν τὸ δὲ τιμῶν λόγῳ τὸ τοιο-
 ῦτον, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ βέλτιον, οἷον ψυχὴ,
 νόον, οὗ ἀρχαῖον τὸν τὸ δ' ἐπαινετὸν
 οἷον ἀρετὴν τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις οἷον ἀρχὴ
 ἐλπίδος ἐλπίδος καὶ ἄλλος τοιοῦτος γὰρ καὶ
 ὁ ἐπαινετὸν τὸ δὲ δυνάμεις χρῆσθαι
 καὶ ὁ φαίνομαι καὶ, ὁ δὲ δυνάμεις τὰ
 ἐπαινετὸν καὶ ἄλλος ἀγαθὰ. If this is
 correct, the δυνάμεις here are identical
 with τὰ βέλτιον ἀγαθὰ. Cf. also Thrasym.
 110 b, 4 καὶ οἱ οἱ τῶν θεῶν ἀπὸ τιμῶν
 ἢ αἰσθητῶν καὶ ὁράσας ἢ τὸ δυνάμεις ἢ
 τιμῶν (cf. 109 b, 12) ὁμοίως.

§ 2. τῷ ποιοῦν τι εἶναι κ.τ.λ., 'in
 respect of some quality and relation.'

§ 3. ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαινῶν,
 'from the praises of the gods.' Here
 we see the c. nos., used as in 109 b,

14 περὶ ψυχῶν and 1101 a, 28 περὶ
 αὐτῶν, develop into a regular genitive
 equivalent, just like the Latin *de*.
 Though barely noticed in the manuscripts,
 this construction is quite common in
 Plato, being used chiefly to avoid a
 cumulation of genitives. For other
 examples see Index a.v. *περὶ*.

γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται, sc. οἱ θεοί.
 'It strikes us as absurd that the gods
 should be referred to our standard'
 (personal construction). The good-
 ness of the gods is independent of
 their relation to us, and so praise of
 them based on a reference (*ἀναφορὰ*)
 to human needs and desires is absurd.

§ 4. τῶν τοιοῦτων, sc. τῶν πρὸς τί
 πως ἔχοντων, the 'relative.'

[μακαρίζομεν], suspected by Sus-
 ann. and bracketed by Bywa cr
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν, sc. τὰ θιότατα μακαρί-
 ζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν.

θειώτερον τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαριζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος 5
καλῶς συνηγορεῖσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ
ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐσαν μνησκεῖν οὗτο ἵπαι κρεῖττόν ἐστι
30 τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τον θεον καὶ τὰγαθόν· πρὸς
ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινος 6
τῆς ἀρετῆς, πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης, τὰ δ'
ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν
ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν 7
35 τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις· ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
1102^a εἰρημέναις ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμῶν καὶ τελείων.
ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ δ.α τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ 8
χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ
καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιον τι καὶ θεῖον τιθεμεν.
5 XIII. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις
κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη· τάχα
γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός περὶ ταυτην μάλιστα 2
πεπονησθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ

1101 b, 31. EE. 1219 b, 8 ἐτι δ' οἱ ἱπαινοὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ
ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων.

§ 5. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος κ.τ.λ.
'And Eudoxos is thought to have
pleaded ably the claims of pleasure to
the prize of highest excellence.' On
Eudoxos see 1171 b, 9 n. This refer-
ence probably indicates the real motive
of the paragraph.

§ 6. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἱπαινος κ.τ.λ.
Rhet. 1367 b, 31 ἐπειδὴ τῶν πράξεων
ὁ ἐπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ
κατὰ προσείρεσθαι, παραστῶν διεκδύναται
πρόστυλοντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν „ἐπαι δ'
ἐπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγιστοι
ἀρετῆς, διὲ οὗ τοῦ πράξεως ἐκτελε-
σθέντος, ὡς τοιαῦται· τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν
ἔργων ἐστὶν, διὲ καὶ ἐγκωμίζουμεν πρῶ-
ξανται· τὰ δ' ἔργα σημαία τῆς ἐξου-
σίας, διὲ ἐκταυοῖμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πεπρα-
γότα, εἰ τιναυοῖμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. EE
1219 b, 34.

§ 5. ἀρχή, ac. πρόθεσις, for it is the
οὐ δύναται, the final Cause of human
activity.

τίθεμεν. Hoc loco clausulam im-
ponere debeamus lib. a primo, Suscumbit.
XIII. § 1. τελείαν. Cf. 1100 a,
4 n

περὶ ἀρετῆς. The first step in the
analysis will be to deliberate about
the production of goodness. See In-
trodutory Note to Book 11. The
first point to note is the distinction
between the two kinds of goodness.

§ 2. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. A con-
firmation of our view from the practice
of the masters of our science. If
πολιτικὴ is a science, the true πολι-
τικός must know how to secure its
end. Cf. 1099 b, 29 n.

3 τῶν νόμων ἐπηρεῶσι παρὰδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς 10
 Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινας ἄλλους
 4 τοιοῦτοι γιγνέσθαι. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σφίσι
 αὕτη, ὁρῶν ὅτι γίνονται ἢ ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 5 προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον
 ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦσιν καὶ τὴν εὐδαι- 15
 6 μονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγουμεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν
 τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ
 7 ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν· εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' αἰτίας ἔχει, ὅλον δὲ
 εἶναι τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν
 ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύουσιν καὶ πᾶν <τὸ> σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον 20
 ὅσοι τιμιώτερα καὶ βελτίων ἢ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς· τῶν δ'

1102 a, 18. EE. 1219 b, 26 μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρητέον·
 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκος, ἐπὶ δ' ἀνθρωπίνῃ
 ἀρετῇ ζητοῦμεν, ἐτακείσθω δὴς μερὴ ψυχῆς τὰ λόγον μετέχοντα,
 οὐ τὸν αἰσὶν δὲ τρόπον μετέχιν λόγον ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῷ
 ἐνταύτῃ, τὸ δὲ τῷ κείσθω καὶ ἀκούειν πεφυκέαι. εἰ δὲ τί
 ἴστιν ἑτέρως ἀλογον, ἀφείσθω τοῦτο τὸ μοριον. διαφανεῖ δ' οὐδὲν
 οὔτ' εἰ μεριστὴ ἡ ψυχὴ οὔτ' εἰ ἀμερῆς, ἔχει μέντοι διυκνίμει διαφόρως

§ 2. τοῖς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαι-
 μονίων νομοθέταις. In his Laws, Plato
 laid a really an indirect a Spartan and
 a Cretan to discuss legislation with an
 Athenian. Spartan and Cretan insti-
 tutions alone seemed to be deliberately
 designed with reference to an end, and
 therefore seemed to be alone worthy of
 Plato and Aristotle were both aware
 that the end they strove to realize was
 but a partial one and that they were
 therefore misguided. But that did not
 alter the fact that they were set an
 end consciously before them.

§ 4. ἡ σφίσι αὕτη αὐτὴ αὐτὴ τοῦ
 πάλαι ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν.

ἡ ζήτησις, κ. ἡ εἰς τὴν ἀρετῆς.
 τὴν προαίρεσιν Cf. 1024 a, 1 n.
 Here προαίρεσις is almost equivalent
 to *proairesis*.

§ 7. εἰδέναι πως, κ. τὸ ὅσον ἵκανον
 ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα (cf. 1024 a).

τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύοντα. Sug-
 gested by Plato, Charrm. 136 b ἀλλ'
 ὥσπερ ἴσως ἦδη καὶ σὺ ἀκούεις τῶν
 ἀγασθῶν αἰσάν. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ προειρη-
 τῶν ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀγασθῶν, λέγουσι περὶ
 τοῦ οὐχ οὐκ αὐτοῦ μόνου ἐπιχειρεῖν
 τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἴσως, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον
 εἶναι καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν εἰ
 μὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν οὐ ἔχει,
 καὶ οὐ τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἰεῖται. ἂν ποτε
 θεραπεύσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ
 τοῦ σώματος, πολλὴν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἐκ
 τοῦ τοῦ τοῦ λόγου διαίτης ἐκ. πᾶν
 τὸ σῶμα τρεπόμενον μετὰ τοῦ σώματος τὸ
 μέρος ἐκ χειρὸς θεραπεύειν

καὶ πᾶν <τὸ> σῶμα, κ. δὲ εἰδέναι
 πως. Kammacher's insertion of the
 αἰτία is generally accepted, see Nyw.
 Contr. p. 26. The phrase comes from
 the passage of the Charmides quoted
 above.

ιατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. θεωρητέον δὲ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, 8 θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ 25 ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλείον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργαστέωτερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων· λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς 9 ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκοῦντως ἓν καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πό- 30 τερον διωρίσται καθόπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ 30 μεριστὸν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότες καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει

καὶ τὰς εἰρημένους, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ καμπύλῳ τὸ κοῖλον καὶ τὸ κυρτὸν ἀδιαχώριστον, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ λυγρὸν· καίτοι τὸ εὐθὺ οὐ λυγρὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

οἱ χαρίεντες, i.e. οι σοφοί (cf. 307a, 18), scientific physicians as opposed to mere practitioners.

τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν, i.e. the 'theory' of the body, or physiology, as opposed to practical therapeutics.

§ 9. ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις, 'in extraneous discourses.' The only question that can arise is 'extraneous to what?' The different views which have been maintained are conveniently summarized in Sussemihl-Hicks, *Politica* p. 56f. There can be no doubt, I think, that Diels has given the right answer, and that the meaning is 'extraneous to the Aristotelian school.' I believe, further, that this is in almost all cases merely another way of saying 'in the writings of the Academic school.' That is certainly the meaning here.

τὸ μὲν ἄλογον κτλ. Aristotle himself did not believe in 'parts of the soul' at all: Plato did, but this is not his division, for it is practically certain that it was first formulated in this way by Xenocrates. There is a part of the soul which 'knows what it

is doing' and a part that does not. Cf. 109ka, 3 n.

§ 10. τῷ λόγῳ δύο, 'verbally two.' This phrase is often opposed to ἀριθμῷ ἐν (cf. 1131 b, 16 n.). Cf. *Phya.* 103a, 21 τῶν γὰρ ὅτις ἀρχὴ μέσου τελευτῆς, τὸ μέσον πρὸς διέτερον ἀμφω ἐστὶ, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ ἐν, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ δύο, 263b, 12 τὸ σημείον μὲν ὅν ἀμφὸν καὶ ἐν, καὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ τοῦ ὑστέρου, καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀριθμῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐ ταῦτόν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τελευτῆς, τοῦ δ' ἀρχῆς. *Gen. Cosm.* 320b, 12 βέλτερον τοῖσι τοῖς πᾶσι ἀχώριστον τὴν ὅλην ὡς ὅτις τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ τῷ ἀριθμῷ, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ μὴ μίαν.

ἀχώριστα. Cf. *De An.* 413b, 14 καὶ εἰ μέρια, πότερον ὅπως ἴσται εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τῷ σφ. 419a, 10 περὶ δὲ τοῦ μέρους τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς... εἴτε χωριστὸν ὅπως εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστὸν κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον. 431a, 19 πότερον ἐν τι μέρει αὐτοῦ χωριστὸν ἐν ἢ μεγέθει ἢ λόγῳ.

πεφυκότες, i.e. φύσει. The distinction, then, is between the dialectical and the physical account of the soul. Cf. below 1147a, 24 n. for λογικῶς καὶ φυσικῶς.

πρὸς τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰσιε κοίτῃ καὶ φυ-
τικῷ. λέγω δὲ τὸ αἷτιον τοῦ τριφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεισθαι· τὴν
τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τρεφομένοις
θεῖη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ 1102^b
ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εἰλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινα. ταύτης
μὲν οὖν κοιτὴ τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπείη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ
γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόνιον τοῦτο καὶ
ἡ δόξα αὐτῇ, ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἡκιστα διώδηλοι καθ' ὅ

1102 a. 32. EE. 1219 b, 36 δέφηρηται δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐστὶ
μή τις ψυχῆς οἷον τὸ φυτικόν. δι' ἀνθρωπίνης γὰρ ψυχῆς τὰ ἐκσημώ-
ματα ἴδια· διὸ οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ αἱ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ
ἐκσημώματα· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ὁ ἀνθρώπος, λογισμὸν ἐνέσσει καὶ ἀρετὴν
καὶ πράξιν· ἀρετὴ δ' ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμὸς ἀλλ' ἀρέσκει καὶ
καθημέριον, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ταῖς ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. καὶ ὥσπερ ἡ εἰσέξια
συγκρίνεται ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μόνιον ἀρετῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ
ἢ τέλει.

b. 5. EE. 1219 b, 16 καὶ τὸ ἀπερούμενον δ' ἐνότε δῆλον ἐκ
τούτων, διὰ τί τοῖς ἐνὶ βελτίαις οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν φαύλων τὸν
ἡμισυ τοῦ βίου ὁμοίαι γὰρ καθυδουότες πάντες. αἷτιον δ' ὅτι ἀργία
ψυχῆς ὁ ὕπνος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνέργεια. διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἰ τι μόνιον ἐστὶ
ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν, ἢ τοῦτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐστὶ μέρων τῆς ὅλης
ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος· ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ
τὸ θρεπτικόν, τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ἐκτατικὸν ἀτελεῖ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ. ὅσον
δὲ τοῖς μὴ (ἐν) (καταδου) ἀναίσθητοι μετέχουσιν, καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι
βελτίαι αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων, ἐάν μὴ οὐκ ἐνότεν ἢ πῆρυνται.

πρὸς τὸ παρόν. For our purposes
the λογική πρότασις furnished by the
theorists of the Academy will be suffi-
cient. It is not necessary to have
evidence on φύσις.

§ 11. κοίτῃ καὶ φυτικῷ. Cf.
supra 1097 b, 35 τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι
ἐκτὸς οἷον φανερὰ καὶ οἷον φυτικόν,
ὑπάρχει δὲ τὸ ἴδιον.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις. The argu-
ment is that the sort of soul we need
is a λογιστικὴ kept up by nutrition
(including pleasure), and in the embryo
(of animals) where there is nothing

besides, we may reasonably assume
to exist also in developed animals,
though in them there is something
besides.

εἰλογώτερον Cf. 1100 a, 13 n. The
word shows that this is purely a λογική
σκέψις.

§ 12. ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. Cf. De Somno
454^b, 32 τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὸ
θρεπτικὸν μόνον ἐν τῷ καθυδουῖν μᾶλλον
ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐκτατικῷ· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ
αὔξεται τότε μᾶλλον, ὥς οὐδὲ προσ-
δεδόμενα πρὶν αὐτὰ τῇ ἀσθεσίᾳ.

ὕπνου—ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἡμῶν τοῦ βίου τοῖς
 εὐδαιμονας τῶν ὑπλίων· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ὡς γὰρ 13
 γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαίλη
 —πλὴν εἴ πῃ κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ δικνοῦνται τινες τῶν κινήσεων,
 10 καὶ ταυτῇ βελτίω γίνεταί τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν
 τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὅλις, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικόν 14
 ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἁμοῖρον πέφικεν.
 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, με 15
 τέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγον. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς
 15 τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν—ὁρῶν
 γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βελ-ιστα παρακαλεῖ—φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς
 καὶ ἄλλο τι παρα τὸν λόγον πεφυκός ὃ μίχεται καὶ
 ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυ-
 μένα τοῦ σώματος μορῖα εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι
 20 τοῖναυτιον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφίρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς

ὅθεν φασὶν κ.τ.λ. This is prob-
 ably a free quotation from some comic
 poet.

§ 18. πλὴν εἴ πῃ, to be taken
 closely with ἡμῶν διὰ ὅλου ἁλόνε.
 Professor Bywater (Cont. p. 26) reads
 πλὴν εἴ μὴ with Aspasios and M^b.
 In L.E. 1919 b, 94 (p. 89) we have
 ὅσοι δὲ τοῦ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μετέχουσιν,
 καὶ εἴ φαντασίαι βελτίους εἴ τῶν
 σπουδαίων. Here μὴ gives no sense,
 and Casaubon was surely right in
 reading πῃ. But, if so, πῃ must
 surely be right here too. It should
 be noted also that the reading of M^b
 may be simply an instance of the
 tendency of scribes to substitute the
 vulgar πλὴν εἴ μὴ for the more correct
 πλὴν εἴ.

κινήσεων κινήσεων, i.e. the 'motions'
 of the senses ('impressions'). Cf. *Περὶ*
ἰσχυρίων 463 a, 29 τὸ φάντασμα τὸ
 ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει τῶν αἰσθημάτων,
ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ καθέξειν ὃ, ὃ καθέξει, τοῦ
ἰσχυρίων κινήσεων.

ἐπιεικῶν τυχόντων. Attic 'littles'
 for ὀλίγων and κατὰ. For ἐπιεικῆς
 cf. 1137 a, 35 n. For the difference

between the desires of good and bad
 men, see *Protr.* 957 a, 25.

§ 18. φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς. Aristotle
 in his Platonic passages uses φύσις
 with the genitive in a somewhat
 vague sense. Often it seems merely
 periphrastic. See *Ind. Ar.* 834 a, 8
 sqq. Here it is equivalent to μέρος
 or δυνάμις.

τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς.
 The meaning of these terms is fully
 discussed in Book VII. Both the
 'continent' and the 'incontinent'
 man have a right λόγος or rule of
 action, though the one follows it and
 the other does not. The fault of the
 ἀκρατοῦς does not lie in the λόγος
 ἔχον, there must therefore be some
 thing else.

ἐν αὐτοῖς, i.e. in the ἐγκρατοῦς as
 well as in the ἀκρατοῦς. The ἐγκρατοῦς
 does not follow his λόγος or rule with-
 out a struggle. It is in this that he
 differs from the σωφρων whose desires
 are in complete harmony with his
 principles. See *eth.* § 17.

ἀντιτείνει, a Platonic word. Cf.
Phaedr. 254 a.

16 οὕτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν
τοῖς σώματι μὲν ὀρώμεν το παραφερομενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυ-
χῆς οἱ χ ὀρώμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἦπτον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομι-
στῆον εἶναι τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντι-
17 βαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οἷδιν διαφέρει. λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο 25
φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῇ λόγῳ
τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς—ἐπεὶ δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι το τοῦ σω-
18 φροτος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφώνῃ τῇ λόγῳ. φαίνεται
δὲ καὶ το ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινων-
εῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὁρεκτικὸν μετέχει 30
πας, ἢ κατήκοον ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ
τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ φάμεν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ
ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου
τὸ ἄλογον, μῆτις καὶ ἡ νοβητησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις τε
39 καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρη καὶ τοῦτο φαῖναι λόγον ἔχειν, 1103^a

ἐπὶ τὰναντία κ.τ.λ., κ.τ.λ. τῇ λόγῳ.
The argument is the same as that by
which Plato proves that θυμός and
ἐπιθυμία are distinct.

§ 17. πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν κ.τ.λ. As the
fact of ἀκρασία shows, it is the λόγος,
so the fact of ἐγκράτεια shows, but it
μετέχει τῇ λόγῳ. We have now
proved the existence of a higher part
of τὸ ἄλογον, which is simply the
disposition of Aristotle's *λογιστικόν*.

τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου, i.e.
the rational part of the man who has
the ἀρετή of the rational part, i.e.
the σωφρονιστὴς who has the ἀρετή of
ἐνδοκεία and the ἀνδρεῖος who has the
ἀρετή of θυμός. See below 1117 b
14. The fact that the rational part
may not only 'direct' the rational, but
may even be 'in harmony with' it,
shows that it μετέχει λόγῳ.

πάντα ὁμοφώνῃ, 'it is in complete
harmony with—'

§ 18. καὶ ὅλως ὁρεκτικόν. This is
a hint for those who know the De
Anima. The force of λόγος is to
τοῦ καὶ ἀνδρείου καὶ βελήτων as well
as ἐνδοκείας.

οὕτω δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς κ.τ.λ. Theon
of Smyrna, p. 72, 21 (Haeckl 393,
quotes an interesting interpretative
enumeration of the various senses
of λόγος which includes *ἐνδοκεία* and
δὲ τῶν τιμωτῶν καὶ τιμωμένων, καθ'
ὃν φάμεν λόγον τιμῶν ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν.
This is clearly the sense referred
to here. The ὁρεκτικόν may be
called λόγον ἔχον inasmuch as it λόγον
ἔχει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος,
'may heed to the λόγος of the λόγον
ἔχον.'

οὐχ ὥσπερ των μαθηματικῶν, 'not
in the mathematical sense,' in which
λόγον ἔχον means to be 'rational' in
the sense of commensurable. For the
idiom cf. Riddell, Digest § 25. We
must not 'understand' any definite
word to 'govern' των μαθηματικῶν.

§ 19. οἱ δὲ χροὶ κ.τ.λ. The in-
sufficiency of the twofold division is
now brought out from the other side.
If, to save the unity of τὸ ἄλογον, we
say that τὸ ὁρεκτικόν belongs to τὸ
λόγον ἔχον, then that in turn will
split up into two 'parts.'

itself and a part of the soul which can not. This distinction has been adopted by Xenokrates, the present head of the Academy, and will therefore make a good starting point¹.

We must, however, note at once that the part of the soul which is strictly speaking "irrational," the part which has to do with nutrition and growth, cannot be the seat of the goodness or badness of man as such. And yet there is a case where a part which we must call irrational does affect human conduct. If we consider what happens in the case of the man who does what he knows to be wrong, we are forced to admit that the judgment (*lóyos*) which he forms is right, and therefore that the rational part of his soul is in just the same state as if he resisted the temptation. His weakness must accordingly be attributed to the irrational part. On the other hand, if we look at the case of the man who does not yield to the temptation, we see that this part of the soul cannot be wholly irrational either, seeing that it is capable of understanding and obeying a judgment.

Perhaps, then, it will be thought better to call this part of the soul "rational," and there can be no objection to that, provided we remember the cases of moral weakness and moral strength, and do not confuse it with the rational part in the strict sense of the word. We must say in that case that the rational part has two parts, one rational in the strict sense, and the other in the sense that it is able to understand and follow a rule given it from without. We have, then, by means of dialectic, discovered the existence of a part of the soul which we may call either the higher part of the irrational soul or the lower part of the rational, as we please.

This discussion is an admirable example of what Aristotle means by the dialectic method. All he wishes to bring out is the existence of what in his own psychology is called the "sentient and appetitive soul,"² and it might seem to us that a reference to

¹ Heintze, Xenokrates p. 140 sqq., makes it extremely probable that the division was due to Xenokrates himself.

² See R. P. 336 and Zeller, Aristotle, II, pp. 2, 399., for the relevant references. Aristotle's own psychological division crosses that of the Academy chiefly in this respect, that, while he assigns Desire, Temper and Wish alike

to the appetitive soul, the Academy had to refer the latter to the "rational," and thus to separate it in an arbitrary way from the other forms of Appetition. Aristotle's advance upon the earlier theory was his recognition of the appetitive character of goodness as well as of badness. Here, however, he does not care to insist. So long as we recognise the existence of this

De Anima would have been more satisfactory than an attempt to twist the doctrines of Xenokrates into a new form. But Aristotle does not wish to assume a knowledge of his own system in the course on Politics, and he therefore tries as best he may to make the popular psychology of the Academy the basis of his argument. The way in which he does this is most ingenious, though to our minds much less convincing than a brief exposition of his own psychological views would have been. The use which he makes of the Platonic term *μετέχου* and the way in which he takes advantage of the different senses of the phrase *λογος ἐστίν* are particularly instructive.

§ 2. These two parts of the soul will each have its proper form of goodness, and this distinction will correspond to that drawn in ordinary speech between goodness of character and goodness of intellect. For the present it is with the latter, the goodness of the sentient and appetitive soul, that we have to do.

The recognition of a form of goodness which was not in the strict sense of the word intellectual and reflective had already been forced upon Plato as a result of his criticism of the Socratic paradox that "Goodness is knowledge." In his earlier dialogues* Plato had taken the various recognised forms of goodness one by one and had discussed the question whether they were knowledge or no. The result of all these dialogues is practically the same. The recognised forms of goodness are not knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word. For as soon as we draw all the conclusions which follow from the assumption that they are, we find ourselves unable to hold fast the distinctions between them. Any single form of goodness, if regarded as knowledge, turns out to be knowledge of the good, and therefore identical with goodness as a whole.

Now it is evident that this view will prevent us from giving the name of goodness to almost everything that commonly goes by that name. By working out to its logical result the doctrine that goodness is knowledge we have really proved at the same

appetitive soul, and distinguish it clearly from the principle of nutrition and growth on the one hand and from the thinking soul on the other hand, we may call it "rational" or "animal" or what we please. Nor does he insist upon its identity with

the "sentient" soul, though that also, as we shall see, is of fundamental importance for the psychological groundwork of his Ethics.

* See especially the Laches, Charmides and Protagoras.

time the existence of another kind of goodness which is not knowledge. In the *Phaedo*⁶ this distinction between two kinds of goodness appears already though there "popular goodness" is rated very low, and the only true goodness is still wisdom or "philosophic goodness." But if we follow the course of Plato's ethical thought we find that the reality and worth of this secondary form of goodness is more and more fully recognised. The "first education" in the *Republic* aims solely at the training of character (*ἡθους*), and the whole of the laws is practically directed to the same end.

§ 3. The distinction between goodness of character and goodness of intellect does not correspond, then, to that between knowledge and conduct, which the traditional rendering "moral and intellectual virtues" is apt to suggest to us. As a matter of fact, Aristotle held that conduct depended upon intellectual goodness just as much as knowledge did, while on the other hand he admitted the existence of a kind of art and a kind of knowledge which were not strictly speaking intellectual, but depended on something more closely resembling character. There is conduct which is intellectual and art which is not.

Though it is beside Aristotle's purpose in the *Ethics* to insist upon the point, we know that the soul with which we are now concerned is not only appetitive, but also sensitive, and we should therefore expect to find an analogy between the development of goodness from appetition and the development of knowledge from sense. It is worth while to point out in what this consists.

The object of sensation⁷, though it is always individual, "a this" (*τοῦδε τι*), necessarily implies a universal element. What we perceive is not strictly speaking the "this" which is the object of sensation, but always "a such" (*τοιοῦδε τι*). We perceive Kallias, indeed, but our perception is of certain things which "mean" Kallias, that is of a man having certain qualities which enable us to identify him as Kallias. The whole content of our perception

⁶ *Phaedo* 68 d 27q.

⁷ Cf. *Rhet.* 1354 a 7 where we are told that many orators succeed *διὰ τὸν ἥθους ἀπὸ ἡρώτων*. The chief example is, of course, the medical *ἔμπειρος*.

⁸ On all this see Zeller, *unt.* II. pp. 38 sqq. It seems necessary to draw attention to the fact that *τοῦδε τι* means "a this." The Greek for "a somewhat" would be *τις τι* *τις*.

is therefore universal in character, and the function of sense-perception is just the discrimination of those universal qualities.

In the case of creatures endowed with memory, these sense-perceptions remain in imagination (*phantasia*), and a number of such memories make up an experience (*ἐμπειρία*). For instance, we say that a man has experience when he has an idea that this or that was good for Kallias when he had this or that disease, and for Sokrates, and so on for other individuals. Aristotle rates experience very high indeed for practical purposes, and he is never tired of citing its value in the practice of medicine. Practice has to do entirely with particulars and is therefore the peculiar province of experience.

But nevertheless experience does not reach the level of Art or Science. These do not arise till the universal implicit in experience is made explicit, till we pass from "This was good for Kallias and Sokrates and so-and-so when they were too hot" to "This is good for the human body in a fever."

The development of goodness is precisely parallel to this. The object of appetite is individual like that of sense, but it too implies a universal. For, though we desire or wish for a particular thing we really desire it because it is "a such." For instance, we desire this food or that honour, but only because they are pleasant or beautiful, and these are universals. These are the qualities which appear in imagination (*phantasia*) and so move appetite on.

Now the retention in memory of a number of such images of the pleasant or beautiful produces an *hêxis*, that is a tendency to desire or wish for similar things as pleasant or beautiful, and this is precisely parallel to experience. And it is of the utmost value in practice, for it is with particulars that practice has to do.

At the same time, this is not human goodness in the full sense any more than experience is science or art. We do not reach the stage of intellect till the implicit universal has been made explicit, till we pass from "This, that and the other thing is pleasant or beautiful" to "This kind of feeling or action is good for the human soul."

§ 4. Closely connected with the question of the two kinds of goodness was the question "Can goodness be taught?" or does it come by nature or the grace of heaven, as was believed in early times? Clearly, if goodness is knowledge, it can be taught, but

the criticism of Plato's earlier dialogues⁸ is largely directed to showing that there are no teachers of goodness in the ordinary sense of that word. In Aristotle we find the solution of the problem taken for granted. It is impossible to teach goodness of character, that can only be acquired by habituation. But goodness of intellect can be taught, with this reservation, however, that the intellectual capacity is presupposed, and that a good character has already been formed. You cannot make any one good by teaching; but, if a man has the gift, his goodness of character may be raised into an intellectual form and become the practical wisdom of the lawgiver.

Aristotle does not even tell us in the *Ethics* what habituation is, and we have to turn to *Eudemos* for a definition of it.⁹ The main point about it is that habituation must be in acts of the same quality as the acts which issue from the character when formed. It is this which makes it necessary for us *alter al.* to discuss the nature of goodness; for it is only if we know what goodness is that we shall be able to stamp the actions of those for whom we are legislating with the right quality. Before, however, we go on to discuss the definition of goodness, it may be well to sketch briefly the ideas which underlie Aristotle's doctrine of habituation as we may gather them from the *Physics* and elsewhere.

The sentient soul has the natural capacity of being moved by the imagination of pleasure and pain. These imaginations are constantly being presented to it; for every act of sensation is accompanied by pleasure or pain, and the images of these feelings are stored up in memory. But the capacity of the soul to feel pleasure and pain is a rational capacity which may become active in two opposite ways. The capacity of taking pleasure in a good act is also the capacity of taking pleasure in a bad act. The capacity will therefore remain dormant unless there is something to determine it in the one direction or the other. This something is to be found in appetite, which converts the mere capacity of pleasure and pain into a desire to have the pleasure and avoid the pain.

But the soul is not in a perfectly neutral state as regards the pleasures and pains which it feels. Its life is a process, and it has

⁸ On this point see especially the *Gorgias* and *Meno*.

⁹ Cf. 1103a, 17 n.

its source of motion and rest in itself. Now every continuous process implies an end to which it is directed, and the qualitative changes in the soul which we call feelings are only the incomplete processes which mark its growth. They are all really directed to the soul's completion, to its attaining the true nature or true form of the human soul. Hence the need of guidance from one who knows this form, and can decide in the light of it which of two alternative possibilities of feeling to actualise.

§ 5. We have asked how goodness is to be produced and we have seen that it is produced by habituation, and by habituation in the same acts which result from goodness when it has been produced. We must, then, ask what goodness is, and first of all we must find its genus.

If Aristotle had been basing his account of goodness on his own philosophical system, there would have been no difficulty about this. We have seen that goodness is a "completion" (*teleiōsis*) of a thing which is by nature capable of such a completion, and we know that such completions are called *êtê* or conditions, a word taken from medicine and gymnastics. The acquisition of such a *êtê* is no mere motion (*κίνησις*) or a iteration (*ἐπανάληψις*) like the feelings which are its matter; it is a "form," and displays all the characteristics of forms. But the fact is that we must go to the *Physics* for Aristotle's moral philosophy, here we only arrive at the knowledge that the genus of goodness is *êtê* by a deductive argument from the "division" of the category of quality. Here is another instance where the doctrine of the categories is assumed as familiar to Aristotle's hearers. (Cf. *Metaph.* § 28.)

The differentia of goodness, the "Mean" is more scientifically unproblematic, doubtless because both the doctrine itself and the metaphysical groundwork on which it rests were quite familiar in the Academy from the days of Plato's *Philebos* onwards at least. Quantity is a category that admits of quantitative determination or degree, "the more and less" as the Academy called it: it is continuous and therefore infinitely divisible, at least potentially. Now, feelings and acts, which are the matter of goodness, being qualitative motions, are continuous, and the degree of feeling which is right for a given person in given circumstances may therefore be quantitatively expressed. This is all that is meant by the doctrine of the mean; for the Greek word *μετρώμενος* does

not mean only or even primarily the arithmetical mean: it is the oldest word for a proportion of any kind and however determined. We must admit that a feeling like fear is capable of such determination, for we must fear either more or less or equally. And the same is true of an act like giving away money; for we must give away either more or less or an equal sum. But to say that Aristotle makes only a quantitative distinction between goodness and badness is to miss the whole point. Aristotle has expressly refused to identify goodness either with the feeling or the outward act. It is the permanent condition of soul, and conditions of soul do not differ quantitatively, nor are they motions. They do not come into being or cease to be by motion or alteration, though they are and are not in virtue of an alteration in something else, that is, in the soul¹⁰.

¹⁰ The locus classicus on this subject is *Phys.* 2.4 b. 3 seq. "Ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἀλλοιούμενα ὅσα ἀλλοιούται ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ ἐν μέντοι ὑπάρχει τοῦτοι ἀλλοιούμενα ὅσα καὶ αὐτὰ λέγεται παρὰ χεῖρ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων μάλιστα ἐν τῇ ἐνδοξασίᾳ ἐν τοῖς σχήμασι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μορφαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἔξερσι καὶ ταῖς τοῖσιν λήξεσι καὶ ἀναρρίλαις ἀλλοιούσιν ὑπάρχει· ἐν οὐδέποτε δ' ἐστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σχηματίζμενον καὶ μεθιζόμενον ὅταν ἐπιτελεσθῇ [κ. τελευτῇ] τέλος λαβῇ, οὐ λέγεται ἐκείνο εἶναι ὅτιν, οἷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου χιτῶν ἢ τῆς πυραμίδος κτήν ἢ τῆς κλίμας χυλόν, ἀλλὰ παρανομαζόμενον τὸ μὲν χαλεκόν, τὸ δὲ σίδηρον, τὸ δὲ ὕλην. τὸ δὲ ποικύλον (κ. ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν) καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον προσδιοριζόμενον (κ. ἵκετο εἰς οὐ ἵσταν)· ὕλην γάρ καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν τὸν χαλκὸν λέγεται καὶ τὸν κτήν, καὶ οὐ μένος οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὕδριν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν χαλκὸν λέγεται. ὁμοιωματικῶς τῷ τῷ αὐτῷ προσδιορίζοντες τῇ ὅλῃ, ὥστ' αἱ κατὰ μὲν τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν μορφήν οὐ λέγεται τὸ γεγονὸς ἐν τῷ (i.e. the ὅλῃ) ἐστὶ τὸ σχῆμα, αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ τῷ καὶ τῷ ἀλλοιούσιν λέγεται, φανερόν δι' οὗ αὖ ἀνείας αἱ γενεαὶ αὗται ἀλλοιούμεναι εἶναι δὲ καὶ εἶπειν οὕτως ἀποφανθῆναι ὁμοίαν."

ἀλλοιῶσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὴν αἰών ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιον τῶν γενημένων· ἀλλὰ γινεσθαι μὲν ἔστιν ἕκαστος ἀσχετῶς ἀλλοιούμενον τοῦ, οἷον τῇ ἔξερσι παρανομένη ἢ μετακινήσει ἢ διαμορφώσεως ἢ ψυχόμενῃ, οὐ μέντοι τὰ γεόμενα γὰρ ἀλλοιούται, οὐδ' ἢ γενεαὶ αὐτῶν ἀλλοιούσιν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ μὲν οὐδ' αἱ ἔξερσι οὐδ' αἱ τοῦ σώματος οὐδ' αἱ τῇ ψυχῇ ἀλλοιούσιν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀμεταβάται· αἱ δὲ καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτῶν ἄμεταβλητα ἢ αὐτὰ ἀλλοιούσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ἀρετὴ τελειοῦσιν τὴν ὄλῃν γὰρ λαβὴν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετῇ, τότε λέγεται τελειῶν ἕκαστος· τότε γὰρ μετὰ τῇ ἐκείνου ἐκείνου, ὥστε ἐκείνου τελειοῦσιν, ὅταν μετὰ γένῃται ἐκείνου καὶ ὅταν βελτιωθῇ, ἢ δὲ καὶ καὶ φθόρον ἐκείνου καὶ ἕκαστος ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ τελειοῦσιν τελειοῦσιν λέγεται ἀλλοιούσιν· ἔστιν γὰρ εἰς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀσχετῶς ἀλλοιούσιν, ἢ εἰ διακρινόμεναι καὶ παρανομαζόμεναι ἀλλοιούται ἀλλὰ μὴ τελειοῦνται ἢ αὐτὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τροχὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ ἐκείνου ἢ λαμβανόμεναι· αἱ μὲν γὰρ τελειοῦσιν δὲ ἐκείνου εἰσιν· ὥστε οὐκ ἀλλοιούσιν ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ φανερόν ἀπασίας εἶναι τὰς γενεὰς ἐν τῷ πρὸς τῷ αὐτῷ, τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον ὕλην καὶ ἐκείνου, ἐν κείνῃ καὶ συμμετρίας θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν τίθεται, ἢ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ αὐτῷ τῷ

§ 8 It is important to remember that the theory of goodness as a "mean" or ratio between opposites is only one case among others of a principle which served to explain all the difficulties which earlier thinkers had felt about becoming, the difficulties which Plato had expressed in the *Phaedo*, and which he finally settled in the *Philebos* by his doctrine of *μέσος* and *ἁρμονία*. Matter to Aristotle is that which is potentially, and it comes to be actually under the influence of that which is already actual. This is just because it is a *στέφανος*, and only attains its own *ἔξω* when it reaches its proper form or *τέλος*. By its very nature it is that which is capable of receiving opposites; it is the substratum in which opposites inhere. Such a substratum we must assume because it is impossible that the one opposite can become or approximate to the other. Cold iron may become hot iron, but cold can never become heat. Now the form which is the cause of all becoming is always a ratio (*λογος*) or mean (*μέσος*); between the two opposites it is a definite "interval" as musicians call it, a fixed proportion in which the opposites neutralise one another and give rise to a new product. If Aristotle had only known the theories of modern chemistry, they would have seemed to him a most perfect exemplification of the principle; for what the modern chemist calls atomic weights are just of this nature, and a chemical formula like H_2O is the most typical instance of

[illegible]

διὰ ἁπλοῦς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ τῆς
 ψυχῆς ἔξῃ· ἐκπαῖσι γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ τῷ
 πρῶτῳ τί πρὸς ἔχουσιν, καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ
 νικητικαί, αἱ δὲ κακίαι ἐκποδοί· διε-
 γνῶντες οὖν διὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὸ κακί-
 ον τὰς, ἡ δὲ κακία ἐκπίπτει, ὥστε αὐτὸς
 αὐτὰς ἐκκαταλλάττει· αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς
 ἀποβλήσκει καὶ τὰ ἔχοντα αὐτῷ γινώσκου-
 σι· αὐτὰς ἀναγκάζει ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τοὺς
 αὐτοῦ ὁμοῦ μέρη. ἀλλοιούται δ' ἐν τῷ
 τῷ αὐτοῦ ὅλῳ ὅλας γὰρ ἡ φύσις ὅλη καὶ
 περὶ ἡρώς καὶ λυγρὸς καὶ σωματικῆς
 ἐπεὶ δ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἐγγιγνο-
 μένης καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐγγίνονται
 περὶ ταύτας γὰρ εἰσὶν, αἱ δ' ἡδοναὶ
 καὶ αἱ λύπαι ἀλλοιωθεὶς τοὺς αὐτοῦ ὁμοῦ
 φαιερὸν ἐστὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 καὶ ταύτας ἀποβαλέσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν
 ὡς· ἡ μὲν γίνεσθαι αὐτῷ μετ' ἀλλοιώ-
 σεως, αὐτὰς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἀλλοιωθεῖς.

what he calls a λόγος or μέσος. Unfortunately he did not know this remarkable confirmation of the theory he had inherited from Plato, and we can only quote examples which seem less striking because biology has not yet been reduced to organic chemistry.

Health had been regarded since the times of the Pythagoreans as a sort of ἁρμονία ("tuning" or "pitch," not "harmony") of the opposites warm and cold, dry and moist, in the human body. The formula or ratio of this proportion exists in the soul of the doctor, and its presence there is the efficient cause of health in the human body as well as its formal and final cause. It is exactly in the same way that the lawgiver has in his soul the formula or λόγος of goodness, and it is the efficient cause of goodness in others.

Again, in discussing the fact of growth, Aristotle is met by some old difficulties which were raised for the first time, so far as we know, by Empedokles and Anaxagoras. As the latter put it "How can flesh arise from what is not flesh, or bone from what is not bone?"¹¹ How, in fact, do the opposites, hot and cold, moist and dry, become organic tissues (ὁμοιομερή)? Aristotle says "If flesh arises from both of them but is neither of them, nor yet a compound in which both are preserved, what remains but that the product of them should be matter? The destruction of one opposite either produces the other opposite or matter. Surely then since there are degrees of heat and cold, when the one is in actuality it will be potentially the other, but when it is not completely actual, but cold as compared to heat, and hot as compared to cold, since things that are mixed destroy one another's excesses, then neither will the matter nor either of the opposites be completely actual, but something intermediate. In so far as it is potentially more hot than cold or the opposite, in that ratio it will be three times as hot potentially as cold, or twice, or whatever the ratio may be. That which is actually hot is potentially cold, and what is actually cold is potentially hot, so that if they are not equal they change into one another—and so with the other opposites—the elements first change in this way, and after these flesh and bones and the like, the hot becoming cold and the cold hot, when they have reached the mean (τὸ μέσος)."¹²

¹¹ Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 286, 289.

¹² I have selected this passage from many others which might have been

It is in this sense, then, that goodness is a mean—it is the form which is the true nature of the human soul when fully developed. To say that Aristotle makes the distinction between goodness and badness a quantitative one is like saying that music is merely mathematics, or that the distinction between the different compounds of an acid and a base is only one of degree.

posed as being, perhaps, specially instructive, but the main thing to remember is that "the Mean" is no isolated ethical doctrine. It is a part of Aristotle's historical and Aristotelian way of examining the Ethical Cases. The misleading view of it as a mere *modus vivendi* is due to the unfortunate isolation in which Aristotle's ethical doctrines are commonly studied; and this in turn is due to the peculiarities of Aristotle's own method. The passage is as follows:

[illegible]

λαρί), τότε ὁδὸν ἢ ὅλην ἔσται οὕτω ἐκείνου
τῶν γενομένων τοῦ ἀποστόλου Ἰωάννου καὶ πάλιν,
ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ αὐτὰ δὲ τὸ δύναμις πολλὸς
ἔστιν θεωρεῖν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ τοσοῦτον,
κατὰ τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀποστολῆς περὶ
δυναμείας ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ἐκπλαστικῆς φαν-
ῖλλον ῥημάτων τοιοῦτον. Ἐστὶν δὲ μὴ
θεωρεῖν τὰλλ' ἐὰν τὴν ἐκείνου ἢ το-
σοῦτον, εὐὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτος ἐξ ἐκείνου
δυναμείας πῶς ὅστις, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς ἢ
ἢ ὅλην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκπλαστικῆς ῥημάτων· κα-
θεστὼ οὕτω μὴ μίαν ἐκείνου δὲ ἢ ὅλην
τοιοῦτον ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἀποδοῖκα ἐκπλασ-
τικῆς τῶν τοιοῦτων πρῶτον ὁμοιωμάτων· ἔστι
κατὰ τὸ ἐκπλαστικῆς θεωρεῖν δυναμείας, ἐκπλαστικῆς
τοιοῦτον ἐκπλαστικῆς δυναμείας περὶ, ὅστις
ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐκπλαστικῆς μεταβάλλει καὶ ἀλλήλων
ἐκπλαστικῆς καὶ ἐκπλαστικῆς ἀλλήλων (ἐκπλαστικῆς) καὶ
πρῶτον οὕτω τοιοῦτος μεταβάλλει, ἐκ-
πλαστικῆς οὕτως οὕτως καὶ οὕτως καὶ τὰ τοιοῦτα,
τοῦ μὴ θεωρεῖν τοιοῦτον φανερὸν τοῦ
δὲ ψυχρὸν θεωρεῖν, ὅστις πρῶτον τοιοῦτον
ἐκπλαστικῆς ἐκπλαστικῆς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὅτις· τοῦ
δὲ μίαν πολλὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀδυνατεῖται ἀποδοῖκα
ὅτις καὶ τοιοῦτον καὶ ὅτις καὶ τὰ τοιοῦτα
κατὰ τοιοῦτον καὶ οὕτως οὕτως καὶ οὕτως
καὶ τὰλλ'.

B

Διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς
 15 δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ὄχει
 καὶ τῇ γένεσιν καὶ τῇ αὐξήσει, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δέεται καὶ
 χρόνου· ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα
 ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεγκλίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.

1103 a. 17. EE. 1220 2. 39 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἥθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ
 ὄνομα σημαίνει, ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίστασιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ἐκ
 ἀγωγῆς καὶ ἐμφύτου τῇ πολλῇ καὶ παλαιᾷ πως οὕτως ἤδη τὸ
 ἐπαγγελλόν, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀφίχοις οὐχ ὁρῶμεν (οἷδ' ἄν ἐν μερικοῖς
 ῥήμασι ὄντω τὸν λῆθον, οἷδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βίη), διὸ ἴστω τὸ
 ἥθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς αὐτῇ ἐπιταπεινὸν λόγον < τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν > ὄντι-
 μένου δ' ἀπολουθεῖν τῇ λύγῃ ποιότης.

1. § 1. Διττῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, as known above 1102 a. 3 seq. We take up the question of how goodness is produced without asking what it is; for this is a practical investigation. We shall, nevertheless, be forced to ask what it is later on.

τὸ πλεῖον. This is a necessary reservation; for we shall see that besides teaching goodness of intellect implies (1) cleverness, which comes by nature, and (2) goodness of character, which comes by habit. Cf. 1144 a. 20 seq.

ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους. Aristotle simply assumes the solution of this old problem (cf. Introductory Note) to which Plato finally came. Cf. Laws 739 c

πάν ἥθος διὰ ἔθου. We have to go to Eudemus (loc. cit.) for a definition of habit. That is habituated which "is an being often moved in a certain way under guidance which is not itself, is now active in that way."

περιγίνεται, 'is gained, as the result of.' Contrast φρεσὶ θημιναί, παραγίνεται, below, which refers to previous process.

παρεγκλίνον. This is the reading of K² and Hcl. There seems to be no instance of *παρεκλίνω*, the usual reading, in the present sense, while *παρεγκλίνω* is used transitively, as Athenaeus 701 b and the scholium on Ar. Knights 96² where it refers as here to a change in *τροπή*. The

2 'Εξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῶν ἐγγίγνεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, πρὶν οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ τίρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδέν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκῶτων ἄλλως

α. 20. Μετ. 1046 a, 36 ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψίχαις οὐκ ἀρχοῦσιν ἀρχαί τοιοῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψίχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔχοντι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἀναμεινῶν αἱ μὲν ἴσπται ἀλογοὶ αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγον· διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῃ ἢ ὃ ἄλλα καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγον πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντιῶν αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δ' ἀλογοὶ μία ἐστὶν, αἷμα τὸ θερμὸν τοῖς θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δ' ἰσχυρὰ ἐκείνη καὶ ὑγίαι· αἰτῶν δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὃ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ὁρῶν τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στερεότητα, πλὴν οὐκ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐστὶν ὡς ἀμφότες, ὅτε δ' ὅτι τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος μᾶλλον ὥστε διέγρηται καὶ τὰς ποικίλταις ἐπιστήμας εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐναντιῶν, εἶναι δὲ τοῖς μὲν καθ' αἷτας τοῦ δὲ μὴ καθ' αἷτας· καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ' αἷτας τοῦ δὲ πρᾶγματος ἐν αὐτῷ συμβεβηκός· ἀποκρίνεται γὰρ καὶ ἀποφωμῇ ἐπὶ αὐτῷ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον· ἡ γὰρ στερεότητα ἢ πρώτη τὸ ἐναντίον· αὕτη δ' ἀποφορὰ διατέρου· ἐπεὶ οὖν τα ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη ὅσονταί τῷ λόγῳ ἔχον, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν πρᾶγματος ἐγγίγναι μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ κρυπτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὃ δ' ἐπιστήμων ὁμῶς· λόγος γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀμφὺν μὲν, οὐκ ὁμοίως δὲ, καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἡ ἔχει κινήσεως ἀρχήν ὥστε ὁμῶς αἰσθάνει τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς κινῆσαι πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συνάψασα· διὸ τὰ κατὰ λόγον ἐναντία τοῖς αἰεν λόγου δυνατοῖς ποιεῖ ἐναντία· μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ πρᾶγματος, τῷ λόγῳ φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῇ μὲν τοῦ εὖ δυνάμει εἰσαλεπθεῖ ἢ τοῖς μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ παθεῖν δυνάμεις, ταύτη δ' ἐκείνη οὐκ αἰεὶ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν εὖ πακύνοντα καὶ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ μόνον ποιῶντα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ εἰ ποιεῖν.

intransitive use though not found elsewhere, presents no difficulty. Observe the etymological theory implied by the use of παρὰ ἢτοι πορὰ τὸ (ἐκ)· The Greeks will not think of words as 'derived' from other words, but as deductions or declarations (πρὸς, οὐκ, ἐκ) from a statement from a nominal form. Cf. Plato, Crat. 400 b ἂν μὲν καὶ σμικρὸν τις παρασκευῇ, 410a

σμερὸν τις παραλείποντες, 398d σμικρὸν παραγγέλλον· So παράνομος cf. 1096 b, 27 n.

§ 2. 'Εξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον κ.τ.λ. That ἠθικὰ ἀρετὴ comes ἐξ οὗ is assumed, but Aristotle digresses a little to show the inconsistency of this with the view that it comes from

οὐδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The first argument is that τὰ φύσει are not affected

ἀν ἐθισθείη. οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οἷτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ 3
25 ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφικότες μὲν ἡμῖν δεξασθαι αἰνέως τελειοί μέντοι
δε διὰ τοῦ ἐθους. ἐπεὶ ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται τὰς 4
δυνάμεις τοῦτοις πρότερον κομιζόμεθα ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐκ-
γείας ἀποδίδωμεν (ὅπερ ἐκὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ

1103 a. 26. Met. 1047 b, 31 ἀρεσῶν δὲ τῶν διαδύμεων οὐκ αὖ
τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν εἰς τὴν αἰσθητικὴν, τῶν δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς τῇ τοῦ αἰθεῖν.
τῶν δὲ μαθησείων οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν οὐλόγη προσηργησάσας
ἔχειν οὔσαι ἐθεῖ καὶ λογῇ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐκὶ τοῦ πᾶσχα
οἷα ἀνάγκη ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν τι δυνατόν καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πῶς καὶ ὅσα
ἄλλα ἀνάγκη προσέτιμι ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ λόγον οἰεῖται

by habituation, *παιδείᾳ* = therefore
goodness does not come by nature.
This really depends on the distinction
between *ἐλαιοὶ δυνάμεις* and *δυνάμεις*
μετὰ λόγον, for which see Met. 104
et. Every λόγος contains both the
thing and its *τέχνη*, the first es-
sentially and the second accidentally,
and therefore every *δύναμις* of the
λόγος *ἔχει*, the part of the soul that
can give an account of itself, is also a
δύναμις of its opposite. But where
there is no λόγος the *δύναμις* can only
become actual in one way.

§ 2. *σοφιστοί...δεξασθαι*, i.e. φύσει
τελειοὶ οὐκ αὖτε.

τελειομένους. Though stated al-
most parenthetically, this is meant as
a hint to those hearers who are ac-
quainted with Aristotle's system. Cf.
Met. 1031 b, 30 καὶ ὅ ἀρετὴ τελειοποι-
εῖς· ἐκαστος γὰρ τότε τέλειος καὶ εὐδαι-
μόμων τότε τελείος, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος
τῆς αἰστικῆς ἀρετῆς μὴδὲν ἐλλειψήσῃ
τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μορθεῖν. Nature has
not only its *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως* in itself, but
also its *ἀρχὴ στάσεως* (Introd. § 27).
The process of growth stops when the
form is fully embodied in the matter.
The *ὁρασίμωτος* is then said to be
complete (*τέλειος εἶναι, τέλος ἔχειν*) or
to have attained its true nature (*ἔχειν*
τὴν φύσιν 1031 b, 39 n.). It is for this

reason that the *γένεσις* of ἀρετὴ αὖτε
an *ἀλλοιωσις*—the *εἶδος* is not *εἰρηδικὸν*
of a *γένεσις*—but takes place ἀλλοιω-
μένου τῶδε, in this case by alteration
of the soul. Cf. Phys. 246 a, 10
1103a.26. Note n. 10.

§ 2. *ἐπὶ ὅσα κατὰ*. In things that
come by nature, the capacity precedes
the act, in things that come by habit
the act precedes the capacity. For
the full explanation of this we must
refer once more to the *Metaphysics*
(loc. cit.). Capacities are either con-
genital (συγγενεῖς) or acquired (whether
by habit or teaching). The reason
why in the case of the latter, the act
precedes the capacity is just that
they are *μετὰ λόγον δυνάμεις*, and ac-
cordingly of opposites. They will
not, therefore, become active as soon
as they are brought into contact with
the appropriate object. They cannot
act in two opposite ways at once, so
they will not act at all till something
else determines in which way they are
to be active. As we are dealing with
the *δυνάμεις* of τὸ ὁρασίμωτος, this some-
thing will be some form of *ἀρετή*, or
at least something which has an ap-
petitive element in it (*κωμικισμός*).

ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν. Cf. Met. loc.
cit.), but we see from Met. 1049 b, 10
and De An. 415 a, 16 that πρότερον

5 μὲν βούλημα πάντες νομοθετοῦ τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ
αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἁμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τοῦτω πολιτεία
πολιτείας ἀγαθῇ φαύλης.

Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα δ
ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ
κιθαρίζειν καὶ [οἱ] ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί.
10 ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδομοὶ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ
τοῦ εἰ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι εἰσονται ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς
κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάσκοντος, γ
ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίγοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλήγμασι
15 τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδι-
κοι πρὺπτοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐπιβόμοις φειβέι-
σθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν
γὰρ σωφρονεῖς καὶ πρῶοι γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκολαστοὶ καὶ ὀρ-
20 γήλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ
ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ
ἐξεις γίνονται. διὸ δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι· 8

§ 6. Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ. This is summed up 1103 a, 14 by the words *ἐτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ὡς γίνεσθαι, δὲ τοῦτω καὶ αἰσθάναι καὶ φείβεσθαι μὴ ὥσθαι γινόμενον*. There is no real difference of meaning between *ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν* and *διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν*, and the same idea is expressed below (1104 a, 16) by *ὅτε τῶν αὐτῶν*. Aristotle might have said that the *ποιητικὰ ἀρετῆς* and the *φθαρτικὰ ἀρετῆς* were the same.

καὶ [οἱ] ἀγαθοὶ κ.τ.λ. I have bracketed it as suggested by Professor Bywater. Tr. 'people become—.'

§ 7. τοῦ διδάσκοντος. We are still speaking of τέχνη.

ἢ δι' λόγῳ. 'in short,' a Platonic phrase apparently only here in Aristotle. Cf. Sandys on Dem. 3, 18 'Like dispositions arise from like activities.' The attribute has to be understood with both members of the phrase, as often, cf. 1094 b, 28 a.

§ 8. ποῖας ἀποδιδόναι, i.e. ἀποδιδόναι. This use of the verb is derived from that which we see in 1103 a, 17. 'We must qualify our activities.' For the use of *τετακ* here cf. Met 1010 b, 17, where the two meanings of quality are given as (1) *διαφορὰ οὐσίας* and (2) *διαφορὰ ἐνεργείας*. The latter meaning is then explained *τὰ δὲ πᾶσι τῶν κινουμένων ἢ κινουμένων καὶ τῶν κινήσεων διαφορὰ· ἀρετὴ δὲ καὶ κακία τῶν παθημάτων μέροι τι· διαφορὰ γὰρ δηλοῦσι τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας, καθ' αἷ τοιοῦτος ἢ τοιοῦτος καθὼς ἢ φαύλος τὰ ἐν κινήσει ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς διδάσκοντος ἀποδιδόναι ἢ ἐνεργείας ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐκ ἐναντίας μοχθηρόν. μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ κακόν σημαίνει τὸ ποῖον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμφύχων, καθ' αὐτῶν μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν προαιρέειν*. The meaning, then, is that we must 'give our activities a certain quality.' It is

κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἔξεις. εὐ
μικρὰν οἷν διαφέρει τὸ οἷταις ἢ οὕταις εἰθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐβίχθαι.
ἀλλὰ πάντοτε, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

25

11. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παρούσα πραγματεία οἱ θεωρίας ἐνεκά
ἐστιν ὥστε αἱ ἄλλαι τοῦ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ
σκεπτόμεθα ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἔν
δφίλος αὐτῇ) ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τί περὶ τὰς
πράξεις, πῶς πράττειν αἰτιάι· αὐταὶ γὰρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ 30
τοῖ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰν ἔξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πρίττει κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείμενον [ῥηθῇ-

1103 b, 26. E.E. 1216 b, 20 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ
τὸ εἰδέναι τιμωτάτην τί ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστὶν· οὐ
γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστὶν ἀδριμεῖ ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρείου, οὐδὲ
τί ἐστι διαλασύνη ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιον, καθάπερ καὶ ἔχουσιν μᾶλλον ἢ
γινώσκον τι ἐστὶ το ἔχουσιν καὶ εὐ ἔχειν τὴν ἔξιν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκον
τί ἐστὶ τὸ εὐ ἔχειν

ωκεῖται to notice he in reduction
of this category

11 § 1 Ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ. The
context of this passage has been
suggested, and it is certainly true that
(1) it runs over what touch this has
been said already, and (2) that it
does prove much - especially the dis-
tinction of the Mean - that will find its
proper place later on. It is also true
(3) that § 8 is continuous not with
this but the preceding passage, and
(4) that this passage is not referred to
in the commentary 1105 b 13. But
these are all characteristics of the
peripatetic style. It is to be noted
also that there is a great difference
between the treatment of the Mean
here and later on. Here it is ex-
plained dialectically by a syllogism;
later on it is discussed philosophically. Now
this is a very characteristic procedure,
as we shall see.

πραγματεία, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἥθη πραγμα-
τεία, ἢ διὰ τὸν ἐπὶ προσωποποιε-
σάμενος (Rhet. 1356 a, 16). In this
sense of a 'branch' of philosophy the

word is a synonym of μέθοδος. Cf.
1094 a, 1 n.

οἱ θεωρίας ἵνα. Cf. 1137.
104 b, 17 ἵνα γὰρ τοῖς εἰδέναι χάριν ἢ
πραγματεία. The statement that a
theoretical study of goodness would
be of no use will not seem too strong
if we remember that in a practical
science the product is 'better' than
the activity. From this it follows
that such a study would not com-
pletely attain its end.

§ 2. κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. The
least misleading translation is 'ac-
cording to the right rule'. The phrase
comes from the Academy (see next
page), and was too familiar to need
explanation.

κοινόν 'is common ground,' i.e.
common to us and other schools, es-
pecially the Academy. That this is
the meaning appears clearly from
1144 b, 21 seq. For the meaning
given to κοινὰ cf. κοινὰ, γινώσκειν, δόξαι,
κοινὰ δοξαστά, 'received beliefs,' 'ac-
cepted names.'

ὑποκείμενον. Cf. 1109 a, 11 ὡς ἐν

σεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς].

- 1104* Ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιαμολογείσθω, ὅτι τὰς ὁ περὶ τῶν 3
πρακτέων λόγος τύπος καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι,
ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἵπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἔλγην οἱ λόγοι
ἀπαιτητέοι, τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν
5 ἐσθηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῖ 4
καθόλου λόγου, ἐτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ
ἔχει τύκρ.βίς· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οἷθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν
οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς εἰς τοὺς πρίττοντας τὰ πρὸς
τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς
10 κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιοῦτου τοῦ παρόντος 5
λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι 6
τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ υπερβολῆς φθεῖρι
σθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίαις

τύπος υποκείμεν ταῦτα. 'Let it be assumed as the basis of our discussion.' Hel and some inferior mss. read *ὑπερεκείσθω*, but no parallel to this expression can be found in Aristotle. The words which follow in brackets are justly suspected by Heiler and Bywater. They imply the identification of the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* with *ἐνόντης*, which in this bald form is post-Aristotelian. See, however, 1144 b, 27 n.

§ 8. περὶ τῶν πρακτέων. περὶ τῶν πρακτέων Bekk. Suz. Byw. with Hel. I have reverted to the reading of all the best mss. Aristotle is not here speaking of the difficulty of practical science in general, but of the difficulty of laying down rules as to how we should 'qualify our activities.'

τύπος... ἀκριβῶς... κατὰ τὴν ἔλγην Cf. 1094 b, 11 eqq. The comparison goes down to τὰ ὑγιεινά, which are here substituted for the *πρόστα* of the arts in the former passage. This is because an example of τὰ ποιητέα is wanted, and *ὀργανῶν* has for one of its meanings *ὀργάναι ποιητικῶν* (cf. 1096 b, 27 n.).

§ 4. περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα. General rules of conduct are hard to give: a system of casuistry is still less capable of exactness.

ὑπὸ παραγγέλων ἐνδεμίαν εἶναι. 'it comes under no professional prescription,' as medical treatment, for instance, does. Cf. Probl. 853 b 32: ἰατροὶ παραγγέλλουσι, Ethic. 211 A 15. 1421 b, 4 παραγγέλματα πολιτικῆ, διακτικῆ. For *πρόστα* cf. *νόμος* ἡ αὐτὴ μέθοδος εἶναι. (Top. 102 a, 37.)

It is curious to note that, in the hands of the Church, casuistry became just such a professional trade.

ὥσπερ καὶ κτλ. Mr Stewart is doubtless right in supposing that Aristotle had in mind the passage of Hippocrates quoted in the introduction, § 16.

§ 8. πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. A Platonic touch. Cf. 1096 a, 14 n.

§ 6. τὰ τοιαῦτα. 'things like good news.' There is no need to seek a definite reference for the pronoun. Aristotle is here employing the dialectical method of *ἐκείναι ἐκ τῶν ἀρετῶν*.

δεῖ γὰρ κτλ. Cf. Isok. Dem. § 34 τὸ γὰρ ἀφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ

κρίσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὀρῶμεν·
 τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα 15
 φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία
 πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ
 7 σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὖξει καὶ σφίξει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ
 ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν.
 ὃ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπο- 20
 μένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὃ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ
 πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πά-
 σης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαίων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ὑπερχόμενος ἀκόλα-
 στος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός
 τις. φθείρεται δὴ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς 25
 ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σφί-
 3 ζεται. ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ
 φθοραὶ ἐκ τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, ὅλον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· 30

1104 a. 27. E.E. 1220 a, 22 ὑποκισθῶ δὴ πρῶτον ἢ βελτιστῇ
 δόξαισι ὑπὸ τῶν βελτίστων γίνεσθαι, καὶ πρᾶττεσθαι ἄριστα περὶ
 ἱλαστον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλεύστου ἀρετῆς, οὖν πύνοι τε ἄριστοι καὶ τροφή ἀφ'

ταύτων ἔχει τὴν δόξαν. The
 parenthetical clause introduces the
 reason for what follows (i.e. the
 choice of health and strength as
 instances) according to the common
 notion. The dialectical method here
 employed consists in finding the things
 that are 'productive and destructive'
 of goodness by finding what is pro-
 ductive and destructive of things simi-
 lar. This is quite without prejudice to
 the more 'physical' account of the
 matter later on.

§ 7 ἀναίσθητός τις. Here and in
 many other places (1107 b, A. 1108 b,
 11 1109 a, 4 1110 a, 7) Aristotle
 uses this word, though with some
 variation, in the special sense of
 'insensitive' to pleasure. In this sense
 it is continued with ἀνάληγος, of

which it is more commonly a synonym.
 Cf. 1114 a, 10 n.

φθείρεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For the reading
 see Bywater, *Conte*, p. 27. The par-
 ticle δὴ is here inferential. Tr. "then."

§§ 8-9. ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ.
 "Οτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἔξ ἐν γένεσι, περὶ ταῦτα
 καὶ ἐνέργειαι (1105 a, 16). This section
 is continuous with c. i, §§ 6-8, cf.
 c. ii, § 1 n. Note that ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
 is unlimited for διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν with
 no difference of meaning. γίνεσθαι
 being treated as the passive of ποιεῖν.
 Bekker has καὶ αἱ αὐξήσεις, but the
 article is omitted in K¹ and obscures
 the sense. The γένεσις καὶ αὐξήσεις
 on the one hand are opposed to the
 φθοραὶ on the other.

καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι, sc. αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
 ἡδονῆς, i.e. ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

γίνεσθαι γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλοῦ τροφῆς λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοῖς τοίοις ὑπερέχειν, καὶ μάλιστα ὅς ἐστιν αὐτὰ τοιαῖα ὁ ἰσχυροί. οὕτω ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἐκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ὑπερῶν γινόμεθα σαφροτές, καὶ γινόμεθα μάλιστα ἐνυπόμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ 1104¹ καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ· ἐπιχειροῦμεν γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρείοι καὶ γενόμεναι μάλιστα ἀντησοῦμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερὰ.

III. Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιῆσθαι τῶν ἔξωθεν τὴν ἐπιμελίαν ἥδεσθαι ἢ λυπεῖν τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος

ὡς γίνεται εὐδία, καὶ ἐκ τῆς εὐδίας ποιοῖσιν ἀριστα· ἐπὶ πᾶσαν δαδύειν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὴν προσφερομένην, ὥστερ ἔγχεαι ἐκ τροφῆς καὶ κόπων καὶ ἔρας· ταῦτα δὲ δῆλα ἐκ τῆς ἰσχυροῦς. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἁπλῆ ἢ τοιαυτῇ διαδύσει ἐστὶν ἢ γίνεται τε ἐκ τῶν ἀριστῶν περὶ ψυχῆν αὐξάνειν καὶ ἐφ' ἧς πράττεται τὰ ἀριστα τῆς ἐκείνης ἔργα καὶ τάχῃ καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πῶς μὲν γίνεται, πῶς δὲ φθείρεται καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἢ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐφ' ἧς καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ φθείρεται πρὸς τὸ βέλτερον ἐνατιῆσθαι.

1104 b. 4. EE. 1220 a. 34 σημείον δ' ὅτι περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ σολάσεις ἰατρικαὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ γινόμεναι διὰ τῶν ἐνατιῶν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσὶν.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται, 'will be ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται.' This way of expressing the idea is Platonic. Cf. *Polit.* 288^a d ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς δημιουργοῦσιν, *Philos.* 59 d το μὲν δὲ φρονητικῶν καὶ λ., ἡ τοι ποιεῖ καθαίρει δημιουργοῖς ἡμῶν ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι παρακρίσθαι (cf. *Isag.* b. 12 n.), καὶ οὕτω ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἀποκρίσθαι. "Kittles are made out of clay, while a potter works on clay" (Bury in loc.). Among the senses of ἐν given in *Phys.* 210 a. 14 210 q. we find *inter alia* ἐν ἢ ἐγγίσει ἐν θυμῷ καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ ὅλων ἐν οἷον ἐν τῇ ὁλῇ. Here the particular meaning of ἐν ᾧ is ἐν ᾧ ἢ ἀνάστασις, which may be *space*, *quantity* or *quality*. Cf. *Phys.* 227 b. 25 καὶ ἐν τῷ τοῦτο κινεῖσθαι, αὖ ἐν τόσῳ ἢ ἐν πλεονεξίᾳ. The *inter alia* here described are fully-

developed) αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν (ἀλλοιῶν) and in particular, *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ* ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. For *αὐτοῦ* is the *αὐτῷ* like of the *γένεσις* and *φθορῆς* of goodness and also the *ἐν ᾧ* of good activities. Note that ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς is replaced in the summary by *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ*, and that *Εὐδαιμονία* says *πρὸς ταῦτα ἢ χρῆσις* (i. q. *ἐνέργεια*) *αὐτῇ*.

III § 1 Σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τ.λ. "Ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ λήγουσιν (1105 a. 23).

σημεῖον ..ποιεῖσθαι. It is in accordance with the practical character of this discussion that the theory of the relation of goodness to feeling should apparently be introduced only to justify a practical rule for diagnosing *ἔξωθεν* by their symptoms. For σημείον ποιεῖσθαι, 'to take as a

ναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἀναντίων πεφύκασιν γίνεσθαι. ἔτι, ὥς καὶ πρῶτον 5 εἶπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ἢ ὅσων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι 20 χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἂν μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὥς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς

1104 b, 18. EE. 1221 b, 27 εἰλημμένων δὲ τούτων, μετὰ ταῦτα λεγέον ὅτι ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα διγῆρηται, καὶ αἱ μὲν ἐνῷ λόγον ἔχοντος διανοητικαί, ὡς ἔργον ἀλήθεια, ἢ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει ἢ περὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου, ἔχοντος δ' ὀρεῖν (οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος μέρος ἔχει τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρεῖν, εἰ μεριστὴ ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη δὲ φαῖλον τὸ ἦθος καὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἡδονὰς τινὰς καὶ λύπας· δηλὸν δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν διαιρέσεων τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἕξεις· αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις τῶν παθημάτων, τὰ δὲ παθητὰ λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ διωρίζεται· ὥστε διὰ τε ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὰς ἱμπροσθεν θέσεις συμβαίνει πᾶσαν ἡθικὴν ὀρετὴν περὶ ἡδονὰς εἶναι καὶ λύπας· πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς ἢ ὅσων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἴσται

posites (e.g. fever is cured by a cold remedy). If the remedy is pain, then pleasure must be the cause of the disease. The medical παράγγελμα expressed in such phrases as βοηθεῖν τῷ μὲν θερμῷ ἐπὶ τῷ ψυχρῷ etc. is often discussed in medical writers. See Mr Stewart's note.

§ 8. πρῶτον. This is the reading of K^b and is not likely to be an invention. The other mss. have the more commonplace πρότερον. The reference is in 1104 a, 27 sqq., and the principle there laid down, εἰ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐργεῖται. This shows that pleasure and pain are the αἰτίαι πάθη of ἀρετῆς. Cf. Phys. 246 b, 10 αἰτία δὲ (πάθη) ὅφ' ὧν γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν. πρὸς ταῦτα. Another variation of the phrase expressing the object to which the activity is relative. Cf.

the note on p. 82 and Eudemus there referred to.

τὴν φύσιν ἔχει. A variation of ἐνέργει which is easily explained if we remember that the αἰτία φύσιν οὐ τελείωσις of any ἕξις is its ἐνέργεια. Things are said ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν, εἶναι ἐν τῇ φύσει (opp. ἐξίστασθαι) when they are complete. Translate 'shows its true nature.'

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, 'by the rule.'

διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται κ.τ.λ. Comm. Anon. Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῶν Στωικῶν ἦν ἡ δόξα αὕτη. The word ἀπάθεια is found once only in what remains to us of Greek philosophy before the Stoics; but we can hardly be wrong in supposing that the reference here is to Dikaiarchos. Cf. Clem. Strom. II, 28 (Στωικισμὸς φησὶ στοιχάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῇ δόξη καὶ νόμῳ. Eudemus (l. c.) refers the definition to πάντι.

τρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχωσμένου τῷ βίῳ. κα-
 νονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πρίξεις, οἱ μὲν μάλλον οἱ δ' ἦττον,
 5 ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα 9
 τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις
 εὐὴ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον 10
 ἡδονῇ μύχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ
 δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετῇ.
 10 καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὐ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ
 ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ
 τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται,
 ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός.

Ὅτε μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, καὶ 11
 15 ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθίρεται μὴ
 ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ
 ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθαι.

IV Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν
 δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα
 σώφρονες· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα,
 20 ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες. ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ
 καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ 2
 τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι

θεραπευθῶσι τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις, (p. 307, 13) φ δὲ ἀπὸ παιδίου συνηθέηται καὶ συντέτροφον (of diseases).

ἀποτρίψασθαι..... ἐγκεχωσμένον. The metaphor is taken from washing out stains. The figurative use of ἀποτρίψασθαι occurs more than once in Demosthenes and is worked out at length by Plato, Rep. 429 d 1-29 q.

κανονίζομεν. The verb occurs only here in Aristotle, but the metaphor of 'the rule' occurs several times and is still felt as a metaphor (cf. 1113 a, 33). The word κανὼν did not become technical till a later date.

§ 10. καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος. Fr. 105 (Hym.) Θυμῷ μύχεσθαι χαλεπὸν· ὅτι γὰρ αὖ χρηστὴ γίνεσθαι ψυχῆς δυνάμει (Early Greek Philo-

sophy, p. 140). No doubt θυμός was here used in the Ionic sense in which it is equivalent to ἐπιθυμία.

περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον κ.τ.λ. For this text cf. 1109 a, 12-29 q.

§ 11. ὅτι... λύπας, 1104 b, 4—1105 a, 13. καὶ ὅτι... γινομένων 1103 b, 6—15 and 1104 a, 10—26. καὶ ὅτι... ἐνεργεῖ 1104 a, 27—b, 9. The section on the Mean (1104 a, 21—27) is not specially referred to. Cf. 1103 b, 26 n.

IV. § 1. πῶς λέγομεν. 1103 a, 31, 34. b, 2. This ἀπορία serves to bring out more fully the character of ἐθεσμός. It falls under the general principle that what exists ἐν δυνάμει can only be made to exist ἐνεργείᾳ by something already actual. The form

τοῖσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν
 ἔσται γραμματικός, εἴαν καὶ γραμματικὸν τι ποιῇσῃ καὶ
 γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμ 25
 3 ματικὴν. ἔτι οὐδ' ὅμοιον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν
 ἀρετῶν τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει
 ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ
 κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ εἴαν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δι-
 καίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴαν ὁ πράττων 30
 πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν εἴαν εἰδῶς, ἔπειτ' εἴαν προαι-
 ρούμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον εἴαν καὶ
 βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς
 μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συνυριμείται, πλὴν 1105^b
 αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν
 ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν
 δύναται εἴπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ
 4 σώφρονα περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώ- 5
 φρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα ὅσα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώ-
 φρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα
 πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ [ὁ] οὕτω πράττων ὥς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώ-

(*εἰδέναι* existing in the soul of the learner tends to reproduce itself as *ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀεθρῶτον γινεῖν*.)

§ 2 κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικὴν, i.e. by realising the form (*εἶδος, λόγος*) of *γραμματικὴ* in his own soul. If he acts *ἄλλω ὑποθεμένου* he is *πράττων* the *λόγος* or form which exists in that other's soul.

§ 3 ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς. Note the change of the propositions, which correspond to the distinction between *ποιεῖν* and *πράττειν*, *εργεῖν* and *πράττειν*.

εἶδω. It is essential that he should know what he is doing. The conditions of this knowledge are analysed below 1110 b, 18 sqq.

προαιρούμενος. The act must be willed or intended. *Προαίρεσις* is analysed below 1111 b, 4 sqq.

εἰς ἀντὶν, i.e. *ὅτι καλοῦ*, as we shall

see later on. We should not praise an act if it was willed not for itself, but to win our praise.

βεβαίως...ἔχων, if the act is *ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως*, the outcome of a constant character, not an isolated effort.

τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας. The idiomatic use of *ἄλλος*.

τὸ εἰδέναι. In the sense of theory (*γνώσις*), knowledge is not essential to goodness, though of course it is essential if we mean simply knowing what we are doing. This is discussed fully in Book 111.

τὸ δ' ἄλλω, sc. προαίρεσις and *ἔξις*, *εἴπερ*. I have adopted Professor Bywater's correction of *MS. ἀπερ*. The subject of *περγίνεσθαι* is *τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν* (Contr. p. 19.).

§ 4. *οὐχ ὅτι ἀλλὰ καὶ*. Cf. 1130 a, 7. For the reading see Bywater (Contr. p. 19).

φρονες πράττουσιν· εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πρῶτ- 5
 10 τειν ὁ εὐκαίος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων·
 ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσῃε
 γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός· ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττου- 6
 σιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἶονται φιλοσοφεῖν
 15 καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὁμοῖον τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς
 κάμνουσιν οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι
 δ' οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ
 ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυ-
 χὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφούντες.

V. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον· ἐπεὶ οἷον
 20 τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις,
 τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ· λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίας 3

1105 b, 19. EE. 1120 b, γ λεκτέον δὴ κατὰ τί τῆς ψυχῆς
 ποιότης τὰ ἦθη, ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τε τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων, καθ'
 ὥς ὡς παθητικοὶ λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις, καθ' ὥς πρὸς τὰ παθῆ
 ταῦτα λεγούται τῷ πάσχειν πως ἡ ἀπαθείη εἶναι· μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ
 διαιρέσις ἐν ταῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις (?) τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων
 καὶ τῶν ἕξεων. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ

§ 6. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. This
 practical exhortation on things the dis-
 cussion of how goodness is produced
 is an appropriate conclusion. There
 is no Royal Road to goodness. We
 cannot become good by studying
 moral philosophy or listening to ser-
 mons.

V. § 1. τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή. The
 connexion of thought is left to be
 inferred as usual, but it is quite plain.
 We found (1103 b, 22) that οὐκ ἐστὶ
 ἀρετὴ τὸ κατὰ τὸν νόμον γενέσθαι
 τὰς ἕξεις (ib. 31). And that means
 further that the acts which are to
 produce goodness must be τοιαῦτα
 οἷα ἐν ᾧ ἀγαθὸς γίνεσθαι (1103 b, 6).
 We cannot therefore know what sort
 of acts make a good *ethos* till we
 have defined this *ποιότης* of the ap-
 petitive soul which we call goodness.

τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα, sc. ἐν τῇ
 ἀρετικῇ. The explanation given of
 τὰς δυνάμεις ἕξεις would be too nar-
 row without this restriction which is
 easily supplied from the context. The
 vague expression τὰ γινόμενα is used
 because τὰ πάθη in the sense here
 explained are not ποιότητες, as
 Eudemos rightly points out. At the
 same time, the διαιρέσις is certainly
 derived from that of ποιότης, which is
 said in Cat. 8 b, 23 seqq. to comprise
 (1) ἕξις καὶ διαθεσις, (2) δυνάμις
 καὶ ἀδυναμία, (3) οὐκ ἀδυναμία
 καὶ ἀδυναμία, (4) οὐκ ἀδυναμία καὶ
 ἀδυναμία.

§ 2. πάθη. The word πάθος is
 very ambiguous. It may be used of
 almost all *συμβεβηκότα*, and especially
 of qualities, so that it is often equiva-
 lent to ποιότης. But even in ordinary
 Greek it had a more restricted ap-
 plication to what we call 'feelings.'

ἐργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον
ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλος οὐκ ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· ἐννάμεις

ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅλος οὐκ ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη
καθ' αὐτά. καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι ποιότης ἀλλὰ πάσχει, κατὰ
δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ποιότης. λέγω δὲ δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς λέγονται κατὰ τὰ

and this is the sense in which we are
using the word here. Now in this
sense a πάθος is not a ποιότης but a
καρτερία κατὰ τὸ πάθος or ἀλλοιωσις.
We can see the distinction well from
Met. 1070 a. 33 sqq., where the two
senses of τὸ πάθος are given as (1) ἡ
ἀσφαρὴ τῆς οὐσίας (cf. 1106 a. 14 n.),
and (2) τὰ πάθη τῶν αἰσθημάτων. As
goodness and badness are said to be
πάθη in this sense (b. 1070 b 17 δὲ καὶ
ἐπειὰ τὰς παθημάτων μερὸς τι), this is
clearly not the meaning of the word
here. Nor can the πάθη here men-
tioned be identified with the παθη-
τικὰ ποιότητες of the Categories, which
are temporary qualitative affections
(such as tastes and colours) accom-
panying a πάθος, but not the πάθος
itself. The latter is thus described
elsewhere: "Ὅσα δὲ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ ἀποκαθίστα-
σθαι γίνονται πάθη λεγόμενα, οὐκ ἐν
λίπῃ αὐτοῦ τὸς θυγαυτέρους ἵστανται οὐδέ
γὰρ λέγονται ὀργισθεὶς οὐ ἐν τῇ τοιοῦτῃ
πίθει ἀπὸ ἀποκαθίστασθαι ὡς καὶ οὐκ πολλὸν
ἐπικρατεῖται ἐν ὧντι πάθη μὲν λεγόμενα,
τὰ τοιαῦτα, ποιότητες δ' οὐ."

ἐπιθυμίαν, i. e. ὁρμήν τοῦ ἡδέως (Top.
106 b. 22 c 1) μετὰ λύπης (1113 n. 4).
I have one of the three main forms of
ἡδονή.

ἐργὴν φόβον θάρσος. Following
the Platonic tradition, there are said to
be five passions (Top. 106 a. 8 sqq.).
The classical definition of ἐργή is
ἡδονὴ τοιοῦτη (Rhet. 1378 a. 31) or
ἀπολαύσις (De An. 403 a. 30) a
rising from a feeling of pain caused
by the idea of a slight (μετὰ λύπῃ δὲ
φαινομένην εὐθυμίαν), (cf. also Top.
107 b. 30 107 a. 13 106 a. 33). The
popular definition of φόβος is πῶς

δοκῇ τοιοῦ (1113 a. 9), but we ought
rather to say it is the desire of self-
preservation accompanied by a feeling
of surprise or φαντασίαν τοιοῦ
φθάρτου ἢ λύπῃ. The opposite
of φόβος is θάρσος, which therefore
involves a feeling of pleasure arising
from a phantasia of the opposite kind.

φθόνον χαρὰν. The latter seems
to be used here in a special sense as
the opposite of ὕβρις, which is λύπη
(cf. φαινομένην εὐφροσύνην τῶν ἐπιπικνῶν
τινός (Top. 109 b. 30).

φιλίαν μῖσος. As φιλοφροσύνη ἀγαθῶν
(cf. 1125 b. 29) φίλος is in the direction
(Top. 106 a. 13), and so we should
understand the classification of all
seven from φθόνος onwards. They
are all αἰσθητικὰ produced by the φαν-
τασία of something good or bad, and
therefore belong to βούλησις. As a
πάθος, φιλία is more correctly called
φίλησις (1117 b. 28). It is a disin-
terested feeling of pleasure when good
happens to another or pain when ill
befalls him (Rhet. 1381 a. 4), and
μῖσος the opposite.

πόθος, intense feeling of the plea-
santness of the absent and pain of the
present.

ζῆλος is the pain a man feels at
seeing good things in the possession
of another like himself, not because
the other has them but because he
himself has not (Rhet. 1384 b. 30),
while ἔλεος is pain at the φαντασία
of evil happening to another like one
self (ib. 1385 b. 13).

οἷς ἔπεται κτλ., i. e. αἰσθητικὰ or
ἀλλοιωσις which are necessary either
μετ' ἡδονῆς or μετὰ λύπῃ (see the
 foregoing notes).

δὲ καθ' ἑς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἑς δυ-
 25 νατοὶ ὀρμισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἔξεις δὲ καθ'
 ἑς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀρμι-
 σθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ
 μέσως, εὖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν
 30 οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα
 κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετάς
 καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη
 οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα—οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινείται ὁ φο-
 βούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἁπλῶς ὀργι-
 1106^a ζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς—κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετάς καὶ τὰς κακίας
 ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἐπεὶ ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβού- 4
 μεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ
 ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη
 5 κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετάς καὶ τὰς κακίας
 οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι πῶς. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδεὶς 5

πάθη οἱ ἐνεργαῶντες, οἷον ὀργίλος ἀνάληγτος ἐρωτικὸς αἰσχυνηλὸς
 ἀναίσχυρος. ἔξεις δὲ εἶναι ὅσαι αἰτιαὶ εἰσι τοῦ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ λόγον
 ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐναντίως, οἷον ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνη δειλία ἀκαλασία.

δυνάμεις. In the present context, these are *φύσις* and therefore *ἄλογος*. *δυνάμεις*. Cf. Cat. 9 a, 16 ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φύσιν ἢ ἀδυναμίας λεγόμενα. They are susceptibilities or insusceptibilities to feeling.

ἔξεις δὲ κ.τ.λ. Note that *ἔξεις* here are not only qualities, but also relations. Cf. Cat. 23 a, 30 οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράσσεσθαι μὴ τις ἡμᾶς φύσιν ἢ ἐνερτυότητα τοῦ πρόθετον ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι συγκαταρῆμυσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ἔξεις καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι ἐλέγχον. The *γίνεσθαι* is ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, for we say ἐκωστήμη (or ἀρετῇ) τινός, but the particular is not. We do not say γραμματιστῇ (or ἀνδρείᾳ) τινός.

σφοδρῶς, ec. ἔχομεν a natural brachylogy for ἔχομεν ὥστε σφοδρῶς ὀρμισθῆναι.

§ 3. *πάθη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* These

arguments to show that goodness is not a *πάθος*, (1) feeling is not in itself good or bad, (2) feeling does not imply will, (3) feeling is a motion (or process), while goodness is a state or disposition. All this comes simply to saying that *πάθη* are not *καίριαι*.

§ 4. **προαιρέσεις.** The meaning of *προαίρεσις* is explained in Book III. Cf. for the present Met. 1023 b, 23 *μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμφύκων, καὶ ταύτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν.*

κινεῖσθαι. Cf. Met. 1023 b, 15 *πάθος λέγεται ἐνα μὲν τρόπον παύτης καθ' ἣν ἀλλοιεύσθαι ἐνδέχεται.* In Phys. 226 a, 26 *ἀλλοιωσθαι* is defined as *qualitative motion* (*κίνησις κατὰ τὸ ποῦν*).

διακεῖσθαι is synonymous with *ἔχειν* in the Ethics, though in the

διτάμεις εἰσὶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι
πάσχειν ἀπλῶς εὔτε κακοί, [οἷτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγό-
μεθα] ἐπεὶ δεικνύται μὲν εἶμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ
διὸ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἰπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ 10
οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε διυνάμεις, λείπεται
ἔξω αὐτὰς εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν οἷν ἐστὶ τῷ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀρετῇ,
εἴρηται.

VI. Δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔξω, ἀλλὰ καὶ
2 ποῖα τις. ῥητιον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετῇ, οὐ ἂν ἡ ἀρετῇ, 15
αὐτό τε εὖ ὅχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδι-
δωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμον σκου-
δαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ
ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁράμεν ὁμοίως ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετῇ ἵππου τε
σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν τὸν ἵπ- 20

Categories 9 & 8 1105 b is distinguished
from 1105 a as being more per-
manent. Knowledge and goodness
are 1105 b, health and disease are dis-
tinct. Both are originally indistin-
guishable.

§ 3. διὰ τούτα δὲ κτλ. Two
arguments to show that goodness is
not a δύναμις, (1) a capacity is not in-
tend good or bad, (2) capacities are
nearly natural.

ἔτι μὲν. Before we can give reason,
we must make a preface, v.2 1105
b. Cf. 1104 b, 35 a.

οἷτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα.
1105 b. Professor Lywater says, these
words have no conjunction to connect
them with what precedes, and seem
to be an independent repetition of 1105 b, 35.
πρότερον, supra 1103 a, 18 1105 b.

§ 4. Λογιστέον. This assumes that
the enumeration is exhaustive which
implies (1) that the σπουδαῖον is the
appetitive soul, (2) that we are con-
sidering it ἐκ τῶ τοῦ σώματος.

VI. § 1. ἀλλὰ καὶ ποῖα τις. We
to 1105 b. 1105 b. we must give
1105 b. 1105 b. The
1105 b. 1105 b. 1105 b.

§ 2. ῥητιον οὖν κτλ. The ar-
gument is that the difference of good-
ness will be the same as the difference
of the activities which (1) produce
goodness, and (2) result from good-
ness. Now we have seen above
(1104 a 11 1105 b) that the 1105 b. 1105 b.
of goodness are activities in
a mean, and also 1105 b, 37 1105 b.
that activities in a mean are the result
of goodness. They are both 1105 b.
1105 b. Therefore
goodness will be a 1105 b. 1105 b.
So far, then, the difference is 1105 b.
1105 b. has been reached in a purely
dialectical way. That it was the
difference of goodness was found by
1105 b. 1105 b. 1105 b.,
and that it is the difference of good-
ness is shown 1105 b. 1105 b.
(cf. Ind. s.v.).

ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ. The illus-
tration is from Plato, Rep. 353 b, ὅτι
1105 b. 1105 b. 1105 b.
ἀρετῇ 1105 b. 1105 b.

ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετῇ. The illustration
is suggested by Plato, Rep. 355 b.

βάτην καὶ μέναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων 3
οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀφ'
ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔσ-
γον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἐτι 4
25 δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν. εἰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστιν
ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαμετρή-
λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἑλάττω τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα
ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον
τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πρᾶγμα 5
30 τοις μέσον το ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ
ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μῆτε πλεονά-

1106 a, 26. EE 1220 b, 21 διορισμένον δὲ τούτων, ληπτέον ὅτι
ἐν ὅπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαμετρή- ὅστιν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον,
καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλην ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οἷον ἐν γυμναστικῇ, ἐν ἱατρικῇ,
ἐν οἰκονομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν ὅποισιν πράξις, καὶ ἐπιστη-
μονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ, καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀτεχνῶ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ
κίνησις σινηχεῖ, ἡ δὲ πράξις κίνησις ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τὰ μέσον τὸ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡς ἡ ἐπαγγέλιος καλεῖται καὶ ὁ λόγος.
πανταχοῦ δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν βελτίστην ἕξιν· καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ἐκ
τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ τοῦ λόγου. τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία φέρεται ἀλλήλην, τὰ δ'
ἄκρα καὶ ἀλλήλοισι καὶ τῷ μέσῳ ἐναντία τὸ γὰρ μέσον ἐκότερον πρὸς
ἐκάτερον ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ ἴσον τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττονος μείζον, τοῦ μείζονος δὲ

§ 2. ἤδη, supra 1104 a, 10 sqq.
ἡ φύσις. We now show φυσικῶς
that the differentia of ἀρετῆ is ἐν
μέσότητι. Cf. Introductory Note.
With the change of method, the
Platonic reminiscences disappear. In-
trod. § 7.

συνχεῖ καὶ διαμετρή, 'continuous
and (infinitely) divisible.' The current
rendering of διαμετρήν by 'discrete' is
a mere blunder and makes nonsense
of the argument. The word for 'dis-
crete' is διορισμένον. Everything
which is continuous is also potentially
divisible αὐτὸ ἐκμήκην, and the point
is that wisdom καὶ πράξις which are the
'matter' of goodness are just such
infinitely divisible continua; for, re-

garded as *energeia* both πράξις and
πράξις are *energeia*. We shall best
understand the doctrine of the mean
by thinking of a scale which is capable
of infinite gradation. There is one
right degree, and all below it down
to zero are ἐλλείψεις, all above it up
to bounding point ὑπερβολή.

ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς
ἡμᾶς. This distinction entirely re-
moves the objection that Aristotle
makes the difference between right
and wrong a quantitative one. The
bad man feels and acts more or less,
as the case may be, than the good
man, but this does not imply that the
good man's feelings are always 100
centigrade and his conduct middling.

ζει μήτε δαίλει· τούτο δ' οὐχ ἔν, οἰδὲ ταύτων πᾶσιν.
 διὼν εἰ τι δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δι δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μέσα
 λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσθι γάρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ
 ὑπερέχεται, τούτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν 35
 ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ
 εἰ τῷ δέκα μιᾷ φαγεῖν πολὺ δυο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὃ ἀλέει 1108^b
 πτης εἰς μᾶς προστάξει· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ
 τῷ ληφόμενῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ
 ὀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ
 8 πάλης οὕτω ἐπὶ πᾶς ἐπιστήμῳ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ 3
 τὴν ἑλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖ-
 ται, μέσον δὲ οὐ το τοῦ πόνεματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
 9 εἰ δὲ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ
 μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτα ὄρουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώ-
 θασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν 10
 ἴσταιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὥς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἑλ-
 λειψέως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σφελούσης,
 αἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὥς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες
 ἐομάζονται). ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβιστέρα καὶ
 ἀμείκτων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἀν εἴη στο- 15
 10 χαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη
 καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ ταύταις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις
 καὶ τὸ μέσον οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπι-

λαττον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ μέσ' ἅπαντα εἶναι καὶ
 μετρίαν τινα. ληπτέον ἄρα ἢ ποῖα μεσότης ἀρετὴ, καὶ περὶ ποῖα
 μέτα

§ 8. κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀνα-
 λογίαν. Theon of Smyrna p. 85 10
 takes from Theaetetus the definition
 τῷ ταύτῳ ἀριθμῷ ὑπερέχουσαν καὶ
 ὑπερέχουσαν. This is not what we
 find in the text, but a version in
 mathematical proposition. Cf. p. 108,
 13 ποῦται δὲ φησὶν ὁ Ἀδραστός
 καὶ τῷ γεωμετρικῷ ἀριθμῷ λέγεσθαι
 ὑπερέχουσαν καὶ ὑπερέχουσαν δὲ
 τῷ, καὶ τὰς ἑλλας μεσότητες ἐν' αὐτοῖς

ελεῖσθαι μεσότητες.

§ 9. ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις. Cf. Part.
 An. 039 b 12 μάλλον ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἐνεκε
 καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς καὶ φύσει ἔργοις
 ἢ ἐν τοῖς καὶ τέχνῃ. If we find that
 the excellence of a work of art con-
 sists in this, that you cannot get to it
 or take anything from it, then a
 fortiori this will be true of goodness
 as it is of nature.

θυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι
 20 καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστε καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττοι, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω
 οἱ κ' εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οἷς καὶ αἱ 11
 ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς
 ἀρετῆς ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ 12
 καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον· ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάνθ' αὖ καὶ
 25 πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ
 ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται], τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθύ-
 νεται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς· μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν 13
 ἡ ἀρετὴ, στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῖς μέσοις· ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρ- 14
 τάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ
 30 Πυθαγόρειοι εἰκάσιν, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ
 δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον το δὲ χα-
 λασπὸν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλασπὸν
 δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν)· καὶ διὰ ταύτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ
 ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·

35 ὁσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα

1106 a, 36. EE. 1227 b, 5 ἀνάγκη τοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἡ
 ἡθικὴ αὐτὴ τε μεσότης τίς ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας πάντα, ἡ δὲ

§ 19. ψέγεται. Cf. Bywater, Contr.
 p. 29

§ 24. τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου.
 Aristotle here makes an ingenious use
 of a Pythagorean idea which had at
 first a cosmological rather than an
 ethical significance. According to the
 Pythagoreans, the world was built up
 of geometrical figures, and these arose
 from the limitation of the unlimited
 (space). The unlimited once limited
 was a point, twice limited a line and so
 forth (Early Greek Philosophy p. 312).
 The limit was thus the principle of
 order. Just in the same way the in-
 finitely divisible continuum of feeling
 and action requires to be determined
 according to the ἄρθε λόγος. There
 are infinite possibilities of wrong in it,

but there is a certain degree in it which
 is right, and that is the limit, the
 μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

ἀποτυχεῖν ... σκοποῦ ... ἐπιτυχεῖν.
 For the metaphor of the σκοπὸς cf.
 1094 a, 23 n. Goodness is στοχε-
 στική τοῦ μέσου and we may think
 of the μεσότης as the bull's eye in the
 target. The possibilities of aiming
 are infinite, there is one right place
 in the

ὁσθλοὶ π. 2. The authorship of
 this verse is unknown.

§ 15 ἕξις προαιρετική. We have
 seen that the genus of goodness is
 ἐξω 1105 b, 291, that is, a habitual
 attitude towards feeling, developed by
 habituation from a neutral dynamis.
 We have seen too that we cannot say

τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. ὁρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος 1107^a
 ἐρίσκειν. μεσοῦς δὲ δύο κακῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβο-
 ρὰ λὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἵτι τῇ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν
 τὰς δ' ὑπερβύλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν
 ταῖς πράξεσι τῇ δ' ἀρετῇ τὸ μέσον καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ 5
 11 αἰρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ
 τί ἔν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ

κατὰ ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τῇ ἀρετῇ, τὴν ἀρετὴν
 εἶναι τῆς ἡθικῆς ἐξ ἡ προσημετικῆς μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδύσει καὶ
 λυπηροῖσι, καθ' ὅσα τοῖος τις λέγεται το ἡθος, ἡ χαίρων ἡ λυπούμενος·
 ὁ γὰρ φιλογλυκὺς ἡ φιλολύπκος οἱ λέγεται, πῶς τις τὸ ἡθος.

1106 b 15 γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ προσημε-
 τικῆς, ὡς ἡ προσημετικὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ
 λυπηροῖσι καὶ ἡδύσει (1103 a, 31). This
 gives us the προσημετικὴ 'a condition
 of the will.'

ἐν μεσότητι οἶσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
 The definition of this ἐν μεσότητι
 οἶσα is a note at the mean relative to
 ourselves (1106 a, 14 sqq.). The word
 οἶσα implies that το εἶναι of the δεῖν is
 a μεσότης, so Lucianus is quite right
 (see 11) in saying προσημετικὴ μεσ-
 οτήτης.

ὁρισμένη λόγῳ. We took as the
 basis of our conclusion that we must
 ascertain τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (1103 b, 32).
 It is now indicated that this is what
 determines the Mean. The Mean is,
 in fact, a provisional formula. We
 cannot yet say what determines the
 proposition. There is still an unknown
 quantity in our 'Rule of Three' pro-
 position. See the beginning of Book VI.
 καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ἐρίσκειν. This
 is added as a hint of the direction in
 which we are to look for our standard.
 We know already that φρόνησις is a
 θεωρητικὴ ἀρετὴ (1103 a, 6), and now
 we are told that the Mean is deter-
 mined by what the wise man would
 determine it by, a sufficient *endoxon*.
 We must, then, be content for the
 present with our provisional formula,

the Mean. We shall learn more
 when we come to Goodness of In-
 tellect.

§ 16. καὶ ἐν τῇ μεσότητι ἐστὶ, τὰς
 μὲν...τὰς δὲ καὶ κακίας.

τοῦ δέοντος. See 1094 a, 24 n.

§ 17. διὰ π. λ. We have seen
 that Goodness is a Mean in its
 essential nature (οὐσία) and by its
 definition (τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν
 εἶναι λέγοντα), but from the point of
 view of what is best it is an extreme.
 When we go beyond the Mean,
 though we are ascending towards the
 upper extreme of our scale of feeling,
 we are yet descending in the scale of
 excellence. The explanation of this
 is to be found in the fact that goodness
 is a τελειωσις, and that therefore all
 badness, whether of excess or defect,
 is opposed to it as *στέρησις* to *εἶδος*.

τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. This curious phrase
 means the real nature (οὐσία) of a
 thing as expressed in its definition by
 genus and specific difference. Its
 origin is easily understood if we take
 such a phrase as τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἄν-
 θρωπον, i. e. 'what it was for him to be
 a man,' 'what his being a man was.'
 The imperfect is to be explained as a
 "philosophical" imperfect (Good-
 win, *Greek Moods and Tenses*, § 40),
 and represents the definition in a

ἀριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐτιδίδχεται πράξις 10
οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἐνια γὰρ εἴθις ὠνόμασται
10 συνελημμένα μετὰ τῆς φανλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχειρηκακία
ἀναισχυρία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρῶξεων μοιχεία κλοπή
ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται
τῷ αὐτῷ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν
οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οἷκ ἐστὶν οἷν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατ-
15 ορθοῦν, ἀλλ' δεῖ ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ
περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἦν δεῖ καὶ ὅτι καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν,
ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὅτισιν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστίν.
ὁμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δευλαίνειν 20
καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἐλ-
20 λειψίν· ἔσται γὰρ οἷτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως με-
σότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλειψὶς ἐλλείψεως
ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἐλλειψὶς διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδ'
ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδ' ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλειψὶς, ἀλλ' ὡς αὖ
25 πρᾶττεται ἀμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἐστίν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἐλλειψὶς.

VII. Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνοι καθύλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ

1107 a. 8. FE 1221 b, 18 σὺ δὲ δι' ἀγνοῖν ὅτι εἰς τῶν λεγο-
μένων οἷκ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πῶς λαμβάνειν, ἀν πῶς λαμβάνηται τῷ μᾶλλον
πάσχειν οἷον μοιχὸς οὐ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ πρὸς τὰς γαμετας
πλητταίνειν (οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ μοιχηρία τις νύκτῃ δὴ ἐστὶν
συνελημμένον γὰρ τό τε πάθος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ποιῆδε εἶναι. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕβρις, διὰ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦσι συγγεῖσθαι μὴ φασκοῦνται,
ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεύσαι ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἢ ἀναγκαζόμενοι καὶ πατάξαι μὲν,
ἀλλ' οἷχ ὕβρισαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα (Cf. Rhet
1374 a, 3.)

iving way as the result of a process,
not as a dead formula. This is
characteristic of Greek philosophy
all through, based as it was on dis-
cussion and debate.

§ 18. εἴθις ὠνόμασται κτλ.,
'have names which at once involve

badness.' For συνελημμένα cf. EF
I. c., Met. 1024 b, 31 τὸ μὲν οὖν
συνελημμένον ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς θαρ.

VII. § 1. Δεῖ δὲ κτλ. The
definition must now be tested by its
applicability to particulars, i.e. par-
ticular forms of goodness. So the

καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθολοὶ κοινότεροί εἰσιν οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέτρον ἀληθινότεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δεόν δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν * * * ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φοβου καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν <εν> τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος 1107^b πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων

a, 32. EE. 1220 b, 36 εἰλήφθω δὴ παραδείγματος χάριν, καὶ θεωρήσθω ἕκαστον ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς.

ὀργιλότης	ἀναληγησία	πρώτης
θρασύτης	δειλία	ἀνδρεία
ἀνισχυρία	κατάπληξις	αἰδώς

definition of εἰδωμονία was tested by its applicability to the relevant facts. Cf. 1093 b, 9 sqq. and 11c Met. An. 693 a, 11.

κοινότεροι, 'of wider application.' This is the meaning of the text and the Greek commentators (ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινότερου). Cf. e.g. De An. 414 b, 23 γίνονται δ' ὅτε οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν σχεδόντων λόγων κοινῶς, δι' ἐφαρμογῆς ἐν ταῖς. (This I' ουδενὸς ἔστιν, σχήματι). The meaning of the text is: κοινότεροι, i.e. more appropriate, for, as will be seen from the references in Eudemus. Metaph. pp. 46-47. εἰσὶν and εἰσὶν-λογισμῶν (De An. 403 a, 2 διαλεκτικῶς ὑποτάσσονται εἰσὶν) refer chiefly, if not wholly, to arguments not based on the *prima logica* of the sciences. Here Aristotle is pointing out the respective *εἰσὶν* of both universal and particular.

How can hardly be anything else but an accusative also, as it cannot stand for a dative. Bonitz would therefore delete εἰσὶν in the next clause. There may be a lacuna in the text cf. 1104 b, 18.

ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. In EE 1220 b, 37 it is called a *ὑπογραφή*, though we have *διαγραφὴ* 1223 a, 28. Cf. *διὰ*

γραμμα. We have references to a *ὑπογραφή* in De Interpr. 22 a, 22. Hist. An. 310 a, 30 and elsewhere. It seems, then, that Aristotle's *ὑπογραφῆς* were illustrated by a sort of syllabus. In the case of the *Analytics* this must have been quite necessary, and there are other parts of the *Ethics* that are not intelligible unless we assume a *διαγραφὴ*.

§ 3. περὶ φοβου καὶ θάρρη. Both fear and its opposite are mentioned because they form a *ἁπλοῦς* continuum. It is possible for the soul to pass by continuous *ἀλλοιώσεις* from the one to the other. We may therefore look at the Mean from two points of view, and there are then two extremes and two defects. For it does not follow that ὁ ἐν τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὀλιγωρῶν (which is what Aristotle means by ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀφροῖα (*περὶβάλλων*)) will be the same as ὁ ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων. They are different *ἕως* altogether, for we are not dealing with the mere *ποσὸν* and *οὐκ ἐστὶν*. It may well be, however, that one or other of the *ἕως* has no special name, or that the same name is given to both; but this must not blind us to the qualitative distinction between them.

θρασύς, ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ μὲν φιβέσθαι ἱπερβαλλὼν τῇ δὲ θαρραλίᾳ
 ἐλλείπων δειλός. περὶ ἡδονῶν δὲ καὶ λύπης—οὐ πάσας 3
 5 ἦττον δὲ καὶ <οὐχ ὁμοίως> τερὶ τὰς λύπης—μεσότης μὲν
 σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς
 ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχή-
 κασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ δό- 4
 σιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψει μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ἱπερ-
 10 βολὴ δὲ καὶ ἑλλειψίς ἄσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία, ἐναντίως
 δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβιάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει,
 ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβιάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει
 ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου λέγομεν, 5
 15 ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐ-

ἀκολασία

φθόρος

κέρδος

ἄσωτία

ἀλαστονεία

κολασία

ἀρέσκεια

τρυφερότης

χαυνότης

δαπανηρία

πανουργία

ἀναισθησία

ἀνώνυμος

ζημία

ἀνελευθερία

αἰρωνεία

ἀπέχθεια

αὐθαδεια

κακοπάθεια

μικροψυχία

μικροπρέπεια

εὐθεία

σωφροσύνη

νέμεσις

δικαίον

ἐλευθεριότης

ἀλήθεια

φιλία

σιμνότης

καρτερία

μεγαλοψυχία

μεγαλοπρέπεια

φρόνησις

τά μὲν πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει ταῖς ψυχαῖς, πάντα δὲ
 λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐλλείπειν, ὁρῶντες μὲν γὰρ
 ἴσθιν ὃ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος καὶ θάπτον καὶ πλείουσιν ἢ οἷς δεῖ,
 ἀνάληγτος δὲ ὃ ἐλλείπων καὶ οἷς καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὥς· καὶ θρασὺς μὲν ὃ

§ 3. οὐ πάσας. We shall see
 what later on

καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως. I have adopted
 Mr Bywater's suggestion to insert οὐχ
 ὁμοίως from 1117 b, 16. The καὶ in
 the common text has no meaning.
 Here is another determination which
 shows we are not dealing with mere
 quantity.

οὐ πάνυ γίνονται, 'cannot be said
 to be common.' Cf. Ind. s.v. οὐ πάνυ.
 ἀναίσθητοι. This is not the usual
 meaning of the word. Cf. 1104 a,
 24 n.

§ 4. περὶ δὲ δόσιν κ.τ.λ. We pass
 now from μεσότητες ἐν πράξει to με-
 σότητες ἐν πράξει.

ἐν αὐταῖς. See Byw. Contr. p. 30.

ἐτῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις
 ὑπὸ μεσότητι μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς
 διαφέρει ελευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ
 μικρά, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαιανυσία, ἔλλει-
 ψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν 20
 7] ελευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. περὶ
 δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερ-
 βολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λογομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία·
 8] ὥς δ' ἐλέγμεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ελευ-
 θεριότητα, <τῷ> περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ 25
 πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ
 περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὥς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ
 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον
 ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ
 μέσος ἀκωνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ 30
 τῷ φιλοσίμῳ φιλοτιμία· ὅθεν ἐπιδικαίζονται αἱ ἄκροι τῆς
 μέσης χώρας· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλό-
 τιμον κατασίμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν

ἐστὶ δὲ χρῆ φοβούμενος μήθ' ὅτε μήθ' ὥς, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ὁ καὶ ὁ μὴ δεῖ καὶ
 ἵν' αὐτὸ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ * * ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκωστος * * καὶ δ
 ἐπιδικητικὸς καὶ ὁ ὑπερβάλλοντος πάντων ὅσοις ἐνδέχεται, ἀναίσθητος δὲ
 ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ μὴ ὅσον βέλτερον καὶ αὐτὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐπιθυμῶν, ἀλλ'
 ἀσπῆξιν ὡς περὶ λίθος· κερδαλεὸς δὲ ὁ παταχόμενος πλεονεκτικὸς,
 ἡμιωδὴς δὲ ὁ μετριοφύων ἀλλ' ἐλιγασχόμενος (?). ἀλοζῶν δὲ ὁ πλείων
 τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος, εἰρων δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω· καὶ κίληξ μὲν
 ὁ πλείων σιασπιρῶν ἢ κελῶς ἔχει, ἀπεχθητικὸς δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω· καὶ τὸ
 μεῖναι πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀρεσκεία, τὸ δ' ὀλίγα καὶ μόγις αἰθάδεια· ἐστὶ δ'
 ὁ μὲν μετριοφύων ὑπομένων λυτὴν, μὴ δ' αἰ βελτίον, τρυφερότης, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν
 ὁμοίως ὡς μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰπεῖν ἀντίθετος, μεταφορᾷ δὲ λέγεται σκληρότης
 καὶ τυλαίεωρος καὶ καυοπαθητικὸς· χαῖνος δ' ὁ μεζύων ἀξίων αὐτόν,
 μακροψυχὴ δ' ὁ ἐλαττόνων· ἐστὶ δ' ἀσωτος ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν δαπάνην

§ 8. διαθέσεις, i. q. ἕξεις. Cf.
 1106 a, 6 a.

§ 9. τῷ περὶ μικρά, sc. εἶναι,
 'being concerned with
 small things.' The insertion of τῷ is

due to Rannauer.

ἐπιδικαίζονται, a legal metaphor.
 For the ἀλλῶν καὶ ἐτελλῶν ἐπιδι-
 καίται see Ac. πολ., c. 43, 4, 56, 6
 with Sandys's notes.

1108^a ἐπαινούμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ 9
 τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιούμεν. ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς μνησθήσεται· νῦν
 δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρό-
 πον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλείψις καὶ 10
 § μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀκωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μῖσον
 πρῶτον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πρᾶγματα καλέσωμεν· τῶν
 δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀρ-
 γιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀοργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἐλλείψις ἀορ-
 γησία. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μὲν 11
 10 τίνα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων·
 πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωμίαν,
 διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔστι περὶ τάληθες τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς,
 αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ εἶδός· τοῦτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν
 πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητεον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων. ἵνα
 15 μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν. τὰ
 δ' ἄκρα οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ οὐτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ μὲν

ὑπερβάλλων, ἀνελεύθερος δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν ἐλλείπων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
 μικροπρεπὴς καὶ ὁ σαλάκιων, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλει τὰ πρέπον, ὁ δ'
 ἐλλείπει τοῦ πρέποντος· καὶ ὁ μὲν πανοῦργος πάντως καὶ πάντοθεν
 πλεονεκτικός, ὁ δ' εὐήθης οὐδ' ὅθεν δεῖ· φθονεὺς δὲ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι
 ἐπὶ πλείουσιν εὐπραγίαις ἢ δεῖ (καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄξιοι εὖ πράττειν λυποῦσι
 τοὺς φθονερούς ἐν πράττουσας), ὁ δ' ἐναντίως ἀνωμύμωτος, ἔστι δ' ὁ
 ὑπερβάλλων τῇ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι μὴδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίτοις εὖ πράττουσιν,
 ἀλλ' εὐχερὴς ὥσπερ οἱ γαστρίμαργοι πρὸς τροφήν, ὁ δὲ δυσχερὴς κατὰ
 τὸν φύσιν ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός οὕτως
 ἔχειν περίεργον διορίζει· οἰδεμία γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, οὔτε θεωρητικὴ οὔτε
 ποιητικὴ, οὔτε λίσγει οὔτε πράττει τοῦτο προαδιορίζουσα, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ'

§ 9. κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.
 'according to the method we have
 traced out' This seems more natural
 than to take the participle in an active
 sense. Cf. Pol. 1251 a, 17 κατὰ τὴν
 ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. Some, however,
 translate 'the method which has
 hitherto guided us.' There is no
 difficulty in taking the perfect parti-
 ciple of a dependent in a passive sense,
 though this is avoided in other tenses.

§ 11. ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν κ.τ.λ.
 Note the motive assigned. It is most
 important all through the discussion
 of the *ἀρεταί* to remember that Ari-
 stotle's aim is not more descriptive, and
 still less to set up ideal types
 for our edification. It is to show
 that the *ἀρεταί* are all μεσότητες and
 therefore imply a *δραστήρια μεσότης*.
 This must be shown in small things
 as in great.

εἰς καὶ τούτων τὰ κλίω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατίον δ' ὡς περ
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῖς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἐνε-
 12 καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθές
 ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λογισθῶ, 20
 ἡ δὲ προσποιήσις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζυνεία καὶ ὁ
 ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλάττω εἰρωνεία καὶ
 13 εἰρων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδείᾳ ὁ μὲν μέσος
 εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπεία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βω-
 μολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολύχων, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων 25
 ἀγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἔξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ
 τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσό-
 τος φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβύλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα ἀρε-
 σκοῖ εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
 30 καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δυσεργὶς τις καὶ δύσκολος. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ 30
 εἰς τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ
 αἰδώς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδούμενος.
 καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταύτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβύλλ-
 λων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξῃ ὁ πάντα αἰδοῦμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
 13 ἡ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδούμενος. νέμε- 35
 σις δὲ μεσότης φόβου καὶ ἐπιχειρειακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ 1108^b
 λυπῆν καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν τοῖς πέλας
 γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνα-
 ξίως εὐ πράττεισιν, ὁ δὲ φιλομερὸν ὑπερβύλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ
 πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρειακὸς τοσούτων ἐλλείπει τοῦ 5

ἔστι τρῶς τὰς συνοφιστίας τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς λογικὰς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν
 διακρίνω τὸν ἐράπον τοῦτον, ἀριβίστερον δ' ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἑξῆων
 λέγωμεν τῶν ἀντικειμένων.

§ 12. ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι is exactly
 equivalent to περὶ τὰ πάθη. For ἐν
 is used in 13 times cf. 1104, 1105,
 1106 and for the acceleration of verbs
 in the plural cf. 1102 1103. The
 construction differs from e.g. ἀδέρεια and
 σωφροσύνη in 1101 1102 1103, but
 these passages contain 1102 1103 1104
 1105 1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188 1189 1190 1191 1192 1193 1194 1195 1196 1197 1198 1199 1200 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213 1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 1244 1245 1246 1247 1248 1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 1259 1260 1261 1262 1263 1264 1265 1266 1267 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273 1274 1275 1276 1277 1278 1279 1280 1281 1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 1301 1302 1303 1304 1305 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318 1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328 1329 1330 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336 1337 1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 1369 1370 1371 1372 1373 1374 1375 1376 1377 1378 1379 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 1494 1495 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 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λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρει. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· [ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν
10 ἀρετῶν].

VIII. Τριῶν δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἐλλείψιν, μᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πῶσαι πύσαις ἀντίκεινται πῶς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ
15 μέσῃ ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἐλαττον μείζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μείζον ἐλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἔξω πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλειπουσιν ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεὺς πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνε-
20 ται πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον

1108 b, 11. EE. 1222 a, 6 ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξω ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ' ἣν ἔριστα διέκινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἀριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον, τοῦτο δ' ἐντὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀναγκαῶν ἂν εἴη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἕκαστος μεσότητα εἶναι καὶ περὶ μέσ' ὅττα ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς, ἔσται δ' ἡ μεσότης ὅτι μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς (καὶ γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις), ὅτι δ' ἐν λύπαις, ὅτι δ' ἐν ἀμφυτέραις. ὁ γὰρ ὑπερβύλλων τῷ χαίρειν τῷ ἡδέϊ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ὁ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι τῷ ἐναντίῳ, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ πρὸς τινα ὅρον, οἷον ὅταν μὴ ὡς οἱ πολλοί· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς ὡς δεῖ.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις ἔξω ἀφ' ἧς τοιοῦτος ἔσται ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ὥστε τοῦ

§ 16 *ὁμοίως*. ἀρετῶν. The term *λογικαὶ ἀρεταὶ* occurs nowhere else in Aristotle, and the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ* are not μεσότητες.

VIII. § 1. Τριῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. The question of the nature of the ἀρεταίς between the three conditions is of cardinal importance to Aristotle. The extremes are opposite to each other and also to the means. We shall see that Speusippus made much of this

and drew unwarrantable conclusions from it. It is necessary to guard against such arguments as that, since intemperance is a vice, insensibility must be a virtue.

διαθέσεων, not distinguishable from ἔξω. Cf. 1105 a, 6 n.

§ 2. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον κ.τ.λ., the stock illustration of this form of ἀντίθεσις. Cf. 1153 b, 5

ἐκείσθη-τος ὁ δ' ἐλευθέρμιος πρὸς μὲν τοῦ ἀνελείθερον ἄσαι-
 3 τικ. πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὰ καὶ ἀπωθεύονται
 τὸν μίσον οἱ ἄκροι ἐκότερος πρὸν ἐκότερον, καὶ καλοῦσε
 τὸν ἀνελείθιον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρᾶσνε δειλόν, καὶ 25
 4 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον. οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοισ
 τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ
 πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρατέρω γὰρ ταῦτα κείνηται ἀλλήλων
 ἢ τοῦ μίσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν
 5 τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ὁ μῦθος τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μίσον 30
 ἐκότες ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρᾶσύτητι πρὸς
 τὴν ἀνελείθιον καὶ τῇ ἰσότητι πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα. τοῖς
 δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης· τὰ δὲ πλεί-
 στον ἀπέχοντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ
 6 μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλείον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸν δὲ τὸ μίσον 35

αἱτοὶ τῷ γματός αὐτὸ μὲν ἀποδέχονται τὴν ὑπερβολὴν οὐ δὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν,
 ὡς ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοισ ἐναντία καὶ τῷ μίσῳ, οἷτω καὶ τὰς ἑξέως
 ἀλλήλοισ ἐναντίας εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ.

EE 1231 a, 34 ἔστι δ' ἐναντιώτερον τῆς ἄκροις τὸ μίσον ἢ
 ἐκείνα ἀλλήλοισ, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' ὑποθέμενον γίνεται αἰσῶν, τὰ δὲ
 πολλαῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰς ἐνίοτε οἱ αὐτοὶ θρασυδύοι, καὶ τὰ
 μὲν αὐτοὶ τὰ δὲ ἀνελείθεροι, καὶ ὅλως ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς. ὅταν μὲν
 γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀνωμαλοὶ ᾖσιν, οἱ μῆσοι γίνονται· ἐν τῷ μίσῳ γὰρ ἐπὶ
 τοῖς τὰ ἄκρα.

EE 1222 a, 22 συμβαίνει μόντοι τὰς ἀντιθέσεις εἶθι μὲν
 φανερωτέρας εἶναι πάσαις, εἶθι δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ
 τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν. ὅτιον δὲ τῇ ἐναντιώσεως ὅτι οὐκ αἰετὶ ἐπὶ
 ταῦτά (2) τῆς ἀσότητος ἢ ὁμοιότητος (?) πρὸς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν
 αὐτοὶ ἀνελείθιον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἐπὶ τὴν μίσον ἔξιν, ὅτε δ' ἀπὸ
 τῆς ἔλλειψιν, ὅτε καὶ πλείον ἀπέχει αὐτοὺς δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτερος εἶναι,
 οἷον οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐν μὲν τοῖς πόνοις ὑγιεινότερον ἢ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς
 ἐλλείψεως καὶ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ μίσου, ἐν δὲ τῇ τροφῇ ἢ ἔλλειψιν ὑπερ-
 βολῆς ὥστε καὶ αἱ προαιρετικαὶ ἑξέως αἱ φιλογυμναστικαὶ φιλογυμνῆς

[4. ἐτι πρὸς μὲν κ.τ.λ. This is
 an act peculiarly which has a great
 interest for Aristotle and is worked
 out in detail in the sequel to each ἀρετῇ.
 It is evident that this case is 'likest'
 to the case of the ἀνελείθιος. This again

shows we are not dealing with mere
 quantities.

τὰ δὲ πλείστον κ.τ.λ. The full
 definition of ἐναντία in τὰ πλείστον
 ἀλλήλων διεισθηκότες τῶν ἐν τῷ ὅτῳ
 γίνονται (Cot. 6 a, 18).

- 1109^a ἀντικείται μᾶλλον ἐφ' αὖ μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' αὖν δε ἡ
 ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή
 οὕσα ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὕσα, τῇ δὲ σιμφοσύνη
 οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἐνδεia οὕσα ἀλλ' ἡ ἀπολασία ὑπερ-
 5 βολή οὕσα διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν
 μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι
 καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ
 τοῦναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ὁμοιότερον
 10 δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπε-
 χοντα πλείον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι· μία μὲν
 οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν
 αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ῥέτομεν πως, ταῦτα
 μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται· οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον
 15 πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν

μᾶλλον ἴσονται. καθ' ἑκατέραν τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἐνθα μὲν αἱ παλιμπνηύτεραι, ἐνθα δ' αἱ ὑπυστατικώτεραι, καὶ ἐναντίον τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ὡς δ' λόγος ἐνθα μὲν ὁ ἄπονος καὶ οἷα ἀμφω, ἐνθα δὲ ὁ ἀπολαυστικός καὶ οἷα ὁ πεινητικός. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διότι ἡ φύσις εἰθίς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφίστηκε τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ' ἦγον μὲν φιλοῦσθαι ἐπὶ μὲν, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπολαυστικῶς. ὁμοίως δὲ ταῦτ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐναντίαν τὴν τιθεμένη τὴν ἐξὶν ἐφ' ἣν τε ἀμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐφ' ἣν αἱ πολλοὶ (ἡ δ' ἑτέρα ὥσπερ οὐκ οὕσα λανθάνει· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὀλίγον ἀναισθητοὺς ἴσασιν), οἷον ὀργὴν πρρόντη καὶ τὸν ὀργίλον τῷ πρῶν. καίτοι ἴσασιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἴλεον εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλλακτικὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι βραπύζομεν. ἀλλ' ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ οἱ πύστες ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον.

1109 a, 1. EE 1234 b, 6 αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρω, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν οὐτε δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· αἷτια δὲ τὰ τε πρῶτα ῥηθέντα

§ 7. ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος. This αἷτια is generally given in some such form as χειρὸς γάρ. So 1122 a, 14 (μειζὺν ὥστε παρὲν), 1123 a, 34 (χειρὸς ὥστε), 1126 a, 31 (οἱ χαλεποὶ χεῖρους), 1127 b, 32 (χειρὸς γάρ).

§ 8. ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. This αἷτια is made use of 1129 a, 15 (μᾶλλον

ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀμαρτάνομεν), 1128 a, 34 (καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον), 1126 a, 30 (καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπὸν κούτερον γάρ), 1151 b, 30 (ὅτι τὸ πρὸς ἐπὶ τὸν ὀλίγον εἶναι φανερόν).

ῥέπομεν. Prof. Georg Bivakiet's 1109 a, 15 is for εἷτος Κ², τρεφόμενος L². Contr. p. 30. Cf. EE. above.

τοὺς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μάλ-
λον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ᾧ ἢ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται·
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ αἴσα ἐναντιωτέρα
ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

IX. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ π
πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δυο κακίων, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς
ἐξ κατ' ἑλλείψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ το στοχαστικῇ
τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῖ ἐν τοῖς παθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἰκα-
νῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σποιδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἐκύστη
γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλον τὸ μέσον οὐ παν- 25
τες ἄλλα τοῦ εἰδότος· οὕτω δὲ καὶ το μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παν-
τες καὶ ῥάβδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύρου καὶ δαπανῆσαι·
το δ' ἢ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς, οἴκετι παν-
τος οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διὸ περ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπανιον καὶ ἐπαινετον καὶ
3 καλόν. διὸ δεῖ τον στοχαζομενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν 30
ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ
παραινεῖ

τούτου μὲν κυπτοῦ καὶ πύματος ἐκτὸς εἶργε
17a.

εἶο, ὀλιγότῃς τε, οἷον τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδὲα ἀνασθῆτων, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ο
ὀμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον, τοῦτο ἐναντιώτερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ δε τρίτον,
ὅτι τὸ ὀρσιότερον ἦτον ἐναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος
πρὸς τὸ θάρρος (?) καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.

a. 20. EF 1212 b, 5 ἐπεὶ δ' εἰληπται ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἔξων
καθ' ἡρоста τὰ πάθη, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἑλλείψεις, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων
ἔξωσι, καθ' ᾧ εἰχουσι κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (τίς δ' ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ
πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέπονται λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτόμεν),
φανερὸν ἐστὶ πῶσαι αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακαὶ περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λιπῶν
ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἑλλείψεις οἷσι καὶ ἡδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημίων
ἔξωσι καὶ ταυθμάτων γίνονται, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε βελτίστη ἔξωσι ἢ περὶ
ἑαστα μέτη ἐστίν. δῆλον τοιουν ὅτι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἢ πάντα, ἢ τούτων τινὲς
ἔσονται τῶν μεσοτήτων.

ἐκείνου 'growth,' i.e. 'in the
direction of our growth.'

IX. 21. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κτλ. After
the recapitulation which as usual,
breaks the argument, we have some

practical rules for attaining 'the mean.'
This is a practical science.

§ 3. πρῶτον μὲν, Aule I
ἡ Καλυψὼ. The words are really
said by Odysseus, Od. xii, 219. Some

- 1109· ἀντικεινται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ
 ὑπερβολή, ὅλον ἀνδρείῳ μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή
 οὐσα ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὐσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ
 οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεα οὐσα ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερ-
 5 βολή οὐσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει. μίαν 7
 μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῇ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι
 καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ
 τοῦναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· ὅλον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ θρασύτῃ καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον
 10 δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέ-
 χοντα πλείον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν 8
 οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν
 αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ῥέπομέν πως, ταῦτα
 μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον
 15 πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν

μᾶλλον εἰσονται καθ' ἑκατέρας τὴν ἀφρῆσιν, εἴθε μὲν αἱ πολυπονώτεραι, εἴθε δ' αἱ ὑποστατικώτεραι, καὶ ἐναντίος τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ὡς ὁ λόγος εἴθε μὲν ὁ ἄκρον καὶ οὐκ ἄμφω, εἴθε δὲ ὁ ἀπολαυστικός καὶ οὐχ ὁ πεινητικός. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διότι ἡ φύσις εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφίσταται τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ' ἤττον μὲν φιλιώτεροι ἐσμέν, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπολαυστικοί. ὁμοίως δὲ ταῦτ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς. ἐναντίαν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀμαρτανόμεν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐφ' ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ (ἢ δ' ἑτέρα ὥσπερ οὐκ οὐσα λανθάνει· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὀλίγον ἀναισθητος εἶστί), ὅλον ὀργὴν πρῶτον καὶ τὸν ὀργίλον τῷ πρῶτῳ. καίτοι εἰστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαυν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλλακτικὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι βαπτίζομενον. ἀλλ' ὀλίγοι αἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο δὲ πάντες ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον.

1109 a, 1. EE. 1234 b, 6 αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρω, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὅτι δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· αἰτία δὲ τὰ τε πρῶτα ρηθέντα

§ 7. ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος. This αἰτία is generally given in some such other form as χεῖρον γὰρ. So 1122 a, 14 (μειζόν ὅτι αὐτῶν), 1125 a, 34 (χεῖρον ὅτι), 1126 a, 31 (αἱ χαλεποὶ χεῖροι), 1127 b, 32 (χεῖρον γὰρ).

§ 8. ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. This second αἰτία is made use of 1122 a, 15 (μᾶλλον

ἐπὶ ταύτῃ ἀμαρτανόουσιν), 1125 a, 34 (καὶ γὰρ γινώσκω μᾶλλον), 1126 a, 30 (καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γινώσκω· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γάρ), 1151 b, 30 (διὰ τὸ τῇ ἑτέρῃ ἐν ὀλίγοις εἶναι φανεράν).

ῥέπομεν. Professor Bywater's conjecture for ἔχομεν K¹, σφύκαμεν L¹. Contr. p. 30. Cf. EE. above.

πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταύτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγεται, πρὸς ἢ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· αἱ δὲ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὕσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

IX. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσοτὴς καὶ τοιαύτης, καὶ ὅτι μεσοτὴς δύο κακίων, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἑκατέρωθεν ἑλλείψεως, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τῷ μέσῳ εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἐκατέρωθεν εἴρηται· διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἐκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παν- 25 τὴν ἑλλειψίν τοῦ εἰδότος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ το μὲν ὀργισθῆναι πανταίῃ καὶ ῥαδίον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ὅ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι πανταίῃ οἶδε ῥαδίον· διοπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ 3 καλόν. διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρώτον μὲν 30 ὑποσχερεῖν τῷ μᾶλλον ἐναντίῳ, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ ἑκατέρωθεν παρανοεῖ

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔργου
τῆς.

ἢ ἐλιγότες τε, οἷον τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδία αἰσθητῶν, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' οὗ ἐμμετρούμεθα μᾶλλον, ταῦτα ἐναντιωτέραν εἶναι δοκεῖ· τὰ δὲ τρίτην, ὅτι τὸ δεινότερον ἦσαν ἐναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θυμὸν (?) καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.

§ 20. EE. 1222 b, 5 ἐπεὶ δ' εἰληπται ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἕξων ἐξ ἑκαστοῦ τῶ πᾶσι, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἑλλείψεις, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἕξων, καθ' αἷς ἴσχυται κατὰ τοὺς ὁρθοὺς λόγους (τίς δ' ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πρὸς τίνα διὰ ὅρων ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὡς τερνὸν ἐπισκεπτέον), φανερόν ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ ἀκακίαι περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν ὑπερβολαῖς καὶ ἑλλείψεσι εἰσὶ, καὶ ἡδοναῖ καὶ λύπαι ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημνίων ἕξων καὶ παθημάτων γίνονται, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ γὰρ βελτίστη ἕξις ἡ περὶ ἑκαστοῦ μέση ἐστίν. δηλοῦν τοῦτον ὅτι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἢ πᾶσαι ἢ τούτων τινὲς εἰσὶν αἱ μεσοτήτων.

ἐπιδόσις. 'grow with,' i. 'in the direction of our growth.'

IX. § 2. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. After the recapitulation which, as usual, betrays the argument, we have some

practical rules for attaining the mean. This is a practical science.

§ 3. πρῶτον μὲν, Rule I

ἡ ἑκατέρωθεν. The words are really said by Oenomaus, Od. xi, 19. Some

BOOK III.

THE WILL—COURAGE, TEMPERANCE.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Our deliberative analysis of Happiness has shown us that it mainly depends upon goodness of character, and we have seen that goodness of character is produced by habituation. We had to ask in the next place what quality our acts must have if their repetition is to produce goodness of character, and we found that acts which are to produce goodness must be of the same quality as the acts which proceed from goodness when it is formed. This made it necessary for us to define goodness, that is, to ascertain its "formal cause," and now that this is done, the next step will clearly be to discuss its "efficient cause."

It cannot be said that this connexion of thought is explicitly marked by Aristotle himself, and the commentators have generally failed to see it. But we must always remember that the reasons given by Aristotle for undertaking any inquiry are not necessarily or even usually the real motives of that inquiry. It is characteristic of him (1) to keep the metaphysical groundwork of his practical science in the background as much as possible, and (2) to enumerate all the incidental advantages, especially those of a practical character, that are likely to follow from the discussion. We shall have occasion to notice this peculiarity more than once in the sequel.

§ 2. In the first place, then, it is clear that a good act must be voluntary. An act of which we can truly say "I couldn't help it" is neither a sign of character nor productive of it. We must first of all, then, determine the limits of the voluntary. This was a question much discussed in the Athenian courts, especially in

connexion with charges of homicide. Homicide was primarily a religious offence since it carried with it religious impurity or bloodguiltiness, and therefore every form of it, from the accidental or involuntary up to deliberate murder, came under the cognisance of the courts. The speeches of Antiphon are specially instructive with regard to the moral consciousness of the Athenian dikast on this subject and it is from this, in accordance with his usual method, that Aristotle starts. For us the chief interest of the discussion lies in his anticipation of some of the most important distinctions of Roman and later law. This goes far to justify his claim to be regarded as a teacher of lawgivers. It would have been well for Athens if law had been administered consistently on principles such as those here laid down.

§ 3. It is clear, however, that to call an act voluntary is merely a negative description of it. The acts of children and the lower animals may be voluntary in the sense that they are not done under compulsion or from ignorance, but they are not acts in the full sense of the word at all, and are therefore no sign of character. To be thus an act must be willed, that is it must be "intended" or deliberately adopted as a means to some end which forms the object of a wish. This distinction too was already recognised by the Athenian law of homicide, which distinguished *phoros de pporias* from ordinary homicide even of the voluntary kind. What we want, then, as the efficient cause of action is something related to acts in general as what lawyers call "malice" is related to wrongdoing. This Aristotle calls by the name *proairesis*, a word which was much used in his own day to express the deliberate adoption of any course of conduct or line of action.

By a piece of dialectical argument we are led to see that Will for this is after all the best rendering of the word is neither a purely intellectual nor a purely appetitive function. It is the union of an intellectual element, Deliberation, with an appetitive element, Wish. Further, as we only deliberate about things "in our power," we may say that it is a "deliberative appetition of things in our power."

§ 4. We have come at last in our deliberation to something in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῶν*), and so our practical analysis of a good act is complete. The only doubt which can arise as to the question whether an act of will is in our power or not is with regard to

the object of Wish. Is it in our power to wish for the good? Aristotle answers this question in the affirmative, though with an important qualification. It is character that determines the object of wish, and character is produced by activities which are willed and therefore voluntary. We have, therefore, the formation of character in our own hands, though it is true that when the character is once formed we may not be able to change it.

The efficient cause of action, then, is Will. In willing man is an efficient cause just as he is the efficient cause of his children (*ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπων γέννη*). To produce Happiness we have only to reverse the order of the series which our deliberative analysis has revealed; though, as our aim is to produce it for the State, that is, for others, we have not yet fully solved the problem with which we started.

§ 5. Now that we know what goodness of character is, the next step will be to go through all its recognised forms and show that our account holds good of each. If we are right we must be able to show that every kind of goodness has as its matter some feeling or act which admits of quantitative determination, that it has as its form a "mean" or proportion in the sense explained, and that its efficient cause is a deliberative wish or will.

So far as we can trace any principle in Aristotle's treatment of the various forms of goodness, he seems to proceed from the more self-regarding virtues to those which have to do with others. This can be the only reason for separating justice from its usual companions Courage and Temperance. The reason given for taking the two latter first is purely "exoteric." They are, we are told, the forms of goodness proper to the "irrational parts," i.e. Temper and Desire, a purely Academic "division."

We notice at once in the treatment of Courage and Temperance a striking difference between Aristotle and Plato. Plato always tries to extend the scope of these virtues as widely as he can, while Aristotle's chief endeavour is to narrow them down to their most literal meaning. Partly, no doubt, this may be attributed to a difference of temperament between the two thinkers, but it is primarily due to the different objects each was aiming at. Plato was seeking for principles of universal application to life, Aristotle is looking for facts by which to test his theory of goodness, and it was important for that purpose to have facts as definite and unmistakeable as possible.

Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περί πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ 30
ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαινων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ
δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συγγνωμῆς, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλείου, τὸ ἐκού-
σιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς
ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς
τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολασίας.

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3 Δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσιαι εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα· 1110^a
βίαιοι δὲ οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὔσα ἐν ἡ μὴδεν συμ-

1109 b. 30. EE. 1223 a, 9 ἐπὶ δ' ἡ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κυρία καὶ
τὰ ἀν' αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἐπαίετ' αὐτὰ δὲ ψεκτά (φέρεται γὰρ καὶ
ἐπαίεσθαι οὐ διὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τυχῆς ἢ φύσεως ὑπάρχοντα, ἀλλ'
ὅσων αὐτοὶ αἰτίοι ἐσμέν· ὅσων γὰρ ἄλλος αἴτιος, ἐκείνος καὶ τὸν
ἐνέχον καὶ τὸν ἐπαίον ἐχει), δὴλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κυρία περὶ
ταύτ' ὥσπερ ὡν αἰεὶς αἰεὶς καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. ληπτέον ὅμως ποῦθεν
αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. πάντες μὲν δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅσα μὲν
ἐκείν' αὐτὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἐκίστοι, ἐκείνον αἴτιον εἶναι, ὅσα δ'
ἄλλοις, οὐκ αὐτὸν αἴτιον. πάντα δ' ὅσα προελόμενα, καὶ ἐκὼν ἐγγόν
ὅτι. ὅλοι τοῖν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κυρία τῶν ἐκείνων ἂν
εἴπωσαν.

1110 a. 1. EE 1224 a, 10 τὸ τε γὰρ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, καὶ τὸ

§ 1. Τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς,
συγγνωμῆς ἐλείου (cf. Antiphon
c. 2, Περὶ τοῦ Ἡρώδου φόνοι § 1) τὰ
μὲν ἐκείν' αὐτὸς τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἐχει
σφύρα, τὰ δ' ἐκείν' οὐκ ἐχει.

§ 2. χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ π.λ. A
characteristic touch. Aristotle never
forgets that we are learning to be
wise.

§ 3. βίᾳ βι' ἄγνοιαν Aristotle
is followed by all subsequent writers
in making compulsion and ignorance
the two conditions of an act being
regarded as involuntary.

ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ διὸν ἡ αἰτία.
τοιαύτη οὔσα π.λ. The effect of
this restriction is cases where the
agent contributes nothing to the mo-

βάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῖμα κομίσαι
ποιῇ ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζονῶς
κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι
αἰσχρὸν τι πρᾶξις κύριος ἢ γυνέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πρῶ-
ξαντος μὲν σφίζονται μὴ πρύξαντος δ' ἀποθυρασκοιεν, ἀμφισ-
βήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἐκούσια. τοιοῦτον δὲ

ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον εἶναι φαμεν. ὥστε περὶ τοῦ βίᾳ σκεπτικόν πρῶτον
τί ἔστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον
καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντικείμενα, καὶ ἡ βία καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, τῇ ἐκουσίᾳ καὶ
τῇ πειθοί ἐπὶ τῶν πραττομένων. καθόλου δὲ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν λίθον ἄνω καὶ τὸ πῖρ κάτω
βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενα φέρεσθαι φαμεν, ταῦτα δ' ὅταν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν
καὶ τὴν καθ' αὐτὰ ὁρμὴν φέρεται, οὐ βίᾳ, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκούσια λεγεται,
ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμος ἢ ἀντιθέσις. ὅταν δὲ παρὰ ταύτην, βίᾳ φαμέν. ὁμοίως
δὲ ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ὁρῶμεν βίᾳ πολλὰ καὶ πάσχοντα καὶ
ποιῶντα, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ ὁρμὴν ἐξωθέν τι αἰνῇ· ἐν μὲν τοῖς
ἀψύχοις ἀπλῇ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις πλεονάζει· ἐν γὰρ αἰὶ ἡ
ὁρμὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος συμφωνεῖ. ὥστ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἀπλοῦν
τὸ βίαιον, ὡς περὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει λόγον καὶ ὁρμὴν
ἐναντίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὁρμῇ ξηρ)· ἐν δ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἔνεστιν ἄμφω, καὶ ἂν
τις ἡλικίᾳ, ἢ καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἀποδίδωμεν. οὐ γὰρ φαμεν τὸ παιδίον
πρόττειν οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἤδη διὰ λογισμὸν πράττοντα.
δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον ἅπαν λυπηρὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐθεὶς βίᾳ μὲν ποιεῖ χαίρων
δέ. διὰ περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ πλείστη ἀμφισβήτησις
ἐστίν· ἐναντίας γὰρ ὁρμῆς ἔχων αἰτὺς ἐκαστος αὐτῷ πράττει, ὥστ' ὁ τ'
ἐγκρατὴς βίᾳ, φασίν, ἀφέλκει αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμιῶν (ἀλγὲ
γὰρ ἀφελκων πρὸς αἰτιτείνουσιν τὴν ὁρμὴν), ὁ τ' ἀκρατὴς βίᾳ παρὰ
τὸν λογισμὸν. ἦττον δὲ δοκεῖ λυπεῖσθαι· ἢ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ἢ
ἀπολουθεὶ χαίρων, ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατὴς μᾶλλον ἐλὼν καὶ οὐ βίᾳ, ὅτι οὐ
λυπηρῶς. ἢ δὲ πειθὸς τῇ βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἀντιτίθεται. ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς
ἐφ' ᾧ τέτρεται ἀγει, καὶ πορεύεται οὐ βίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐκὼν. ἢ δὲ ἐπιθυμία

the cause is to ~~the~~ compulsion as a
condition of the involuntary to actual
its ~~major~~. Where the agent con-
tributes to the cause, the case is more
complicated. The contribution may
be of two kinds, either fear of greater
evils *metus*, 'disfess per metum') or
hope of greater goods, as in the case

of the man who does a wrong thing
to save his parents or children. Are
these voluntary agents?

ἢ ὁ πάσχων. Thus is added as a
sort of correction. It is really a
πάθος, not a πράξις.

§ 4. ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει 'admits
of disjunctive.'

ἡ συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χεῖμασι ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς
 μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἕκων, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἰο
 δυν λοιπῶν πάντες οἱ ἰσὺν ἔχουσιν. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν

αἱ τῶν σφαιρῶν αἱ γὰρ μετέχει λόγου. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκούσιν ἡτοί
 ροιαι β' φ καὶ ἀκέραιες ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι καὶ ὁ ὁμοιωτα
 τισι τοῖς β' φ, καὶ ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνύχων λέγουμεν, εἴρηται, καὶ μὴν
 ἀλλ' αἱ τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῷ διαρισμῷ προσκειμένην, καὶ αἱ λοιπὰς τὸ
 λεγόμεν. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τε τῷ ἐξέλθῃ παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμήν, καὶ ἡ
 ὁρμήν, β' φ φαίνεται, ὅταν δὲ μὴ, οὐ β' φ. ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκέραια καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ
 ἡ καὶ αὐτὸν ὁρμήν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἄρει· ἀκέραιον γὰρ ἔχει—αὐτὸν οὐ β' φ
 σφαιρῶν αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ δ' αἱ γὰρ τὰς πρῶτοι αἱ, οὐδ' ἀγαθὰ ἔχουσιν. τὴν
 γὰρ ἐξέλθῃ ἀκέραιον, τὴν παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν ἡ ἐμπροσθεν αὐτῶν ἡ ἀκούσαν,
 ἀκέραιον λέγουμεν, ὅσπερ αἱ τὴν λαβὴν τὴν χεῖρα τίπτει τινὰ
 ἀκέραιον καὶ τῷ βούλῃσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμῇ ὅταν δ' ἐσθλὴν ἡ
 ὁρμήν, αἱ β' φ. ἔτι καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὄντι, καὶ γὰρ
 ὁ ἐγκρατεὺς ἀκέραιον παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πρᾶττειν ἡδονήν, καὶ
 λύπην τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὅτι ὑστερον ὠφελήσεται, ἡ καὶ ἡδονή
 ὠφελείᾳ ἐγγίσκει καὶ ἡ ἀκέραιον χεῖρα μὲν εὐχάριον ἀκέραιον
 αἱ ἐπιθυμῇ, ἀκέραιον αἱ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐλπίδου λύπην, οἷον γὰρ κακὸν
 πρᾶττειν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν β' φ ἐκότερον φαίνεται ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν
 ἡδονήν καὶ διὰ τὴν λύπην ἐκότερον ἀκέραιον ποτε πρᾶττειν ἀκέραιον
 μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἐκότερον ἀκέραιον ἐκότερον ἐκότερον πρᾶττειν ἀκέραιον
 ὅταν μεταφερῇσιν ψυχὴν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁρμήν. ἐπὶ
 αὐτῶν τῶν μερῶν εἰσδεχεται τοῖτο λέγειν· ἡ δ' ὅλη ἐκότερα ψυχὴ καὶ
 αὐτὴ ἀκέραιος καὶ τοῖς ἐγκρατεῖς πρᾶττει, β' φ δ' ἐκότερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν
 αἱ ἀκέραιος τε, ἐπὶ καὶ φαίνεται ἀμφοτέρω ἔχουμεν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος
 φαίνεται ἐκότερος, ὅτι ἐκότερος τῆς γενέσεως καὶ μὴ πηρωθείσης ἐκότερος,
 καὶ ἡ ἐκότερος, ὅτι ἐκότερος ἐκότερος ἀκέραιος καὶ ἐκότερος ἐκότερος
 αἱ ἀκέραιος ἐκότερος τὸ φαίνεται διαρίσκειν, τῷ τε ὅσα ἐκότερος γιγνόμενος
 ἀκέραιος ἐκότερος, καὶ ὅσα ἐκότερος τῆς γενέσεως ἐκότερος γιγνόμενος
 ἡμῶν, αὐτὴν πολλὰ καὶ γῆρας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ τοιαῦτα, ὥστε μὴ κατὰ
 φαίνεται ἐκότερος πρᾶττει, ἀπλῶς οἱ κατὰ φαίνεται ἐκότερος, οἱ τὴν αὐτήν.

[1. ἐκβολὰς. *περὶ τὴν ἀκέραιον*
 In context quoted by Demosthenes
 ἀκέραιον § 11, we have the
 ἀκέραιον, πλὴν ἐκβολῆς ὅτι αἱ οἱ
 ἀκέραιον ἀκέραιον ἀκέραιον
 ἀκέραιον αἱ αἱ ἀκέραιον ἀκέραιον
 ἀκέραιον αἱ αἱ ἀκέραιον ἀκέραιον

in special circumstances voluntarily
 sacrifice his property.' The word
 ἀπλῶς merely marks the absence of
 qualifying circumstances, such as are
 indicated in the clause ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ
 καὶ λ.

§ 6. μικταί, because the efficient

αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις ἐοίκασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκούσιαις· αἰρεταὶ
 γὰρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ
 τὸν καιρὸν ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ὅτε
 15 πράττει λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἕκων· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ
 κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ
 ἐστίν· ἂν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν
 καὶ μὴ. ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσιοι·
 οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αὐτὴ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδεὶς. ἐπὶ
 20 ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐμῶτε καὶ ἐπαινουῦνται, ὅταν
 αἰσχροὺν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ κο-
 λῶν ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχισθ' ὑπομνί-

1110a, 11. EE. 1225 a, 2 λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον β.1
 καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες πράξαι, οὐ διαφωνοῦντες τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ὁρέξεως,
 ὅταν πράττωσιν δ' καὶ λυπηρὸν καὶ φαῦλον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλ' ὅ
 μὴ τοῦτο πράττωσι, πληγαὶ ἢ δισμοὶ ἢ θάνατοι ὦσιν· ταῦτα γὰρ
 φασιν ἀναγκασθέντες πρᾶξαι. ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἐκόντες ποιεῖν
 οὗτο τοῦτο, ἔξιστι γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖν ἀλλ' ἐκείνο ὑπομνῆναι τὸ πᾶσι
 εἶναι ἴσως τοιούτων τὰ μὲν φαίη τις ἂν τὰ δ' οὐ. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ
 τῶν τοιούτων μὴ ὑπάρχει ἢ ὑπάρχει, αἱ δὲ ὅσα πράττει δ' μὴ βούλεται

cause lies partly outside the agent (the tyrant's order or the storm) and is partly contributed by the agent (fear and desire).

αἰρεταὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'they are preferable at the time of the action, and the end of the act varies with the occasion.' We cannot call an act which is at a given moment the preferable alternative an involuntary act, simply because, regarded apart from the circumstances (*ἀπλῶς*) it would not be performed. 'We must use the terms *voluntary* and *involuntary* with reference to the time of the act.'

ὅτε πράττει. This use of the third person in an indefinite sense is especially common after *εἰ, ὅτε* etc. Zell quotes 1127 b 16, 1128 b, 26, 1130 a, 29, 2135 b, 28, 1139 b, 33, 1141 b, 18, 1164 a, 15, 1166 b, 23, 1175 b, 8.

καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. There is no force majeure and therefore no compulsion. The agent is free to pass his limits or not. In the 'Parti d'Animal' Aristotle distinguishes the 'instrumental parts' of the body from the *σώματα* parts (*σώματα* and the *εργασματα* secretions and excretions). Zeller (Eng. Trans. vol. II, p. 39).

ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἐκούσια. 'though they may be involuntary if we regard them apart from the special circumstances of the case.' They are not *αἰρετά γενεῶν* (not *αἰρετά*, though they may become so as an alternative to something else).

§ 7. *καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται.* The fact that praise is sometimes given to such acts shows they must be voluntary.

ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν. i.e. if they accept great dishonour for a trifling advantage.

μηδενὶ καλῶ ἢ μετρίῳ φαῖλον. ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαι-
 οῦ γίγνεται. *πυργνώμη* δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πρῆξῃ
 ὃ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἱπερτείνει καὶ μη- 35
 ὑπομείναι. *ἐνια* δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι,
 ἄλλον ἀποθανεῖον παθόντα τὰ δεινότερα· καὶ
 Ἐρίπιδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγ-
 ῖ μητροκτονήσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίνας
 πλὴ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον. ἐπε 30
 πώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ
 τι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δ' ἀναγκάζου-
 χρά, ὅθεν ἔπαικοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοῖς
 θύοντας ἢ μὴ. τὰ δὲ ποῖα φατεον βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς 1110^b

τα καὶ οὐ βίᾳ· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων, βίᾳ πῶς,
 γ' ἀπλῶς, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸ τοῦτο προαιρέεται ὁ πράττει, ἀλλ' οὐ
 καὶ ἐν τοῖσις ἐστὶ τις διαφορὰ· εἰ γὰρ ἴνα μὴ λάβῃ
 ἀποκτεῖναι, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκάζο-
 ῖ· οὐδὲ μείζον κακὸν καὶ λυπηρότερον εἶναι, ὃ πείσεται μὴ
 οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκάζομενος καὶ [μὴ] βίᾳ πράξει, ἢ οὐ φύσει
 ἐν ἀγαθῷ ἔνικα ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ ἀπολιπείας πράττει, καὶ
 οὐ γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτα. διὸ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα πολλοὶ ἀκούουσιν
 καὶ θυμοῖς ἐνίοτε καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ, ὅτι ἐν χερσὶ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν
 καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχομεν ὡς πεφικότα βιάζεσθαι τὴν φύσιν.
 ὅν δὲ ἐόξει βίᾳ καὶ ἄκων πράττειν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ

19 a. l. In this case the
 act is involuntary; for the
 intention is as a *passion*.
 the weakness inseparable
 in nature.

19a δ' ἴσως a. l. Still,
 this case, the act is not
 voluntary. for there is no
 passion, and the act may
 be the most painful death
 blow and we, therefore, be
 pitying.

ἐρίπιδου Ἀλκμαίωνα. The
 scholast quotes the lines—

1 μὲν α ἴσως ἐννοεῖται
 ὅτι

ὅθ' ἄρμαρ' εὐεργατοῦ εἰς Θόβα
 ἴω.

A kinsman killed his mother Eriphyle
 to escape the curse of his father Am-
 phiarachos. The lines quoted below
 1936 a, 19 on the same subject
 probably come from the 'Alkmaion'
 too. See note in loc.

§ 9 ἴσως βι χαλεπὸν a. l. The
 fact of the difficulty and of the con-
 sequent praise or blame proves the
 act voluntary.

§ 10. τὰ δὲ ποῖα a. l. This is a
 recapitulant on rather than a duplicate
 passage.

μέν, ὅπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός ἢ καὶ ὁ πράττων με-
 εἶν συμβάλλεται· ἀ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκουσίᾳ ἐστὶ, νῦν
 ἐκ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι.
 5 καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκουσίᾳ ἐστὶ, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια.
 μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκούσιόις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ'
 ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον. οὐ
 ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσι ἐν τοῖς καθ'
 ἕκαστα. εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια 11
 10 εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια·
 τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν
 βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν
 μεθ' ἡδονῆς· γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ
 αὐτὸν ἐδθίρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν
 15 καλῶν ἑαυτὸν, τῶν δ' αἰσχυρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. εἴκοι δὴ τὸ βί- 12

ἵνα μὴ ἡρέμα, καὶ ὅπως ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἢ ἵνα [μὴ] χαίρῃ. τὸ γὰρ ἐφ'
 αὐτῷ, εἰς δ' ἀνάγκησιν ὅλον, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ δ' ἡ αἰτοῦ φύσις οἷα τε φερει
 δὲ μὴ οἷα τε, μὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκείνου φύσεως ὑρίξεως ἢ λογισμοῦ, οἷα
 ἐφ' αὐτῷ. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας καὶ προλέγοντας, καὶ περ διανοίας
 ἔργον ποιῶντας, ὅμως οὐ φημεν ἐφ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι, οἷτ' εἰπεῖν ἂ εἴπον,
 οἷτε πράξειν ἂ ἐπραξάν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷδ' ἐπὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε καὶ
 διανοοῖαι τινες καὶ παθῇ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσιν, ἢ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς
 τοιαύτας διανοίας καὶ λογισμούς, ἀλλ' ὥστερ Φιλόλαος εἶπεν εἶναι τινος
 λόγους κρείττους ἡμῶν.

νῦν is equivalent to ἐντε πράττει
 above and opposed to ἀπὸ τῶνδε, ἀπὸ
 τῶνδε is opposed to καθ' αὐτά.

αἱ γὰρ πράξεις κ.τ.λ. This is
 fundamental. There is no such thing
 as an act which is not this particular
 act in these particular circumstances.
 It is, therefore, a false way of speak-
 ing to say that a certain class of acts
 is involuntary. An act performed is
 always *this* act. Hence too the diffi-
 culty; or there can be no scientific
 rules about particulars.

§ 11. αἱ δὲ τῆς κ.τ.λ. A caution
 against an error which language is
 apt to lead us into. The truth is that

it is not τὰ καλὰ or τὰ ἡδέα which are
 the motive or efficient cause of our
 acts, but our own *εἰς*, which is an
 internal, not an external, ἀρχή.

καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν κ.τ.λ. This
 distinction in our attitude towards
 τὰ καλὰ and τὰ ἡδέα has not been
 mentioned above, but the want of
 logical connexion is merely formal.
 Aristotle is dealing with real life, and
 we know that it is only bad acts of
 which men try to shake off the re-
 sponsibility in this way. No one ever
 declines to be responsible for a fine
 act on the ground that it was so fine
 he couldn't help doing it.

αιον ειναι ου εξωθεν η αρχη, μηδεν συμβαλλομένου του βιασθέντος.

- 13 Το δε δι' αγνοιας ουχ ακούσιον μιν ὅταν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ λυπῶν καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' αἰγνοϊαν πράξας στιοῦν, μηδὲν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐλθων 20 μὲν οὐν πέπραχεν, ὃ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λιποῦ- μένος γε. τοῖς δὲ δι' αἰγνοϊαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπὶ ἑτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἑκῶν·
- 14 ἔπει γὰρ διαφέρει, βίλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἑτερον δ' εἰκε καὶ τὸ δι' αἰγνοϊαν πράττειν τοῦ αἰγνοοῦντα· ὁ 25 γὰρ μεθίων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' αἰγνοϊαν πράττειν ἀλλὰ διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημίων, οὐκ εἰδώς δὲ ἀλλ' αἰγνοῶν. ἀγνοῶν μὲν οὖν πῶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἢ δει πράττειν καὶ οὐν ἀφεκτίον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἀδικεῖ καὶ ὄλως
- 15 κακοὶ γίνονται· τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις 30 ἄρνοι τα συμφέρεστα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει αἰγνοια αἷα τοῦ ἀκούσιον ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθυλου

1110 b, 18. E. L. 1225 a, 36 ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχει τέλος, καὶ οὕτε τῇ ὁρμῇ οὕτε τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ λαοῦσιν ὤρισταί, λυπῶν δὲ ὁρίσασθαι το κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. δοκεῖ δὲ ἐναιτίον εἶναι τὸ ἀκούσιον τῷ ἀκούσιῳ,

§ 12. Το δε δι' αἰγνοϊαν κτλ We now pass to Ignorance, the second condition of the Involuntary and consider the limits of its application.

ὁ γὰρ δι' αἰγνοϊαν κτλ If he is the party for the act, he makes it his own by his acquiescence &c. Cf. the text in Aristoph. *Τετρα. B. S.* 9 οὐ σφαιραεισιν μὲν οὐδὲ σινδελόδωρον ἔστω, σινδελόδοτον δὲ καὶ σινδελόδοτον.

τοῦ δὲ ὁ μὲν ὁ δὲ For the continuation cf. 1127 a, 7

οὐχ ἑκόν, 'non-voluntary' as opposed to 'involuntary'. The contrary is substituted for the contrary.

§ 14. ἑτερον δ' εἰκε κτλ To be involuntary the act must be performed not merely in ignorance but from

αἰγνοία μὲν οὖν κτλ This is not the case of the *ἀμαρτία* which knows he right and does the wrong, but that of the *ἀλόαστοι* to whom wrong is right

§ 15. βούλεται λέγεσθαι, 'really means'

ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει αἰγνοια οὐδ' ἡ καθυλου. Giant and Stewart seem right in refusing to draw a distinction between these two in the present passage. Ignorance shown in the deliberate preference of bad acts to good, and ignorance of the universal rules of conduct, come to the same thing, ignorance of the major premiss of the practical syllogism. *ἴσως ποτε* has nothing to do with the minor premiss as such.

(ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἑκαστα, ἐν
 1111^a οἷς καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς πράξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ
 συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει.
 ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, ταῖς
 5 τὴν δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τῆς ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ
 5 τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς
 οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἐκ
 ἀγνοήσεως μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδε τὸν πράττοντα·
 πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; ὁ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσας αὖ τις, οἷον
 † λέγοντες φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς † ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπὸ

καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ ὅτι ἢ ὡς ἢ οὐ ἔνεκα (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν ὅτι πατήρ, ἀλλ'
 οὐκ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ, ἀλλ' ἵνα σώσῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιαῖδες, ἦται ὡς πατήρ
 μὲν πῶμα, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δ' ἦν κώνειον) τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι
 καὶ οὐ καὶ ὡς καὶ ὁ δὲ ἀγνοῖεν, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὸ δὲ δὲ ἀγνοῖεν,
 καὶ ὁ καὶ ὡς καὶ ὁ δὲ ἀγνοῖεν· τὸ ἐμπιπτόν ἄρ' ἐκπέσκει· ὅσα μὲν οὖν
 ἐφ' αὐτῷ δὲ μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ δὲ αὐτόν, ἰσοῖσα
 ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν· ὅσα δ' ἀγνοῶν, καὶ οὐ
 τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἄκων. ἐπεὶ δὲ το ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διέκον ἐν
 μὲν τὸ ἔχειν ἐν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρῶμενος ἢ
 ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς δικαίως < ἐν > ἀγνοῶν λέγεται, ὅτε δὲ ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οὐκ
 αἱ δὲ ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἐχρήτο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγειτο ἂν, εἰ δ'
 βραδύον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν μὴ ἔχει δὲ ἀμέλειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην. ταῖς
 οὖν προσδιοριστέον.

ἡ καθ' ἑκαστα, i.e. ignorance of the minor premises of the practical syllogism.

ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς, 'the persons or things which are the objects of the acts.' As we cannot use πράττειν by itself with an external object accusative, we are forced to use a prepositional equivalent. Thus ἐν οἷς πράττεται means the persons on whom we act.

§ 10. οἷς, 'the agent'; τί, 'the act'; περὶ τῆς ἐν τίνι, 'the object'; οἷον, 'the instrument'; ἔνεκα τίνος, 'the effect'; ὥς, 'the manner.' The phrase ἔνεκα τίνος does not mean that the agent may be ignorant of the

right end,—that would be ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει ἀγνοῖεν,—but merely that from ignorance he performs an act which leads to a different result from the one intended. He performs an act ἔνεκα σωτηρίας which, but for his ignorance, he would only perform for the sake of destroying his object. Cf. 1135 b, 14.

§ 11. οὐκ εἰδέναι, i.e. not knowing.

λέγοντες φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν. The simplest way of dealing with this *καταρτισμένη* is to delete *εἰδέναι*, and to translate 'they say they were put out (or "flustered") when speaking,' and so did not know what they were

ἢ, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ διῆξαι βουλόμενος 10
 ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. οἷθαίη δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὸν
 ὁλέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερύπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι
 συγχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίστην εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ
 πίσας ἀπακτεῖναι αὐν· καὶ θῆξαι βουλόμενος.
 οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξουσιν αὐν. περὶ πάντα δὴ 15
 τῆς ἀγνοίας οὗσης, [ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις,] ὁ τούτων τι

The verb *ἀπακτεῖναι* is not
 entered in this notice, though
 present, and is doubtless a
 form the character take the
ἐκτείνω, *λόγος*. A clause
 in *ἀσπας*, *Νικηφόρος* § 27
 ἤρχεται καὶ λυγρὸν καταλήμ-
 νον αὐν ἰδρῶτι ἐσπερρῶμεν,
 ὡς θῆξαι βουλόμενος ἐπὶ
 π. καὶ ἀπακτεῖναι, καὶ ἢ το
 λυγρὸν καὶ ἢ γλῶττα δημῶ-
 This is just the conclusion in
 the *ἀγνοία* ἐπὶ πρῶτον. The
 word, though it has been
 in old, for *ἱερατικός* has
 γὰρ περὶ ἄλλων συγχωρῆναι
 ἐπὶ καὶ τῶν μυστηρίων
 ἔσθαι καὶ *ἀπακτεῖναι* ἐπὶ
 ἐπὶ πρῶτον. There is no
 for *ἀπακτεῖναι* c. c. in the
 used by the common version
 it *ἐκτείνω* ἐπὶ πρῶτον
 were speaking' (reading
 and *ἀπακτεῖναι*)

Αἰσχύλος. This is the
 sentence to the accusation of
 for revealing the mysteries.
 tells us that Herakleides of
 the details in *Book 1* of
 ἱερόν. The indications
 of were in the *Τετραλογία*,
Μεσοποι, *Ἰσχυροί* and *Οἰδοί*.

βουλόμενος α.τ.λ. This
 is a simple rhetorical exercise
 in the style of
 the *Τετραλογία*.

δ' αὐν τις α.τ.λ. Ignorance
 of (α.τ.λ. ὡς πρῶτον). *ἐν*

of the person as a *πρόφασις* of
συγγνώμη, cf. *Dem. Mid.* § 32.

ὥσπερ ἡ Μερύπη. Cf. *Psalm* 143.4.
 ἢ ἐν τῷ Κρησφόντῳ ἡ Μερύπη μέλλει
 τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπακτεῖναι· ἀπακτεῖται δ' οὐ
 ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώσκειν

ἐσφαιρῶσθαι κίστην εἶναι *ἐν*
 ignorance of the instrument (*τὸν*).
 Xenophon (*Eq.* viii, 10) speaks of
 ἀνέγνω ἐσφαιρῶσθαι.

ἐπὶ συστηρίῳ πίσας. We see from
 a, § above that this is the explanation
 of what is there called ignorance of
 the *οὐδὲν*. For the reading here
 see *Bywater*, *Comm.* p. 31. In *MM.*
 1.68 b, 31 a similar *ἀπακτεῖναι* is
ἀνέγνω—ὅσον φάσι τὰ ἐν τῷ γυναικί
 φίλτρον τινι δαίνει πικρὸν, εἴτα τὸν
 ἀνθρώπου ἀπακτεῖναι ἐπὶ τῷ φίλτρῳ,
 ἐπὶ δ' ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ Ἀρτίῳ πάγῳ ἀπο-
 φνύει α.τ.λ. There is a case just like
 this in *Antiphon* *Κατηγορία* *φω-
 ραζέας* ἐπὶ τῇ μητρὶ καὶ *ἐπὶ* § 9
 οὐκ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ φάσκουσιν δίδωαι ἀλλ'
 ἐπὶ φίλτρον. See also *EE.* 1.15 b, 4
 quoted on p. 118.

θῆξαι βουλόμενος. For the reading
 see *Bywater*, *Comm.* p. 31. The word
 means 'just to touch' and is approp-
 priate in connexion with 'spraying.'
 The mistake here is ignorance of the
 manner (*πῶς*). The man *Μηκλ* he
 is touching *ἄρμα*, whereas he really
 strikes *σφοδρά*.

§ 18 *ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις*. I bracket
 these words with *καταλήμναι*. They
 are awkward here and occur in their
 proper place two lines below, where
 the phrase means, as it ought to do,

ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς
 κεριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις καὶ
 οὐ ἔνεκα. τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀγνοίαν ἀκούσιον 19
 20 λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πράξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μετα-
 μελείῳ.

Οὗτος δ' ἀκούσιον τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκόν- 20
 σιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶδωσι τὰ καθ'
 ἔκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκού- 21
 25 σια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ 22
 οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πραξί, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες·
 εἴτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίας 23

1111 a, 24. EE. 1223 a, 21 ληπτέον ἄρα τί τὸ ἐκόνσιον καὶ τί
 τὸ ἀκούσιον, καὶ τί ἔστιν ἡ προαίρεσις, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία
 ὀρίζεται ταῦτα. πρῶτον σκοπεῖτον τὸ ἐκόνσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον
 τριῶν δὴ τούτων ἐν τι δόξειεν < ἂν > εἶναι, ἥτοι κατ' ὄρεξιν ἢ κατὰ
 προαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ διάνοιαν, τὸ μὲν ἐκόνσιον κατὰ τούτων τι, το δ'
 ἀκούσιον πᾶρα τούτων τι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὄρεξις εἰς ἐρία διαρείται, εἰς
 βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε ταῦτα διαρεττέον καὶ πρῶτον
 κατ' ἐπιθυμίας.

δόξειε δ' ἂν πᾶν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίας ἐκόνσιον εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ
 ἀκούσιον πᾶν δοκεῖ εἶναι βίαιον, τὸ δὲ βίαιον λυπηρόν, καὶ πῶς ὁ
 ἀναγκαζόμενος ποιεῖσιν ἢ πάσχειν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐθύδης φησι

πάν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πράγμα ἀνιάρων ἔφην,

ὥστ' εἰ τι λυπηρὸν, βίαιον, καὶ εἰ βίαιον, λυπηρόν· τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν
 ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρόν (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος), ὥστε βίαιον καὶ
 ἀκούσιον. τὸ ἄρα κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκόνσιον· ἐναντία γὰρ ταῦτ'

the object of the act. It is true, indeed, that in § 10 it seems to be used in a wider sense to include all the particular circumstances of the act other than the agent, but this will hardly justify its use in two meanings within the limits of the same sentence.

§ 21. ἴσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reference is to Plato's *Laws* 863 b, seqq. where the distinction of τὸ ἐκόνσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον starts from the enumeration of three εἴδη τῶν ἀμασσημάτων, viz. θυμῷ, ἡσυχίᾳ and ἀγνοίᾳ.

§ 22. εἴτα πότερον κ.τ.λ. There are certain acts proceeding from temper or desire which ought to be performed, and for the performance of which we are praised. It is absurd to say that such acts are involuntary, for there is no sense in saying that it is right to perform an involuntary act. Are we, then, to adopt the conventional doctrine that only the bad acts which proceed from temper and desire are involuntary while the good acts are voluntary? On what principle can we

καὶ θυμὸν. ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἀκούσιως τὰ δ' αἰσχυρὰ ἀκού-
 24 σίας; ἢ γελῶν ἐνός γε αἰτίου οὗτος; ἄποπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ
 ἀκούσια φαναι αἱ δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι· δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀρριζεσθαι 30
 ἐπὶ τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν τινων, ὅλον ἡγείας ἐπὶ μαθησεως.
 25 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυ-
 26 μίων ἰδέα. ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ

ἀλλήλων. ἔτι ἡ μοχθηρία πλείονετον πᾶσα τοιαῦτ', ἢ ὁ ἀκρασία
 μοχθηρία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὁ δ' ἀκρατής ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν παρὰ τὴν
 λογισμὸν οὐκ πράττει, ἀρατεύεται δ' ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατ' αὐτήν, τὸ δ'
 ἐθέλει ἐκούσιον, ὡς δ' ὁ ἀκρατής αὐτῇ αἴσῃ τῷ πράττειν κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν
 ἐλὼν ὅρα πράξει, αἱ ἐκούσιον τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ γὰρ ἄποπον αἱ
 δικαιότεροι εἰσιν αἱ ἀκρατεῖς γεγόμενοι. ἐκ μὲν τούτων τούτων δέξιν
 ἐν τῷ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε τοῦτον ὅταν
 γὰρ ὁ ἄκων τις πράττει, βουλόμενος πράττει καὶ ὁ βούλεται ἄκων.
 βούλεται δ' αἴτιος ὁ οἶσται εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος
 οἷα αἱ βούλεται ποιεῖ. τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὁ οἶσται βέλτεστον εἶναι πράττειν
 ἐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρατεύεσθαι εἶναι. ὥστε ἅμα συμβήσεται τὸν αὐτὸν
 ἐκούσιον καὶ ἄκωντα πράττειν. τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον. ἔτι δ' ὁ ἀκρατής
 διακουπράσσει, καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἀκρασίας. ἢ γὰρ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἢ
 ὁ ἀρετῇ δικαιότερος ποιεῖ. ἐγκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν πράττει παρὰ τὴν
 ἐπιθυμίαν κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν. ὡς εἰ το μὲν δικαιωπραγεῖν ἐκούσιον,
 ὡς περ καὶ τὸ ἰδεῖν (ἡμῶν γὰρ δοκεῖ τὰ αἰσῶσια εἶναι, καὶ αἰσῶκη,
 αἱ θύτερον ἐκούσιον, καὶ θύτεροι), τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκούσιον,
 ὅμα ὅρα ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ αὐτὸ πράξει ἄκων καὶ ἄκων

ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ θυμοῦ. ἀκρασία γὰρ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καὶ
 θυμοὶ ἐκαστὶ εἶναι, ὡς περ καὶ ἐπιθυμία. καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὴν θυμὸν
 λυπηρὰ, καὶ βίαιον ἢ αὐτεῖς, ὡς εἰ τὸ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, τὸ κατὰ τὸν
 θυμὸν ἐκούσιον ἢ εἴη πᾶν. εἶναι δὲ καὶ Περικλείους λέγειν εἰς τὴν
 ἰσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ βλῆσαι ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἢ κώλιος αὐτοῦ "χαλεπὸν
 γὰρ." φησι, "θυμὸν μάχεσθαι." ψυχῆς γὰρ ἐνείκεται. αἱ δ' ἀδύνατον τὸ
 αὐτοὶ ἐκόντα καὶ ἄκωντα πράττειν ὅμα τὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ πράγματος,

just as this when we have admitted
 that both proceed from the same
 source?

§ 26. ἐτι δε τι διαφέρει κτλ. If,
 on the other hand, we say that al-
 though both proceed from temper
 and desire are involuntary, and this
 the only voluntary movements are those

which proceed from the rational part
 of us, we seem to be making an in-
 warranted assumption. "If reason"
 acts not to say the least of it, as
 much incidents of human nature as
 the 'rational,' and it is absurd,
 therefore, for a human being to say
 he is not answerable for them.

λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω.
 1111^b δοκεῖ δὲ οἷχ' ἦττον ἀνθρωπικά εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα [πάθη], ὥς τι καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου <αἱ> ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.
 ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ τίθεναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

II. Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκυσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου
 5 περὶ προαιρέσεως ἐπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἡθὴ κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. αἱ
 προαίσεις δὲ ἐκυσίου μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτον δέ, ἀλλ'

μᾶλλον ἐκυσίου τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν
 τεκμήριον δέ· πολλὰ γὰρ πράττομεν ἐκόντες ἀνεν ὀργῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.
 λείπεται ἄρα εἰ τὸ βουλούμενον καὶ ἐκυσίον ταῦτ' σκέψασθαι
 φαίνεται δι' καὶ τοῦτο ἄδύνατον. ὑποκειται γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ δοκεῖ ἢ
 μοχθηρία ἀδυνάτωμεν ποιεῖν, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία μοχθηρία τις φαίνεται
 συμβῆναι δι' τοῦναντίον, βούλεται μὲν γὰρ οὐθεὶς ἃ οἶσται εἶναι
 κακά, πράττει δ' ὅταν γίνηται ἀκρατής· εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν
 ἐκόντως, τὸ δ' ἐκυσίον τὸ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅταν ἀκρατής γένηται,
 οὐκέτι ἀδικήσει, ἀλλ' ἔστι δικαιότερος ἢ πρὶν γινέσθαι ἀκρατής· τοῦτο
 δ' ἄδύνατον.

1111 b, 4. EE. 1225 b, 18 περὶ δὲ προαιρέσεως μετὰ ταῦτο
 λέγωμαι, διαφορήσωμεν πρῶτον τῷ λόγῳ περὶ αὐτῆς.

EE. 1228 a, 11 ἐπὶ πάντας ἐπαινούμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν
 προαίρεσιν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα· καίτοι αἰρετώτερον ἢ
 ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς ὅτι πραττοῦσι μὲν φαῖλα καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενοι,
 προαίρεται δ' οἱθεῖς. ἔτι δὲ τὸ μὴ ῥῆδιον εἶπε ἰδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν
 ὅποια τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀναγκάζεμεθα κρίνειν ποῖός τις.
 αἰρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἢ ἐνέργεια, ἐπαινετώτερον δ' ἡ προαίρεσις. ἐκ τε
 τῷ κειμένῳ οὖν συμβαίνει ταῦτα, καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμολογεῖται τοῖς φαινομένοις.

§ 27. ἀνθρωπικός is used, like the
 Latin *humanius*, with special reference
 to the weaknesses of mere human
 nature.

τὰ ἄλογα, i.e. τὰ μὴ κατὰ λογισμὸν
 ἀμαρτηθέντα. The word *πάθη* is
 omitted by the first hand of the best
 ms. (K¹), and is better away. If we
 retain it, we must assume that *θυμὸς*
 and *ἐπιθυμία* are called *ἄλογα πάθη* in
 a loose popular way. Really, they
 are forms of *ἔρως*.

II. § 2. περὶ προαιρέσεως. See

Introductory note.

μᾶλλον· κρίνω, 'to be a better
 test of character.' This has been
 shown above, 1105 a, 20 seq.

§ 2. οὐ ταῦτον δέ. This distinction
 becomes of great importance later on
 in the discussion of moral weakness
 (*ἀκρασία*). A man may perform a
 wrong act voluntarily and therefore
 be fully answerable for it, and yet it
 may not show that his character is
 depraved. The acts of children and
 the lower animals are of this sort, and

ἐπὶ πλεον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ
 ἄλλα ζῷα κοινωνοῦν προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης
 ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν. κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ, οἱ δὲ λέγοντες 10
 αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμία ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ ἐοί-
 κασιν ὁρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἢ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν
 ἀλόγων ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. καὶ ὁ ἡκράτης ἐπιθυ-
 μῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνά-
 σταλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. καὶ προαιρέσει 15
 μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. καὶ ἡ
 μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἰδίος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυ-
 τήρου οὐδ' ἡδέος. θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἥττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ

FF. 1115 b, 19 διατάσσει γὰρ ἂν τις ἐν τῷ γόει πέφυκε καὶ ἐν
 ταύτῃ θείναι αὐτὴν χρῆ, καὶ ποτερον οὐ ταῦτόν τὸ ἐκουσιον καὶ τὸ
 προαιρετὸν ἢ ταῦτόν ἐστιν. μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρὰ τινων, καὶ
 ἰησιῦντι δόξαι δ' ἂν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον ἢ προαίρεσις, ἥτοι δόξα ἢ
 ἰσχυρῆς. ἀμφότερα γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολουθοῦντα, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ
 ἔστιν ὁρεῖς φανερον. ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἢ θυμός·
 εἰθεὶς γὰρ ὁρίγεται μῆθεν πεπονθὼς ταύτων. θυμὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπιθυμία
 καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις ὑπάρχει, προαίρεσις δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ οἱς ὑπάρχει ἀμφω
 ταῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ αἰνὴ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας προαιροῦνται· καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 τάδεσιν ὄντας οὐ προαιροῦνται, ἀλλὰ καρτεροῦσιν. ἐπὶ ἐπιθυμία μὲν
 καὶ θυμός τε μετὰ λύπης, προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ αἰνὴ λύπης.

to are acts done when we are taken
 unaware. But moral, as distinct
 from legal, responsibility to use a
 modern distinction only arises when
 we set up the act as our own as a
 means to the realisation of some end
 § 3. *οἱ δὲ λέγοντες κτλ.* We do
 not know who gave these inadequate
 objections or whether there is any
 reference to particular people at all.
 The passage is dialectical, and could
 be expanded into a Platonic dialogue
 on the model of the first part of the
 Theaetetus with its successive defini-
 tions of knowledge.

οἱ γὰρ νομῶν κτλ. The argument
 is directed first of all to showing that
 προαίρεσις cannot be identified with

any form of appetition. In the first
 place, it cannot be the same as Temper
 or Desire; for they are found also in
 irrational creatures, while προαίρεσις
 is not. Observe that this argument
 does not apply to Wish, the third form
 of appetition; for it, like προαίρεσις,
 is only found in rational creatures.

§§ 4—8. The next three arguments
 are specially devoted to showing that
 προαίρεσις is not identical with Desire.
 For (1) in the case of the morally weak
 man and of the morally strong man
 we find a conflict between προαίρεσις
 and Desire. This is fully worked out
 in Book VII. (2) Desire never comes
 into conflict with Desire, but προ-
 αίρεσις does. This does not mean,

θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις 7
 20 γὰρ, καίτερος σίνεγγυς φαινόμενος· προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οἷα
 ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη
 ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἔστι <καὶ> τῶν ἐδυνάτων, οἷον
 ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἔστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδάρῃ 8
 δι' αὐτοὶ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἄλλοτην·
 25 προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰδέει, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἰεταί γασσθαι
 ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μάλιστα, 9
 ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα,
 προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' αὐτὸ ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα
 μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἄρμόζει· ὅλος
 30 γὰρ ὁικνεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. οἶδε δὲ 10

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις ταῦτόν. βούλοντας μὲν
 γὰρ ἵνα [ταῦτόν] καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων αἰδέσθαι, οἷον βωβελεύειν τι πατρὸς
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀθανάτου εἶναι, προαιρεῖται δ' αἰδέσθαι μὴ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι
 ἀδύνατον, οἷδ' ὅπως δ' δυνατὸν μὲν, μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ δ' αἰεταί πρᾶξαι ἢ μὴ
 πρᾶξαι. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν φανερόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸ προαιρετὸν τῶν ἐφ'
 αὐτῷ τε εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ ὁῖλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δοῖα, οὐδ' ἀπλῶς εἰ τις αἰεταί
 τε. τῶν γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτῷ τι ἦν τὸ προαιρετὸν, δοξάζουσιν οἱ πολλὰ καὶ
 τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οἷον τὴν διάμετρον συμμετρον. ἔτι οἷα ὅτι
 προαίρεσις ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής· οὐδὲ δὲ ἡ τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων πρακτῶν
 δοῖα, ἢ τυγχάνουσιν αἰωμένοι διὸν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν. κοινὸν

of course, that there can be no conflict of desires, but merely that there cannot be conflicting desires with regard to the same object. We cannot desire both to be asleep and to be awake; but we may desire to be asleep and intend to keep awake.

§ 6. θυμὸς δ' ἐτι ἦτον. If it cannot be identified with Desire, a fortiori it cannot be identified with Temper. Everyone can see that acts proceeding from Temper are ἀπροαίρετα in the highest degree.

§ 7. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ. We have seen that Wish, the third form of appetite, is, like προαίρεσις, confined to rational beings. But we cannot identify προαίρεσις even with Wish.

For () we may wish for what we know to be impossible, but we cannot wish it. (2) We may wish for what, though possible, is not in our own power but we cannot wish. (3) We wish for the end, but we will the means.

<καὶ> τῶν ἐδυνάτων. The καὶ comes from ἀπορροια and is commented by E.E. above. See Bywater, *Comm.* p. 30.

§ 10. οὐδὲ δὲ κ.τ.λ. We see, then, that προαίρεσις cannot be identified with any form of appetite, and that it is distinguished even from Wish by being confined to what is in our own power (ἐφ' ἡμῖν). We have now to consider the possibility of its being

δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι,
καὶ οἷδεν ἥττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ αἰύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ'
ἡμῶν· καὶ τῷ φεῖδει καὶ ἄλλοις διαιρείται, οἱ τῷ κακῷ
καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαιρεσις δὲ τοῖς αἰδέοις μᾶλλον. ὅπως μὲν οὖν
11 ἔωξεν ταῖς τοῖς ἰσως οἷδεν λέγει οἷδεν. ἀλλ' οἷδε τινι· τῷ γὰρ 1112·
προαιρεῖσθαι ταχὺ ἢ τὰ κακὰ πεισὶ τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δε
12 δοξαζέμεν αὐτ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φηγεῖν [ἢ] τι
τῶν τοιαύτων, ἐξάξωμεν δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ τί τι σιμφέρι ἢ τῷδε·
13 λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φηγεῖν οὐ πάντ' δοξαζόμεν καὶ ἡ μὲν προ- 5
αίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὐ διὰ μᾶλλον, ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἢ
δε δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἂ μάλιστα
14 ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξαζόμεν δὲ ἂ οὐ πάντ' ἴσμεν· δοκούσι
δὲ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξαζέειν, ἀλλ'
ἱστοὶ δοξάζουσιν μὲν ἀμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἂ 10
15 ἂν. εἰ δὲ προήνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ,

δε περιέδοξεν τοῦτο καὶ βουλήσεως· οἷθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οἷδεν προαιρεῖται,
ἀλλὰ τὰ προατὸ τέλος· λέγω δ' οἷον οἷθεὶς ἐγχεῖναι πρᾶξι, ἀλλὰ
περιπατεῖν ἢ κυβήσθαι τοῦ ἰγνῶναι ἐκεῖν, οὐδ' εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλὰ
χρηματίζεσθαι ἢ κινδυνεύειν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐνεκα καὶ ὅπως δηλαδὴ αἱ
προαιρέσεις τί τε καὶ τίνας ἐνεκα προαίρεται, ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν τίνας,
αἱ ἐνεκα προαίρεται ἄλλοι, τὸ δὲ τί, δ' προαίρεται ἐνεκα ἄλλου.
βουλεῖται δὲ γὰρ μάλιστα τὸ τέλος, καὶ δοξάζει οἷον καὶ ἰγνῶναι
καὶ εἰ πράττειν. ὥστε φαιερὸν διὰ τοῦτων οἷ ἄλλο καὶ δόξης καὶ
βουλήσεως βουλεῖσθαι μὲν «γὰρ» καὶ δόξα μάλιστα τοῦ τελους,
προαιρέσεις δ' οἷον αἷται.

adequated with the intellectual state
known as Belief. In the first place,
it cannot be identified with Belief in
general, for that has to do with every
kind of object, and not merely with
things in our own power. Belief is
true or false, while προαίρεσις is good
or bad.

§ 11. ἀλλ' οἷδε τινι. Nor can it
be identified with any species of Belief,
that is not even with belief as to
things in our own power as right or
wrong. For (1) Belief does not de-

terminate that a thing is good for us is not the
same as to will it. (2) We praise a
belief for its truth, an act of will for
its rightness. (3) We only will what
we are fairly sure is good for us, we
believe without knowing very well.
(4) We find that some persons have
excellent beliefs, but that their προ-
αίρεσις is bad.

§ 12. τι οὖν ποιεῖται π' ἀγαθὸν
ἡ κακόν. For the reading of Bywater,
Comit. p. 32.

§ 13. εἰ δὲ προήνεται, κ.τ.λ. This
we should find to be the case. The

οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτόν
 ἔστε δόξη ταύτῃ. τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν, ἔπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἢ
 οὐθὲν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προ-
 15 αἰρετόν, ἀλλ' ἤρᾳ γε το προβεβουλευμένον; ἢ γὰρ προ-17
 αἵρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ
 τοῦνομα ὡς ὃν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.

III. Βουλευόνται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βου-
 λευτόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως 2
 20 βουλευτόν οἷχ' ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλευσάιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινο-
 μένος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς 3
 βουλευέται οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς
 πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, 4
 αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταυτὰ γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ

dialectical argument, by showing that *πραίρεσις* cannot be identified either with appetition or thought in any form, prepares us for the view that it is the union of both.

§ 16. τί... ἢ ποῖόν τι; what is its genus and differential?

ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ. This gives the genus, the τί ἐστιν. τὸ προβεβουλευμένον. This word seems still to be chosen under the influence of Attic legal terminology. Antiphon, κατὰ τῆς μαρτυρίας § 5, uses *προβουλή* as a synonym of *πρόνοια*. Cf. also the use of the verb below 1135 b, 10—20.

§ 17. μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας, 'is accompanied by a reason (ground) and thought,' i.e. is based upon consciousness of a ground.

ὅς ὃν, sc. τὸ προαιρετόν. The fact that the object of *πραίρεσις* is a choice between two alternatives proves that it implies a λόγος; for it is only λόγος that can express at once a thing and its opposite. Cf. Met. quoted on p. 75.

III. § 1. Βουλευόνται δὲ κ.τ.λ. We have seen that *πραίρεσις* contains an intellectual element, namely Deliberation. We have first to examine this, and to determine its scope.

§ 2. περὶ... τῶν αἰδίων. The examples given show that the objects of First Philosophy (or Theology) and Mathematics are meant. Both of these are eternal and immovable, though the objects of the first are separate from matter (*χωριστόν*), while those of the second are 'in matter,' though separated in thought. Met. 1026 a, 13 sqq. Zeller (Eng. trans.) 1, 33.

περὶ τοῦ κόσμου. The κόσμος here means the spherical *σφαιρὸς οὐρανός*.

τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς. The incommensurability of the side of a square with its diagonal was the comparison difficulty to the incommensurability of the diameter of a circle with its circumference, which makes it impossible to square the circle.

§ 4. περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει. These will be the objects of *αστρολογικῆς* or *φυσικῆς* according as they happen ἐξ ἀνάγκης or φύσει. The 'solstices and equinoxes' of the first, the growth of an animal would be an example of the second.

ἔσσει ἢ διὰ τινος αἰτίας ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατο- 15
 ρῶν. οὔδε περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, εἴην αἰχμῶν καὶ ὀμ-
 βρον. οὔδε περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρίσσεως.
 ἅλλ' οὔδε περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀπάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύ-
 λαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοντο οὔδεις Λακεδαιμονίων βουλευέται.
 οὐ γὰρ γίνονται ἂν ταύτων οὔθιν δι' ἡμῶν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ 20
 περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐπίλοιπα.
 αἵτις γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ὅτι
 ἢ τοὺς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι

1112a, 18. FE 1216a, 17 ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε βούλησις
 οὔτε ὁρμή οὐδ' ὑπόληψις ἀπλῶς ἢ προαίρεσις, δῖλον· τί δὲ διαφέρει
 ταύτων, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐκούσιον, ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἔσται καὶ τί
 ὅστι προαίρεσις. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶα, καὶ μὴ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα
 ὥστε ἐνδέχασθαι βουλευέσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· περὶ δὲ τῶν δ' οὐκ ἐνδέ-
 χσται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὰ μὲν ἔστι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἅλλ' οὐκ
 ἐφ' ἡμῖν αἰτῶν ἢ γίνεσθαι ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας
 αἰτίας γίνεσθαι, περὶ ὧν οὔδεις ἂν ἐγχειρήσειε βουλευέσθαι μὴ ἀγνοῶν·
 τῶν δὲ ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ * *
 βουλευέσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστι
 πράξις ἢ μὴ πράξις. διὸ οὐ βουλευόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰσθμοῖς, οὔδὲ
 τοῖς ἂν ὁ πύκλος τετραγωνισθεῖ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· τὰ δ'

§ 5. περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. This
 may be equivalent to ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτιο-
 ῶν. Rain and droughts are not
 regulated by an internal motive or
 efficient cause like organic growth.
 We have the phrase in Part. An.
 1.2 b, 25 τὸ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως καὶ ὡς
 τυχόν, where it is opposed to τεταγ-
 μένον.

περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης. When τύχη
 is distinguished from τὸ αὐτόματον, it
 is what happens by chance in the
 presence of human thought or purpose.
 It is, in fact, related as an *αἰτία ἐν ἡμῖν*
 ἐνδεχόμενα to Thought just as τὸ
 αὐτόματον is related to Nature. The
 taking of the treasure might have
 been due to design if the man had
 any reason to believe that there was

a treasure buried in his vineyard. See
 Bonitz on Met. 1065 a, 30.

§ 6. ἅλλ' οὔδὲ κ.τ.λ. The suc-
 cessive elimination of Nature, Necessity
 and Chance from the sphere of
 Deliberation would leave us with the
 remaining cause, Man. But even here
 there is a limitation.

Σκυθαί. Eudemus substitutes 'In
 dians. We may perhaps see in this
 a trace of the extension of the Macedo-
 nian Empire.

§ 7. ἐπίλοιπα. For the reading
 see Bywater, *Contr.* p. 35.

αἵτις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For this popular
 and traditional analysis of causation
 see Newman's 'Positives,' *Intro* pp.
 16-20.

ἕκαστοι, 'each class of men.'

βουλευόμεναι περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ περ. μὲν ται 8
 1112^b ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλῇ, οἷον
 περὶ γραμμάτων (οἱ γὰρ δισταζόμεν πῶς γραπτέον). ἀλλ'
 ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' αἰεὶ, περὶ τούτων βου-
 λευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικὴν,
 5 καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γηρυστικὴν, ὅσῃ ἦττον
 διεκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δε 9
 καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ
 αὐτὰς δισταζόμεν, τὸ βουλευέσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς αἰ. ἐπ. τὸ 10
 πολύ, ἀδ' ἄλλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς <τὸ πῶς δε>
 10 ἀξιόριστον. συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα
 ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνώσαι. βου- 15

ὅπως οὐ πρακτοί. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν περὶ ἀπαρτων
 (ἢ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῶν ὅτι οὐδὲ δεῖα ἀπλῶς ἢ προαιρέσις ἐστίν). τὰ δὲ
 προαιρέτὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὅτιον ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ ἀπορρήσειεν
 ἂν τις τί δὲ ποῦ οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ, βουλευόμεναι περὶ ὧν ἔχουσιν τὴν
 ἐπιστήμην, οἱ δὲ γραμματικοὶ οὐδ' αἰτίον ὅτι διχῇ γινώσκῃς τῆς
 ἀμαρτίας (ἢ γὰρ λογιζόμενοι ἀμαρτάνομεν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν αὐτὰ
 ἐκρίνωμεν) εἰ μὲν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀμφωτόμως ἐνδέχεται ἀμαρτεῖν. ἐν δὲ τῇ
 γραμματικῇ κατὰ τῆς αἰσθησιν καὶ πρᾶξιν, περὶ ἧς ἂν σκοπούμεν, εἰς
 ἀπειρον ἤξουσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ οὔτε δοξοῦσι οὔτε βουλήσονται [ἐστίν] προαίρεσις
 ἐστίν ὡς ἐκάτερον, οὐδ' ἀμφω (ἐξαιρέτως γὰρ προαιρέσις μὲν οὐδεὶς
 δοκεῖ δὲ πράττειν καὶ βῆλονται) ὡς ἐξ ἀμφότερων ἄρα ἀμφω γὰρ
 ὑπάρχει τῷ πρᾶττειν καὶ βῆλονται. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθησιν,
 δηλοῖ δὲ πῶς καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτό. ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις αἰρέσις μὲν ἐστίν,
 οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ, ἀλλ' ἐτέρου πρὸ ἐτέρου· τοῦτο δὲ οἷον τὸ αἰεὶ
 σκέψασθαι καὶ βουλή. διὸ ἐν δόξῃ βουλευτικῇ ἐστίν ἡ προαίρεσις.

1112 b, 11. EE 1226 b, 10 περὶ μὲν δὲ τοῦ τέλους οὐδὲς

§ 8. ἀκριβεῖς. Cf. Introd. § 26.
 οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων. 'for instance
 about spelling.' This is explained
 more fully by Eudemus (loc. cit.).
 The doctor may go wrong (1) in the
 treatment he adopts, an error of
diagnosis, (2) in applying it to the
 particular case, an error of *aisthesis*.
 The latter kind of error alone is
 possible in the case of spelling; for

it is not an open question how a
 particular word is to be spelt.

§ 10. τὸ πῶς δε. I have followed
 Ransow in inserting these words. It
 is not clear, as Bywater says (loc. cit. p. 12),
 that we can interpret the text as it
 stands, by supplying τὸν ἀποφασιστικόν
 in thought. But the fact that MM
 (1189 b, 24) has τὸ δὲ δεῖα seems to
 decide in favour of Ransow's proposal.

κενόμεθα ὃ οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
οὔτε γὰρ ἰα-πρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάνει οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει.
οὔτε πολιτικός εἰ εἰρομένην ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς
τις τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων 15
ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειονων μὲν φαινόμενον γίνεσθαι
ἀσείκτους ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι. δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπι-
κειμένου πῶς διὰ τοῦτον ἔσται κἄκεῖν διὰ τίνος. ὥς ἂν
ἀνῶμεν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἰτίον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατον
ἐστίν. ὃ γὰρ βουλευόμενος δοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύνειν τὸν 20
ἐπιμενὲν τρόπον ὅσπερ διάγραμμα—φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν
ζητῆσις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικά, ἡ
ἡ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζητῆσις καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀνα-
13 λυσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενεσει. κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῃ ἐν-

βουλευεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αἰτᾷται πᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο τεινόντων,
εἴπω τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε συντείνει, ἢ διδογμένου τοῦτο πῶς ἔσται
βουλευόμεθα δὲ τοῦτο πάντα ὥς ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς
γενεως τὴν ἀρχήν. εἰ δὴ προαιεῖται μὲν μυθίαι μὴ παρασκευασά-
μενος μορὴ βουλευόμενος εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον, βουλευέται δὲ ὥσα ἐφ'
ἡμῶν εἶναι δινατὸν ἀπὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡ
ἐκταρσις μὲν ἔστιν ὕψις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ βουλευτικῇ. πάντες γὰρ
βουλευόμεθα ἡ καὶ προαιεῖται, οὐ μὲντοι γὰρ ἡ βουλευόμεθα, πάντα
προαιεῖται. λέγω δὲ βουλευτικῇ, ἥτις ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία βούλευσις
ἐστὶ καὶ ἀργεῖται διὰ τὴν βουλευτικῇ. διὸ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἔσται ἔστιν ἢ προαιεῖται, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσι ἡλικίῃ, οὔτε πάντως ἔχοντος
ἀνθρώπου. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι, οὐδ' ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί,
ἀλλὰ ἐκταρσις μὲν εἰ ποιητέον ἢ μὴ ποιητέον οὐδὲν καλῶς πολλοῖς
ἐκταρσις, τὸ δὲ διὰ λογισμοῦ οὐκέτι. ἔστι γὰρ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς
ἐκταρσις αἰτίας τινός· ἡ γὰρ οὐ ἕνεκα μία τῶν αἰτιῶν ἐστίν· τὸ
μὲν γὰρ διὰ τί αἰτία, οὐ δ' ἕνεκα ἐστὶν ἢ γίνεσθαι τι, τοῦτ' αἰτιῶν
εἶναι εἶναι, οἷον τὴν βαδίζειν ἢ κινεῖν τῶν χρημάτων, εἰ τοῦτο ἕνεκα
βαδίζει. διὰ οἷς μὴτε αἰτᾷται σκοπός, οὐ βουλευτικοί. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ

§ 11. οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν. This is
Anaximander. Cf. Introd. § 12.

ἄνωμεν, or more exactly ἐπιμενόμεναι,
is a term of geometry. We assume
the Q. E. F. of the problem and then
work for the construction.

πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων. These two
phrases are equivalent. Below we
have πῶς alone (b. 18) and πῶς ἢ διὰ
τίνων (b. 30).

§ 12. ὅσπερ διάγραμμα. See In-
troduct. § 22.

25 τύχωσιν. ὑφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων ἐκεί, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ
οἷον τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατόν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι
πράττειν. δυνατόν δὲ ἂ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ
τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πῶς ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. ἕτ-
τεῖται δ' ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὅργανα ὅτε δ' ἡ χρεῖα αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως
30 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι' οὐ ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ
τίνας. εἰκοεὶ δὲ καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ
τῶν πραξέων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ
δὲ πραξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν το
τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη· οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα

μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἐν ᾧ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν, ἐὰν τις πράττῃ ἢ ὑπρακτῇ
δι' αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ δι' ἄνθρωπον, ἐλὼν πρῶτα ἢ ὑπρακτεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν
τοιούτων πραττομένων βουλευσάμενος οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ
μὲν προαιετὸν ἅπαν ἐκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον μὴ προαιετῶν, ἐπὶ
τῷ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πάντα ἐκούσια εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἀκούσια μὴ
πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν. ἅμα δ' ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς
διορίζονται οἱ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκ
προνοίας νομοθετούσων· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀπρονταί· γέ-
νη τῆς ἀληθείας· ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐροῖμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν
δικαίων ἐπιτεκνίσει· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὅτι οὐτε ἀπλῶς βούλησις οὔτε
δοξα ἐντί, δῆλον, ἀλλὰ δόξα τε καὶ ὀρεξις, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ βουλευίσσασθαι
συμπερανθῶσιν.

1112 b, 34. EE 1227 a, 6 ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλευέται αἰεὶ ὁ βουλευτο-
μενος ἕνεκά τινος, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπὸς τις αἰεὶ τῷ βουλευομένῳ πρὸς ὅ-
σῃ σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθὲς βουλευέται, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑποθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμασι ὑπο-
θέσεις (εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχέως ἐν δὲ
τοῖς ἀναλυτικαῖς δι' ἀκριβείας), περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερότων ἡ
σκέψις καὶ μετὰ τέχνης καὶ ἀνευ τέχνης πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οἷον εἰ πολυμῶσι
ἢ μὴ πολυμῶσι τοῦτο βουλευομένοις. ἐκ προτέρου δὲ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ
τὸ δι' ὁ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα, οἷον πλούτος ἢ ἡδονὴ ἢ τι ἄλλο

§ 14. B. ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὅρων. πῶς
ἢ διὰ τίνας, i.e. ἢ χρεῖα. See b, 15a.

§ 16. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη π.τ.λ. De-
liberation, like Demonstration, has
its limits. Cf. Introd. § 22. We
cannot demonstrate first principles

nor yet particulars. In the same way
we cannot deliberate about ends as
yet about particular acts. The latter
are a matter for *αἰσθησις*. In neither
case is there an infinite progression or
regress.

αὖν αἱ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέτεται ὡς δι' αἰσθήσεως γὰρ 1119^a
 17 ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ αἱ βουλευσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἕξει. βουλευ-
 τιν ἐκ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ
 προαιρετὸν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κρῖναι προαιρετὸν
 ἴστιν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει ὅταν εἰς 5
 αἰὶα ἀναγῇ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον·
 18 αἰτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρετικόν. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν

ποῦτον ὁ τυγχάνει οὐκ ἴκανα. βουλεύεται γὰρ ὁ βουλευόμενος, εἰ ἀπὸ
 τοῦ τελος ἰσχυρίζεται. - ἢ - ὅτι ἐκεῖ συντείνει ὅπως εἰς αὐτὸν ἀγάγῃ, ἢ
 αὐτὸν δεῖναται πρὸς τὸ τέλος

τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶ φύσει μὲν αἰὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ περὶ οὗ κατὰ μέρος
 βουλευεται, οἷον ἰατρὸς βουλευσάμενος ἂν εἰ ὅψ φάρμακον, καὶ
 πρυττανεῖ ποῖ στρατοπεδεύσῃται, οἷον ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς
 ἴσμεν ἴστιν· παρα φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν αἰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
 ἀποφασίζον ἀγαθόν. αἰσιν ὅ ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οἷον ἴστιν ἐπ'
 ἄλλῃ χρῆμασθαι ἢ πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν, οἷον ὕψι οὐ γὰρ οἷον τ' ἰδεῖν οὐ
 μὴ ἴστιν ὄψις, οἷον ἀκούειν οὐ μὴ ἴστιν ἄκοή· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης
 φαίνεται, καὶ αἰ μὴ ἴστιν ἢ ἐπιστήμη οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως τῆς ὑγιείας ἢ
 αἰτῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ νύκτι· ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς δὲ παρὰ
 φύσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ βούλησις φύσει μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴστιν, παρὰ
 φύσιν δὲ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ βουλεται φύσει μὲν τὸ ἀγαθόν, παρὰ
 φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν καὶ τὸ κακόν

§ 17. ἀφωρισμένον. 'determined,'
 i.e. it is no longer in the form of a
 problem. For the expression cf.
 112a 14, 15.

πράξει. cf. a. 12 αἰσθάνεται, βουλευται.
 112a 14, 15.

ὅταν ἀναγῇ. 'when he has
 placed the efficient cause to himself,'
 when he has traced back the series of
 causes to something internal to him-
 self.

τὸ ἡγούμενον. 'the commanding
 part.' This shows that προαιρεσις is
 really what we call the will, though
 the idea is generally speaking foreign
 to Aristotle's thought in this form.
 In the Nicomachean philosophy τὸ ἡγεμονικόν
 plays a very important part. There
 is no need, however, to suspect that

this is a later interpolation for Ari-
 stotle is using popular language, and
 ἡγεμονία was already familiar from
 Plato in a similar metaphorical sense.
 In like manner Aristotle calls it τὸ
 κυβερνῶν in Met. 1042 a, 10 (p. 77).
 Translated into Aristotelian language,
 this literary phrase means that προαι-
 ρεσις is the ἀρχὴ πράξεως, the ἀρχὴ
 ὅθεν ἡ αἵρεσις. Cf. De An. 406 b, 24
 φαίνεται αὐτὸν ἢ ψυχὴ τὸ ἴσον ὁδὸν
 προαιρέσει τινοὶ καὶ νοήσῃ

§ 18. τούτω, i.e. that τὸ προαιρού-
 μενον is τὸ ἡγούμενον and that προαι-
 ρεσις is subsequent to βούλησις and
 the cause of πράξις. The union of the
 imperative with the deliberative power
 arises from the fusion of thought and
 appetition in this 'part of the soul.'

ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν δὲ Ὁμηρος ἐμμεῖτο· αἱ γὰρ βασ-
 λεῖς ἢ προΐλουντο ἀνῆγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. δυντοὶ δὲ τοῖς
 10 προαίρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὄρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις
 ἂν εἴη βουλευτική ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσασθαι
 γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
 20 προαίρεσις τύπτει εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ πούτῳ ἐστι καὶ ὅτι τῶν
 πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

15 IV Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἰρηται
 δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φασιζόμενου
 ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλευτὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι·
 2 μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν ὃ βούλεται ὃ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ
 ἔσται βουλευτὸν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν).
 30 τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν βουλευτὸν λέγουσι μὴ
 εἶναι φύσει βουλευτὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστω τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ'
 ἄλλως φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε τἀναντία. εἰ δὲ ἐξ
 4 ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φατέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλή-
 θειαν βουλευτὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον·
 25 τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ
 τὸ τυχόν—ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ δια-

§ 19. βουλευτική ὄρεξις. The de-
 finition of προαίρεσις as a 'deliberative
 appetition of things in our power' is
 really the fundamental doctrine of the
 Ethics.

κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν, 'in the
 direction of (on the lines of) the
 deliberation.' Appetition follows all
 the steps of deliberation, but in the
 reverse order. Cf. the phrases κατ'
 εὐθείαν, κατ' ἐκδοκίαν.

IV. § 1. Ἡ δὲ βούλησις κ.τ.λ.
 We now come to the appetitive
 element in προαίρεσις, which has
 problems of its own.

εἰρηται. Cf. 1111 b, 26.

§ 2. τοῖς μὲν κ.τ.λ. This is the
 Academic view derived from Plato's
 Gorgias 466 e sqq. where σοφία ἡ
 βούλησις is distinguished from σοφία
 ἡ δυνάμις.

ἦν. For this idiomatic use of the

imperfect, cf. 1112 a, 2. 1117 a, 16.
 114^h b, 12.

§ 4. τῷ σπουδαίῳ, εὐαγγελιστῇ
 sent to τῷ ἀγαθῷ or τῷ ἐπιεικῇ. Cf.
 1099 a, 23. So τῷ φαύλῳ κατὰ τὸ κατ'
 ἀλήθειαν, i.e. ἀγαθόν, ἀρετήν
 i.e. βουλευτὸν.

ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων κ.τ.λ.
 The argument in favour of relativism
 drawn from morbid conditions is
 Cypriatic. Cf. Sext. Math. 192 (RF
 § 210) τοῦτο γὰρ ὃ μὲν σπονηδία
 (suffering from vertigo) καὶ λευκαῖα
 (jaundiced) ἀρρωστία ἐστὶ πάντων
 κακίων, ὃ δὲ ἀρρωστῶν ἐνθυμῶνται, ὃ
 δὲ παρατίθεται τὸν ἀρρωστὸν ὡς ὅτι
 δουρὶ κινεῖται, ὃ δὲ μικρὸν διαστὰς
 τοῦ κέντρου τοῦ δουρὸς φαίνεται τὸν
 ἥλιον (from Sext. Math. v 918 sqq.)
 κ.τ.λ. From our present point of view
 it is a sufficient answer to this to say
 that health is the normal condition.

επιείκοις ἡγικεύει ἔστι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπόσοις ἑτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκεῖα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα—τὸν σπουδαῖον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουν ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τάληβες αὐτῷ φαίνε- 30
ται καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἔξιν ἰδέσθαι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλείστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τάληβι ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς ὡς περ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν. τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ὑπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰσιν ἰνισθῆναι· οἱ γὰρ οὐσα δάμαβον φαίνεται. αἰρούνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ 1113^b
λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

V. Ὅντος δὲ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ

1113 a. 31. FE 1227 a, 31 Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἑκάστον γε φθορὰ καὶ σωτηριότης οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξί. οὐ γὰρ ἴστω ἐκβῆται ἐκ τούτων. ἐπὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπύτη οὐκ εἰς τὰ τυχεύοντα γίνονται, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ θαντὰ ὅσοις ἑστὶν ἄναια, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα τῶν ἑσπερίων ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄναια ἐστίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ τὴν ἀπύτην καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέτου ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία γίνεσθαι (ἑσπερία δὲ τῷ μέτῳ καὶ τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον). αὐτῶν δὲ τὸ ἥδιον καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· αὐτῶ γὰρ εἶχει ὥστε τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μὲν ἥδιον ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἡδιον ἀμεινόν, καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν κακὸν καὶ τὸ λυπηρότερον χείρον. ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων δήλον ὅτι παρὰ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ ἀναία. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα ἐγ-
χαιροῦσιν οἷσι, ὃ δὲ προαίρεσις περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ταυτὰ δὲ φύσει ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη.

τὸν σπουδαῖον κρίνουν. This is the reading of K² and seems to be more original than the ὁ σπουδαῖος ὅμοιος δὲ I^o. I have therefore adopted it, making the preceding sentence as parenthetical.

K² καθ' ἑκάστην ἔξιν. It is well established at least at ἔξιν and διαφέρει αὐτῶν αὐτῶν. Cf. note 10 above.

κανὼν. The canon is the highest rule, the Latin *norma*. The metaphorical use of the word seems to occur first in Epicurus. Cf. *Epic.* 602. 1. 51

μέτρον. This is a clear reference to the dictum of Protagoras.

§ 2. αἰρούνται ὡς ἀγαθόν. All men, the good included, *deem* pleasure; the mistake made by ordinary people is that they *mistake* it, i.e. it appears to them in the light of good. Cf. *Mor. An.* 700 b, 18 διὰ δὲ τιθεῖναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν χρεῖται εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ φαινόμενον γὰρ ἴστω ἀγαθόν.

V. § 1. Ὅντος δὲ κατὰ. We know that our deliberative analysis of Happiness will be complete when we reach something which is *εἰς*

καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
 5 κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἰκνούσιναι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν
 ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἱρετη, ὁμοίως 2
 δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ
 τὸ μὴ πρῦταιν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ καί· ὅστ' εἰ τὸ
 πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μὴ πρῦταιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 10 ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πρῦταιν καλὸν ἐν ἐφ' ἡμῖν,
 καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ 3
 καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πρῦ-
 τειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὅρα
 τὸ ἐπεικέσει καὶ φανύλοισιν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἐκὰς 4
 15 ποιητὴς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψεῖδει τὸ δ' ἀλη-
 θεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἰκνού-

1113 b, 13. EF. 1223 a, 4 ὥστε ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἀν-
 θρωπὸς ὅταν ὄρχη καὶ κύριος, φανερόν ἐστι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ
 μὴ, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' αὐτῷ ταῦτ' ἐντὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ, ὡς γὰρ αἰνῶς ἐστὶ τοῦ
 εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ὅσα δ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἐντὶ ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, αἴτιαι
 τούτων αὐτὸς ἐστίν· καὶ ὅσων αἰτίαι, ἐφ' αὐτῷ.

ἡμῖν. It is therefore important to
 show clearly that good acts are ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν. They are so because they have
 προαίρεσις as their efficient cause, and
 αἱ προαίρεσις is ἐκόντιον

περὶ ταῦτα, sc. περὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸ
 τέλος. This is the middle term of
 the syllogism. All acts concerned
 with the means to an end are προ-
 αἰρετὰ and therefore ἐκόντια, the
 activities of goodness are concerned
 with the means to an end, therefore
 the activities of goodness are volun-
 tary.

§ 2. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ κ.τ.λ. The con-
 clusion of the celebrative analysis
 of Happiness. We have at last
 come to something ἐφ' ἡμῖν. If the
 activities which produce goodness are
 voluntary, then goodness is in our
 power.

ἐν οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is because
 our capacities are μετὰ λόγον, and

every λόγος implies both 'yes' and
 'no.' Cf. above 1103 a, 10-12.

§ 3. ἦν, 'is, as we saw.' For this
 idiomatic Imperfect cf. 1117 a, 26,
 1129 b, 11. 1134 b, 24.

ἐπεικέσει φανύλοισιν. This passage
 shows clearly that the various A-
 equivalents for ἀγαθόν and κακόν are
 used without any distinction of mean-
 ing.

§ 4. οὐδεὶς ἄκων κ.τ.λ. The
 Latin scholar quotes a fragment
 from the 'Περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς' of Epic-
 taretos, in which occurs the line
 οὐδεὶς ἄκων ποιητὴς οὐδ' ἀπὸς ἔχων.
 Whoever wrote the verse as we have
 it no doubt meant only 'wretched' by
 ποιητὴς, as Martini and Cameron
 suggest. Valerius Maximus
 μακάριον μακάριον to make an author-
 line on the authority of [Plato] περὶ
 ἀρετῆς 374 a. Cf. Tim. 86 d. οὐδεὶς
 μὲν γὰρ ἀκὼν οὐδεὶς.

ῥπιν. ἡ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένους ἀμφισβητητίον, καὶ τὸν
 ἀνθρώπου οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων
 ὥσπερ καὶ τέκτων, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχον
 ἄς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὣν καὶ 20
 αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσια. τούτοις
 ὅ τοις μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκυστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν
 τῶν νομοθετῶν· καλύζονσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦν-αι τοὺς ἐρών
 τας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δι' ἀγνοίαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ
 αἴτιοι, τοῖς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοῖς μὲν 25
 τρυφρῶντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσαντες. καίτοι ὅσα μὴτ' ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μὴτ' ἐκούσια, οὐδὲς προτρίπεται πρῆττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν
 πρὸ ἐργου ὅν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ

b, 17. Cf. I. E. 1222 b, 15 ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσίαι
 κατὰ φύσιν εἰνὶς ἀρχαί, διὸ καὶ ἐκύστη πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γενεῖν,
 ὡς ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῶον ὃν ὅλοις ζῷα καὶ φυτὸν φυτά. πρὸς
 ἐκ τούτοις ὅ γ' ἀνθρώπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν
 ἐκείνῃ τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐθὲν εἰποιμεν ἂν πράττειν. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ὅσαι
 ταπεινᾶι, ὅθεν πρῶτον αἱ κινήσεις, κύριαι λέγονται, μάλιστα δὲ δικαίως
 ἐφ' ὧν μὴ ἐκτελεῖται ἄλλως, ἣν ἴσως ὁ θεὸς ἀρχεῖ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκινήτοις
 ἀρχαῖς, ὅλῃ ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον, καίτοι λέγεταί
 γε καθ' ὁμοιότητα· καὶ γὰρ ἐκταῦθα κινουμένης τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντα
 μάλιστα ἂν τὰ δεκνόμενα μεταβάλλοι, αὐτὰ δ' αὐτὰ οὐ μεταβάλλει
 ἀσπινυμένῃς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου, ἂν μὴ τῇ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ
 δι' ἐκείνης διέξαι. ὁ δ' ἀνθρώπος ἀρχὴ κινήσεως τινος· ἢ γὰρ πρῆξις
 αἰτήσεως. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ ἀρχὴ αἰτία ἐστὶ τῶν δι' αὐτὴν
 ὄντων ἢ γινομένων, δι' ἐκείνης καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων· εἰ γὰρ
 ἔχρητος τοῦ τριγώνου δύο ὁρθὰς ἀνάγκη τὸ τετράγωνον εἶναι τέτταρας
 ὁρθὰς, φανερόν ὡς αἴτιον τοῦτο τὸ δύο ὁρθὰς εἶναι τὸ τρίγωνον. εἰ δὲ
 γε μεταβάλλει τὸ τρίγωνον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τετράγωνον μεταβάλλειν,

§ 6. ἀρχὴν· τῶν πράξεων, i.e. ὅθεν
 ἡ αἰτία

ὥσπερ καὶ τούτων, i.e. as ἀνθρώπος
 ἀνθρώπους γενεῖ. Cf. above, p. 110.

§ 7. αἱ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνονται κ.τ.λ.
 We have introduced the efficient cause
 to something internal to ourselves,
 namely ourselves. Not only so, but
 there is no other ἀρχὴ to which we

could refer it; for neither Necessity,
 Nature nor Chance could produce
 human actions. Now that of which
 the ἀρχὴ is ἐν ἡμῖν will itself be ἐφ'
 ἡμῶν.

§ 7. τοῖς τοῖς δ' τοῖς κ.τ.λ. The
 usual appeal to the practice of some
 thing. Cf. above 1102 a, 7 n.

πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιον τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἦπτον πεισο-
 30 μεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν. ἐὰν
 αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ
 ἐπιτίμια. ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυ-
 σθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοῖς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι
 τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπὰ ἔστι.

1114^a πολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα εἰ' ἀμέ- 9
 λειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν
 τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε 10
 μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἰτία
 5 ζῶντες ἀνεμείνας, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν
 κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες·
 αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. ταῦτο δὲ 11
 δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πράξιν·
 διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ 12
 10 ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἔξαι γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθῆναι.

οἷον εἰ τρεῖς, ἔξ, εἰ δὲ τέτταρες, ὅκτω. καὶ εἰ μὴ μεταβαλλοι, τοιοῦτος
 δ' ἴστί, καλεῖται τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. δῆλον δ' ἐπιχειροῦμεν ὅτι
 ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν· εἶναι δ' οὔτε μὴ λῖγην οὔτε λίγην
 ἀκριβῶς οὐκ ἔστι, πλὴν τυσοῦτον. εἰ γὰρ μὴθι ἄλλο αἴτιον τοῦ
 τριγώνου οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀρχὴ τις ἂν εἴη τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιος τῶν ἰσχυρῶν
 ὥστ' εἴπερ ἴσθιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν ἐνδεχόμενα αἰσθητικῶς ἔχειν, ἀσχυρὰ καὶ
 τῆς ἀρχῆς αἰσθῶν εἶναι τοιαύτας. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναγκαῖον το
 συμβαῖνόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ γε ἐντελεῖται διδέχεται γενέσθαι τοιαύτα, καὶ ὁ
 ἐφ' αὐτοῖς ὥστε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν
 τοιούτων εἰσὶν αὐτοί.

§ 8. διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια. A law of
 Pittakos. Cf. Pol. 1274 b, 19 νόμος δ'
 νόμος αὐτοῦ τὸ νόμι μεθύοντα, ὅτι τι
 πινόμεναι, σκῆψι ζημιὰν ἀποτίσκει τῶν
 μεθύοντων. Rhet. 1402 b, 10 ὁ νόμος
 ἐνδίκημα εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ
 συγγνωμὴν εἶναι· ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἀμαρ-
 τάνουσι, ἔστιν αἴτιον ὅτι οὐκ οὐκ ἔστιν
 αἰσθητικῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μεθύοντες ζημιὰς ἀπο-
 μεθίστησαν ὅτι τι μεθύοντες ἀμαρτάνουσι.

§ 10. τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν, sc. εἰς

αἱ ἐνέργειαι. Cf. above 1103 b, 21 ἐν
 τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργεῖν αἱ ἔξαι γίνονται.
 The words περὶ ἕκαστα are explained
 1103 b, 6 sqq.

§ 12. ἀναισθῆναι. The word is
 here used in its common meaning of
 'dull', 'stupid', cf. 1104 a, 24 ἡ, 12
 which sense it is applied to the nature of
 ἀνέγγηται (1100 b, 37 n). It is a
 very strong term, and is applied to the
 Thebans in Dem. de Cor. § 140.

13 ἐτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικούντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ
 τοῖς ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράτ-
 14 τι ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἀδικος, ἐκὼν ἀδικος ἂν εἴη, οἱ μὲν δ' ἂν γε
 βούληται, ἀδικος ὧν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται εἰκαίος· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 οὐκ ὧν ἐγίης, καίτοι εἰ αὐτοὺς ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσέει, ἀκρατῶς 15
 βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξήν αὐτῷ
 μὴ νοσεῖν, προημέρι δ' οὐδέτι, ὥσπερ οἱ δ' ὑφ' ἑντε λίθον ἔτ'
 αὐτοῖς δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ [βαλεῖν
 εἰ.] ρίψαι· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ
 καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξήν τοιοῦτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, 20
 ἐκὼν ἔκοντες εἰσὶν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκίτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι. οὐ
 μοῖον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακαίαι ἐκούσιοι εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ
 αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ
 φύσιν πύσχεα οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ
 ὁμείλειαν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πῆρωσιν· οὐθίς 25
 γὰρ ἂν οὐκίησιν τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς,
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεῆσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἀλλης
 26 ἀκόλαστας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμῆσαι. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κα-
 κῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐ. εἰ
 δ' αὖτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακῶν 30
 27 ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφ' εἵναι τοῦ

§ 13. ἐτι δ' ἄλογον κ.τ.λ. It is unreasonable (οὐκ ἔχει λόγον) for a man who does dishonestly to say he does not wish to be dishonest. He is making himself so to the best of his power, and that voluntarily. The reference is to the paradox of Socrates, cf. *VM* 1187 a, § 1 of *sup* 15, φρεῖν ἰδ. *Σωκράτης*, ἀποφασίζον δυνάσθαι εἶναι ἢ ἀδικεῖν, οὐδὲν δὲ θέλον ἐπὶ ἀδικεῖν. (cf. *VM*, *Met.* III, 9, 4, 12, 6, 6 *sup*.)

§ 14. καίτοι. *Kawson's* emendation of καίτοι. See Bywater, *Comm.*, p. 34.

προημέρι. sc. τῆς ἡμέρας.

τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ρίψαι. See Bywater, *Comm.*, p. 34. I prefer to bracket the entire common βαλεῖν rather than the

more striking ρίψαι. No one would require a note on βαλεῖν. ἀρχή, sc. θέλον ἢ κινήσει.

§ 15. ἐφ' ἑντε κ.τ.λ. We have once more two common τόνοι: (1) the analogy of bodily states, (2) praise and blame as a *συναίρεσις* of τὸ ἐκούσιον. (cf. Plato, *Protag.* 352 c 4-5.)

§ 17. εἰ δὲ τις κ.τ.λ. The argument is as follows. "If any one were to say that we are not responsible for our *φαντασία*, we answer (1) that if a man is responsible in a sense for his *ἔξις*, he is responsible in the same sense for his *φαντασία*, (2) that if a man is not responsible for his *ἔξις*, he is not responsible for any of his bad acts at all. It is all a mere question of natural endowment."

φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὑποὶ
 1114^b ποθ' ἕκαστος ἐστὶ, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· ἢ
 μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἐξέως ἐστὶ πῶς αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς
 φαντασίας ἔσται πῶς αὐτός αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οἷοί εἰσι οὗτοι
 αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα
 5 πρᾶττει. διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἀριστον ἔσσεσθαι, ἢ
 δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσιν οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύσει ξει ὥσπερ
 ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἢ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγα-
 θὸν αἰρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφροσύνη καὶ ταῦτα καλῶς πέφικεν·
 τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὁ παρ' ἑτέρου μὴ οἶσα
 10 τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἔφω τοιοῦτον ἔχει, καὶ
 τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθῆ
 ἂν εἴη εὐφροσύνη. εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ, τί μᾶλλον ἢ
 ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἐστὶν ἐκούσιον; ἀμφότερον γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ 18
 ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὑπασσθήποτε φαί-
 15 νεται καὶ κείται τὰ δε λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες
 πράττουσιν ὑπασσθήποτε· εἴτε δὲ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκαστῷ 19
 φαίνεται οἰονδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐστὶν, εἴτε
 τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δε τὰ λοιπὰ πρᾶττειν ἐκούσιως
 τὸν σπονδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιον ἐστὶν, οὐθεν ἦττον καὶ ἢ
 20 κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει
 τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τελείῳ· εἰ 20

τῆς φαντασίας. In this passage the φαντασία is simply equiv-
 alent to τὸ φαίνεσθαι. Bonitz rightly
 paraphrases the clause by οὐ καὶ οὐ
 κύριοι τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

εὐφροσύνη. In fact we should in that
 case have to go back to the doctrine
 that goodness comes to us φύσει. Of
 course Aristotle emphasizes the importance
 of εὐφροσύνη both in practical and theo-
 retical matters. Cf. *Top.* 103^b, 13
 τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εὐφροσύνη, τὸ
 δοῦναι καλῶς λαμβάνειν τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ
 φυγεῖν τὸ ψεύδος. But he will not
 allow that we have no responsibility
 for the formation of εὐφροσύνη.

εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. If it is all a matter
 of εὐφροσύνη, and we are not responsible

for our character, then goodness is as
 involuntary as badness. Plato cannot
 mean this.

§ 19. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. We may try
 to maintain that goodness is voluntary
 by holding either (1) that the φαντασία
 of the end is not given to a man by
 nature, but is partly due to himself
 (παρ' αὐτόν), or (2) that the end is
 given by nature, but the means are
 voluntary. But both these views will
 make badness voluntary to the same
 extent as goodness.

τὸ δι' αὐτόν. Mr Bywater's propo-
 sition to read τὸ δι' αὐτόν is attractive.

§ 20. εἰ οὖν κ.τ.λ. The argument
 may be summed up thus. (1) Our
 πράξεις are in our power and we have

ὡν ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκοινοὶ εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν
ἔξων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοὶ τινες εἰσι
τὸ τέλος τοιούτῳ τιθίμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκοινοὶ ἂν εἴην·
ὡσαύτως γὰρ.

25

- 21 Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε
γίνεσθαι τι πρὶ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἔξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε
κινῶνται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ <καὶ> καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ὅτι
ὑφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκοῖσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος
προστάξῃ. οἷχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πρυξεν ἐκοῖσιοι εἰσι καὶ αἱ 30
ἔξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρυξεν ὑπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους
κίριοι ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἔξων δὲ τῆς
ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ 1115
ἵπτι τῶν ἀρρωστικῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἡ μὴ οὕτω
χρήσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτο ἐκοινοὶ.
- 22 Ἀναλαμβάνοντες δὲ περὶ ἐκάστης εἰπώμεν τινες εἰσὶ καὶ
περὶ ποῖα καὶ πᾶς· ἅμα δ' ἔστας δῆλον καὶ πῶσαι εἰσὶν. 5
καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας. VI. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ

1114 b, 26. EE. 1228 a, 23 ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότητές εἰσι τε ἐν
ταῖς ἀρεταῖς καὶ αὐτὴ προαιρετικὴ, καὶ αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι, καὶ τινες
ἔξων αὐταῖς, συβυλὸν εἰρηται καὶ ἐκάστην δὲ λυμβάζοντες λεγόμεν
ἐφεξῆς, καὶ πρῶτον εἰπώμεν περὶ ἀνδρείας

1115 a, 4. EE. 1228 a, 26 σχεδὸν ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὅ τ'
ἀνδρείας εἶναι περὶ φόβου καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία μία τῶν ἀρετῶν διελκομένη
δ' ἐν τῇ ἐπιγραφῇ πρῶτον καὶ θράους καὶ φόβου ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ
ἐστὶ πως ἀντικείμενα ἄλληλοις. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις
ταῦτας λεγόμενοι ὁμοίως ἀντικείμενοι σφίσι αὐτοῖς, ὡς ὁ διελὸς

not the only way for them (2) that
these proceed from our wishes and are
so far from perfect. We have partial
responsibility for them, that is we are
responsible at the start (in ἀρχῇ).
(3) The desirability of the τέλος de-
pends on our ἔξω, so we are just as
responsible for that.

§ 21. Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν π.τ.λ. The
summary at usual destroys the con-
nection. The words οὐκ οἰκιστοὶ δὲ
(b, 30) should be taken closely with

what precedes:

— καὶ — καθ' αὐτὸς καὶ κατὰ σκε-
βῆσιν. The καὶ comes from Aristoteles
and the Velus Vetus.

ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος, 'the right rule'
1103 b, 32 n.

§ 22. περὶ ποῖα καὶ πᾶς, i.e. μεσ-
ότητές εἰσιν. Aristotle discusses all the
ἀρεταὶ under these two heads.

VI. § 1. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν π.τ.λ. This
chapter deals with the question περὶ
ποῖα μεσότης ἡ ἀνδρεία.

- περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερόν γεγενῆσθαι· φοβούμεθα
 δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερὰ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν
 κακά, διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακῶ.
 10 φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πικρίαν
 νόσον ἀφίλιαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ αν-
 δρείος εἶναι· ἕνα γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ
 δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὸν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπι-
 εκῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυιτος. λέ-
 15 γεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρείος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γὰρ
 τε ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γὰρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος.

(οὔτος γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ θαρρεῖν ἥτοι
 ἢ δεῖ) καὶ ὁ θρασυὶς καὶ γὰρ οὔτος κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷον
 φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἥττον ἢ δεῖ θαρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ παρω-
 νυμίζεται· ὁ γὰρ θρασύς παρὰ τὸ θράος λέγεται παρωνύμιος ὥστ'
 ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη ἐξίς περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη δεῖ δὲ
 μὴ οὕτως ὡς οἱ θρασεῖς (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπουνσι, τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλουνσι)
 μὴ οὕτως ὡς οἱ δειλοί (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ταῦτο ποιοῦσι, πλὴν οὐ περὶ
 ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· τῷ μὲν γὰρ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπουνσι, τῷ δὲ
 φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλουνσι), δῆλον ὡς ἡ μέση διάθεσις θρασύτητος καὶ
 δειλίας ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· αὕτη γὰρ βελτίστη.

1116 a, 10. EE. 1229 a, 32 περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν οὐκ μὲν
 ἀπλῶς εἰρήκαμεν, βέλτερον δὲ διωρίσασθαι μᾶλλον. ὅπως μὲν οἱ
 φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φοβοὶ τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται.
 ποιητικῇ λύπῃς φθαρτικῇ· τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλῃν τινα προσδεχόμενοι
 λύπην ἑτέρα μὲν ἂν τις ἴσως λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἕτερον, φόβος δ'

ἡδύ, 1107 a, 33.

§ 2. προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. Plato, Pro-
 tag. 358 d προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγει κακοῦ
 τοῦτο, ὅτε φοβῶν εἴτε δέος καλεῖται.
 Laches 198 b ἡγοῦμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς εἶναι
 μὲν εἶναι ὁ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ
 ὁ μὴ δέος παρέχει· δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ
 τὰ γεγονότα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν
 κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος
 γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μὲλλοντος κακοῦ.

§ 3. οὐ περὶ πάντα κ.τ.λ. In
 EE. 1229 a, 34 sqq. this restriction
 is made clearer by the amended
 definition of τὰ φοβερὰ as ὅσα φαίνεται
 ποιητικῇ λύπῃ φθαρτικῇ, i.e. those

lyrics which are destructive of the good.
 But this is not the 'Eudaimonia de-
 velopment' for we read in Rhet
 1382 a, 21 δεῖται δὲ φόβος λύπη τις ἡ
 ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μὲλλοντος κακοῦ
 φθαρτικῇ ἢ λυπηροῦ. οὐ γὰρ εἴδοτε
 τὰ κατὰ φοβούνται, οἷον οἱ εἶναι θάνατον
 ἢ βλάβην, ἀλλ' ὅσα λίπας μεγάλας ἢ
 φθορὰς δυνατόν, καὶ ταῦν' ἔσοι μὴ πόρρω
 ἀλλὰ συνεγγεῖ φοιτοῦσι ὥστε εἰδέναι.

οἷον ἀδοξίαν. Cf. the Platonic de-
 finition of εἰδέναι as φοβεῖσθαι δέος below
 1128 b, 11 and see note there.

κατὰ μεταφοράν i.e. κατ' ὁμοιότητα.
 This alludes to Plato, see § 7 n.

ετιμίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ διτ' φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον οἷδ' ὅλως ὅσα
 μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οἷδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα
 ἀφοβος ἀνδρείος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον κατ' ὁμοιότητα·
 ἵπποι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἔλκυ- 20
 θηροὶ εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν ἐνθαρσύνει ἔχον-
 τισιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἰ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖ-
 ται ἢ φθόνον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλὸς ἐστίν· οἷδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ
 ἐκείνων μαστερεύσθαι ἀνδρείως. περὶ πῦρα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν
 ὁ ἀνδρείος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐβείς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος 25
 τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πῆρας γάρ, καὶ
 οὐκ ἔστι τῷ τελευτῶντι δοκεῖ οὗτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι.
 ἴσως οὖν δ' ἂν οὐδε περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντί ὁ ἀνδρείος

οὐκ ἴσται, οἷον εἰ τις προσηύητο ὅτι λυπησεται λύπην ἢν οἱ φθοροῦντες
 λυποῖνται, ἢ τοιοῦτην οἷον οἱ ἐχθροὶντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυνομένοι. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
 μόταις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἐπιστῆαι λύπαις φάβῃς γίνεται ὅσων
 ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετική τοῦ ζῆν. διὸ καὶ σφοδρῶς τινες ὄντες μαλακοὶ περὶ
 εἴνα ἀνδρείου εἰσι, καὶ ἔναι σκληροὶ καὶ καρτερικοὶ [καὶ] δειλοὶ, καὶ
 δι' αὐτὴν καὶ ἐκείνους σχεδὸν ἴδιον τῆς ἀνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν θάνατον καὶ
 τὴν περὶ τοῦτον λύπην ἔχειν πῶς· εἰ γὰρ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος πρὸς
 αἰέας καὶ ψίχην καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λίπας ὑπομενετικῶς ὥς ὁ λόγος,
 εἰμυλίζοντες οὐσας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ μαλακὸς καὶ περίφοβος, μὴ
 δι' ἄλλο τ. πάθος ἄλλὰ δι' αὐτὴν τὴν φθορὰν, ἄλλος δὲ πρὸς μὲν
 ἐκείνας μαλακός, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἀπαθής, ἐκείνος μὲν ἂν εἴναι
 ἐκείνους ἐκείνους, οὗτος δ' ἀνδρείος· καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις
 λέγεται μόνους τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ἢ τὸ τῆς τιμωτῆς φθορᾶς
 ποσότητον. φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνεται.

τὰ μὲν οἷν φαίμεν, περὶ ὅσα φημὲν εἶναι τὸν ἀνδρείον, εἴρηται δὲ
 ὅτι τὰ φαίμεναι πικρὰ καὶ λύπη τῆς φθορικῆς ταῦτα μόντοι πλησίον
 τὴν φαίμεναι καὶ μὴ πύρρῳ, καὶ τοιαῦτα τῷ μεγέθει ὄντα ἢ φαινόμενα
 ὥστ' εἶναι σύμμετρα πρὸς ἀνθρώπον. εἴνα γὰρ ἀναγκὴ παντὶ φαί-
 νοῦναι ἀνθρώπου φοβερὰ καὶ διαταράττειν. οἷθεν γὰρ καλῶς, ὥσπερ
 θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνημῶν ἐνίας ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ
 τὰς τὰς ἀνθρώπων σωματικὰς ἐξείας, οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
 σαθμῶν.

§ 3. φθόνον. We might be tempted
 to think that φθόνος is the true reading.
 It goes well with ὅστις (‘‘those of
 parents of children and wife’’), and

the corruption is common. This is
 a case, however, where the text is
 guaranteed by Eudemos. See above.

εἶναι, ὅσον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσῳ. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν 8
 30 τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῖτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῃ γὰρ
 καὶ καλλίστῃ κινδύνῳ. ὁμολογοῖ δὲ ταῦτοις εἰσι καὶ αἱ 9
 τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως 10
 δὴ λέγοντ' ἂν ἀνδρείος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον αἰεὶ,
 καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπὸ γυμναστικῇ· τοιαῦτα δὲ μά- 11
 35 λιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὲν ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ 12
 1115^b καὶ ἐν νόσοις αἰεὶς ὁ ἀνδρείος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥς οἱ θαλάτ-
 τιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασιν τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνα-
 τον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδες εἰσι παρὰ
 τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ὅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἴστιν ἀλήθ 13
 5 ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς αἰδέ-
 τερον ὑπάρχει.

VII. Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό. λέγομεν δέ τι
 καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παιτὶ φοβερον τῷ γε

1115 b. 7. EE 1228 b, 4 δοκῇ δ' ὁ ἀνδρείος ἀφόβος εἶναι
 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πάλιν, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς φοβητικός, καὶ ὁ μὲν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἴσχυρα
 καὶ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ φοβέσθαι, καὶ σφοδρὰ καὶ ταχὺ, ὁ δὲ τὸ
 ἐναντίον ἢ οὐ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ἥμερα καὶ μόλις καὶ ἀλιγὰς καὶ μετὰ
 καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερά, σφοδρὰ, ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἥμερα. πῶς οὖν
 ὑπομένει ὁ ἀνδρείος, πρῶτον πότερον τὰ αὐτῷ φοβερά ἢ τὰ ἑτέρῳ, εἰ
 μὲν δὲ τὰ ἑτέρῳ φοβερά, οὐθέν σεμιν φοῖναι αὐτὸς εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτῷ,

§ 7. ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσῳ. This is directed against the doctrine of Plato in *Laches* 191 d—e that Courage is not displayed only in war. Sokrates asks for τοῖς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θαλάτταν κινδύνου ἀνδρείου δυνάμει, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσον ατλ. Plato was describing the significance of ἀνδρεία. Aristotle has to do only with τὰ δοκούντα, the moral consciousness of the average Hellenic, and he proves his point as usual by referring to the practice of free states and monarchs.

§ 10. ὑπὸ γυμνῇ. Tr. 'close at hand.' Cf. EE, 1229 b, 25 πλεονεχῶς γε φαινομένη καὶ μὴ ὄφρων. MM, 1191 a, 33 εἰ γὰρ τοὶ τὸν αἰὶ δέκατον ἔτος κινδύνον μὴ φοβέται, οὕτω ἀνδρείος.

εἶναι γὰρ θαρροῦσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ποτὲ ἀνέχεσθαι, ἀν δὲ πλεονεχῶς γένηται, ἀποθνήσκουσιν τῷ δέπν. Cf. also Rhht. 1232 a, 21 ἣν quoted Euseb. *deo* 24 πόρρω ἄλλα συνεγχευε φαινομένη.

§ 11 οἱ μὲν, οἱ μὴ θαλάττιοι. There is surely a touch of humor in the contrast between the cheerful sailors and the brave Helene who has given up all hope and laments the approaching in a pearly death, not fit for a gentleman and soldier.

§ 12. ἐν οἷς ἴστιν ἀλήθ. where there is a possibility of a brave defense.

VII. § 1. Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν κατλ. The misanthrope described and contrasted with the περιβολὴ καὶ ἔλκεται.

οὐκ ἔχοντες· τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀνθρώπου διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ
 2 μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττω, ὁμοίων δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀν- 10
 ὄριος ἀνέκτληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οἷν καὶ
 τα τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ εἶ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ
 3 ἥνκα· τοῦτο γάρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ
 ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τὰ μὴ φοβερά ὡς τοιαῦτα
 4 φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι <δ> οὐ δεῖ, ἡ 15
 ἡ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἡ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως

ὡς αὐτῷ μεγάλῃ καὶ πολλὰ φοβερά. «φοβερά δὲ τὰ· φόβου ποιητικά
 ἴσως ᾧ φοβερά, οἷον εἰ μὲν σφοδρὰ φοβερά, εἴη ἂν ἰσχυροὶ ὁ φόβος,
 εἰ δ' ἡρέμα, ἡσθενέστε ὥστε συμβαίνει, τὸν ἀνδρείον μεγαλοῦς φόβου
 καὶ παλλεῖς ποιῆσαι. ἰδοὺ δὲ τοῦναντίον ἡ ἀνδρεία ἄφουβον παρα-
 σκευάζει, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἢ μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡρέμα
 καὶ μάλιστα. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ φοβερόν λεγεται, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ
 ἀγαθόν, διχῶς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τιμὴ μὲν καὶ ἡδονα καὶ ἀγαθὰ
 ἔστιν, ἁπλῶς δ' οὐ. ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον φαῖλα καὶ οἷζ ἡδονα, ὅσα τοῖς
 πικροῦς ὠφέλιμα καὶ ὅσα ἡδονα τοῖς παιδίοις ἢ παιδεία. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 τὰ φοβερά τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ τιμὴ. αὐτὰ μὲν δὲ διωλὸς φοβεῖται
 5 ὁ δειλός, τα μὲν οἷον ἐστὶ φοβερά, τὰ δ' ἡρέμα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς πλεῖστοις
 φοβερά, καὶ ὅσα τῇ διθυρακίῃ φύσει, τοῦτ' ἁπλῶς φοβερά λέγομεν.
 αὐτὸ δ' ἀνδρείος πρὸς τοῦτ' ἔχει ἀφώδευτον, καὶ ὑπομείνει τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερά,
 αὐτὸς μὲν ὡς φοβερά αὐτῷ, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς οὐ, ἢ μὲν ἀνθρώπος, φοβερά, ἢ
 6 δ' ἀνδρείος, οὐ φοβερά ἀλλ' ἡ ἡρέμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ἔστι μὲντοι φοβερά
 ταῦτα· τοῖς γὰρ πλεῖστοις φοβερά ὅτι καὶ ἐπαινεῖται ἡ δέξαι· ὥστε
 γὰρ ὁ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ὑμεινὴν ἔχει, καὶ γὰρ οὕτοι οὐ τῷ ἐπὶ μηθὲν ὁ
 7 μὲν τόσον τριβίσθαι, ἢ δ' ὑπὸ μηδεμίαν ὑπερβολὴν, τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν,
 ἀλλὰ τῷ ἴσο τοῦτων ἀπαθείς εἶναι, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἡ ἡρέμα, ἐφ' ᾧ οἱ πολλοὶ
 8 εἰ οἱ πλείεσται· οἱ μὲν οἷν νοσοῦντες καὶ ἀσθεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν κοινῶν ταυτημάτων πάσχουσιν τι, πλὴν θῆττόν τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ
 9 πολλοί, * * καὶ ἐπὶ ἐφ' ᾧ οἱ πολλοὶ πάσχουσιν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθείς
 ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἡμέμα.

ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ οὐθέν ἐστι φοβερόν, οὐδ' ἂν φοβηθῇ.
 ἡ οὐθέν εἰσὶν τὸν ἐφημέριον τρόπον, ἢ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀπολούθησις τῷ

* 2 καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, sc. τὰ κατ'
 ἀνθρώπου.

ὡς ὁ λόγος (sc. λόγος, πᾶσι,
 προσάττει), not 'reason,' but the

'rule' which guides him. Cf. 1114 b, 29, 1115 b, 19, 1117 a, 8, 1119 a, 10, 1118 b, 28, 1120 b, 20, 29, ὑπομενεῖ, sc. ὁ ἀνδρείος.

δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλία. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔκκεισιν
ὑπομίνων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρείος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος,
20 πᾶσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος. τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας
ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἰσχύς καλὴ
τοιούτου δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστου τῷ τέλει.

λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὃ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἰρεῖσθαι κελύει. διὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ
τοῦτο ὑπομίνων αὐτά, οὔτος ἦτοι ἐξέστηκεν ἢ θρασύς· ὁ δὲ δια τὸ
καλὸν ἀφοβος καὶ ἀνδρείος μόνος. ὁ μὲν οὖν δειλὸς καὶ ἂν μὴ διὰ
φοβῆται, ὁ δὲ θρασὺς καὶ ἂν μὴ δεῖ θορρεῖ· ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἀμφὺ ἂν διὰ
καὶ ταύτῃ μέσος ἴσθιν. ἂν γὰρ ἂν ὁ λόγος κελύει, ταῦτα καὶ θαρρεῖ
καὶ φοβῆται. ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ μέγαλα λιπερὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ οὐ κελύει
ὑπομίνειν, ἂν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν θρασύς, καὶ εἰ μὴ κελύει, ταῦτα
θαρρεῖ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς οὐδ' ἂν κελύει· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείος μόνος, εἴαν κελύει.

1115 b, 17. EE. 1230 a, 31 καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία
αὕτη. ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε αὕτη οὐτ' ἐκείνων οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ ὁμοία μὲν,
ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ἡμίση τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται
οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἀδολέσσει, δεῖ μένειν φοβούμενους, οὔτε δι' ὀργὴν, οὔτε διὰ
τὸ μὴ τυμίζειν ὑποθινεῖσθαι, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικὰς οὐδὲ
γὰρ οἴσεται οὕτω γε φοβερὸν εἶναι οὔθιν. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ

§ 8. κατ' ἀξίαν. Not very different from κατὰ τὸ δέον.

§ 8. τέλος δὲ κ.τ.λ. The text here is not quite certain, but the argument is plain. The rule says that an act to be really brave must be done from the right motive (οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ). It is to be shown that this means τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. This is proved as follows. The end of every activity which proceeds from a *ἔξις* must be the end which corresponds to the *ἔξις* from which it proceeds. To the brave man, that is the man who embodies the *ἔξις* (τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν), bravery appears as τὸ καλόν, and therefore τὸ καλόν is its end. From this it follows that every act, if it is to be called brave, must have τὸ καλόν as its end, that is, it must be performed τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα.

τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. We might paraphrase this by saying that the end of

every activity is conformity to a certain type of character or, in more Aristotelian language, the reproduction of a form (εἶδος, λόγος τῆς οὐσίας). So the Paraphrase says the end of every activity according to goodness is τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἔξεως γίνεσθαι. The good man's end is the reproduction of the form of goodness in all his acts. Now a final cause appearing as a formal cause appears as τὸ καλόν, cf. Part. An. 645 a, 25 οὐ δ' ἔνεκα συνίσταται ἡ γέγονε τέλει, τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν εἰληφέν.

καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. Rossow here reads καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ <δ'> ἀνδρεία καλόν.

τοιούτου, sc. καλοῦ.

ὀρίζεται.. τῷ τέλει, i.e. the end determines the form. Cf. Meteor. 340a, 10 ἀπαντα δ' ἐστὶν ὁρισμένον τῷ ἔργῳ.

καλὸν δὴ εἶναι τὸν ἀνδρῆον ὑπομένει καὶ πρῶττοι τὰ κατὰ
 7 τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ
 ἀντίπαλος εἴρηται ὃ ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς προτέρων ὅτι πολλὰ ἐστὶν 25
 ἀπειρία), εἴη δ' ἂν τις μακρόμενος ἢ ἀκαλγητος εἰ μη-
 ἂν φοβοῖτο μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε τὰ κίματα, καθάπερ φασὶ
 τοὺς Κελτοὺς· ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλον περὶ τὰ
 8 φοβερά θρασυς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὑλαζύν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ
 προσποιητῶς ἀνδρείας· ὡς γοῦν ἐκείνου περὶ τὰ φοβερά 30
 ἔχει. οὕτως βούλεται φαίνεσθαι. ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται,
 9 μιμῆται. διὸ καὶ εἰσιν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασυέτατοι· ἐν
 10 τοῖς τοῖς γὰρ θρασυζόμενοι τὰ φοβερά οἷχ' ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ
 ἐς τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλον δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ
 καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολοιθεῖ αὐτῷ. 35

γραμματική (ταῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἐνθάδε τινος
 ταῦτα οἱ εἶσθαι ποιῶν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τῷ οἱ εἶναι, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον
 ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἀντίπαλος ἀρετὴ τις οὕσα ἐνθάδε τινος ποιῆσαι τὰ φοβερά
 ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὕτως οἱ ἄνθρωποι (ὡς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ ἀμείναι)
 οὕτως εἰ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεὶ, ἂν γε μὴ καλόν ἢ ἀλλὰ μακρόν,
 οὐχ ὑπομένει· ἀπὸ τῆς γὰρ

b. 24. H.F. 1229 b. 22 οἱ μὲν <οἱ> δειλοὶ καὶ θρασυεῖς
 ἐκτείνονται διὰ τὰς εἴδεις τῷ μὲν γὰρ δειλῷ τὰ τε μὴ φοβερά δοκεῖ
 φοβερά εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἥρεμα σφοδρὰ, τῷ δὲ θρασυεῖ τὰ ἐναντίον τὰ τε
 φοβερά θαρραλέα καὶ τὰ σφοδρὰ ἥρεμα, τῷ δ' ἀνδρείῳ ταλῆθ' ἡ
 καλίστα. διὸ περ οὗτ' εἰ τις ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερά δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀνδρείως,
 αὐτὸς εἰ τις τοῖς κινουμένοις ὑπομένει φερόμενους διὰ μακρίαν, οὗτ' εἰ
 γυναικῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκτείνονται διὰ θέματα, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κίματα
 ὅσα αἰσταντὶ λαβόντες, καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρική ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ
 αὐτῶν εἶναι δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ὑπομένουσιν καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
 ἥδοναν ἔχει τιμῇ· μετ' ἐλπίδος γὰρ ἐστὶ τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὗτ' εἰ
 διὰ ταῦτα οὗτ' εἰ δὲ ἄλλῃ ἡδονῇ ὑπομένει τις τὴν θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν

§ 1 ἀκαλγητος, cf. 1100 b. 28 n.
 τοὺς Κελτοὺς. H.F. 1229 b. 24 οἷον
 α. Κελτὰ οἷον τὰ σφοδρὰ ὅλα ἀπα-
 νῶσι λαβόντες. Apianus c. 10
 bene taken this from Ephorus, for
 Strabo (iii, p. 263) says from his
 authority ἐκτείνονται πρὸς τὰς πλημ-
 μερίας τοὺς Κελτοὺς, καὶ ὅτι ἀφοβίαν

οἱ Κελτοὶ ἀσπασσέναι κατακλιθεῖσθαι
 τὰς εἰσας ὑπομένουσιν.

§ 2. θρασυέτατοι. This compound
 is not found elsewhere, but may be
 owing to the language of comedy.

ἐν τοῖς τοῖς, sc. ἐν οἷς δύναται,
 μιμῆσθαι.

- 1116^a ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπὲρ
βιῶντων μᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστιν. δύσελπις δὲ τις ὁ δα
λός· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἐναντίων· το γὰρ
θαρρεῖν ἐνέλπιδος· περὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ τε δεῖται
5 καὶ ὁ θρασύς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσιν πρὸς
αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβαλλοῦσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέ-
σως ἔχει καὶ ὥς δεῖ· καὶ αἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ
βουλόμενοι προ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, αἱ
δ' ἀνδρεῖαι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀφείλουσιν, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.
10 Καθότι οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ
θαρραλίας καὶ φοβερῶς ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἰρεῖ-
ται καὶ ὑπομένει ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ. τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν
φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ
15 οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν. VIII. Ἔστι
μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι
κατὰ πέντε τρόπους. πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτικὴ· μάλιστα γὰρ

μεζόνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως <ἀν> ἀνδρείως λέγοιτο τοῦτων. εἰ γὰρ
ἦν ἡδὺ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν, πολλὰς αὖ δὲ ἀκρυσίας ἀπέθνησκον οἱ
ἀκολαστοι, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐκ ὄντος ἡδὺς,
τῶν παιρτικῶν δ' αὐτοῖς, πολλοὶ δὲ ἀκρυσίας περιπίπτουσιν εἰδότες, ὡς
οὐδεὶς <ἀν> ἀνδρείως εἶναι δοξάζει, εἰ καὶ πάντες ἐτυμῶς ἀποθνήσκουσιν
οὐτ' εἰ φεύγοντες τὸ πονεῖν, ὅπερ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσι, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων
οὐδεὶς ἀνδρείως, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ

“φαῦλοι βροτῶν γὰρ τοῦ πονεῖν ἡσσώμενοι,
θανεῖν ἠρώσω.”

ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Χείρωνα μυθολογοῦσιν οἱ ποιεῖν διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἔλκου δόνην εἰλασθαι ἀποθανεῖν ἀθάνατον ὄντα.

1116 a, 15. EF. 1279 a, 12 ἐστὶ δ' εἰδὴ ἀνδρείας καὶ
λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοίηται· <τὰ> αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ

§ 12. ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται.
For 54 connecting a finite verb with
a participle, cf. 1135 b, 31. 1152 a, 4.

§ 13. ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, sc. ἐν τοῖς
καλλίστοις, i.e. ἐν πολέμοις.

VIII. § 1. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν κ. ε. λ.

We pass now to the five forms of
ἀνδρεία καθ' ὁμοίηται.

ἡ πολιτικὴ. This is the courage
of the citizen army, the courage that
won Marathon.

δοκεῖν. δοκεῖσαι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νύμφων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ οὐκ εὖ καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀνδρείοτατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι ἐντιμοί. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὀμηρος γαῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα·

Πουλυδάμας μαι πρῶτος ἀλαγχέην ἀναθήσει·

καὶ [Διομήδης]

Ἐκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσας ἐν Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων

25

"Τυδείδης ἐπ' ἐμῷ."

ἐμῷ τας δ' αὐτὴ μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη, ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὀρεξιν (τιμῆς γὰρ) καὶ φυγὴν οὐκ εὖ, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταῦτά· 30 χάρου δ', ὅσον οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ ἐρῶσι,

εἰτά. μία μὲν πολιτικὴ· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ δι' αἰδῶ οὖσα. δευτέρα ἡ στρατιωτικὴ· αὕτη δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἶδέναι, οὐχ ὥστε Σωκράτης εἶναι τὰ δειλά, ἀλλ' ὅτι τας βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. τρίτη δ' ἡ δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἄγνοιαν, δι' ἣν τὰ παῖδιά καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι οἱ μὲν ἰστομεύουσιν τὰ φερόμενα, οἱ δὲ λαμβάνουσιν τοὺς ὕψους. ἄλλη δ' ἡ κατ' ἐλπίδα, καθ' ἣν οἱ τε κατευτυχηκότες πολλάκις ὑπομένουσιν τοὺς αἰδῶντες καὶ οἱ μεθύοντες· εὐέλπιδας γὰρ ποιεῖ ὁ οἶνος. ἄλλη δὲ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλοτρίστον, οἷον δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θίμην. ἂν τε γὰρ ἐρῶ, θρασυτεῖαν μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοῦν, καὶ ὑπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους, ὥστε καὶ ἐν Μεταποταμῷ τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείνει καὶ ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογούμενος· καὶ δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θυμὸν ὡσαύτως ἐκστατικὸν γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς, διὰ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι σὺν ἀνδράσι δοκεῖσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκσταῶσι, τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἰσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὥστε οἱ θρασυτεῖς. ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἀήτητον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς, διὰ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἀριστά μαχονται. διὰ νόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία. κατ'

§ 2. Πουλυδάμας κ.τ.λ. II. 221, 222.

[Διομήδης] This seems to be an addition. Hymaier, *Conte*, p. 35.

Ἐκτωρ γάρ κ.τ.λ. II. viii, 148.

§ 2. δι' αἰδῶ. For αἰδῶ cf. 1128 b, 10 κ.τ.λ. Franche quotes II. v, 239

δι' αἰδῶ, ἀνδρείς εὐτε, καὶ ἀλκιμον ἦτορ

ἐλπίσθαι,

ἀλλήλων τ' αἰδεσθῆναι κατὰ ἀρετὴν

ὁρμῆναι·

αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλεονεξία οὐκ ἐστὶν

φαντασία

καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν· ἀναγέ-
ζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἑκτωρ

ὃν δὲ κ' ἰγὼν ἀπέκνυθε μαχῆς πταίσσοντα νησσω.

35

οὐ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐστῆται φυγεῖν κίνας.

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες το αἰτί-
1116^b δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τύφρην καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατα-
τοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκης
ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. ἑκαεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία
ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης αἰσθ-
5 ἐπιστημὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἀλ-
λοῖς, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι

ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐδεμίαν τούτων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς παρακαλείσταις τὰς ἐν τοῖς
παιδείαις χρήσιμα ταῦτα πάντα.

1116 b. 3. EE. 1230 2, 4 παμπλησίως δὲ τοῖς αἰσθ-
δὲ ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσιν τοὺς καλόνους, ὥσπερ τρόποι σχεδὸν οἱ πλείους
τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῖς αἰσθ-
ἢ ὡς πρὸς Σωκράτη, ἐπιστήμη π' ἔμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. αἰσθ-
διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ φοβερὰ θαμβοῦν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰστοῖς ἀναβα-
ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλ' οἱ ἴσασιν τῆς βοήθειας τῶν δεινῶν εἴτε δὲ ὁ δρ-

§ 4. ὃν δὲ κ' ἰγὼν κ.τ.λ. II, 2,
399 with a high variation. The words
are not Hector's, but Agamemnon's.
They are attributed to the right
speaker in Pol. 1283 a, 10, but there
too with variants. Aristotle quotes
his Homer from memory.

§ 5 οἱ προστάττοντες Lombroso
says that Amyot affirmed he saw
προστάττοντες "in codice quodam pon-
ificio." But his authority is of no
weight in deciding between these two
texts. Victorinus renders *qui se
prima acie locant*. If II προστάττοντες
is probably right, for it suggests the
order of the δεσπότης to the δοῦλοι.
For *οὐκ ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες* cf.
Hercul vii, 373.

οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων κ.τ.λ. Schol.
Anon. τοῖς περὶ λαοειδομολίαν λόγοις
ἐν· τοιαύτην γὰρ τινα βόχην, ὅτε πρὸς

Μεσσηνίου εὐμαχέσσας, ἐπαλμοὶ ὃ
καὶ Τυρταῖος μνημονεύει.

§ 6. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The
second part of ἀνδρεία καθ' ὅσοντις
στρατιωτικῇ ἀνδρεία.

ὁ Σωκράτης. In the Laches (191
47) courage is defined as *ἐπιστήμη
τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ*, but this definition
is soon shown to involve a great dis-
tinction. When Socrates describes cou-
rage and knowledge, he does not
mean knowledge or reverence of a
special kind but knowledge of the
good. Aristotle's statement is only
accurate if we understand by ὁ Σω-
κράτης not the final result of the
discussion, but a provisional proposi-
tion temporarily adopted, and that too not
originated by Socrates but borrowed
by him from the culture of his time.
οἱ στρατιῶται. These are the pro-

- 20 καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος· οἱ δὲ
καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνουν ὥς κρείττους ὄντες, γινόντες δὲ
φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ο
δ' ἀνδρείος οὐ τοιοῦτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδραγαθίαν
φέρουσιν· ἀνδρείοι, γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ αἱ διὰ θῆρας
25 ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς πρῶσαντας φερομένα, ὅτε καὶ οἱ
ἀνδρείοι θυμοειδεῖ· ἱπτικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς
κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὀμηρος "σθίνος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ" καὶ
"μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε" καὶ "δριμύ δ' ἀνὰ ρίνας μένοι"
καὶ "ἔξεσεν αἷμα·" πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαί-
30 νειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμῇν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείοι τι
διὰ τὸ καλὸν πρῶττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνερχεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ
θηρία δὲ δια λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖ-
σθαι, ὅπῃ εἴν γε ἐν ὕλῃ [ἢ ἐν ἔλει] ἢ οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ
δὲ ἔστιν ἀνδρεία δια τὸ ὑπ' ἀληγδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
35 πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμῶν οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προσρῶντα, ἐπεὶ
οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρείοι εἶναι πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ
1117· οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς. καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ δια τὴν ἐπι-
θυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. [οὐ δὲ ἔστιν ἀνδρεία το
δι' ἀληγδόνος ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον]
φυσικωτάτῃ δ' ἔοικεν ἢ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσ-

κεδνὸς ἐν αὐτῇ, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνωμαλῶν
δυνάμεων, ἐν ᾗ παρατεταγμέναι ποτὲ Κορυ-
μεῖς συν τοῖς βοηθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς στρα-
τωμένοι ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχολοῦ μετὰ τῶν
βιοιωταρχῶν, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατέλαβον
καὶ τὴν ἀσφόδον εἶχον ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν·
Ὁνομαρχοὶ δὲ θηλαῖες προδεδίωσαν αὐτῶν
(H.C. 314-5). αὐτοὶ μὲν μέγα κτερεῖς ἀπέ-
θανον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Ὁνομαρχόν,
ἀπολειπόμενοι τὰς πόλεις, ὅτε αὐτοὶ
μηδὲ δουλομαχοῖ ἐπὶ φυγῇ καὶ κατα-
λιπεῖν τὴν πατρίδα· οὐ δὲ τῶν βιοιωτῶν
βοηθήσαντες αὐτοῖς στοναγῶνται ἐκ τοῦ
Μεταχολοῦ ἐφυγῶν πύθου ἐς ἀρχὴν τῆς
μάχης, ἀσθενεῖν δὲνα τεθῆναι, τῶν
βιοιωταρχῶν Χάρωννα, Ἰσσοροῦς, περὶ
τῆς μάχης ταύτης Κηφισόδωρος ἐν τῇ
48' <των> Περὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ πολέμου καὶ
'Αναξίμενης ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ τῶν Περὶ

Φίλιππον καὶ Ἐφοροῖς ἐν τῇ ἑκτατῇ
(FHG 1, 274, 133).

§ 10. Ὀμηροί. These are lines
reminiscent of II. vii. 339 and Od.
xxiv. 288. The phrase ἔμβαλε εἰς
'his blood bled' occurs nowhere in
Homer, but ζεῦς τοῦ περι-αἵματος
αἵματος was a constant denotation of
Anger (He Ap. 403a-31). It occurs
first in Theocritus, Id. ii.
25 ἴμοι δ' ἄφαρ ἔβρεχ' αἶμα.

§ 11. ἢ ἐν δεινῷ was bracketed by
Victorius. It seems to be a later
variant of ἐν δεινῷ.

οἱ ὄνοι. Cf. Homer's comparison
of Ajax to a stubborn ox which goes
on eating the corn though the boys
keep on beating it. II. xi. 548-549.

λαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ 5
 ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀρμιζόμενοι μὲν ἡλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδον-
 ται· οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μαιχμοὶ μὲν, οὐκ ἄν-
 δρείοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ
 διὰ παθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσιν τε. οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλ-
 πιδες οὕτως ἀνδρείοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς 10
 κενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις· παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι
 ἀρρωθαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρη-
 μισα θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν
 <ἀν> ἄντιπαθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιῶσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι·
 εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα, 15
 φεγρῶσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἢ τὰ φοβερά ἄνθρωποι οὐκ αὖτε καὶ
 φαίνόμενα ὑπομένειν ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ. διὸ
 καὶ ἀνδρειότερον δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν ταῖς αἰφνιδίαις φοβῆαις
 ἀφοβὸν καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ
 ἔξωτος γὰρ μάλλον ἢ, ὅτι ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προ- 20
 φανῇ μὲν γὰρ κἀν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο,
 τὰ δ' ἑξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. ἀνδρείοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ
 αἱ ἀγροῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πορρωτῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ'
 ὅσοι ἰξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσιν τινα

§ 12. προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα.
 'and and motive,' i.e. If the man acts
 spontaneously and not *calculated* because.
 As in Plato, *Alcibiades* is recognized as
 the natural basis of courage.

μεθυσκόμενοι δ' ἡδονταί. Cf. EE.
 1125b, 31-1126a, 14. Rhet. 1372b, 1
 1126a, 14. 1126a, 14. 1126a, 14. 1126a, 14.
 (ἀνδρείοι) ἐν ἀνδρείᾳ (ἀνδρείοι) ἐν ἀνδρείᾳ
 ἡδονταί.

§ 13. οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι.. οἱ δὲ
 Bywater points out (Cont. p. 36)
 that this "twofold use of the article,"
 the first being an ordinary article, the
 second meaning 'otherwise,' is "a favour-
 ite construction with Aristotle." (Cf.
 1129a, 16. 1129b, 31. 1135a, 31.
 1135b, 31. 1135b, 31. 1135b, 31.
 καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ.

§ 14. αἰφνιδίαις γὰρ γίνονται. Probl.

955a, 3. διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πᾶν εἰς
 μέθην πάντες ἔχουσι προθυμίαν, ὅτι
 πάντες ὁ οἶκος ὁ πολὺς εὐελπίδας αἰεὶ
 καθέπερ ἢ νεότερον τοῦ παιδός· τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ γήρας δύσπλητος ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ νεότης
 ἡλικίᾳ πλήρης.

§ 15. ἀπὸ ἔξωτος κ.τ.λ. We know
 that a man may perform a brave act
 without being already brave; for it is
 only so that he becomes brave. But
 it is only the formed *ἔξω* that can be
 trusted in an emergency.

ἢν. On the reading see Bywater,
 Cont. p. 35 and, for the idiomatic
 imperfect, 1123a, 19a.

§ 16. ἰξίωμα, not 'dignity' but
 self-reliance. It is the same thing
 as τὸ σθένος ἐνδύναμις εἶναι.

μένοντες αἱ αἰφνιδίαι.

25 χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἡπατημένοι, εἰς γινώσκοντες ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑπο-
πιτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν, ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐπαθον περιπεσόντες
τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἳ τε δὴ ἀνδρείοι εἰρησταί,¹
ποιοῖ τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρείοι.

IX. Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὐσα οὐχ
30 ὁμοίως περὶ ἀμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· ὁ
γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ὑπάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῖθ' ὡς δεῦρ' ἔχων ἀνδρείος
μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρράλεια. τῇ δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπο-²
μένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρείοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπιλιπὼν ἡ
ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυ-
35 πηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι· οἱ μὲν ἀλλό³
1117^b δόξαιεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν
κύκλων δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κύν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γι-
νέται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὐ ἕνεκα, ὁ
στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγινόν, ὅπερ
5 σίρηνιοι, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόθος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ
ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὅν τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα οἰδέν ἡδύ φαίνεται ἔχειν.

οἱ δ' ἡπατημένοι, i.e. deceived ones.
ἢ ὑποπιτεύσωσι, 'or (even) suspect
(that it is)'. L^b has ὑποπιτεύσονται, K^b
ὑποπτεύουσιν. The corruption is due
to the scribes having taken ἕτερον ἢ
together.

ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι κ.τ.λ. The story
is told in Xen. Hel. iv 4, 10. The
Spartan cavalry had taken Sicyonian
shielders with a *septa* upon them.
This was in the battle at the Long
Wall of Corinth B.C. 392.

IX. § 1. Περὶ θάρρη δὲ κ.τ.λ.
We now approach the question *πῶς
μετέστιν ἡ ἀνδρεία*, and we find that
it has more to do with pains than
pleasures, whereas we shall see that
σωφροσύνη has more to do with plea-
sures than pains (1117 b, 26). This
is really the same question as *πῶς
ἀριστύνεται ἀλλήλων καὶ τῇ μετέστι
ἡ υπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἐλλειψίς*. The fact
that the *θεοὶ* is like the *ἀνδρείος*
while the *θεός* is not (1108 b, 30 seq.)
is due to the fact that *ἀνδρεία* is

μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά ἢ τὰ θαρράλεια.
It has already been pointed out how
important these questions of *ἀνδρεία*
are. Cf. above 1108 b, 11 ff.

§ 2. διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The merit of
ἀνδρεία does not lie in not facing the
wrong things but in facing the right
things; for it has to do with *ἐφ' ὧν
ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνδρεία* than τὰ θαρράλεια. That is
why it is harder to be *ἀνδρεῖος* than
to be *σωφρων*. *Ἀνδρεία* implies the
presence of positive pains, *σωφροσύνη*
only the negation of certain pleasures.
But the merit of *σωφροσύνη* lies in
abstaining from the wrong pleasures
not in enduring the right pains.

§ 3. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος,
'the end of an act which conforms to
the definition of *ἀνδρεία*'. Cf. 1112 b,
21 τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. Being an *ἀνδρεῖος*
ἀριστὸν ἀριστὸν, it must be *ἡδύ καὶ
αἰσθητόν*.

ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλων 'by the attendant
circumstances,' cf. Ethic. 1367 b, 29,
1407 a, 35-1415 b, 24.

καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις ἐστί καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὃ μὲν θάνατος
 καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἐστίν,
 πομπῇ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τοῦ μῆ, καὶ
 ἰσὺ ὧν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχη πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστε- 10
 ρος ἢ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῇ θανάτῳ λυπησεται. τῷ τοιούτῳ
 γὰρ μάλιστα ἔην ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀπο-
 στερείται εἰδώς, λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἥττον ἀνδρείος,
 ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ'
 ζικέων αἰρεῖται. οὐ δὲ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως 15
 ἐπιφέρειν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.
 βατραχιῶτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως καλοῦσι μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἥττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μη-
 ῶν ἔχοντας· ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν
 20 θύον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ
 ἀνδρείου ἐπὶ τοσούτων εἰρησθῶ· τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύφῳ
 γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

X. Μετα δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἰρεταί. ὅτι μὲν οἷν μεσοτης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν· 25 ἦσαν γὰρ καὶ οἱχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αἰτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οἷν τῶν ἡδῶν κτλ. ἀφορίσωμεν. διερῆσθωσαν δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ

1117 b, 20. EE 1237 a, 34 περί ποῖα μὲν οὖν ἴσθιν ἡ
ἐνὶ ἡμέρᾳ μισότης καὶ τῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς, καὶ τὰ φοβερά τῶν ἀνισμῶν
ἔχει σφόδρᾳ ἐμφανὲς αὐτὴ τὴν παρουσίαν ἐφύδον ἰσχυρῶς περὶ δὲ
σφαιρικότητος καὶ ἀκροασίας μετὰ ταῦτα διεξιέναι πειρατέον. λέγεται
δὲ ὅτι ἀκρόστατος πολλοχῶς,

b, 28. EE. 1230 b, 21 $\tau\alpha\iota$ δ' δ $\sigma\acute{\omega}\phi\rho\omega\varsigma$ $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota$

45 ~~64~~ ~~77~~ ~~106~~ 52. 9. 1. Cf 1410 B,
14 D.

3. ο στρατιώτης δ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ.
A political remark on the honesty of
the statesman. The soldier we have
been describing is not necessarily the
best for professional services.

Χ. § 1. τῶν ἀλογων μερῶν. αα.
 αα. ἐπιδιδόμει. Αριστοτελὲς μαθητὰς

as usual from *vd hekōnra*, in this case the P atomic view. Aristotle did not himself believe in 'parts of the soul.'

ἔτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The question
 περὶ τοῦ μετέωρου ἢ συνηθουμένη is
 discussed after a brief notification of
 πρὶν μετέωρι, i.e. ἥτοις περὶ τὰς λυγροί.
 Cf. above 1:152, 2 n.

αἱ σωματικά, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ
 30 ταύτων χαίρει οὐ φιλητικός ἐστίν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος ταῖ σώ-
 ματος ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς ταιαν-
 τας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὁμοίως
 δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικά εἰσιν· τοῖς
 γὰρ φιλομήθους καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχεύων
 35 κατατρίβοντες τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολόχοι, ἀκολαστοὶ δ' οὐ
 1118^a λέγονται, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπαιμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασι ἢ φίλοις. περὶ 3
 δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὕτε
 ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὀψέως, οἷον χρώ-
 μασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκό-
 5 λαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δοξίειν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὥς δεῖ χαί-
 ρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἑλλείψιν. ὁμοίως 4
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβιβλαμένους
 χαίροντας μέλισιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθείς ἀκολάστους λέγει οὐδὲ

ἡδονὰς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν
 περὶ τίνων. οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἅπαντα τὰ ἡδονὰς ὁ σωφρον
 πῶφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περὶ τε τὰ
 γευστὸν καὶ τὸ ἡπτόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἡπτόν· περὶ γὰρ τὴν διὰ
 τῆς ὀψέως ἡδονὴν τῶν καλῶν ὡς ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων, ἢ λύπην τῶν
 αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τῶν εἰρημύσεων ἢ ἀταρμύσεων.
 ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς δι' ἀσφρήσεως, τὰς τε ἀπὸ εὐωδίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ
 δυσωδίας, οἷα ἐστὶν ὁ σάββων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀόλαστος οἰδεῖς λέγεται τὸ
 πᾶσχειν ἢ μὴ πᾶσχειν. εἰ γοῦν τις ἢ καλὸν ἀνδρῶν τα θεώμενος ἢ
 ἵππων ἢ ἀνθρώπων, ἢ ἀκροώμενος ῥόδοντος, μὴ βούλοιο μῦτε ἐσθῆτα
 μῦτε πίνειν μῦτε ἀφροδισιάζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καλὰ θεωρεῖν τῶν δ'
 ῥόδοντων ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ὡς περὶ οὐδ' αἱ
 πηλούμενοι παρὰ ταῖς Σευρήσιν.

§ 2. οἷον refers to ψυχικά, which is the emphatic word, as it is really the pleasure of the soul that are lying divide] from the more obvious pleasures of the body

ἐκάτερος. For similar constructions and instances cf. 1108 b, 10, 1161 a, 10.

οὐ, i.e. τούτω or τῷ οὐ. The ellipse of the demonstrative or article before the relative is common. Cf. 1131 b,

1. 1136 a, 21. 1168 a, 11. 1174 a, 10. Bywater, *Conte*, p. 45.

§ 3 οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες κ.τ.λ. This distinctive character was already given to the pleasures of sight, hearing and smell by Plato. Cf. *Phaedr.* 51 b ἀληθεῖς ἡσυχὰς ἡσυχῶς τὰ ὁσολοβοῖτο καὶ περὶ τὰ καλὰ λογίσματα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰς ὁσμὰς τὰς πλεονεχίας καὶ τὰς τῶν φύσεων.

5 τους ὡς δεῖ σωφρονας. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμὴν, πλὴν κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός· τοῖς γὰρ χαίροντας μῆλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμα- 10
 μων ὁσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς
 μύρων ἢ ὕψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι
 διὰ τούτων ἀναμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμημάτων. ἴδοι
 δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅταν πεινώσι χαίροντας ταῖς
 ὡν βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τριούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστον· 15
 ἰουτή γὰρ ἐπιθυμήματα ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δ' εἰδ' ἐν τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ζῴοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὁσμαῖς τῶν λαγῶν αἱ κύνεις
 χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρωσῇ, τὴν δ' αἰσθήσιν ἡ ὁσμὴ ἐποίη
 σεν· οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοῦς μὲν τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι 20
 ὁ ἰγρὺς ἴσθι διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἥσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν διὰ ταύτη
 φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἢ [εὐρών] ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον

1118 a, 9. EE. 1230 b, 36 ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ διὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 ταῦτα, περὶ ἅπερ καὶ τὰλλα θηρία μόνον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα,
 καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυποίμενα, περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἀπτά. περὶ δὲ τὰ
 τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἡδὲα σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνεται ἀνισθῆναι
 διακρίματα, εἰς περὶ εὐαρμοστῆν ἢ κἄλλος. οὐθὲς γάρ, ὅτι καὶ ὀξίον
 αἰσθῆναι, φαίνεται πᾶσχοντα αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἢ τῇ ἀκροάσει
 τῶν εὐαρμοσίων, εἰ μὴ τί που συμβεβηκε τιροτυπίας· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς
 τὴν εἰσθήσιν ἢ δυσωδίαν· καίτοι ταῖς γε αἰσθήσεσι δυνάστεας ἔχουσι πᾶσαι.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τούτοις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὺς

1 6. πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. There is no ἀκολασία in the pleasures of smell for as (καθ' αὐτὰς), it only comes in so far as they incidentally suggest the hope or memory of pleasures of another class. Plato (loc. cit.) had said τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας, Aristotle shows with great skill how it happens that to take pleasure in certain smells may be ἀκόλαστον. It is only in so far as they suggest pictures of taste and touch.

§ 6. καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, sc. τοὺς ἀκόλαστους. In Probl. 930 a, 11 seq. the example of the smell of

salt fish is given, which is unpleasant when we are not hungry, ἢ τοῦ τὰρίχου ὁσμῇ, ὅταν δὲ ἴσθι ἐχνομασ τοῦ φαγεῖν. ἢ δὲ τοῦ ῥόδου καὶ ἡδονα.

§ 7. ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις. The peculiarly human character of the pleasures of sight, hearing and smell is evidence of their 'pure' character.

τὴν δ' αἰσθήσιν.. ὁποιήσιν, 'it is the smell that makes them aware of the presence of hares.'

[εὐρών]. This word comes from Aspasios, who mean to correct what seemed a misquotation of II. iii, 24 εὐρών ἢ ἔλαφον παραδὸν ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα. But εὐρών is pointless, for it does not

αἴγα," ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὴν ἔξει. περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἴδεας β
 ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
 25 ἔξω κοιωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδωδεῖ καὶ θηριώδει φαίνονται.
 αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀφῆ καὶ γέσεις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γέν-
 σει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ μένιν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γένεσός ἐστιν ἡ
 κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δοκιμάζοντες
 καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι ταῦτοις, ἢ οὐχ
 30 οἱ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα ἐν
 ἀφῆ καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις

αἰσθάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὐτὰς. λεγὼν δὲ «μὴ» καθ' αὐτὰς αἵς ἢ
 ἐλπίζοντες χυρίζομεν ἢ μεμνημένοι, ὅν ὄψων καὶ πικρῶν ἰδὲ ἑτέρων γὰρ
 ἡδονὴν ταῖταις χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πίνειν, καθ' αὐτὰς δὲ οἷον αἱ
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσιν. διὸ ἐμμελῶς ἐφη Στρατωνικὸς τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν
 τοῖς δὲ πρὸς. ἔπει καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γενετῶν οἱ περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν
 ἐπιτίθεται τὸ θηρία, οἷδ' ὅσων τῷ ἄκρῳ τῆς γλώττης ἢ αἰσθησι, ἀλλ'
 ὅσων τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ εἰμὲν ἀφῆ μᾶλλον ἢ γένει τὸ πῖθος. διὸ οἱ
 ἀψοφάγοι οὔκ εἰχονται τὴν γλῶτταν ἔχειν μακράν· ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα
 γαρᾶνον, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξειδος. ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἀπτόσιμα, ὡς
 ἐπὶ πλεὺς εἰπεῖν, ὅτεσιν τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ὁμοίως οἱ καὶ ὁ ἀκόλατος περὶ
 τοῦ τοιαύτου ἐστίν. οἰνοφλυγία γὰρ καὶ γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεία κα.

express a definite αἰσθησι like sight (see Bywater, *Coma*, p. 36). We have here ὁμοῦ ἀπὸ ἀκοῆς, so we must now have ὁμοῦ.

§ 2. ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κ.τ.λ. Prohl. 249 b. ὁ δὲ τίς ἐστὶ μόνος δυο αἰσθησι ἀκούει λέγομεν, οἷον ὁρᾶν καὶ γεύειν ἢ διὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινόμενας ἡδονὰς κοινὰ εἶναι ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴων. ἀπὸ αὐτῶν κοινὰ εἶναι ἀιμώματα οἷον, διὸ καὶ μέλιτος ἢ μόνος ἐκπονημένοι οἷον.

§ 3. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Even taste, so far as it affords an opening to ἀκολασία, may be returned to touch. So far as it is strictly speaking the sense of taste, i.e. a δύναμις ἀρτυτικὴ which distinguishes the various savours which lie between sweet and bitter, it does not appeal to the

αἰσθησι. The real αἰσθησι would certainly refuse to be aroused by the sweet and bitter lying in the intermediate of vintages. That is rather on the level of artistic pleasure.

τῆς γὰρ γένεσος κ.τ.λ. Cf. De An. 429 a, 3 seq. for Aristotle's theory of taste.

οἱ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι ταῦτοις. It is not the distinction of tastes that gives pleasure to the glutton, but the contact of food with the gullet. Would he be willing to spit it out after tasting it? Cf. *Par. An.* 610 b, 29 τ μὴ γὰρ γλῶττα τῶν χυμῶν σπᾶν τὴν αἰσθησι· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν...καὶ σχεδὸν τῶν πλείστων ὄψων καὶ ἰδίων ἐν τῇ σατυρήσει τῇ τῶν ('contact' v. l. διὰ 'contact') τοῦ οἰνοφλογίου γίνεται ὁ χάρος.

λαγομήκεις. δὲ καὶ πῶς αὐτό τις ἀποφάγος ὦν τὸν φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γερανοῦ γενέσθαι, ὥς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῆ. κοινοτάτη δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκόλασία· 1118^b
καὶ δοῖεν ἂν δίκαιως ἰπποκρίδιστος εἶπαι, ὅτι οὐχ ὃ ἀνθρωποι ἔσμεν ὑπαρχει, ἀλλ' ὃ ζῆα. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγατῶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριωταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφθρηταί, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφῆ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς μέρη. XI. Τῶν δ' ἐπιθιμίων αἱ μὲν κοινὰ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἰδιοὶ καὶ ἐπιθιτοὶ· οἷον ἢ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσικῇ·

ἀναφαγία καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρημίας ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς ἅσπερ μῦθος ἡ ἀκόλασία διαιρείται. περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς ἢ ἀκῆς ἢ ἀσφρήσεως ἡδονὰς οὐδαμῶς λέγεται ἀκόλαστος εἶναι ὑπερβῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὀνειδίζουσιν τὰς ἀμαρτίας ψίγουμεν ταύτας, καὶ ὅπως περὶ οὐσα μὴ λέγονται ἐγκρατεῖς· οἱ δ' ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι οὐδὲ σώφρονες.

§ 10. ἀποφάγος ὦν. Εὐαίμων ἄσπετος ἦν. He was Philoleus son of Eryas. A certain man was called after him (φιλολέουσι τλασσομένῳ). As he was a favourite butt of the comic poets, Athenaeus is full of information about him. In a comedy of Krotyn he was called τλασσομένη, one who was eaten because he liked to turn his throat with hot chere of fish. When he went out to dine his servant used to take his own wine, and vinegar and sauce with which he corrected the crudity of his host's cookery. Theophrastus (HC II. 56) says αὐτὸν ἡδυνετο ποτὶ γερανοῦ τῆς φάρυγγος εἶναι, and Macdon has put his prayer in verse: φιλολέουσι πῶς, ὡς λέγουσ', ὁ Κυθῆσιος ἡδυνετο τρώειν γερανοῦ πηχέως, ὅπως ἀποστίω φάρην ὅτι πλεονατον
χλῶος
αὐτὸν δ' ἔμαχ' ἐν βρυχῶν' ἡδυνετο
πρῶτ.

τὸν φάρυγγα. This is incorrect, of course, from the anatomical point of view. Aristotle himself restricts the name φάρυγξ to the trachea or windpipe. But it was popularly used for ἀποφάγος. Cf. Eur. Cycl. 215 ὁ φάρυγξ εὐτρεπὴς ἐστω (i.e. I mean), A. Trach. 271 ὁ μῦθος φάρυγξ. We cannot expect correct anatomical terminology ἀποφάγος, a Sa yf and a paudo-εσπερία. Macdon says, λαρυγγα, which is equally wrong.

κοινοτάτη, i.e. παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις. Cf. Phil. 450 a, ὅτι καὶ οὐκ ὅσον δὲ τῶν ἀσφρησίων πίστε, τὰς δὲ φάρυγγας ἀπὸ τοῦ μόκων τῶν προσημνίων ἡδυνετο.

§ 11. καὶ γὰρ καὶ. A further restriction to certain pleasures of food.

XI. § 1. κοινὰ ἱπποκρίτου καὶ. Certain pleasures are common to all as opposed to ἰδιοὶ and therefore φυσικῶν, as opposed to ἐπιθιτοῦ: 'adventitious.'

καὶ ἡ ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ἱερμυλὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δίδλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων οὐδ' ἀκόλαστος τῷ μῇ, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ πρὸ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀποσιῳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχασθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ 1119^a τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἀγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντι τῶν ἄλλων ταύτῃ αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν—μετὰ λύπης γάρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία—αὐτόφρ^ο 5 ὁ δ' εἶκε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδέων καὶ ἡττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δὲ τῷ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἡδὴ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος 10

1119 a. 5. EE. 1331 a, 26 ἀνίσθητος μὲν οὖν, ἢ ὅπως δεῖ διομῆσει, ὁ οὕτως ἔχων ὥστε καὶ ἐλλείπειν ὅσων ἀνάγκη κοινοῦναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ παιταε καὶ χαίρειν· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον ἀκόλαστος πάντες γὰρ τοῦτοις φύσει τε χαίρουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι, καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἷοι ἀγνοεῖν ἀκόλαστοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ τυγχάνοντες καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες), οὐδ' ἀναισθητοὶ (οὐ γὰρ ἐλλείπονται τῷ χαίρειν ἢ λυπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλουσιν).

§ 5. περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας α τ λ The question of *ποικιλότης* is here briefly touched, and the relation of *σωφροσύνη* to pleasure and pain is contrasted with that of *ἀνδρεία*. To perform a brave act we must endure positive pain, to act in a temperate way we have only to abstain from pleasure. If we are *σωφρονεῖν* this will give us positive pleasure and not pain; if we feel pain in abstaining, we are *ἀκόλαστοι*, but the pain is not positive; τῇ λύπῃ ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

§ 6. μετὰ λύπῃς ἡ ἐπιθυμία. Cf. 1103 b 31.

§ 7. οὐ πάνυ γίνονται, 'hardly occur.' For the use of *οὐ πάνυ*, cf. Ind. s. v.

οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὀνόματος. Cf. 1107 b, 6 where he says *δοῦσαν δ' ἀναισθητοί*. Eustathius (loc. cit.) compares the New Comedy type of the *αἰσθητοί*. There were comedies of this name by Antiphanes, Anaxandrides, Anaxilas, Philémon and Menander.

διὰ τὸ μὴ πᾶν γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ ταῖς ὁ
 ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδέεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μάλ-
 λον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ' ὅλως οὐκ μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιοῦτον
 οὐδενί· οὐτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθιμεί, ἢ μετρίως αἰεὶ
 15 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οἷδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιοῦτων οἰεῖν·
 ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων
 ὀρέζεται μετρίως καὶ ὥς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμ-
 ποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.
 ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῇ
 20 ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὥς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

XII Ἐκονσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας.
 ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὣν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν,
 τὸ δὲ φευκτόν· καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν
 τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον
 25 δὲ ἐκούσιον. διὰ καὶ ἐπαινεϊδιστοτερον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι
 ῥῆιον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ
 ἐθισμοὶ ἀκλιδνοὶ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. δόξειε
 3 δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκούσιον ἢ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἄλλαισι περὶ αὐτὰ θῆλον ὅτι αἰ-
 μεσώτης, καὶ βελτίστη αὕτη ἡ ἔξῃ, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἐναντία· ὥστ' ἡ
 σωφροσύνη ἢ βελτίστη ἔστι, περὶ δὲ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἡδέα τὰ
 εἰρημῆα τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεσώτης σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, μεσώτης οἷσα
 ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀνασθησίας· ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολασίας· ἡ δ' ἄλλαισι
 ἦται ἀνόημος ἢ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀνόματι προαισθητικῆς ἀκριβο-
 τερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις
 ὑστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας.

§ 2. ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, sc. λέγει, εν-
 λείπει, προστάττει. Cf. 1115 b, 22 a.

XII. § 2. Ἐκονσίῳ δὲ κ.τ.λ.
 This discussion of the voluntariness of
 ἀκολασία and δειλία is due to the
 need of showing how far the respec-
 tive are really ἐφ' ἑμῶν, and
 therefore how far it is true that our
 deliberation is really complete with
 regard to them.

ὡν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν κ.τ.λ. The point

is that it is more in our power not to
 pursue a good thing than to avoid a
 bad one.

§ 2. ἐξίστησι explained by φείρει
 τὴν φύσιν, φερεῖ here being used in
 the Aristotelian sense of normal state or
 condition. Cf. below 1149 b, 35.

§ 3. ἔοικεν δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. There is
 no pain in being a coward, for the
 coward keeps out of the way of pain;
 but particular acts of cowardice imply

δὲν γὰρ ἄλυστος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε
 ὅπλα ῥίπτειν καὶ τὰλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ 30
 ἵναί τι τῷ δ' ἀκολάστοι ἀνυπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα
 εἰς ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀργυμένῳ—τὸ δ' ὅλον ἦπτον·
 γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκο-
 καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς παιδικαῖς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι
 καὶ ἐμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐδὲν 1119^b
 ἀλλὰ καὶ διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προ-
 οὐ κακῶς δ' εἶκε μεταπηρέχθαι· κκολάσθαι γὰρ εἰς
 αἰσχροῦν ὀργυμενον καὶ πολλὴν αἰξήσιν ἔχον, τοιοῦ-

§ 2, 33. EE. 1230 a. 38 λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος παλλα-
 ρεὶ γὰρ μὴ κκολασμέος πως μὴδ' ἑντραμένος, ὥσπερ ἀτμητος
 τμημένος, καὶ τοῦτων ὁ μὲν δυνατός, ὁ δ' ἀδύνατος· ἀτμητον
 τε μὴ δυνάμετον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατόν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον
 αἰετὸν δὲ τρώπον καὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς
 ἐκλίσιν καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκλινημένον διὰ περὶ
 εἰς περὶ δὲ ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ υἰόφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ πνίδες· καὶ τὸ
 ῥῖον ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ἐτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον
 εἰσι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάντες διὰ κολάσεως. πλεοναχῶς δὲ
 ἔστι τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν περὶ ἡδονῆς τινος καὶ λιπῆς εἰσὶ,
 καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτης διακρίσθαι πως καὶ ἀλλήλων
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκο-
 ὀνομαζόντες μεταφέρωμεν. ταῦτα δὲ ἀκριβέστερον ἔχοντας δι-

in. On the other hand, there
 is quite the contrary—in
 ing a particular act of intem-
 perance to be an intemperate
 always painful (τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ

βία εἶναι. Really they are
 painful.

τὸ δ' ὄνομα κ.τ.λ. A note
 on the word ἀκόλαστος
 of children like the English
 "It conveys the idea of the
 "Spice the real" etc.

on. The verb φέρει is used
 giving a name to a thing. See
 30 a. 13 διὰ τοίνυν τῶν ὀνο-

μάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι γινώσκον καὶ δι-
 λούον τι, καὶ μὴ πολλὰ, μόνον δ' ἐν αὐ-
 τῷ πλείω σημαίνει (i. e. πλεοναχῶς
 λέγεται.), φανερόν ποτεν εἶφ' ὁ φέρει
 τοῦτομα ποτεν. Khet 1412 b. 10
 εἰς προσήκοντως τὸ ὄνομα ἐνέγκη.
 Cf. below 1115 b. 15, b. 18.

§ 3. οὐ κακῶς μεταπηρέχθαι, 'not
 as he had metaphor' (μεταφορά). The
 word μεταφέρειν is to be explained
 from the use of φέρει given in the
 last note. We 'transfer' a name from
 its proper application in virtue of
 some similitude or, more strictly, in
 virtue of some analogy. Cf. Post.
 1457 b. 6 seqq.

5 τον δὲ μάλιστα ἢ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ
 ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος
 ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὴς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πάντων
 ἔξει· ἀπληστος γὰρ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῇ
 ἀνοήτῃ, καὶ ἢ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὖξιν τὸ συγγενὲς
 10 κὼν μεγάλα καὶ σφοδρὰ ὥσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρουνοῦσι.
 διὸ δεῖ μετρίως εἶναι αὐτάς καὶ ὀλίγας καὶ τῷ λόγῳ με-
 θὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι—τὰ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθέες λέγομεν καὶ κενὸν δ
 λασμένον—ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὴ πρόσταγμ
 τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν
 15 λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν
 τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμί ὁ
 σώφρων ὣν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ
 λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης. 16

ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἱ μὲν καλῶσιν αἰσθητήτων
 οἱ δὲ ἄλλως ὀνόμασι τοιαύτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἵπτι ὁ οὐ πύτι
 γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ' ἐπιθυλαῖον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον
 ἁμαρτανεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν τῶν τοιοῦτων ἡδονῶν
 ἦτταν καὶ αἰσθησιν μάλιστα ὅ· εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἷους οἱ καμφοδοὶ ἢ
 σκαλοὶ παράγουσι ἀγρυπνοῦς, οἱ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα
 πλησιάζουσιν τοῖς ἡδέσις.

καὶ ὁ παῖς. Cf. above 1103 a. 3
 ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικὸν τι.

§ 7 τὸ συγγενὲς Here apparent.

ly in the sense of τὸ σύμφυτον as in
 1149 b 11 and often

ἐκκρουνοῦσιν Cf. 1134 a. 27.

BOOK IV.

GOODNESS IN SOCIAL LIFE.

Introductory Note.

The Fourth Book shows how the principles we have discovered apply not only to the great virtues of Fortitude and Temperance, but also to those "minor morals" which make up ~~one~~ ^{the} tenths of life. If our principles are worth anything at all, they must be capable of explaining these also, and in fact it is the best possible test we can apply to them. The importance of this book is entirely missed if we imagine that Aristotle is setting before us types of character for our admiration and imitation. His aim is not edification, but the application of the test of fact to a general law. From this point of view the criticism that he has strayed from moral philosophy into matters more fitting for a handbook of etiquette will be seen to be wide of the mark. Our principles must be shown to explain what the average Athenian understood by *καλοκάγαθία*, or they stand condemned. The lesser men who came after Aristotle did not rise to this point of view. They apologise for discussing such things, or even deny to them the name of "virtues." But Aristotle's greatness is seen in this, that he felt bound to show that the Mean was exemplified not only in the regulation of such passions as Fear and Desire, but just as much in the ordinary acts of everyday social life.

Δ

Λέγωμεν δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οἶκ' ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οἱ δ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σωφρων, οἱ δ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρί- 25 σεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία 10-3

1119 b, 22. EE. 1231 b, 27 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία καὶ ἡ μεγαλοπρεπεία καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης μεσότητες. ἡ μὲν ἐλευθεριότης περὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν καὶ ἀποβολῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτῆσιν μὲν εἴς 3 μάλλον χαίρων ἢ δεῖ, ἀποβολῇ δὲ τάσῃ λυπούμενος μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ἀνελκίσθαι, ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέρω ἤττον ἢ δεῖ ὥσπερ, ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέρω ὡς δεῖ.

I. § 1. περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. The restriction of the word *ἐλευθέριος* to liberality in money matters was Attic. Cf. Plato, Rep. 401 c, Theaet. 144 d ἡ τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότης, Xen. Symp. 4. 13 *ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα*, passages which show that the limitation did not even in Attic always 'go without saying.' Many points in Aristotle's sketch are suggested by Plato's picture of Kephaios in the Republic.

περὶ χρήματα. The first question is περὶ τοῖς μεσότης. Cf. 1118 a, § 2. ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, sc. ἐν οἷς ὁ ἀνδραγαθὸς. ἐν οἷς ὁ σωφρων, sc. ἐν κρίσεσιν. ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, Par. ὥσπερ ὁ δίκαιος. Aristotle speaks as if *δικαιοσύνη* had already been treated in its natural place along with *ἀνδρεία* and

σωφροσύνη, though it had really been postponed, on the ground, as we are told above (1108 b, 7), that οἷα εἰδὲ λέγεται.

περὶ δόσιν ἐν τῇ δόσει. a good example of the equivalence of these two prepositional phrases to express the material (ὅλη of goodness, *what* is here a *πρᾶξις* not, as hitherto, a *πάθος*. Cf. also ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς κ. v. l. above.

μᾶλλον δεῖ ἐν τῇ δόσει. Cf. also 1117 b 26 ἥττον . . . περὶ τὰς λύπας.

§ 2. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν κ. v. l., 'all that has a money value' is merely money itself. The money value is the *continuum* in which we have to find the *μεσότης* *πρὸς τὰς*. Aristotle's theory of money is discussed later on in Book V.

ζώματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία
 περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἀλλεΐψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνε-
 λευθερίαν προσήπτομεν εἰς τοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρή-
 ματα σπουδάζουσιν, τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρουμεν εἰς τοὺς συμ- 30
 τείκοντες. τοῖς γὰρ ἡκράτεις καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανη-
 τοῖς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν, διὸ καὶ φανυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι·
 πολλὰς γὰρ ὥρα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγο-
 ρεῖνται· βούλεται γὰρ ἀσώτος εἶναι ὁ ἐν τι κακὸν ἔχων,
 τὸ φθίρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἀσώτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμε- 1120
 νος, δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά,
 ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὲ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχό-
 μεθα.

Παράβρισις. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω τὸ εἰς δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων, τὸ ὡς δὲ λόγος δ' ὁρθός. ἐπεὶ δ' ἑκαῖνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ
 καὶ ἀλλεΐψει, ὅπου δὲ ἔσχατά εἰσι, καὶ μέσων, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιστον, ἐν
 ἑστέρι ἑκαστον τῶ εἶδει τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀναγκαῖα καὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα
 μέσσητα εἶναι ἀσωτίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας παρὶ χρημάτων πτῆσιν καὶ

§ 2. *ἀσωτία*, 'prodigality.' Antiphanes and Eubulus wrote comedies called *Ἀσώτοι*, and Timonistion one called *Ἀσώτοι*. Epicharmus and Crates also wrote an *Ἀσώτος*. We shall see that all through this book Aristotle draws more on Comedy than on Life. The 'Middle' and New Comedy had provided a *doctrinae generis* of types of character, which furnished him with the material he wanted. There could be no better evidence of τὰ δοκούντα.

ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἀλλεΐψεις. The plural is used because each may be either *ὑπερβολὴ* or *ἀλλεΐψης* according as we refer it to *ἀσώτοι* or *δῶτοι*.

ἐπιφέρουμεν, 'we apply.' For *φέρειν*, *ἐπιφέρειν* ὄνομα cf. 1119 a, 34 n.

συμπελάουσιν. Of this word Bonitz says: 'hucce usque usqueque ad com-
 munitatem in eandem notionem plu-
 ralis notus' (Ind. An. 718 a, 55). We
 may render 'in a complex sense,'
 with a wider connotation. 'Pro-

digality' often connotes incontinence and Intemperance.

§ 3. *οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται*, i.e. *ἀλλοτρίως προσαγορεύονται*. We have *ἀλλοτρίως ἀποδοῖναι* in Cat. 3 b, 35 of those who answer the question *τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωποι* in any other category than the *τί ἐστὶν* (genus and species). So Top. 108 b, 28 *οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ὁρίεσθαι*. From Phys. 195 b, 3 we see that *οἰκείως* is also opposed to *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, and that term could be substituted for *ἀλλοτρίως* in the passages above. The meaning here, then, is *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* λέγονται.

§ 4. *βούλεται...εἶναι*. 'By *ἀσώτοι* we mean ὁ ἐν τι κακὸν ἔχων.' The phrase *βούλεται εἶναι* is often used in the same sense as *βούλεται λέγεσθαι* (for which see 1110 b, 30 n.) So below 1123 b, 33. The usage explained 1122 a, 32 n. is a little different.

Ἦν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία τις, ἔστι τοῦτοισι χρῆσθαι καὶ εὐ καὶ κα
 3 κῶς· ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἐπεί τε δ' αἰσιστα χρῆ-
 ται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴν καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ χρησται
 ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετὴν· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶ
 ὁ ἐλευθέριος. χρῆσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ
 10 δόσις· ἢ δὲ λήψις καὶ ἢ φυλακὴ κτήσις μᾶλλον. διὸ μάλ-
 λον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ δίδοναι οἷς διὰ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν
 δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον
 τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μάλ-
 λον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρά μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄξιον δ' ὅτι τῇ μετ
 15 δόσει ἔπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν τῇ δι' ἀ-
 ψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χίρις τῇ
 δίδοντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δε μᾶλλον
 καὶ βῆρον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκτεῖον ἦττον
 προΐκνται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἄλλότρινον. καὶ ἐλευ-
 20 θέριος δὲ λεγόνται οἱ δίδοντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ

ἀποβολὴν. διὸ καὶ τὰ χρήματα λέγομεν καὶ τὴν χρηματιστήν.
 ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ χρησις τοῦ κτήματος ἐστίν, ὡς ὑποδήματος ἢ
 ἱματίου, ἢ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μὲν, οἱ μέντοι οὕτως ὥς ἂν εἰ τις σταθμῇ
 χρήματα τῷ ὑποδήματι, ἄλλ' οὐκ ἢ πώλῃσι καὶ ἢ μίσθωσις· χρῆται
 γὰρ ὑποδήματι. ὁ δὲ φιλάργυρος ὁ περὶ τὸ νόμισμά ἐστιν ἐσταιδέας.
 τὸ δὲ νόμισμα τῆς κτήσεως διὰ τὴς κατὰ συμβεβηκός χρησιμῶς ἐστὶ
 ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἂν εἴη καὶ ἄσωτος περὶ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός τρόπον
 τοῦ χρηματισμοῦ, καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν χρηματισμοῦ τὴν
 αἵψην δυνάει· ὁ δ' ἄσωτος ἐλλείπει τῶν ἀναγκαίων· ὁ δ' ἐλευθέρως
 τὴν περιουσίαν δίδωσιν.

§ 6. Ἦν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία κ.τ.λ. The middle term of the first syllogism is τὸ χρησιμὸν = ὅν χρεία ἐστίν, that of the next is ὁ ἔχων...τὴν ἀρετὴν.

§ 7. χρῆσις...κτῆσις. Cf. 109b 5, 32 n. The point is that the ἀρετὴ derives its character from its *ἐνέργεια*.

§ 8. καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος. We are looking for an *ἐπαινετὴ* *ἔξις*, and that will have to do with τὸ χαλεπώτερον and not τὸ βρον.

§ 9. ἦττον προΐκνται, sc. τοῖς δεσποῖς. "Men are apter to give away too little of their own than to take their neighbours' goods." It is not the μᾶλλον which is redundant, as we may say, but the εὖ. For μᾶλλον ἢ εὖ after a negative is explicit or *virtually* negative. Cf. Liddell and Scott s. v. *μαλίστα* 11, 6. Kuhnert, § 316, 6. So in French, "on donne trop peu du sien, plus on veut qu'on ne prend le bien d'autrui."

οἱ ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἥττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην 10
 11 αἱ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πῦνν. φιλοῦνται δὲ σχε-
 ῖον μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ὠφέλιμοι γάρ,
 12 τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δώσει. αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις κηλαὶ καὶ
 τὸ καλοῦ ἔνεκα, καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα
 13 καὶ ὀρθῶς. οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα 15
 14 ἵκτεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δώσει. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γάρ
 15 κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺν ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρύν. ὁ δὲ διδούς
 ὡς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην
 αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυ-
 16 τηρώς· μάλλον γὰρ ἔλαιοι' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς 20
 17 πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. οὐδὲ λήψεται δεῖ ὅθεν μὴ
 18 εἶ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη
 19 λήψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικὸς· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ εὖ ποιούν-
 20 τος εὐχερώς εὐεργετεῖσθαι. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ
 τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον. 1120^b
 ὅπως ἔχη δίδοναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν οἰκείων, βουλόμενός γε
 διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχη
 21 δίδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ καλόν, ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ

§ 10. αἱ ἐλευθεριότητα Cf. Rhet. 1376 a, 18 ἀφισβήσεις περὶ τοῦ ἥττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην

οὐχ ἥττον, i.e. μάλλον. We call them 'better' rather than 'better.'

οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες, sc. ὡς δεῖ.
 § 11. τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, sc. λεγομένων Cf. 1123 b, 7 τὸν μακάριον ἀφισβήσεις ἀπὸ τοῦ χαιρεῖν.

§ 12. κηλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. For the proof of this see 1123 b, 20.

τῇ ὀρθῇ δώσει, i.e. τῇ κατὰ τὸν ἥττον δώσει.

§ 13. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως. Cf. above 1124 b, 5 καὶ.

§ 14. εὐχερῶς, 'without causing loss,' μὴ ἀσχερῶς. The εὐχερῶς is not 'free' or 'voluntary.'

§ 15. οἷον ἀπὸ κ.τ.λ., e.g. the produce of his own lands or his money, not from the public property

(ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν), as some politicians do. Cf. below 1163 b, 8.

καλόν· ἀναγκαῖον. This is the literary form of the opposition between the end and the condition, the good and the material cause. The ἀναγκαῖον here referred to is not τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως εἶναι, but τὸ εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι (Met. 1072 b, 12), τὸ εἶναι ὑποθέσκει ἀναγκαῖον (Part. An. 642 a, 9), the conditionally necessary, that which must be if something else is to be.

οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν οἰκείων. I prefer οἰκείων, the reading of L^b, to ἰδίων (K^b) which all the editors follow. Above ἰδίων (opp. κοινῶν, δημοσίων) is in place, but here we want an opposite to ἀλλοτρίων.

§ 16. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show the need of the caution given in the preceding section.

5 σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν
 ἑαυτῷ εὐαίττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτον εὐειθερίᾳ
 κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ εὐειθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ 10
 πλήθει τῶν διδυμένων τὸ εὐειθεριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδύμετου
 ἔξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν [δίδωσιν]. αἶθεν δὲ κυρίως
 10 εὐειθεριωτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ εὐαίττω δίδοντα, ἢ τὸν ἀπ' ἐλα-
 τόνων διδόντα. εὐειθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησά-
 μένοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς
 ἐνδεΐας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα
 ἢ ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ' εὐ ρῆδιον τὴν
 15 εὐειθερίον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προητικὸν
 δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τῆς
 δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι 20
 ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλογως τοῦτο· ὁ
 γὰρ οἷον τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥστερ
 20 οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὲν δώσει γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ οἷδ' ὅτε μὴ 22
 δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιούτα· οὐ γὰρ αἱ εἰς κέρειται κατὰ
 τὴν εὐειθερίτητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς
 αἱ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥστερ γὰρ εἴρηται, εὐειθερίας ἐστὶν ὁ 23
 κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς αἱ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον
 25 ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἄσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆ-
 θος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ρῆδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς
 δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς εὐειθεριότητος δὲ μεσότητος 24
 οὕσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λήψιν, ὁ εὐειθέριος καὶ
 δώσει καὶ δαπανήσῃ εἰς αἱ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μι-
 30 κροῖς καὶ μεγάλαις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν

§ 19. αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, sc.
 ἐπὶ. For the reading see Rywaters,
 Contr. p. 37. It is the proposition
 which makes the man liberal.

§ 20. εἶναι δοκοῦσιν. Cf. infra
 1167 b, 34. 1168 a, 21. This inference
 comes from Plato, Rep. 330 b ὅ τοι
 ἐν αὐτῇ ἡρώμῃ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας
 οἱ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. ταῦτα
 δὲ ποιῶσι ὡς τὸ πολλοὶ εἰ μὴ αὐτοὶ
 ἐκτιθέμενοι· οἱ δὲ ἀποφράμει διελθὲν ἢ

οἱ ἄλλοι ἀπεφύγονται αὐτά. ὥστε γὰρ
 οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ αἱ
 πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι, ταῦτα
 τε δὲ αἱ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ
 χρήματα σπουδῇ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἔργον αὐτοῦ
 καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρῆσιν ἦσαν οἱ ἄλλοι.

§ 21. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται π. τ. λ.
 Cf. the scholion of T. 1168 a, 21. Cf. also
 ὁ τὸν πλοῦτον π. τ. λ. (Bergk-Crossius
 p. 269), and the Plotina of Aristoteli-
 phones.

μηδαμῶθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι—ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλεί-
πει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας οἷπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι
εἶναι—ἐπεὶ δ' γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῶ βελτίων εἶναι 30
τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εἰατός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας
καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον εἴναιτο εἰλθεῖν.
ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβά-
νει, οὐδέτεροι δ' ὥς δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἰθυσθεῖν ἢ πως
ἄλλως μεταβαῦναι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οὐς δεῖ 35
καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὰ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῖλος
τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οἶδ' ἀγεινοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν
διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν 32
τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι εἰς
τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οἰθίνα,
30 ἄλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν. ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἄσωτων, κατ' ἄτερ 33
εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο
ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὴ ἀνα- 34
λίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ
ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οἷν ἐτέρωθεν
1121^b πορίζειν. ὅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλι-
γώρως καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι,
τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οἶδ' ἐλευ- 35
θέριοι αἱ δύο εἰς αὐτῶν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ καλαὶ εὐδὲ τοῦτου
5 ἔνεκα, οὐδὲ ὥς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὐς δεῖ πέμψαι τούτους πλου-
σίους ποιοῦσι καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη οὐδὲν ἂν ᾔσιν,
τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ
ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκονται
καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροὶ εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πως
10 τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οἷν ἄσω- 36

§ 30. οἷπερ καί, 'and it is just
thas,' i.e. private persons as opposed
to tyrants.

§ 31. ἐπεὶ δ' γε τοιοῦτος. ὁ γε τοιοῦτος, i.e. ὁ μηδαμῶθεν λαμβάνων καὶ
πάντα δίδων. This is the prodigal
young man of the New Comedy, who
is usually a sympathetic character.

§ 32. εὐχερῶς here is simply 'con-

veniently,' 'easily,' opp. to δυσχερῶς.
In this sentence the meaning ex-
pressed by εὐχερῶς above (1120 2, 34)
is given by διευγνώμης.

§ 33. τοῦτου ἔνεκα, sc. τοῦ καλοῦ,
cf. 1120 2 3.

εὐχερῶς once more with the same
meaning as 1120 2, 34.

πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν. Rhet. 1399 b,

ἡδαιγώγητος γινόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν
 λείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν. ἡ δ'
 ἱρία αἰατός τ' ἐστίν—δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα
 π' ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν—καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
 ροις ἡσυχίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον 15
 αἰ. καὶ διατείνε δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν·
 γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ
 α, τῇ γ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δοσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς
 οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χω-
 καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβύλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δό- 20
 ἔπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις
 ἰόωλοι γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δύσει ἐλλεί-
 των δ' ἀλλοτριῶν οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβά-
 μιν διὰ τίνα ἐπιστάκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχροῦν
 ι γὰρ ἔκκοι ἢ φασὶ γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μὴ 25
 παγασθῶσιν αἰσχροῖν τι πράξαι· τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ
 κρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμαστα δ' ἀπὸ τῆς

b, 21. EE. 1231 a, 10 αἰτῶν δὲ τούτων εἶδη λέγονται.
 καὶ τὴν μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον περὶ μόρια, οἷον ἀνελευθέρους φειδωλὸς
 καὶ αἰσχροκερδής, φειδωλὸς μὲν ἐν τῷ μὴ προϊένεσθαι,
 κέρδους δ' ἐν τῷ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται κίμβιν δὲ ὁ σφίδημα περὶ μεμῆ-
 κεναι, παραλυγιστῆς δὲ καὶ ἀπιστηρητῆς ὁ ἀδικεῖ κατ' ἀνελευ-
 καὶ τοῦ ἀσώτου ὡσαύτως λαφύκτης μὲν ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀτάκτῳ ἀναλί-
 κτιστος δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπομένειν τὴν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ λύπην

καὶ τῶν αἰσχροῦν
 ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλόν. 1890 a,
 γὰρ τὸ καλὸν ὅστις μόνον
 το συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς

ἡ γῆρας. The New Comedy
 κενεῖται οὐκ ἀπὸ ἀνελ-
 Rhet. 1387b. καὶ ἀνελευθέρους
 πρὸς τὸ γὰρ τι τὸν ἀνελ-
 κεία· ἀπὸ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν
 ἐκείνην ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ πρὸς
 ἡ δὲ τὸ ἀνελ-
 κείαται αἰ. το σφίδημα
 2 a, 16.

§ 20. οἷον π.τ.λ. Cf. EE. 1231 a,
 12 above. We are here in the midst
 of the New Comedy vocabulary.

κίμβικες. According to Langes,
 quoted by Stewart, the word κίμβις
 properly meant 'flea' (Modern Greek
 κίμβις = αἰσχροκερδής). The name seems
 to have been applied to Simonides (by
 Xenophanes, according to schol. Ar.
 Poese 697), cf. Athenaeus 656 d ὡς οὖν
 διὰ τὴν ἀληθῆς κίμβιν ὁ Σιμωνίδης καὶ
 αἰσχροκερδής, ὡς ὁ Χαρμείδης φησὶ.

αἰσχροκερδής. 'common-lawyer'
 Cf. our 'skin flint,' 'cheese-parer.'

ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδεν δι δοῦναι) οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβου ἀπέ-
 χονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὥς οὐ ῥῆδιον αὐτὸν μιν τῇ ἐτέρῳ
 30 λαμβάνειν, τα δ' αὐτοῦ ἐτέρους μὴ ἄρῃσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς το
 μῆτε λαμβάνειν μῆτε διδόναι. οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν
 ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον αἱ
 τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκαὶ καὶ
 πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῇ
 1122^α πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὄθιν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὅσον οὐ δεῖ
 κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἢ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ
 ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνειδῇ ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς
 γὰρ τὰ μεγάλᾳ μὴ ἔθεν δι' οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ αἱ δεῖ, οὐ
 5 λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους οἷον τοὺς τυρίνους πώλεις πορβοῦντας
 καὶ ἱερὰ συλαίνοντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ
 ἀδίκους. ὁ μὲντοι κυβευτής καὶ λωποδύτης [καὶ ὁ ληστὴ] 13
 τῶν ἀνελευθέρων· αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκα
 ἀμφοτέροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνειδῇ ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ
 10 μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μερίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ
 τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οὐκ δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφοτέροι δὲ ὄθιν
 σὺ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς· καὶ πᾶσαι εἰς αἱ
 τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι εἰκότως δὴ τῇ ἐλευθερίῳτι 44
 ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μείζον τε γὰρ ἐστὶ κακὸν τῆς
 15 ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν
 ληχθεῖσαι ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν
 ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τούτων εἰρήσθω.

Anisophanes, *Wakre* 1357, has the expressive compound *κυμοσπιστο* καρδαμοσπύροι. The word is found in *Alexu* (r. 351) and *Poxidippus* (fr. 96), while *κυμοσπιστις* is quoted from an anonymous comic writer.

ἀρίστην. I prefer this, the reading of both K^h and L^a, to the more colourless *ἀρίστην* of inferior sources. The sudden transition to indirect speech brings vividly before us some comic old man's mind.

§ 30. *πορνοβοσκαί*, the *homoeroti* of the New Comedy. Cf. *Trochoph.* *Char.* 6 διὰ τὴν δι καὶ παρὰ τὴν καὶ

πορνοβοσκήσαι καὶ *τελευτῆσαι* το *μήτερος* *αἰσχρο* *ἐργασίας* *ἀποδο* *μάσαι*, ἀλλὰ *ἐργασίας* *μογυρο* *εὐβοίας*.

κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῇ, 'in small steps and at high intervals.'

§ 43. καὶ ὁ ληστὴ is omitted by *Aspasia* and is inconsistent with *ἀμφοτέροι* below. *Diwater*, *Com.* p. 38.

αἱ μὲν, the robbers (*λωποδύται*); αἱ δὲ, the charpers.

§ 44. *μείζον τε γὰρ* c. l. For the question *καὶ ἀντικειμένων* see *Boiss.* on 1109 a, 6 and a, 12.

11. Δίξαι δ' ἂν ἀκίλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας
 διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γάρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρημάτων τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι·
 οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνεται περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν τοῖς
 χρημασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν
 τοῦτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθυπερ γὰρ
 τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν.
 2 τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ
 καὶ ὑρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ 35
 3 περὶ δ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν
 οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ "πολλὰκι δύσκον ἀλγίτη,"
 ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευ-
 4 θήριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής. τῆς
 τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἢ μὲν ἑλλειψίς μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, 30

1122 a, 18. EE. 1233 a, 31 ἵσται δὲ καὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς οὐ
 περὶ τῆς τυχοῦσιν πρῶζιν αἰὶ προαίρειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δαπάνην, εἰ μὴ
 πον κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν· αἰνεῖ δὲ δαπάνης μεγαλοπρέπεια οὐκ
 ἵσται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἐστὶ, ὃ δὲ κόσμος οἷα ἐκ τῶν
 τιχέτων ἀναλωμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. ὁ δὲ
 ἐν μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ τοῖς πρέποντος μεγέθους προαιρετικός, καὶ τῆς
 τοιαύτης μεσότητος καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡδονῇ ὁρατικός, μεγαλοπρεπής.
 ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέζον καὶ πλεονέκτης, ἀνάγκη· οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' ἔχει τὰς

11. 41. περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας. 'magnificence'. This was a form of good-
 ness (τὸ καλόν) expected of the Athenian
 citizens, and showed itself chiefly
 in largeness and liberality.

ὑποσημαίνει, cf. 1122 a, 16

ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα. It occurs in
 the compound μεγαλοπρέπεια. πρέπειν
 has its original sense of 'to be con-
 sidered,' but Aristotle treats it as if
 it meant 'to be fitting.'

§ 2. πρὸς τι, 'relative.'

τριηράρχῳ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. The trier-
 archy was an extraordinary magistracy
 (EBCI. Ant. a. v.), the ἀρχιθεωρία
 was an extraordinary one. The ἀρχι-
 θεωρὸς had to equip the sacred pil-
 grimages to Delos, Olympia and else-

where. See 'Ath. pol. 56. 3 καθίσταται
 δὲ καὶ (ὁ ψήφος) εἰς δόξαν χρημάτων,
 καὶ ἀρχιθεωρὸν τῷ τριηραρχῷ τῷ τοῦ
 πλοῦτος ἀγορεύει. These are the duties
 of Triarch, Phylarch and Rakchylides

ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ δ. ὑποσημαίνει, 'the
 object.' Cf. above 1119 b, 35 n. The
 expression is condensed for πρὸς τὸ ἐν
 ᾧ καὶ περὶ δ. For the omission of the
 antecedent, cf. below 1121 b, 2.

§ 3. πολλὰκι κ.τ.λ. Od. xiv,
 420-1

Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τότε εἶλον ἐν ἀνθρώποις
 ἑναίον
 ὀλοὶοι ἀφνειοί, καὶ πολλοὶ δύναν
 ὀλῆτη

§ 4. μικροπρέπεια. The word does
 not seem to occur before Aristotle,

ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν αἷ οἱ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτὰς ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γάρ 5
 33 δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ δ'
 1122^b γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται καὶ ὧν ἔστιν, αἱ δὲ τοῦ μεγαλυπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὗτα γὰρ ἔσται μὴ δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δα-
 5 πάνης ἀξίου δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἡ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ 7
 8 ὅνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ 8
 9 προστικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπὲς. καὶ πῶς καλῶ

γεννίᾳσιν, οὐδὲ καλοῦσιν τινες ἀπειροκάλους καὶ παλίσκουσι αἶον πρὸς εἰς γάμον δαπανῶν τις τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, πλούσιος ὢν, δικαίᾳ πρέπει εἶναι τοιαύτην κατασκευὴν οἷον ἀγαθυδαίμονιστάς ἐστίνων, οὗτος μὲν μικροπρεπὴς, ὁ δὲ τοιούτους δεχόμενος ἐκείνως μὴ δεῖν χάριν μᾶλλον ἐξουσίαν ὁμοιοε τῷ παλάμῳ, ὁ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ ὥς ὁ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπὴς· τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρέπει ταῖς πᾶσι τὴν ἀξίαν. δεῖ δὲ πρέπον εἶναι [καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πρέποντος (i. πρᾶκτοντος) κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ πρέπον (περὶ οὗ Jackson)] καὶ περὶ ὁ (οἷον περὶ οἰκτου γάμον ἑτέρον τὸ πρέπον καὶ περὶ ἀρμυμένον) καὶ αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἐκί

ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κ.τ.λ. EE. 1213 a, 38. Isokr. Dem. 7 d ἐστὶ φιλοκάλων μετὰ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς, καλλωπιστοῦ δὲ τοῦ περιεργον.

βαναυσία. The origin of the word is unknown, but its primitive application was clearly to mechanical arts unworthy of a free citizen. In the Poetics we find it in this sense without any moral implication, e.g. 1277 b, 35 ἡ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦ βαναύσου καλὸς ὄντων. **ἀπειροκαλία,** 'want of taste,' coupled with αἰσμία in Plato, Rep. 403 c.

§ 8 ἐπιστήμονι, 'an artist,' 'a cognoscentur.'

§ 8. ἐν ἀρχῇ. No such statement has yet been made, but that will not justify us in bracketing the sentence

with Raimbaux. It has been interpreted throughout in the discussion of *τινα* under the two headings *τινα ποιεῖ* (= ὡς ἔστιν) and *τινα* (= ταῖς ἐνεργείαις). The point here is that we must have *πρέπον μέγεθος* not only in the *ἐνεργεία*, i.e. the *δαπάνη*, but also in the *ἔργον*, the object of the *δαπάνη*. I therefore read at 8i for the *καὶ* at 8g

§ 8. προστικῶς, 'profusely,' already in Xen. Meta. iii. 1, 6.

ἀκριβολογία, 'nice counting of the cost.' This use of the word for the habit of ἀκριβὴς λογισμός (instead of ἀκριβὴς λόγος) cf. ἀκριβολογία at 1139 b, 19 is rare. The usual term for this is μικρολογία (Theophr. Char. 10). A similar idea, however, under-

πρετωδιάστατον σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ
 βατου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλο- 10
 τι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὡς
 ἔπαις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος,
 π τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δα-
 βργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπότερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ
 πατος καὶ ἔργον. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἀξίον 15
 ν, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ
 του ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυ-

λον) τοιαῦτον ἢ τοιαῖον, οἷον τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ἔπει-
 πρίπειν, ἢ ἐποικήσαντο Ὀλυμπίαζε, διὰ τὴν προεπάρξωσαν
 , ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι. ὁ δ' ὅπως ἔπαιεν ἔχων πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν [δ]
 ον καὶ ἐπ' ἐλευθεριότητος οἷσαυτως. ἵστε γὰρ ὅτι οὐτ'
 κτ' ἀνελεύθερος.

ἢ ἀκριβὲς in Aristotle, 33
 κοινῶς θείει and Menander
 κ ἀκριβὲς πῶς ἐρῶντες
 κ 1272 B44 b εἰς δὲ δι'
 το ὕδαρι, i.e. so scarce
 to count every bucket

π καὶ πῶς θαλάσσιον,
 π will cost and how t
 chespest.'

οὔτοις δὲ κ.τ.λ., κ. εἰ
 ἐν δὲ. 'It is here that
 κ. the μέγεθος, of the
 shows itself, and this is
 y has to do with. He
 κ more magnificent re-
 κ μικροπρεπὲς or the
 κ be some expense.' The
 κ is intended to show
 κ the ἐλευθεριότης and the
 . It is not the actual
 κ spends which makes
 κ, but the way he
 κ κλαυθρὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰσῆς
 κ does not, I think, con-
 κ ce with Liberal ty, but
 κ κeres and defect Sup-

πνε the μικροπρεπὲς and the βάναυσος
 κ spend the same sum as the μεγαλο-
 κ πρεπὲς on a public object, the result
 κ will be neither μέγα nor πρεπὲς. In
 κ the one case it will be spoiled by a
 κ desire to do more for the money than
 κ can properly be done, in the other by
 κ the desire to make the ἔργον look ex-
 κ penensive of the cost of higher qualities.
 Cf. 1122 B, 32

οἷον μέγεθος, πῶς κ.τ.λ. μέγεθος.
 Aristotle uses οἷον to introduce ex-
 κ planations of an etymology. Cf.
 1126 a, 10

κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Public
 κ munificence is not to be gauged by
 κ its money value like property, but by
 κ its impressive character. The word
 κ θαυρία is a characteristic Greek touch.
 κ The munificent man is the man who
 κ provides due "sights," processions,
 κ tragedies, public buildings and the
 κ like. The Athenians were known φιλο-
 κ θαυρία. The munificent man pro-
 κ duces something "grand," not merely
 κ something costly.

τρογόνους ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι, καὶ τοῖς
 ὑπόδοξαι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει
 καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ
 ἔρπται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότεστα· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα 35
 ἐσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιαῦτον, καὶ εἰ περὶ 1123
 ἢ ἡ πᾶσα πολις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ
 ἡνῶν δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντι-
 δωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής ἀλλ'
 ἐν τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὁμοίου. 5
 μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι τρεποντῶς
 πρὸ πλούτῳ (κόσμος γὰρ τις καὶ οὗτος), καὶ περὶ ταῦτα
 ἄλλον δαπανῶν ὅσα πολυχρόνιαι τῶν ἔργων (κάλλιστα
 αὐτὰ), καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά ἀρ-
 εώξει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ 10
 τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γενεῖ, καὶ μεγαλο-
 πρεπέστατον <ἀπλῶς> μὲν τὸ εἰ μέγα μὲν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ
 ἐν οὗτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ
 δαπανήματι—σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἡ καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος μεγαλο-
 πρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικῷ δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ 15
 ἐντελεύθερον—διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ
 κρίνει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐπέρβλη-
 τόν) καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν
 ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δ' ὑπερβᾶλλον καὶ βάνυστος τῷ

§ 14. ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, 'those
 they have to do with' by relationship
 (ὧν γὰρ προσκείμενον) or otherwise.

§ 15. τῶν δὲ ἰδίων, 'private' as
 opposed to τὰ περὶ θεοῦ and τὰ περὶ
 τοῦ κοινού.

ἡνῶν ἀποστολάς. Specially used
 in connection with gifts given to the
 ruling class.

§ 17. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. A long con-
 struction which goes down to
 § 14 ἐνταῦθα, followed by a paren-
 thesis (c. 14 σφαῖρα c. 16 ἐντελεύθερον).
 The analysis begins at c. 16 διὰ τοῦτο.

ἀπλῶς, inserted by Bywater (Contr.

p. 38), seems necessary to make an
 antithesis to ἐνταῦθα. 'Expenditure
 is magnificent ἀπλῶς when it is great
 expenditure on a great object, in a
 given kind of expenditure, it is what
 is great in that kind.' The words
 ἐνταῦθα and ἐν τοῖτοις are equivalent
 to ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γενεῖ.

§ 20. βάνυστος. Cf. above 1107 b,
 19, 1122 a, 31, where βανυσταὶ καὶ
 ἀπειρηταῖα are compared. Pindaros
 (loc. cit. p. 174) speaks of ἀνιερ-
 οῦς καὶ ἐνδοξούς, and Theo-
 phrastus (ap. Stob. II. 240 Wachsm.)
 called the ὑπερβολή by the name

20 παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥστερ εἴρηται. ἐν
 γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τὰ δαπανημάτων πολλά ἀναλίσκει καὶ
 λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλοι, οἷον ἐρασισταὶς γαμικῶς ἐστὼν,
 καὶ κωμικοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παροδῷ πορφύραν εἰσφέρον,
 ὥστερ οἱ Μεγαροί. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τὸ
 25 καλοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ
 ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μὴν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀνα-
 λῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὐ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικρο- 21
 πρὸς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν
 μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ὑπολεί, καὶ ὅτι ἐν ποιῇ μέλλων κα-
 30 σκοπῶν πῶς ἐν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσει, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδύρομενοι.
 καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μέλλω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οἷον αἱ ἔξαι- 22
 αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνειδῇ ἢ ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλα-
 βεραι τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

III. Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ οὐό-

1123 a. 34. EE. 1232 a, 19 περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς
 μεγαλοψύχοις ἀποδιδόμενων δεῖ διορίσθαι τὸ ἴδιον. ὥστερ γὰρ καὶ τὴ

οἱ σαλακωνία. Cf. also Hirsch.
 a v. σαλακωνισαί. 'Ο δὲ θεόρατος
 σαλακωνία φρενὶ εἶναι τὸ δαπανῶντα
 δυνὸν μὴ δεῖ. Cf. Rhet. 1391 a, 2 (of
 the φῆν which go with wealth) καὶ
 τρυφεροὶ καὶ σαλακωνοί. τρυφεροὶ μὲν
 διὰ τὴν τρυφήν καὶ τὴν ἐνδοξίαν τῆς
 εὐδαιμονίας, σαλακωνοὶ δὲ καὶ ὀδύροισι
 διὰ τὸ πλεονεξία πλεονεξία περὶ
 τὸ ἐρωμεν καὶ θαυμάζομενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν,
 καὶ τῷ ὁρᾶσθαι ζηλοῦν τοῦτο φλοῦν δὲ καὶ
 αἰτοῖ

παρὰ μέλοι, i.e. πλημμελῶν, ἀδύναμι,
 opposed to ἀμνηστῶν (1122 a, 31)
 for which Plato has ἐν μέλοι Soph.
 427 d. Cf. also παρὰ μέλοι φθόγγω-
 σθαι, νέειν Philob. 28 b, Critias
 106 b, Laws 696 d and EE. 1232 a,
 39 (p. 173).

ἐρασισταί, "Braute being a club
 where each member entertained in
 turn, or an entertainment where each
 guest contributed, it was of course

had taste to eclipse the rest in splen-
 dour." Great Eudaimon refers to
 ἀγαθοδαίμονισται,

κωμικοῖς χορηγῶν. For the case
 of a comic χορηγῶν Cf. letters to Eupr.
 p. 119 κωμικοῖς χορηγῶν. Κῆπος δὲ
 οἷον καὶ ἀνέλωσα οὐν τῇ τῇ ἐπὶ
 ἀναπλάσει ἀναπλάσει μὴ. A tragic
 χορηγῶν might cost 30 talents.

ἐν τῇ παροδῷ. i.e. τοῦ χοροῦ.
 ὥστερ οἱ Μεγαροί. For the term-
 ing, see Hirsch, Contr. p. 32. Me-
 garian comedy was thought foolish
 at Athens.

§ 22 ἐν μικρῷ ἀναλίσκει. He will
 taken together. He will speak of
 beauty of his work 'for a trifle'
 (Weidson). This use of ἐν τῷ μικρῷ
 its use in the phrase ἀνέλωσα οὐν τῇ
 dat. for which see Kühner § 431, 4.

III. § 2. Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία
 just rendered 'Pride.'

μετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἐαυτὸν ἀξίων ἀνίσχιστος ἂν ᾖ
 χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζωνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῖνος. ὁ δ' ἐλαττωσικ
 10 ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, εἴαντε μεγάλων εἴστε μετρίων, εἴαντε
 καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὧν ἐτι ἐλαττώων αὐτὸν ἀξιοί. κα
 μάλιστα ἂν δόξαιεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἰπία· εἰ
 μὴ τοσοῦτων ἢν ἄξιος· ἐστὶ δὲ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν οὐ δ
 γέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτοῦ
 15 ἀξιοί, οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὲ μετρί
 ῶν ἐαυτὸν ἀξιοί ἄξιος ἂν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περ
 ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. ἢ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ
 μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδόμενον, καὶ οὐ
 μάλιστα ἐφίευνται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις
 20 ἀθλοῦν· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς
 ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχος ἐστὶ
 ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δε λόγου φαίνοντας οἱ μεγαλοψυχοὶ περὶ 11

καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθῶς κρίναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰκανοῦται
 δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μεγάλα δ' ἐκείνη ἡ δυνάμις ὃ τὴν κρατιστὴν ἔχων ἐξίη περὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα [εἶναι ἡδέα] ἢ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία πραΰστη· ἀρίνη δ' ἡ περ
 ἐκυστον ἀμνητὴ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον ὀρθῶς, ἄλλοι δ' ἐκείνην δὲ
 κελεύουσιν· καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ὥστε ἵππεσθαι αὐτῇ πᾶσαι τὰς ἀρετάς, ὃ αὐτῇ
 ἵππεσθαι πᾶσαις.

1123 b, 13. EE. 1232 b, 14 οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξαιεν ἂν ἐναντίας
 ἔχων· τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν καὶ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι
 τῶν πολλῶν [καὶ] δόξης οὐκ ὁμολογῶσθαι. δεῖ δὲ ταῦτα διαρινεῖσθαι
 εἰπεῖν. ἵσται γὰρ τιμὴ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλη διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ τῷ ὅτι
 πολλῶν τῶν συχύντων ἢ τῷ ὅτι τῶν ἀξίων λόγοι, καὶ πόλιν τῷ ὅτι
 τίς ἢ τιμὴ διαφέρει. μεγάλη γὰρ οὐ τῷ πληθεῖ τῶν τιμώμετων ἀλλὰ
 τῷ ποιῶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τιμῶν εἶναι· τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ
 τὰλλα ἀγαθὰ τίμια καὶ ἀξία σπουδῆς ταῦτα ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἵσται

§ 8. χαῦνος. The literal sense of this word is 'gaping.' It is then applied to anything porous, spongy or loose (Liddell and Scott) as for instance snow. It is from this that the meaning 'silly,' 'foolish,' 'mune' is derived.

§ 9. τῷ μὲν μεγάλῳ ἄκρος καὶ λ.

CF. 1107 a, 6 διὰ κατὰ μέτρον τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἐστιν εἶναι λεγόμενον· ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ μέτρον καὶ τὸ εἰς ἀρετὴν.

§ 11. ἀνευ λόγου, 'without argument,' i.e. it is evident on the face of it even apart from the explanation on ground. Cf. 1131 a, 13, 1142 b, 1

32 τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμὴς γὰρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς,
 33 κατ' ἄξιον ἐξέ. ὁ δὲ μικροψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
 34 καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς 35
 ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν γε μεγαλόψυχον. ὁ
 δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἀξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη·
 μέζοντος γὰρ οὐκ ὁ βελτίων ἀξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος.
 τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ
 δοξεῖεν ἄνθρωπος εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκείτῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα. 30
 35 οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεῖγειν παρασείσαντι,
 οὐδ' ἀδυνατεῖν· τίς γὰρ ἔνεκα τράχτει αἰσχρὰ φ' ὃ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα;
 καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάντων γελοῖος φαίνεται ἂν ὁ
 μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν. οἷα εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμὴς ἀξιος
 φαῦλος ὢν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἀθλον ἢ τιμὴ, καὶ ἀπονέμεται 35

ὥστε καὶ ἀρετὴ οὐδεμία ἄνευ μεγέθους· διὸ δοκοῦσι μεγαλοψύχους
 εἶναι ἐκείνη, περὶ ὃ ἔστιν ἐκείνη αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν. ἀλλ'
 ἔγωγε ἵστί τις παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς μία μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ
 αἱ μεγαλοψυχον τοῖτον λεγόντων τὸν ἔχοντα ταύτην· ἐπεὶ δ' ἴσθιν
 ἴδια τῶν θεῶν τὰ μὲν τέμια τὰ δ' ὡς διαρίσθην πρότερον, τῶν
 τοιοῦτων ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγιστα κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὰ δὲ μικρά, καὶ
 τοῖτοι εἰσι ἀξιοὶ καὶ ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς, εἰ τοῖτοι ζητητέος ὁ μεγαλό-
 ψυχος, τετραχίς δ' ἀδύνη διαφέρειν. ἴσθι μὲν γὰρ ὅτιον εἶναι
 μεγάλων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τοῦτων, ἴσθι δὲ μικρὰ καὶ ἀξιοῦν τινα
 ἡλικιότιον καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τοῦτων, ἴσθι δ' ἀνύπαλιν πρὸς ἑαυτέρα
 εἴτων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἱ εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος ἀξιος ὢν μικρῶν μεγάλων ἀξιοῦν
 ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἑσπεριῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ ἀξιος ὢν μεγάλων ἀξιοῖ ἂν μικρῶν
 ἑαυτὸν· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀξιος μικρῶν, μεγάλων δ' ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν φεακός
 (ἀνύπαλιν γὰρ καὶ οἱ καλοὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν τυγχάνουσιν), φεακὸς δὲ
 καὶ ὅστις ἀξιοῦν οἱ ἐπαρχόντων αὐτῶ τῶν τοιοῦτων μετέχει μὴ ἀξιοῦν
 ἑαυτὸν· λειπεται δι' ἐνταῦθα ἐναντίας τοῖτοις ἀμφοτέροις, ὅστις ὢν

§ 12 οἱ μεγάλοι. For the reading, see Hyman, *Loc. cit.* p. 38.

§ 14 τὸ μέγα, 'the grand' i.e. every thing is 'on the grand scale' with the μεγαλόψυχοι.

§ 15 φεῖγειν παρασείσαντι. The meaning is made quite clear by the *Met. Axiomaticum* 705 a, 17 *οἱ οἱ*

θέλοντες θάπτον θέλουσι παρασείσαντες
 ταῖς χερσὶν, *Prohl* 88: b, 6 ὁ δὲ
 θέλοντες οὐκ παρασείων ἢ μὴ παρασείων.
 The attitude is familiar from vase-
 paintings and is certainly beneath the
 dignity of our hero. Is it possible
 not to see that this is a humorous
 touch?

1124^a τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος¹⁶
 τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ αἱ γίνε-
 ται αὐτῶν ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλό-
 ψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷον τε αὐτῶν καλοκαγαθίαν. μάλιστα¹⁷
 5 μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι. καὶ
 ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως
 ἡσθίησεται, ὥς τῶν οἰκείων τυχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττώων· ἀρε-
 τῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄξια τιμῇ. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ'
 ἀποδιίξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῖς μῖζαν αἰτῶν ἀπαντῶν.
 10 τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν οὐ-
 γωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας οἱ
 γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτῶν. μάλιστα μὲν οἷν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ¹⁸
 εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ
 πλούτου καὶ δυναστείας καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν
 15 μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὗτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρῆς
 ἔσται οὗτ' ἀτυχῶν περιλυπός. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμῆς οἷσιν ἔχει,
 ὥς μέγιστον ἐν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν
 τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αἰτῶν
 βούλονται· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρὸν ἐστὶ, τοῦτο καὶ τὰλλα
 20 διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα
 συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦν-
 ται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ἱππορυχί-
 ᾳ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχότερους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ἰπὸ ταύτης·
 25 κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ὃ δ' ἄμυν²⁰
 ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δ' αὖτε ἀρετῆς τε

ἀξίως μεγάλων ἀξιοῖ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τοιούτων, καὶ τοιούτος ἐστὶν εἰς
 ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὗτος ἐπαινετός καὶ μέγας τοιούτων. ἐπεὶ οὖν πρὸς
 τιμῆς αἰρεσιν καὶ χρήσιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐντιμωτέων ἀξίως
 ἐστὶ διαθέσιος ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, καὶ τοῖς ἀποδιδομένοι, καὶ οὐ πρὸς το
 χρήσιμα, τῷ μεγαλόψυχῳ, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης αὐτῇ ἐπαινετωτέρα.
 ὁ γὰρ οὗτος καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης ἐν εἴῃ.

§ 16. κόσμος...τῶν ἀρετῶν. Sim-
 ply 'an adornment of goodness.' Grant
 rightly translates 'the crown of the

virtues.'

§ 19. τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπερέχον. For
 this reason, cf. Top. 11; a. 16.

τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιού-
 σιν οὔτε ὑπερῶν μεγαλόψυχος λίγυνται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἡρετῆς
 21 παντελοῦς οἷς ἐστὶ ταῦτα ὑπερύπται δὲ καὶ ἰβριστάι καὶ οἱ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἡρετῆς οὐ 30
 ῥαδίον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχηματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δι-
 φικρῖν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἑκείνων μὲν κατα- 1124^b
 φρονέουσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅτι ἂν τύχῃσι πράττουσιν. μμούνται
 γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν
 οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἡρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρο-
 22 νούσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως κατα- 3
 23 δικαίῳ—δοξάζει γὰρ ἡληθῶς—οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ
 ἐστὶ δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν,
 μεγαλοκίνδυνος δὲ καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφαιδῆς τοῦ βίου ὡς
 24 οὐκ ἀξίον ἐν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὐ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος
 ὃ αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. 10

1124 b. 1. EF. 1232 a, 38 ἐτι δοκεῖ μεγαλοψύχου εἶναι τὸ
 καταφρονῆσαι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ὁ καταφρονῆσαι τοῖς ποιῶσι τῶν
 παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλων, οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ κινδυνεύων (μεγα γὰρ οἶσται εἶπει
 (ὑπομείναι τι, Eristische) τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ πλῆθος (παθος Eristische)
 πρὸ πᾶν φοβερῶν), καὶ σιφῶν ἡδονῶν μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, καὶ
 ἐλακτέριος χρημάτων. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ περὶ ὀλίγα
 σπουδάζειν, καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οἷος ὅτι δοκεῖ ἑτέρῳ τινί, καὶ μᾶλλον
 ἐν φροντῇ σκεῖν αὐτὴν μεγαλοψυχῆς τί δοκεῖ ἐν σπουδᾷ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς
 τυγχάνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀντιφῶν ἰφθὴ πρὸς Ἀγάθωνα καταψηφισμένους τὴν
 ὑπολογίαν ἐπιαινέοντα. καὶ τὸ ὀλίγων τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου μάλιστα
 εἶναι παθος εἶδον. πάλιν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ πλούτου, περὶ
 ἐν σπουδάζειν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐθὲν φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 πλὴν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ ληψέσθαι ἀτιμαζόμενος καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἐπὶ
 ἀναξίον. καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα τυγχάνων.

§ 21. καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ.
 Those who have wealth and power
 (without goodness) become haughty
 etc. We have seen already (a. 30)
 that the μεγαλοψυχοι is considered
 supercilious. As Antisthenes goes on to
 say, haughtiness is the one point in
 which they can successfully imitate

the μεγαλοψυχοι.

ἐν οἷς δύνανται. Cf. 1115 b, 31.

§ 22. μικροκίνδυνος. L¹ and L²
 paslos have μικροκίνδυνος.

ὡς οὐκ ἀξίον ἐν κ.τ.λ. 'Life at
 any price is not worth having' The
 adverb πάντως corresponds in meaning
 to the verbal phrase τῶν ποιῶν

καὶ ἀντενεργητικὸς πλείονων· οὕτω γὰρ οἱ προσοφλεῖται
ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὐ πεπονθὼς. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνησ- 25
μεύειν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὐ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὐ (ἐλαττω-
γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὐ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν) καὶ
15 τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούειν, τὰ δ' ἀηδέως· διὸ καὶ τὴν θέτιν οὐ
λεγειν τὰς ἐνεργεσίας τῷ Διί, οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς
'Αθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὐ. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ π
μηδενὸς ἐκίσθαι ἢ μόλας, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς
μὲν τοῦν ἐν αἰξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίᾳ μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ
20 τοὺς μέσους μετριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ
σεμνὸν τῶν δὲ ῥιπίδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ
ἀγενεές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθε-

§ 24. ἀντενεργητικὸς πλείονων, 'he is apt to return it by a greater benefit.' For the reading in the next clause, see Bywater, *Contr.* p. 39. By ὁ ὑπάρξας is meant the man who starts the interchange of benefits, 'the original benefactor.' Cf. 2136 b, 23. 1163 b, 21. In the same way ὁ ὑπάρχων is the aggressor, he was as opposed to ὁ ἀμυνόμενος.

§ 25. δοκῶντι δὲ καὶ κ.π.λ. Aristotle enjoys noting the traits of this character. The μεγαλοψύχου was an object of raillery from the days of the Old Comedy downwards.—Pericles got his share,—but all the same he was the type that all true Hellenes inwardly admired.

οὐκ ἂν, neuter, 'any benefit they have conferred.' This is Bywater's correction of MS. οὐκ (Asp. 60). See *Contr.* p. 39. If we keep οὐκ, we shall have to insert ἐφ' before ὧν with Manacher.

ἀκούειν sc. δοκοῦν, 'to be told of' Bywater's correction of MS. ἀκούει (*Contr.* p. 39).

διὸ καὶ τὴν θέτιν κ.π.λ. This seems to be referred to as if it were a well known difficulty. Achilles had told Thetis to remind Zeus of certain

definite services she had done him (Il. i. 394-479) but she countered her self with saying ἀπὸς δὲ σε μὴ ἀσάδρασκον θνητῶν | ἢ ἔστι δ' ἔργον (ib. 303). The question why she did not take her son's advice is just the sort of πρόβλημα that ancient critics propounded, and Aristotle here gives the λύσις. Cf. Poet. c. 21.

οἱ Λάκωνες. The whole quotation Kalambas is in τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν 'Ελληνικῶν who related the story of the Λακωνιστὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀθηναίου. Ἐπειδὴ Λακωνισμοὶ πρὸς τοῦ Ἀθηναίου μάχῃς δόξαναι, λέγοντες ἔχει τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ὡς μετὰ τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις οἱ Λακωνισμοὶ πεποισμένοι εἰς ταῦτα ἐπελάθοντο ἑαυτοῖς, ἀ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἡγεῖται πρὸς 'Αθηναῖον ἐπὶ τοῦτο πεποισμένον ἐμμένοντο, ὡς δὲ ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ἐπαθὲν μετὰ πρὸς τὴν ἐκφρασίαν ἀλλῶν. If ἐπὶ refers to 369 sc., the speechless Xen. *Hell.* vi. 3, 33 do not bear it out.

§ 26. ἐπ' ἀκούειν ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐκτὸς expressions are admissible. For ἐπ' cf. χαίρειν ἐπὶ, and for ἐν cf. γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς οὐ γὰρ δὲ. Aristotle likes to vary his prepositions. So we have immediately after ἐν τοῖς ἀσθενοῖς.

27 πρὸς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ εἶναι ἢ οὐ πρω-
 28 τεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ὑργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου
 τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων 25
 28 δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστών. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομῆ εἶναι καὶ
 φανερόφιλον (τὸ γὰρ λαμβάνειν φοβούμενου καὶ ἀμελεῖν
 τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν
 φανερώς (παρησιαστικὴ γὰρ διὰ τὰ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι,
 καὶ ἀληθευτικός· πλὴν ὅσοι μὴ δι' εἰρωνειῶν [εἰρωνεῖα δι] 30
 29 πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς), καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν
 ἀλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουρικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κό- 1125
 30 λακες θητικαὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες, οἷδε θανμαστικός·
 οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἔστιν. οὐδὲ μνηστικός· οὐ γὰρ
 μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ
 31 μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐ- 3
 τοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἔνα ἐπαινεῖται μελεῖ
 αὐτῷ οὐθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός
 ἔστιν· διόπερ οἷδε κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι'
 32 ἔθριν. καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικός
 καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα, 10
 33 καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν
 34 καρπύμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κί-
 νησις ἐξ βραδεία τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ
 βαρεῖα, καὶ λίξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπενστικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα

§ 27. εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα κτλ. i.e., if I am right he reserves himself for the ἀφαιρέματα. Cf. above 1122 b, 29 n.

§ 28. ἀναγκαῖον δι καὶ κτλ. On the reading and interpretation of this passage see Dwyer. Contr. p. 39. The 28 tradition is more confused than anywhere in the Ethics.

ἀληθευτικός, 'frank'—cf. below 1127 a, 23 seq.

δι' ἐφρονέειν. For the meaning of this word see below 1127 a, 31 n. The proud man affects a certain mock-humour in order to evade those who would trouble him with small matters. "I fear that is not quite in my line."

§ 29. πρὸς ἄλλον. ζῆν, 'to take his rule of life from another.' The preposition πρὸς is used of the standard to which τὸ καλὸν ζῆν, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ζῆν εἰς.

§ 31. ἀνθρωπολόγος, apparently here only. The proud man does not care for personal conversation.

εἰ μὴ δι' ἔθριν. The proud man will not indulge in weak abuse, though, when he wants to insult and humiliate people, he will speak his mind freely enough.

§ 34. καὶ κίνησις δι καὶ κτλ. Aristotle knows in his heart that the μεγαλοψύχος is something of a *peccator*.

15 σπουδάξαι, οὐδὲ σύντομος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα αἰόμενος· ἡ δ' ὀξυφωρία καὶ ἡ ταχυτής διὰ τούτων.

Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· ὁ δ' ἑλλείπων μικρο- 35
ψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οἱ ν δοκάζειν
εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι (οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοὶ εἰσιν), ἡμωρημένοι δέ.
20 ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικροψυχος ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ὀψοστέρι ὢν
ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ δοκεῖ κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸς
τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτὸν· ὁρᾷ γὰρ ἂν ὃν ἄξιος
ᾖ, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὲν ἡλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑκούσιον
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ὀκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ ὁρᾷ δοκεῖ καὶ
25 χείρους ποιῶν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀφί-
σταται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδει-
μάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτός ἀγαθῶν. οἱ γ'
δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανὲς
οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἴτα ἐξελίγῃον

1125 a, 17. EE 1233 a, 9 τῶν δ' ἐναντίων, ὡς περ διαγραψαται.
ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀγαθῶν μεγάλων ἀνάξιος ὄντα χαυνότης
(τοὺς τοιοῦτους γὰρ χαῦνους λέγομεν, οἷοι μεγάλων οἰκται ἀξίον εἶναι
οὐκ ὄντες), ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀξίον ὄντα μὴ ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν μεγάλῳ
μικροψυχία (μικροψύχου γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅστις ὑπογράφεται δι' ὁ διακρί-
ναι ἡδυνάτο, μὴ ἀξίος μὴθεὺς μεγάλου δικαίου), ὡστ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν
μεγαλοψυχίαν εἶναι μεσότητά χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας· ὁ δὲ
τέταρτος τῶν διορισθέντων οὔτε πᾶμπαν ψεκτὸς οὔτε μεγαλόψυχος,
περὶ οὐδὲν ἔχων· ὢν μέγεθος· οὔτε γὰρ ἄξιος οὔτε ἀξίος μεγάλως,
ἀλλ' οἷα ἐναντίας. καίτοι δίδειν ἂν ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ μεγάλῳ ἀξίῳ
ὄντι μεγάλῳ τὸ μικρὸν ὄντα ἀξίον <μικρῶν> ἀξίῳ ἑαυτὸν· οἷα ἔστι
δ' ἐναντίας οὔτε τῷ μὴ μεμπτὸς εἶναι, ὡς γὰρ ὁ λόγος κελεύει, ἔχει·
καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῷ μεγαλόψυχῳ (ὢν γὰρ ἀξίος, τοῖσι
ἀξιοῦσιν αἰνῶν ἀμφοῖν)· καὶ ὁ μὲν γένειτ' ἂν μεγαλόψυχος (ἀξιώσει γὰρ

σύντομος, 'short,' as is shown by
Gen. Ap. 786 b, 35 δοκεῖ γυναικώτερος
εἶναι φύσει ἢ βασιλευσίν· καὶ ἐν τοῖς
μέλει τοῦ βασιλέως συντόμων βέλτιον·
τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον ἐν ὑπεροχῇ, ἢ δὲ βασιλεὺς
ὑπεροχῇ τοῖς. This seems better than
making it a mere synonym of σπαν-
ιστός. We want a word for the voice

as well as one for the gait. So
ὀξυφωρία immediately afterwards.

§ 85. οὐδ' οὗτοι any more than
the μικροψυχὴ and the βραδύς.

Cl. 1193 a, 31.

ὀκνηροί, 'backward,' 'shy,' 're-
tiring.' 'They are not ὀκνηροὶ like the
others. Cl. 1193 b, 3.

ται· καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχηματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, 30
καὶ δουλοῦνται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φαυτέρᾳ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λή-
37 γουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὅς διὰ τούτων τιμωρσόμενοι, ἀντιτίθεται
δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος·
38 καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χειρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλο-
ψυχία περὶ τιμὴν ἐστὶ μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. 35

IV Ἔοικε ἐκ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετὴ τις, καθάπερ ἐν 1125^b
τοῖς πρώτοις εὐλέθη, ἡ δέξεν ἂν παρεμπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς
τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν με-
γαλοτρίπειαν. ἀμφὶ γὰρ αὐταὶ τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφιστάται,
περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθείσιν ἡμᾶς ὡς εἰ· 3
2 ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ ὅστις χρημάτων μεσοτης ἐστὶ καὶ
ὑπεριβολή τε καὶ ἰλλειψίς, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῇ ὀρέξει τὸ
3 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἦτον, καὶ τὸ ὕθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τὸν τε
γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὕθεν οὐ δεῖ
τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιδέμενον, τὸν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οἷδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς 10
4 καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον
ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ' ἀφιλότιμον
ὡς μίτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπο-
μεν. ὅλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτιμοῦ λεγομένου οὐκ
ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες 15

ὡς ἴσταν ἀξίους), ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος, ὅς ἐπαρχύντων αὐτῷ μεγάλων κατὰ
τιμὴν ἀγαθῶν οἷα ἀξιοί, τί ἂν ἵποισι εἰ μικρῶι ἀξιοί ἦν, εἰ γὰρ [ἂν]
μεγάλων ἀξίων χάριτες ἦν, * * ἡ ἐλαττωμένη ἵτι, διὰ καὶ οὕτως ἂν
ἵποισι μικρόψυχον, εἰ τίς μέτριος ὢν ἄρχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ αὐτόν, ἀλλ'
ὑπείκει· ἀλλ' εἰ τοι εὐγαιῆς ὡς καὶ ἡγαύμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἀρχεῖν.

§ 39. σχήματι, 'manages'.

§ 37. ἀντιτίθεται. We expect ἀντι-
τίθεται, but cf. 1145 a, 35 a.
καὶ γὰρ γίνεται π.τ.λ. See notes
on 1109 a, 6 and a, 12.

IV § 3. ταύτην, sc. τὴν τιμὴν.
ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις 1107 b, 24.

§ 4. κλεσσαχῶς τοῦ φιλοτιμοῦ
λεγομένου, 'as φιλω-as-and-as in am-
biguous, it is clear that we do not

always apply the name φιλότιμον (on
the reading, Hywarr, Contr. p. 40)
to the same thing.' In other words,
compounds with φιλω-sometimes have
a good sense, sometimes a bad one.
Mr Stewart translates φιλωεθῆς and
φιλωσεῖ 'ὁν φιλοτιμοῦ' cf. 1099 a,
9 n., 1118 b, 12 n., and for φῖραν
ὄνομα ἐπὶ τι 'to apply a name to a
thing,' see 1119 a, 34 n.

μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψεύγονται δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. ἀνωμίμου δ' οὐσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· ὁρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ 5
20 δεῖ καὶ ἦτταν· ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται δ' οἷν ἢ ἔξει αἵτη μεσότης οὕσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω δὲ ἀμφοτέρω πως. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' 6
25 οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

V. Πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὄργας· ἀνωμίμου δ' οὗτος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀπακλίνουσας, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. ἢ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιότης τις λέγοιτ' αὖ 2

1125 b, 26 FF 1231 b, 5 τὸν αἰτὸν δι' τρόπον ληπτέην καὶ περὶ πρῶτητος καὶ χαλεποτήτος· καὶ γὰρ τὸν πρῶτον περὶ λήπτῃ τὴν ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γινομένην ὀρώμεν οὕτως, τῷ πρὸς ταύτην ἔχειω τοῖς διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντιθέκαμεν τῷ ὀργίῳ καὶ χαλεπῷ καὶ ἄγρῳ

τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. On this text see 1118 b, 23 n. It is put here to vary the expression. The more accurate μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ follows in the next clause.

ὡς ἐρήμη ἀμφισβητεῖν. In the sense of 'lay claim to' ἀμφισβητεῖν takes the genitive like ἀντιποιεῖσθαι (c.g. Pl. 1283 a, 11 ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, Isocr. 3 § 1 οὐδαί πρυσποιοῦσά τοι οὐδ' ἀμφισβήτησαι τῆς ἀληθονομίας). The best commentary is the parallel passage 1107 b, 31 δεῖα ἐπιδιέκασθαι οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας. We are not to understand διατε with ἐρήμης, for the allusion is to the κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἐπιδικασίαι, and in that connexion ἐρημοί means 'unclaimed.' Cf. 'Ab. vol. c. 43, 4 καὶ τὰς λήξαις τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἀναγιγνωσκείν, ὅπως μηδὲν λάθῃ μηδὲν ἐρημοῖς γενομένον, Isokr. Agr. § 3

τοῦ οἴκου ἐρημοῖς ποιῆσαι, and especially Isocr. 3 § 51 καὶ ἐρημῶν τῶν κλήρων ἐπιδιέκασθαι.

§ 8. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς Cf. 1108 b, 19-24.

ἀντικεῖσθαι δι' κτλ. If a name had a name, one or other of the ἄκροι would have been thought μᾶλλον ἀντικεῖσθαι τῷ μέσῳ. As it is, they are only opposed to one another.

V. § 1. Πραότης, 'good temper' 'patience.'

φέρομεν, 'we apply the name Patience to the mean.' See 1119 a, 34 a.

ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. But see FF 1231 b, 8 διεγράψαμεν δὲ τοῖς ἀντιθέκαμεν τῷ ὀργίῳ (EN 1126 a, 15) καὶ χαλεπῷ (EN 1126 a, 16) καὶ ἄγρῳ τὸν ἀνδραποδιστῇ (EN 1126 a, 8) καὶ τῷ εὐόχῳ (cf. ἡλιθίῳ EN 1126 a, 5).

τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ γ
 3 εἰσφέρουντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος,
 ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινέται· πρῶτος
 δὲ οὗτος ἂν εἴη εἴπερ ἡ πρῶτης ἐπαινέται. βουλευται γάρ
 ὁ πρῶτος ὁτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους.
 ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ 35
 4 τοιοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον 1126
 ἐπὶ τῇ ἑλλειψει· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρῶτος ἀλλὰ μάλ-
 5 λον συγγνωμονικὸς ἢ δ' ἑλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς ἐστὶν
 αἴτι' ὅτιδιποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς
 δεῖ ἡλιθιοὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μὴδ' ὅτε μὴδ' 5
 6 αἶς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργι-
 ζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικόν, το δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον
 7 ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκέλους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες. ἢ δ'

(πάντα γὰρ τα τοιαῦτα τῆς οὐτῆς ἐστὶ διπλήσιως) τὸν ἀνδραποδῶδη καὶ
 τὴν ἀνύπτον, σχιδοὶ γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα καλοῦσι τοὺς μὴδ' ἐφ' ὅσοις
 δεῖ κινουμένους τὸν θυμόν, ἀλλὰ προπηλακιζομένους εἰχερώς καὶ
 τωπαινοῦς πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς. ἐπὶ γὰρ ἀντικείμενον τῷ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ
 μολεῖ, τῷ δ' ἡρέμα τὸ σφύδρα, τῷ δὲ πολὺν χρόνον τὸ ὀλίγον λυπεῖσθαι
 ταύτην τὴν λύπην ἣν καλοῦμεν θυμὸν ἐπεὶ δ' ὡς περ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων εἴπομεν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις (ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 χαλεπὸς τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ὁ καὶ θάττον καὶ μᾶλλον πεσῶν καὶ πλείω
 χρόνον καὶ ὅτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅποιοις οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς, ὁ δ' ἀνδραπο-
 δῶδες τολμαῖόν), διήλον ὅτι ἐστὶ τις καὶ ὁ μέσος τῆς ἀμυστήτης.
 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡμαρτημένοι ἀμφότεροι αἱ ἕξεις φαῖναι, φαίνεται ὅτι ἐπιεικὲς
 ἡ μέση τούτων ἕξις· οὐτε γὰρ προτερεῖ οὐθ' ὑστερεῖ, οὔτε οἷς οὐ δεῖ
 ὀργίζεται οὔτε οἷς δεῖ οὐκ ὀργίζεται. αὐτ' ἐπεὶ καὶ πρῶτης ἡ βελτίστη
 ἕξις περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐστίν, εἴη καὶ ἡ πρώτη μεσότης τις, καὶ ὁ
 πρῶτος μέσος τοῦ χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδῶδους.

§ 3 ἐφ' οἷς neut., οἷς μακ.

βουλευται εἶναι, 'we mean by
 patient one who is unperturbable
 and not led on by feeling.'

ἐπὶ τούτοις neut., cf. above ἐφ' οἷς.

§ 4 αἴτ' ἀοργησία Eudemon and
 MN call it ἀοργησία on which see
 1100 b, 31 a. Probably the sense
 by which ἀοργητος meant rather

'coarse' or 'stupid' prevented Anis-
 totle from giving it this more restricted
 sense. Cf. 1115 b, 15 n.

ἐφ' οἷς, neuter. Cf. 1125 b, 35 n.

§ 5 αἰσθάνεσθαι, like *sensire*, 'to
 have a sense of one's position,' to
 realize what is going on whether
 pleasant or otherwise. Hence *deus*
sensit, cf. 1104 a, 24 n.

ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται—καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ
 10 καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ βάττον, καὶ πλεον
 χρόνον,—οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ὄν
 δύναται εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπολλυσι, κἂν ὁλο
 κληρον ἢ ἀφόρητος γίνεταί. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν 8
 ὀργίζονται καὶ οὔτε οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οἱ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ
 15 δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὁ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμ
 βαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς ταῦτα ὅτι οἱ κατέχουσιν τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ'
 αἰταποδιδύασιν ἢ φανεροὶ εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἴτ' ὀπο
 παύονται. ὑπερβολὴ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀπράχολοι ὅξεσι καὶ πρὸς 9
 πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα. οἱ δὲ πειροὶ 10
 20 δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσιν γὰρ
 τὸν θυμόν. πᾶντα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν αἰταποδιδῶν· ἡ γὰρ
 τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα
 τοῖτον δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπι
 φανες εἶναι οἷδε συμπίπτει αὐτοῖς οὐδεὶς, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ πεῖσαι
 25 τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνον δείται. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἰατροῖς ὀχληρότα
 30 τοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις χαλεποὺς δε λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ'
 οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλεον
 χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κυδίσσεως.
 τῇ πρᾶοιότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν καὶ 12
 30 γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται—ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρισθῆναι—
 καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβοῖν οἱ χαλεποὶ χεῖρους. ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 13

1126 a, 13. I.E. 1221 b, 10 αὐτῶν δὲ τοιούτων τῶν παθημάτων
 εἶδη κατονομαζέται τῷ διαφέρειν κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ χρόνον ἢ τοι
 μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τι τῶν ποιούντων τὸ πάθος λέγειν δ' οἷον ὀξύθυμος μὴ
 τῷ βάττον πησχεῖν ἢ δεῖ, χαλεπὸς δὲ καὶ θυμώδης τῷ μᾶλλον, τισὶν
 δὲ τῷ φυλακτικῶς εἶναι τῆς ὀργῆς, πλήκτῃ δὲ καὶ λιθοβολητικῶς ταῖς
 κολάσεσι ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς.

§ 8. ἢ φανεροὶ εἰσι, καὶ αἰταποδι
 δύνανται, 'in an open way.'

§ 10. ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία κ.τ.λ. Cf.
 1117 a, 6 π

τὸ βάρος. "The piercé has as it
 were a load of indigestible anger in
 him." Stewart.

δείται. For the reading see Hy-

water, Comte, p. 41. The metaphor
 of digesting anger is at least as old as
 Homer. Cf. Il. i, 81.

§ 12. μᾶλλον γίνεταί κ.τ.λ. See
 notes on 1109 a, 6 and 11.

ἀνθρωπικώτερον. Cf. 1118 a, 11
 συμβοῖν. We have the most
 correct σὺν below 1126 b, 11.

εἶρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ
οἰεῖσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσων
μιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁμαρ-
μὴν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ' ἐπὶ 33
οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον· ἐπίσπε γὰρ τοὺς ἑλλειπώντας
καὶ πρᾶτους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀν- 1128^b
ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὲ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκ-
τεκτόν, οὐ βέβαιον τῇ λόγῳ ἀποδυνάμει· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς
ταύταις αἰσθηταῖς ἡ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ το γε τοσοῦτον
ἢ ἡ μὲν μέση ἐξίς ἐπαινοσῆ, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργι- 5
αῖ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα,
τριστολαὶ καὶ ἑλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν
ἡρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δε μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφύδρα.
ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἐξέως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ
ἐξίς εἰρήσθωσαν. 10

Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῇ συζῇ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ
καὶ κοινωνοῦν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα
ἣν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι
τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τοῦτοιοι 15
ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὅτι οὖν φρονι-
μοὶ καὶ δυσκόλοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ

b, ll. E.E. 1233 b, 29 φίλιον δὲ μεσότης ἐχθρὰ καὶ κολα-

γὰρ βέβαιον ἀνθεκτικόν,
x is repeated almost ver-
bally, 14 m. q.

καὶ καθ' ἑκαστὰ αὖ τὰ τοι-
αῦτα, 23). καὶ τῇ αἰσθησὶ
αὖ τῶν τοιοῦτων. See the
p. 23. The reading αὖν
is due to Professor By-
ron's parallel passage has and

1. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις
καὶ ταῖς (1234 a, 24)
εἰς τοὺς ἀρετὰς ἀρετὰν ἐπαι-
νοῦν. They are more exact
words. The author of the
second copy (1233 a, 35) εἰ
αὐτοὶ ἀρετὰ ἢ μὴ ἀρετὰ,

ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος. We see how the
notion of ἀρετή had been narrowed
and narrowed. The principle of the
Mean must apply here too if it is any
good at all. Cf. below 1227 a, 14—
17.

ἀρεσκοί. The ἀρεσκός is beautifully
described by Theophrastus. The
'Good-natured Man' has a way of being
a type in comedy. The Schol here
says ἀρετὴ δὲ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν
προαγόμενος ὁμοίως.

§ 2. Δυσκόλοι καὶ δυσέριδες. These
were comedies entitled Δόσκολοι by
Menomachus and Menander. For ἀ-
ρετὴ cf. Laert. Democ. 84, ἀμολητικὸς
δ' ἐστὶ, μὴ δύσερε ὡς καὶ δύσεριδες.

εἰρημέται ἔξεις ψεαταί· εἰσιν οὐκ ἄδελον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μίση
 τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν ἀποδίδεται ἡ δει καὶ ὡς δι
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδίδεται αὐτῇ
 20 τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ. τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τῆς
 μίσου ἔξιν οἶον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τον ἐπεικὴ φίλον, τι
 στέργειν προσλαβόντα, διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι αὐτῷ
 πάθονε ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἡ
 ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιαῦτος
 25 εἶναι ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνηθεί
 καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ὡς ὀρμη
 ζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνηθῶν καὶ ὀθνεῶν φροντίζει,
 οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν καθύλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει,
 ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάζεται
 30 τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ
 λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινόμενας· τούτων δ' ὅσας
 μιν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερα
 νεῖ, καὶ προαιρησέται λυπεῖν· κλν τῷ ποιῶντι δ' ἀσχημα
 σῶντη φέρη, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικρὴν, ἢ βλάβην, ἢ δ' ἐναντίωσιν
 35 μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέχεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ· διαφέρει
 δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῖσι, καὶ μάλλιν
 1127· ἡ ἥττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφορας.

είας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτῷς ὅπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν καλεῖ, ὁ
 δὲ πρὸς ἀπάσας ἀντικρουὼν ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ [τε] πρὸς ἄποσιν
 ἡδονῆν μὴτ' ἀκολουθῶν μὴτ' ἀντιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαυλόμενον
 βέλτεστον, φίλος.

1126 b, 36. EE 1233 b, 34 σημειώτης δι μεσότης αἰσθητικῆς καὶ
 ἀρεσκείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μὴδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν καταφρονητικὸς αἰσθάνει,

§ 4. φιλία. The Greeks had no
 word for 'amiability.' Aristotle is
 careful to note the difference between
 φίλος in that sense and the ἀρετὴ πρὸς
 ἕτερον discussed in Books VIII and
 IX. With the addition of affection
 (τὸ στέργειν καὶ προσλαμβάνειν) the amiable
 man becomes the friend. We know
 he is not so, for his amiability does
 not depend on feeling for another, but

on his own character (τῷ τῷ αὐτοῦ
 εἶναι).

§ 5. διαφόρως. The usual reading
 is διαφορετικῶς. It is true that Ari
 stotle often uses this word in exactly
 in the sense of 'differently' but here
 it has διαφερόμενος διαφορῶς δ', which
 may perhaps justify us in substituting
 the more Attic adverb.

ἐκάστοις ἀπενέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὴν αἰρούμενος
τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυτεῖν δ' ἐύλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίροισιν,
ἐὰν ᾗ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λόγῳ δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέ-
ροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαυθις μεγάλης μικρὰς
λύπησαι ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτος ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνύμασται
δὲ τοῦ δε συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδῶν εἶναι στοχαζόμενος
μὴ διὰ τι ἄλλο ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ἀφελεία τις αὐτῷ γίνηται
εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, κύλλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχε-
ραίων εἴρηται ὅτι ἐύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικείμεθα δὲ
φαιεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

VII. Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δε σχεδὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας
μεσότης ἀνώνυμος ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς
τοιαύτας ἐτελθεῖν· μᾶλλον τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ 15
ἡδῶν, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἄρε-
τάς πιστεύσαιμεν ἂν ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. ἐν
δὲ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρη-
ται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθεύοντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν
ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. δοκεῖ 20
δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ

δὲ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ καὶ πάντων ἐλαττων ἄρετας, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ
καὶ κατὰ, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὕτως ἔχων σεμνόν.

1127 a, 12. EE. 1233 b, 38 ὁ δὲ ἀληθὴς καὶ ἀπλοῦς, ὃν

§ 9. τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν
δὲ B. For the construction cf
1110 b, 32.

κύλλαξ. The κύλλαξ is the Parasite
of the New Comedy. Athenaeus vi,
24 c 12 has a learned dissertation
on the words. The word παράσιτος
was originally σεμνὸν καὶ λεπτόν, being
the name of certain persons associated
with the priests in the sacrificial meal.
According to Ἑρμαῖος τριγυρὰ τοῦ
παράσιτου ἐλάσαι ἐκέλευε. Eupolis
wrote a comedy entitled Κύλλαξ
identifying καὶ as the son of Hippo-
clides and his train of parasites. The
first to use the word παράσιτος in its
later sense was Ἀδραμῖς ἐν Τριταίῳ
Rock 11, 118).

ἀντικείμεθα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1123 b.

29
VII. § 1. Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ, sc. περὶ
τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τῆς συζῆς καὶ λόγων καὶ
πραγμάτων κοινωνιῶν (1126 b, 11).

ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης. 'the
mean between ἀλαζονία and its op-
posite.' It is unnecessary to insert
καὶ (τῆς) σύμμετρον with Imelmann and
recent editors. It is idiomatic Greek
to omit one of the extremes with
μέσος καὶ μεταξύ, cf. Aristophanes,
Birds, 127 ἐν μασσὶ θηροῦσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ
γῆς (καὶ οὐρανοῦ).

οὐ χεῖρον κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1116 b,
11 b.

§ 2. ὁ ἀλαζὼν. The original
meaning of ἀλαζὼν was 'vauntant'

ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀντίπαλος
ἀρνισθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλαττω ποιῆναι, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδέ-
καστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικός κἂν τοῖ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, 74
25 ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε
ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἑνὴν τιμὴν ποιεῖν καὶ
μῆδενος, ἕκαστος δ' οἷος ἔστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πρῆττει
καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, εἰ μὴ τινος ἑνὴν κρᾶττην, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῖ
μὲν ψεῦδους φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ
30 ἐπαινετόν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικός μέσος ὢν ἐπαι-
ντός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφοτεροὶ μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ' ἐ-
ἁλαζιών, περὶ ἕκατερον δ' εἰπώμεν, προτέρου δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀλ-
θευτικῆς, οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος
1137^b γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταύτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μῆνινος τοιοῦτου διε-
φέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ την εἴ-
τοιούτος εἶναι, δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικής εἶναι, ὁ γὰρ δ
φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύου

καλῶσιν αὐθίκαστων, μέσος τοῖ εἴρωνος καὶ ἀλαζόνος, ὁ μὲν γὰρ
ἐπὶ τὰ χειρῶν καθ' αὐτοῦ ψευδόμενος μὴ ἄγνοων εἴρων, ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ
βελτίως ἀλαζων, ὁ δ' ὡς ἔχει, ἀληθὲς καὶ αὐτ' Ὀμηρον πεπεισμένον
καὶ ὅλως ὁ μὲν φιλαλήθης, ὁ δὲ φιλοψευδής.

(ἀλάωνται), cf. πλάσσει. Hence the
meaning 'charlatan,' 'quack' (Italian
ciarlatanico, 'a mountebank doctor').
In Plato and Aristophanes the word
still means 'impostor' quite generally
and is associated with γόη. Socrates
is an ἀλάων as well as an εἴρων. For
the associated active here given to the
word cf. Xen. Hys II, 2 32 quoted
below b, 15 n. In the New Comedy
the ἀλάων is the Miles Genucius.
The original adapted by Plautus had
this use.

§ 3. ὁ εἴρων. The εἴρων is pro-
perly the 'sly' man. Cf. Plauton,
fr. 89 Kock.

Ὅτε τοι' ἀλατῆς ἢ μὲν εἴρων τῇ φύσει,
ἢ δ' αὐθίκαστος.

The word occurs first in Aristophanes
Civitas, 437.

§ 4. αὐθίκαστος ποί 'the man
who always himself, but a self
θεστων λόγων 'the man who says
each thing himself, i.e. 'by its proper
name' as ὁ τῆς σκῆπτου σκῆπτου
λέγων 'the man who calls a spade a
spade.' The opposite is given as
Antiphanez fr. 32 Kock, αὐτὸς καὶ
μῆδεν. See last note.

καὶ. Cf. 1117 b, 2 καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ
ἐν βίῳ. The reading καὶ is sug-
gested by Professor Bryant. The
mss. have καί.

§ 7. τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. Cf.
1136 b, 24. We are not discussing
truthfulness as an ἀρετὴ apart from

ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονεύονται¹³
 τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιῶνται ἔφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός,
 οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἔστι τοῖς πέλαις καὶ δια-
²⁰ λαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ δοῦναι, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἱατρόν διὰ τοῦτο
 οἱ πλείστοι προσποιῶνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται
 ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ δ' εἰρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλατ¹⁴
 του λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἡθὴ φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ
 κέρδους ἔνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὄγκον¹⁵
²⁵ μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἐνδοξα ἀπαρνούνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκρά-
 τῆς ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερά [προσποιούμενοι]¹⁶
 βαυκοπανούργου λέγονται καὶ εἰ καταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν· καὶ
 ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἢ τῶν Λακωνῶν ἐσθῆς· καὶ
 γὰρ ἢ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἢ λίαν ἑλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν· οἱ δὲ τοῦ

λαθεῖν τι ἔνεκα καὶ κέρδους, ποιοῦσι.
 οἱ δὲ μηχανώμενοι γέλωτα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
 μήτε ἐνὶ τῷ αὐτῷ κέρδι μὴτ' ἐνὶ
 ἡμέρᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴτ' ἐνὶ βλάβῃ
 μηδὲ μὲν πῶς οὐκ οἱ τοὶ ἀστέροι ἦν καὶ
 ἀχάρεται δικαιοτέρων πολλὰς ἡ ἀλαζονείας;

§ 13. οἱ δὲ κέρδους, i.e. τὰ τοιαῦτα
 προσποιῶνται, they pretend to things
 from which their principal object is to
 benefit. Then καὶ διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ
 δοῦναι is added as if προσποιῶνται τοι-
 οῦτοι εἶναι had preceded; for δοῦναι
 must be taken in the negative if μάντιν
 σοφὸν ἱατρόν is to have any con-
 sistent sense. 'They assume whatever is
 the uncertainty of which may excite
 suspicion.'

§ 14. οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης. This
 passage seems to be the origin of the
 current phrase 'Socratic irony,' a
 thing which is at once as natural as
 'tragic irony.' We know from Plato
 that Socrates was often called 'sly' by
 his opponents, and no wonder! But
 neither here nor anywhere else is the
 word used in a good sense.

§ 15. προσποιούμενοι. Bracketed
 by Valen., is exactly the opposite of
 what is meant. The verb to be sup-
 plied is ἀπαρνούνται. It seems to

have come from the correct sense
 'to deny' or 'to refuse' of Ἀπαρνέω. Cf.
 Valen., *Comit.* p. 48.

Βαυκοπανούργου. A word from
 the antiquity of comedy. *Schell.*
Antiq. p. 478 says that ἄνθρωποι
 τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἄνθρωποις βαυκοῦσι γὰρ
 τρυφεροῖς, ὡς δὲ περὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος
 Καμπύλιον. *Klein, Com. Fines* II.
 2. 7.)

βαυκὰ μάλιστα τρυφὰ τρυφὰ
 μεταφύκεται ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὡς
 πῶς, ὅτι οἱ αἱ ἰδέαι τρυφῶνται ὡς
 πῶς, οἱ αἱ ἰδέαι χιρῶνται, οὐ γὰρ
 οἱ αἱ ἰδέαι ἐν θεομορφίᾳ τρυφῶνται
 καὶ ὡς πῶς (Klein 1, 482) μεταφύκεται.
 Ἀλλ' οἱ αἱ ἰδέαι ἐν θεομορφίᾳ τρυφῶνται
 καὶ ὡς πῶς (Klein 1, 482) μεταφύκεται.

ἢ τῶν Λακωνῶν ἐσθῆς. *Schell.*
Antiq. p. 478 says that ἄνθρωποι
 τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἄνθρωποις βαυκοῦσι γὰρ
 τρυφεροῖς, ὡς δὲ περὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος
 Καμπύλιον. *Klein, Com. Fines* II.
 2. 7.)

οἷον ἐν τῷ βίβλῳ συμπεριλαμβανόμενον
 διὰ τὴν ἀντιφύκην.

I do not know why the editors should
 thus refer to the anonymous Athenians
 not to the Spartans themselves.

ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὀμίλῃ.

- 10 IX. Περὶ δε αἰδούς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσηκεῖ λίσσιν·
πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῖσιν ἢ ἔξει. ὀρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις
ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλή-
σιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυρόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον
φοβούμενοι ὠχρῶσιν. σωματικὰ δὲ φαίνεται πως εἶναι.
15 ἀμφοτέρω, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεως εἶναι. οἱ 3

1128 b, 10. F.E. 123; b, 16 σχιδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἴσασι
τῶν περὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐπαινετῶν καὶ ψεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπερβολαί, τὰ δ' ἐλλείψεις
τὰ δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι, παθητικαί. οἷον ὁ φθονρὸς καὶ ἐπιχαρακασ-
καὶ ὅτι γὰρ ἔξως λίσσονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς κατ'
ἀξίαν εὐ πρῶτον ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαρῆκαίου πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔχων δηλοῖ, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
κακοπραγίαις. μεσοί δὲ τούτων ὁ μεσότητις, καὶ ὁ ἐκάλειν οἱ
ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νίμειν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
κακοπραγίαις καὶ εἰπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις διὸ καὶ οὕτως
οἰοῦνται εἶναι τὴν νίμειν. αἰδώς δὲ μεσότης ἀνασχυντίας καὶ κατὰ
πληξῆως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμίαν φροντίδων δόξης ἀνασχυντοί, ὁ δ'

IX. § 1. Περὶ δὲ αἰδούς κτλ
In 108 a, 30 πῃ we were told of
two μεσότητες which were ἐν τοῖς πα-
θήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη, viz. αἰδώς
and νίμειν. Here we are told that
αἰδώς is not an ἀρετή, because it is
the feeling itself, not a habit or habitual
attitude towards the feeling. Nothing
is said of νίμειν at all. The two
seem to be μεσότητες in the feelings
of fear and anger which come by
nature.

ὀρίζεται. Plato, Laws 646 e φο-
βούμεθα δὲ γὰρ πολλὰς δόξας, ἡγοῦ-
μενοι δεδιέναι καὶ οἱ πρῶτοντες ἢ
ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν τῶν μὴ καλῶν· ὅν δὲ καὶ
καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γὰρ, οἶμαι δὲ
καὶ πάντες, αἰσχύνειν. (Aristotle does
not distinguish αἰδώς and αἰσχύνειν at all
in this discussion, see next note.) In
Top. 126 a, 6 he connects this de-
finition of shame. Shame, he says,
is ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, fear ἐν τῷ θυμοειδῷ.
So in the Rhetoric (1383 b, 13) we

have an appended definition which
leaves out fear, ἐστὶ δὲ αἰσχύνειν ὅταν
τις ἢ ταπεινὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φε-
ρμένα φέρῃ τὸν καλόν, ἢ ταπεινὸς ἢ
γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, κ. τ. λ. (lit-
erally περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία 1254 a, 31.)

§ 2. ἐρυθραίνονται... αἰσχυρόμενοι.
We see here that Aristotle is precise in
thoroughly Hellenic distinction be-
tween αἰδώς and αἰσχύνειν. The eye
of the listener is not missing, but the
downcast eye. Cf. Rhet. 1374 a, 30
where Aristotle himself quotes the
proverbial ἐν ἀφελείᾳ αἰδώς. His
tendency was to use αἰσχύνειν for αἰδώς.
Aristotle, at least in the LITTE, uses
αἰδώς for αἰσχύνειν. Cf. Scholast.
Ethik der alten Griechen, 1, 28, 29.

σωματικὰ δὲ κτλ. In An. 403 a,
16 τοῖς δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πάθος
πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματι, εἰμὴν τὰ
ὅτι φόβος, πένθος, θυμὸς, ἐπὶ τῷ
καὶ τὸ φέρεται καὶ μετὰ σώματι γὰρ
πάντες πάσχειν τὸ τὸ σώμα.

πάση δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέῃ. οἰόμεθα γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἡλικιότους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμνηστῆναι, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἵπαικοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἀν' ἵπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυνηλός· οἶδεν γὰρ οἰόμεθα εἶναι 10 αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικούς ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις (οὐ γὰρ 5 πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχυρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δοξάν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτικά, ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυνηλός). φαύλου δὲ καὶ τῷ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἶον 15 πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχει· ὥστ' εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἰεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἀτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίους γὰρ ἢ αἰδώς, ἔκων δ' ὁ 7 ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδώς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικὴς· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνουσ' ἂν· οὐκ ἔστι 20 δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυνητία φαίλου καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδέεσθαι τὰ αἰσχυρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ 8 τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικὲς· οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκατάστατος ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τις μεκτὴ· δευχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν. 35

σύστη δμοῦς καταπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων.

EE. 1234 a, 24 πᾶσαι δ' αὐταὶ αἱ μισοτητικαὶ ἐπαινεταὶ μὲν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δ' ἀρεταί, οὐδ' αἱ ἐναντία κακίαι· ἀνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ, ταῦτα δὲ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς τῶν παθημάτων διαιρέσεσιν· ἔλαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος τί ἐστίν. διὸ δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν εἶναι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν συμβάλλεται ἀρετάν· ἔπει γὰρ ὥσπερ λαχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς ὕστεροις, ἐκώστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως· ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ἡ αἰδώς εἰς σωφροσύνην, διὸ καὶ ὑπέρχεται ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι τοῦτω τὴν σωφροσύνην· ὁ δ' ἀλήθεια καὶ ψευδὴς ὁ μὲν ἔμφρων, ὁ δ' ἀφρων.

§ 3. αἰδήμονας. The regular Attic word for this was αἰσχυνηλός, which is used in exactly the same sense below. Cf. Plato, Charm. 156 c 1-2, γὰρ τὸ αἰσχυνηλὸν οὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τρεφέτω. (Cf. a 50 160 c) So Aristotle himself says in Rhetic 1389 a 29 that the young are αἰσχυνηλοί but not the old. It is characteristic of

Xenophon's fiction that αἰδήμων is a favourite word with him.

§ 6 καὶ τῷ εἶναι. For the reading see Brainerd, Contr. p. 41, and for the construction cf. 1107 a, 3. 1117 b, 14.

§ 7. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, 'conditionally good', and the hypothesis is that we have done something bad.

§ 8. ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, in Book VII.

BOOK V.

JUSTICE

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Justice receives a much more elaborate treatment than any other form of goodness. This is not only because of its great importance, but also because of the greater complexity of the problems to which it gives rise. The object of the whole discussion is, of course, to show that the principle of the Mean applies to Justice as well as to other forms of goodness, but Justice differs from the forms of goodness we have studied hitherto in being essentially relative (*πρὸς ἄλλους*). It thus involves four terms and not three only, for there are at least two persons and at least two things which are just for those persons. The mean which Justice aims at is at first an unknown *x* which has to be found by some application of the Rule of Three.

Aristotle begins at once by limiting the sense of the word justice. In Greek *ἀδίκῃ* meant not merely "to be unjust," but also "to be guilty" of any offence whatsoever against the law, and the word *δικαιοσύνη* could therefore be used as equivalent to "righteousness," that is to say, the whole of goodness regarded as relative to others. In the *Republic*, Plato had given it a wider meaning still, and had made it include the relations between the different "parts" of the individual soul, a view which Aristotle discusses later on (1138 b, 5 sqq.). It was therefore necessary at the outset to distinguish "particular" from "universal" justice, but the distinction is of little interest to us, seeing that the English word "justice" is never used naturally in the wider sense which Aristotle is anxious to distinguish and set aside. We have only to consider justice in the special sense in which it refers to the fair apportionment of "external goods."

§ 2. The first form of justice in this sense which Aristotle treats of is Distributive Justice. He has to show that the principle of the Mean applies to this, and he does so by showing that the formula of justice may be expressed as a proportion of the form $A : B :: C : D$ or $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{C}{D}$. This is what the Greeks called a "geometrical" proportion. The name of the second kind is usually mistranslated "Corrective Justice," and this mistranslation has led to much confusion in the interpretation of the argument. Really this form of justice regulates *obligationes ex contractu* quite as much as *obligationes ex delicto*. The true meaning of διορθῆναι is to "adjust" whether by correction (ἐναντιόφθασις) or otherwise, and the scholastic term *iustitia directiva* is really far more accurate. There would be no harm in calling the form of justice which adjusts the damages and penalties imposed by a court of law *iustitia correctiva*, and that which regulates the exchange of commodities and the like might then be called by St. Thomas's name *iustitia commutativa*. But this would obscure the fact that the two are applications of the same principle, that, namely, of "arithmetical proportion."

We are not in the habit of calling an equation of the form $A - B = C - D$ a proportion at all, but it was one of the recognised Pythagorean μεσότητες, and in Aristotle's day it was commonly called an ἀναλογία, though that word was properly confined to the γεωμετρικὴ μεσότης. It will be convenient for us to speak of "arithmetical proportion" too.

Περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας ἀεττέον, περὶ ποίας
 τε τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μέσότης ἐστὶν ὁ
 5 δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῶν
 ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις. ὁρῶμεν ἔνθα
 πᾶντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλευμένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην
 ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσι, καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπρα-
 γοῦσαι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τρόπον καὶ
 10 περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἀδίκαια διὸ
 καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκαίσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ
 τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμει

1. § 1. περὶ ποίας, πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης. The two regular questions *περὶ ποίας μεσότης* and *πῶς μεσότης*; cf. i 182, § n.

§ 2. κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον, i.e. that of starting with τὰ ἔνδοξα and arguing dialectically from them. For μέθοδος, see 1094a. . 21.

§ 3. ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ κ.τ.λ. This ἔνδοξον comes from Plato, *Georgias* 460 b (referred to by *Erasmache*). Τί οὖν, ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηὺς τεκτονικὸς ἦ οὐ, —Ναί.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικὸς. —Ναί.—Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικὸς κ.τ.λ.; —Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν ἐκτὸς τούτων τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηὺς δίκαιος; —Πάντως θήνουν.—Ὁ δὲ ὁ καὶ οὗτος δίκαιός που πράττει; —Ναί.—Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν δίκαιον βουλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν.—Φαίνεται γὰρ

ὡς ἐν τύπῳ. Schol. Anon. καὶ ταύτας αὐτῶν ἀποδοὺς ἐκφράσσει τῶν οὐ γὰρ ὡς ὁρίσμενοι εἶναι αὐτά· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τε διὰ λόγον ἀναπόδεικτον, οὐτε γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐτε τῆς ἀδικίας, ὅτε προῖον δεῖται ἐνὶ πολλοῦ λέγεσθαι.

§ 4. οὐδὲ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. I understand the connection of this passage with the preceding exactly as Professor *Heinrich* does; and, if we suppose that there is a direct reference to Plato's *Georgias*, it comes out still better. Plato was right in adding ἀνάγκη τὸν δίκαιον βουλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν, for this case is really different from that of the ἐπιστήμαι καὶ δυνάμεις (*σοφιστική, μουσική* and *ιατρική*) from which he starts. If *δικαιοσύνη* were a *δύναμις*, then the just man would also be the clever thief (Plato, *Rep.* 334 a). It is, however, an *ἔξιν*, and we know that the

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ
τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξιν δ' ἢ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων
οὐ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ 15
τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν
5 βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων, πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἢ
ἐναντία ἔξιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἔξιν ἀπὸ
τῶν ὑποκειμένων· εἴαν τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ἢ φανερά, καὶ ἡ
καχεξία φανερά γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἡ εὐεξία 20
καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ εὐεξία πυκνότης
σαρκὸς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς
6 καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολου-

ξιν determines βούλησις (and therefore προαίρεσις) by determining τὸ φαυλό-
μενον ἀγαθόν. So in Top. 145 b 34
the definition of διαίεσις as δύναμις
τοῦ σοῦ διαμεμενηῆς is criticised, διαίεσις
γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ προαιρουμένης τὸ ἴσον
διαίεσις τοῦ δυναμένου. For δύναμις
and προαιρέσις cf. 1117 b 14 n.

δύναμις μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is
true, of course, only of αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου
δυναμὴν (cf. 1103a, 16 n.) Plato had
already shown in the First Book of
the Republic that, if we regard justice
as an art, it will be the art of doing
justest things as well as just, exactly
as ὁσόν ὅστις θεοὺς φυλάσσειν, αὐ-
τοῖσι οὗτοι θεοτάτοι ἐμποιεῖται (Rep.
333 c).

ἡ ἐναντία. It is needless to read
ἐναντί, though it would be more
logical. The double ἐναντία is dia-
lectic, cf. below 2, 18.

ἀπὸ τῆς ἑνείας, the typical ξιν.

θυμικῶς βαδίζων, here in the sense
of τὸ σωματικὸν ὑγιείας, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς
ἔξιν, cf. Top. 106 b, 36 τὸ θυμικῶς
ἐπιστημῶς ἢ φιλοσοφῶς (i.e. πρὸς τὴν
ἔξιν) ἢ σωματικῶς (i.e. ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξιν)
πράττεται.

§ 8. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. For
ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου as applied to
ξιν, cf. Top. 147 a, 17.

ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. I cannot
believe that this means anything else

than the things in which the ξιν
are found. As a ποιότης, διαίεσις ἐν
ὑποκειμένῳ λέγεται τῷ διαίῳ (Bohitz
Ind. 160 b, 4). If this is so, the
ὑποκείμενα will be σύνταξις, and
σκέψιν ἐπὶ τῶν συντακτικῶν is a recog-
nised dialectical method. Further
this is in accordance with the actual
procedure which Aristotle follows;
for what he actually does is to con-
sider the δίδειν, i.e. the ὑποκείμενον
of the ἐναντία ξιν. If I am right, τῶν
ἐκτικῶν must = τῶν εὐ ἐκτικῶν as
below 1176 a, 15 and often.

τὸ ποιητικόν. The ambiguity of
the word ἐκτικὸς seems to have
caused a transition to another class of
σύνταξις, for τὰ ποιητικά are not
properly ὑποκείμενα. But it matters
little; for τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἔξιν are identi-
cal with τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξιν and these
are such as τὰ ἔχοντα persons. This
mention of them here will not seem
irrelevant if we remember that our
aim is not merely to know justice
but to produce it.

§ 9. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Top.
106 a, 9 πρότερον δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἢ
μοναχῶς τῷ αἰεὶ λέγεται, ἐκ τῶνδε
σωματικῶν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνα-
τίου σκοπεῖν αἱ πολλὰ καὶ λέγονται,
ἐντε τῷ αἰεὶ εἶναι τῷ αἰετῶν
διαφωγῇ.

θεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, εἰν θύτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεται.
 25 καὶ θύτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ εἰκαῖον, καὶ τὸ
 ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία. ὅμοιαι δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ εἰκαῖο-
 σῖνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεργος εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν
 αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρων δὴλῃ μᾶλλον,
 (ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν) οἷον ὅτε καλεῖται
 30 κλείς ὁμοιόμοις ἢ, τε ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζώων καὶ ἢ τὰς
 θύρας κλείουσιν. εἰλήφθαι δὲ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. δ
 δοκεῖ δὲ δ τε παρίνομον ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ
 ἄμισος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ [ὁ] δίκαιος ἔσται δ τε νόμιμος
 καὶ ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ
 1129^b δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρίνομον καὶ τὸ ἄμισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεο-9

εἰν θύτερα κ.τ.λ. On the reading see Bywater Contre p. 41 and Stewart's note in loc. I have followed Stewart in keeping the θύτερα of K^b L^b. Bywater reads θάτερα from the Vatican Version and omits καὶ ἡ ἀδικία. But (1) the idiomatic θά-τερα is more likely to have been lost in the Vatican than invented by the scribes, and (2) we really want the two pairs, the ζῶον and the κλείουσα. 'If one pair of terms is ambiguous, the other pair will be so too.' I do not think it necessary to insert καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη after τὸ δίκαιον with Stewart. Aristotle does not care for minute synonymy in such clauses. Cf. 1105a, 16 οὐτ' ἀπειρεσὶ οὐτ' ἀρᾷ ἀλλὰ περὶ, quoted by Bywater, Contre p. 39.

§ 7. τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν. The word is here used in the widest sense, in which any two things which share the same name are called ὁμωνυμία, not in the restricted sense explained in 1096 b, 27 n. As a matter of fact they are συνώνυμα (cf. 1130 a, 33).

λανθάνει, sc. ἡ ὁμωνυμία. Cf. Phys. 249 a, 23 εἰς τὰ τῶν ὁμωνυμῶν αἰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐπέχουσιν, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσιν τινα ἐμωσύτητα, αἱ δ' ἐγγὺς ἢ γῆρας ἢ ἀναλογία, διὰ τὸ θεοποιεῖν ὁμωνυμίας εἶναι εἶναι. So Top. 139 b, 28 λανθανούσῃ

τῇ ὁμωνυμίᾳ, An. Post. 97 b, 30 εἰ ὁμωνυμῶν λανθάνουσι. In the present case the ὁμωνυμία is συνεγγὺς γένος and therefore properly a συνωνυμία.

ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ κ.τ.λ. The γὰρ = I indicates the reason for the choice of the instance which follows. Cf. 1042 13. κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν, 'in outward appearance.'

§ 8. καὶ ἄμισος. 'antipathetic, i.e. so equal.' This is added because the popular word ἐκονέκτης does nothing out the fact that the ἄδικος not only takes more than his share of good things, but less than his share of bad things. Cf. 1101 1, 10. (Bywater Contre p. 43).

τὸ παρίνομον. Of course the English word 'unjust' has not the wider sense, but it was quite familiar to Athenian ears. 'To be guilty' of any offence whatsoever was in the language of the courts *adikos*. The ὁμωνυμία is, therefore, a mere accident of the Greek language, and we should not erect the distinction between "universal and particular instances" into a part of Aristotle's system. He is only clearing the ground as usual, by narrowing the application of the word.

- νέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τὰγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ
 ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ ἀγαθὰ,
 τινα δ' οἷα αἰεὶ. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εἰχόμενοι καὶ διέκουνσιν·
 δεῖ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εἰχέσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς 5
 10 ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ. ὁ δ' ἄδικος
 οἷα αἰεὶ το πλεον αἰρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μῖον κακὸν ἀγαθὸν
 πως εἶναι, τὸν δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ
 11 πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἄμικτος τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ 10
 12 κοινόν. ἔπει δ' ὁ παρίομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος,
 ἐήλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ
 ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νομιμά ἐστί, καὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ-
 13 των δίκαιον εἶναι φάμεν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάν-
 των, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς 15
 ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίως κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινα τρό-
 πον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιη-
 τικὰ καὶ φιλακτικά εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ

§ 9. περὶ ὅσα κ.τ.λ., sc. τὰ ἐκείναι
 ἀγαθὰ. Cf. 1039 l, 8 n. For ἀπλῶς
 ἀγαθὰ. Cf. Top. 115 b, 33 ἀ μὴδὲν
 προστιθέμενον δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ὃ
 αὐτὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιοῦτων ἀπλῶς
 λεγόμενον. See too Phil. 1332 a, 31 καὶ
 γὰρ τοῦτο διακρίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ἡθικούς
 λόγους, ὅτι τινὲς εἰσι οἱ σπουδαῖοι
 ὃ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὰ ἔστι τὰ ἀπλῶς
 ἀγαθὰ.

§ 11 ἔστιν ἡμετέρας' ἐρρηγοῦσθε
 for μέ. ἔστι.

περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. The word
 εἶναι includes the man who τὸ πλεον
 αἰρεῖται τῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν and also
 the man who τὸ ἐλαττον αἰρεῖται τῶν
 ἀπλῶς κακῶν. It is 'common' to
 both.

§ 12. ἦν. Cf. 1113 b, 13 a.

πως δίκαια, i.e. in the wide sense
 in which τὰ δίκαια includes the
 practice of all goodness so far as it is
 contained by law.

§ 13. ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων.
 This need not be taken too literally.

Aristotle only means that the laws
 deal with all departments of life, but
 we are looking for the particular de-
 partment to which Justice belongs.
 The verb ἀγορεύειν belongs to Attic
 legal style, and is never used in Aes-
 chyle except of εἰς τοῦτο.

στοχαζόμενοι κ.τ.λ. This refers to
 the distinction between ὁρὰ πολιτείας
 and παρτέρας, for which see below
 1160 a, 31 seq. I think Cassow is
 right in his view that the ὁρὰ πολιτείας
 στοχαζέται τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος
 πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις, while the
 παρτέρας στοχαζέται τοῦ συμφέροντος
 τοιοῦτος κυρίου, whether one (tyranny),
 few (oligarchy), or many (democracy).
 I therefore retain κατ' ἀρετὴν, though
 omitted by K^b, and I understand it of
 ἀριστοκρατία, while κατ' ἄλλον τινα
 τρόπον τοιοῦτον refers to τιμοκρατία
 and the like.

ἓνα μὲν τρόπον, i.e. in the wide
 sense. The μὲν is answered by εἰ γε
 in 1130 a, 1 a.

πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀν- 14
 20 δρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λειπεῖν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν
 μηδὲ ρίπτειν τὰ ὄπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοι-
 χεύειν μηδ' ἰβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πρᾶου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν
 μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς
 καὶ μυκθηρίως τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ὑπαγορεύων. ὁρθῶς
 25 μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὁρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη 15
 μὲν οἶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπλῶς
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν
 ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ "οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἰώης"
 οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοι φάμεν "ἐν δὲ δικαιο-
 30 σύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἐνί." καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετὴ,
 ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστίν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ
 ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι,
 ἀλλ' οὐ μένων καθ' αὐτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείαις
 τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνα-

§ 14. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος κ.τ.λ. The argument is intended to show that δικαιοσύνη as a *virtute* form of goodness must have some other meaning than legality. That is shown to extend to all forms of goodness so far as they are πρὸς ἕτερον.

§ 25. οὐθ' ἔσπερος κ.τ.λ. Schol. Anon. (p. 210, § Meyilut) τοῦτο ἐξ Ῥωμαίου σοφῶν, Σοφιστ. Vindex, ut is it a marginal exclamation? Μελαμπροπης· λέγεις γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ (fr. 485 Nauck)—

δικαιοσύνης τὸ χεῖρον πρὸς ἑαυτὸν. This is explained and confirmed by Plotinos Enn. I, 6 ὡς αὐτὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐτὸν, ib. vi, 6 δικαιοσύνη. ἥ ἐστὶ ἀλλῶς αὐτὸν τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον κ.τ.λ. Bywater, *Hermes* v. 356.

παροιμιαζόμενοι φάμεν κ.τ.λ. Schol. Anon. (loc. cit.) τοῖς θεοῖς· ὅτι· ἀρετὰς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν (v. 145-6)—
 Βούλεται δ' εὐσεβεῖν ἀλλοῖσι σὺν χρή-
 μασις εἶναι

ἡ πλουτεῖα ἐδίδωκε χρήματα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην τὰς ἀρετὰς (εἰς) χεῖρον μένειν παραμένει ἐπὶ καὶ μέμνηται αὐτῇ ὡς παραμένει ἐπὶ φροῦδος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ἡθῶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῷ Ἰδμεῖν ὡς ἀφωκῶν αὐτὸν μέμνηται. καὶ ἴσως κα. = θυμὸν λήθης αὐτῷ (χρήματα).

καὶ τελεία κ.τ.λ. We shall not feel any difficulty about this passage if we remember that it is purely literary and that we must not look for technical and precision in it. Justice (= Righteousness) is 'complete' because it is all goodness. 'complete' goodness. It is 'complete' because it is the *eu* (not merely the possession) of good-ness. It is 'complete' because it is πρὸς ἕτερον.

χρῆσις. The implied antithesis is ἀρετῆς. Cf. 1093 b, 34 n. In Pol. i 328 a, 38 εὐδαιμονία is defined ἐν τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ καὶ χρήσει τῆς τιμῆς.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος ὅτι ἀρχὴ 1130·
 βίβει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἦδη ὁ ἄρχων.
 τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ
 τύχη μὴ τῶν ἀρετῶν ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλω
 | συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῶ. κακί- 5
 ἐν αὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χροόμενος
 ῥηθρία· ἀριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ
 ἵερον· ταῖτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπὸν αὐτῇ μὲν οὖν ἡ
 τύχη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετὴ ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐν-
 δεικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέρει 10
 ἢ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὐτῇ, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·
 ἐν γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν
 τερον, δικαιοσύνη ἢ δὲ τοιαύτη ἐξίς ἀπλῶς, ἀρετῇ.
 ζητοῦμεν δὲ γὰρ τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἐστὶ

τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος. In L^h the
 βίβει, but why about this
 special Domic? This is one
 of those which Sophocles has
 in poetry Cf Antig v. 173

εἰς τὴν κοινωνίαν We may bring
 once of ἀρχὴ by paraphrasing
 come to the same, a relation
 is at once implied. Cf.
 14. 11. 7 a. 6. This is cor-
 of the idiomatic use of οὗτω
 εἰς τὴν κοινωνίαν

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν This is
 is limitations given by T. 100
 of the First Book of the Re-
 Cf. 341 c. 'Εξ ἡμετέρας
 ; see 1001 γ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν,
 for the stronger and the
 341 δ τοῦ ἐπιθυμίου τε καὶ
 τοῦ βλάπτου.

οὗτος ἢ κοινωνῶ The first
 be case is a παράδειγμα, the
 is ἀρχὴ καλῶς Jackson
 καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν κ.τ.λ. Since
 | man is he who acts badly,
 πρὸς αὐτόν, but also πρὸς
 be best man is he who acts

well not only with regard to himself,
 but also with regard to others.

§ 20. τὸ δ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ. for the
 phrase cf 1141 b, 24. The full ex-
 pression would be ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστι τὸ
 εἶναι ἀρετῇ καὶ τὸ εἶναι δικαιοσύνη, cf.
 Top. 133 b, 23 ἄλλο λέγεται τῷ ἑνὶ
 εἶναι αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶναι· ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστι
 εἶναι ἀνθρώπου τοῦ τὸ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι
 καὶ λεγῶν ἀνθρώπου τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου
 λεγῶν Simplicius in Phys. (p. 735,
 12 Dicitur) examples of τὸ εἶναι συνήθως
 ἐπὶ τοῦ Παραδείτου λεγόμενον καὶ τὸ
 εἶναι σημαίνει. Cf. Phys. 202 a, 28,
 ὡς τὸ πρὸς δύο διάνοιμα ἐν πρὸς δύο
 καὶ δύο πρὸς ἐν, καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ
 κἀντὺν ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν, δ
 μὲν τοι λόγος οὐχ εἶναι, with Met. 1066 a,
 32 where we have the same examples
 but the last clause runs ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι
 οὐχ ἐν. (Kammanner.)

ἀπλῶς, closely with ταῦτόν ἐστι,
 'without qualification' Translate
 'regarded simply as a state of this
 kind, it is the same as goodness.'

II § 1. Ζητοῦμεν δὲ γὰρ. 'Yes,
 but we are looking for—.' This an-
 swers the μὲν πρότερον 1129 b, 17. The

- 15 γὰρ τις, ὥς φαμεν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας 2
μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οἰδὶν, οἷον
ὁ ρίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ βελίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπων διὰ χαλ-
ποτητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ
20 πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν
οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δὲ γὰρ τινα (ψευόμεν γὰρ)
καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὥς μέρος 3
τῆς ἄλλης καὶ ἡδίκον τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἡδίκου τοῦ παρὰ
τὸν νομον. ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ 4
25 προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν.
οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δύξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης,
ἐκεῖνος δ' ἡδίκος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ· ὁ γὰρ ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ
κερδαίνειν. ἔτι περὶ μὲν τίλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνονται 5
ἢ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινα μοχθηρίαν αἰεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν
30 ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δὲ λίαν.
εἰ δ' ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθη-
ρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία 6

particles *δι* γὰρ are used with their idiomatic force.

τὴν ἐν μέρει δικήν, 'particular justice,' i.e. that justice which is a part of goodness and not *δὴν ἀρετῆς*. The phrases *ἐν μέρει* and *κατὰ μέρος* known are equivalent. The force of the preposition here is modal (Ind. Ar. 243 b. 27 seq.) and may be best brought out by 'as,' 'justice as a part of goodness.' So we have *ὡς μέρος* τῆς ἄλλης below a, 32.

§ 2. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ π.λ. The argument is as follows. In the case of particular vices we say that a man *ἀδικεῖ* even although he gains no unfair advantage for himself, and in this use of the word *ἀδία* = *δὴν κακία πρὸς ἑαυτὸν*. But, on the other hand, there are cases where a man gains an unfair advantage and therefore *ἀδικεῖ*, but where his *οἶδος* is neither identical

with any particular vice nor yet with *δὴν κακία*. Yet it is *κακία* (for it is blame it), and it is *ἀδία* (for it is the sense of the word, *ἀδία* = *πλεονεκτή*, cf. above 1120 a, 32).

οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας. We have the same argument about *ἀκαρσία* below 1143 b. 4.

§ 3. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη. For the reading see Bywater, *Conts.* p. 23.

ὡς μέρος, equivalent to *ἐν μέρος* and *κατὰ μέρος* above.

§ 4. προσλαμβάνων.. προστιθεῖς, 'making money,' 'treasuring up' (cf. Plato, *Euthyphro*, 3 d λέγων, ἢ μόνον ἀνεν μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ᾔδωσι εἰ τ.τ. μου ἰσχύει ἀκαρσία).

διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν, sc. *ἀδικεῖ* λογεται.

§ 5. ἀδικήματα, in the wider sense = *παράνομα*.

ἐμοίχευσεν. Cf. 1120 a, 14 n.

παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει συνωνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γίνεται· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν 1130^b δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἰ τινα ἔχοιμεν εἰς ὄνοματι περιλαβεῖν τὰυτα πάντα, καὶ εἰ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπο τοῦ κερδους, ἢ δε περὶ πάντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖον.

5

§ 1. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ δικαιοσύνηαι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ ποία 5 τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἀδικον τὸ τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ 5 μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἢ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ 10 δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ το παράνομον οὐ ταῦτόν ἀλλ' ἕτερον καὶ ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐκ ἅπαν ἄνισον), καὶ τὸ ἀδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταῦτά ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιο- 15 σύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ἄσπε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου 10 καὶ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἡ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς 20 ὅσα χρῆσις πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ δε τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ 20 τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερόν ὡς διωριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πρᾶττομενά ἐστίν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν

§ 6. συνωνυμος. This is more technical than the ὁμωνυμιαν of 1119 a, 27 and for the reason given. The definition is in the same genus, and συνωνυμος τὰ γένος καὶ τὰ εἶδος (Top. 1135 a, 28).

τὴν δύναμιν, i.e. εἰς τὴν above 1130 a, 17.

ταῦτα πάντα. They are, of course, τὰ ἑκαταχμια καὶ ἀπὶ χμια (1119 b, 3), i.e. τὰ μικρὰ ἀγαθὰ.

§ 7. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν α. γ. λ. A striking example of the continuous transitions and recapitulations which distinguish

the Ethics. We may attribute these to Nikomachos if we please. Instead § 3.

§ 8. τὸ παράνομον. For the reading see Stewart's note.

§ 10. τὰ πρᾶττομενα. I agree with Professor Stewart in preferring the πρᾶττομενα of K^b. See, however, Mywaine, *Contre* p. 44. The νομια are called δίκαια τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι and τῷ ποιηταῖς εἶναι (ib., 25), i.e. τῷ πρὸς ἐν εἶναι, cf. 1096 b, 17 n. They are related to justice exactly as τὰ εὐα-

προσάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην μοχθηρίαν κοῦναι ὁ νόμος
 15 τὰ δὲ ποιητικά τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα κτε-
 μοθέτται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς
 καθ' ἑαυτὸν παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶ
 πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐτέρας, ὑστερον διοριστέον· οὐ
 γὰρ ἴσως ταῦτόν ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί.
 20 τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου
 ὃν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων
 ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν
 ταύτοις γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὕμνον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἐτέρου) ἢ

πὰρ τὴν πόλιν (1139 a, 30), or τὸ
 ὁμοῦν τὸ ὅμοιον. This does not mean,
 however, that general and special
 justice are related in that way.

§ 11. τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, 'the
 education which is to make a good
 citizen.' For the expression cf. Pol.
 1310 a, 14 τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς
 πολιτείας... εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοκρα-
 τικαί, εἰ δ' ὀλιγαρχικαί, ὀλιγαρ-
 χικαί.

ἀπλῶς, i.e. without any such quali-
 fication as 'a citizen of a democracy
 or an oligarchy.'

οὐ γὰρ ἴσως κ.τ.λ., 'it is not per-
 haps the same thing for a man to be
 a good man and to be a good citizen
 of any state' lit. 'any citizen'). For
 the question here raised see Newman's
 Politics, Introd. pp. 234 sqq. The
 main point is that the goodness in
 virtue of which a man is a good
 citizen is relative to the constitution
 (πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν) and cannot there-
 fore in all cases be identical with the
 goodness of a good man. Pol. 1276 b,
 34 ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὥστε σπουδαῖον
 μὴ πενήθεσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπου-
 दाῖος ἀνὴρ. This is because the state
 is not the κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτεία, the
 true ἀριστοκρατία. In it the good
 man and the good citizen coincide.
 Cf. Pol. 1293 b, 5 ἐν μόνῳ γὰρ (ἀριστο-
 κρατίῳ) ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης
 ἀγαθὸς ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοῖ

πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν πόλιν.
 Yet even here the good man in the
 fullest sense and the good citizen are
 completely identical only in the ruler
 for he alone has occasion to exercise
 φρόνησις.

ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. This use of
 εἶναι with a predicative dative is a
 favourite way of expressing the eni-
 gory of εἶναι or, in other words, the
 definition of a thing (λόγος). Cf. the
 account given of the similar phrase τὸ
 δ' εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ 1130 a, 12. As
 a συνότης, ἀγαθὸς has always the same
 meaning, but since it is a relative
 term also (πρὸς τι), it will have dif-
 ferent definitions when it is predicated
 in the category of εἶναι.

παντί. Jackson illustrates this use
 from Pol. 1277 a, 13 ἀλλ' ὅπου ὅπου
 τινός (in any state) ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολλῶν
 τε σπουδαῖον καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαῖον;

§ 12. τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος κ.τ.λ.
 We now come to the two divisions of
 justice in the particular sense, the
 only sense which the word has in
 English.

ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς. Citizenship
 meant to a Greek the right to share
 in the goods of the state, and only in
 the second place the corresponding
 duty of contributing to them. The
 citizen was a shareholder, not a tax-
 payer.

1131^a τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη
 ἴσο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια ἐστὶ τὰ δ'
 αἰούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷον πρᾶσις αὐτῇ δανεισμός
 ἐγγυή χρήσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἰκοῖσια δὲ λέγεται,
 ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος), τῶν δ'
 αἰουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραία, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμα-
 κεία προαγωγή δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία,
 τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμός θάνατος ἀρπαγὴ πῆρσις
 κατηγορία προπηλακισμός.

III. Ὅτι δ' ὁ τ' ἀδίκος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἀδικον ἄνισον, το
 1 ἐήλθον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τι ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον·
 2 ἐν ὁποῖα γὰρ πράξει ἐστὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ
 3 ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἀδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἀνε-
 λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι
 4 ἂν εἴη. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ 15

ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι. A wide word which includes all business transactions and is not at all confined to 'contracts' (*ἐνθήκαι*). The *ἐκούσια* are contracts, but the *αἰούσια* are *delictiones* or *delicta*.

διορθωτικόν. Much confusion has been caused by the current translation 'Correct to Justice.' The *metastictica* of the schoolmen is really more accurate; for *διορθόν* is a word of far wider meaning than *ἐναρμόνουν* and signifies 'to adjust,' whether before or after the transaction. Cf. Loesck on *Phrynichus* p. 330 "Ὅρθον et corrigere et dirigere nomen; signato dicitur illud *ἐναρμόνουν* hoc *διορθόν*. Utique affine est *ἐναρμόνουν* quod locum habet in utraque et pristinum statum, unde *εἰσαῖα* erant, reducuntur; omnis eorum saltem notio mutationis in melius, quamlibet autem promiscuum habent."

§ 12. *ἐκούσια*. Jackson maintains that the form of justice applicable to these is only the "rectification of wrong arising out of such trans-

actions." But this will not do; for, if a wrong has arisen, the *συναλλάγμα* at once becomes *ἀκούσιον*. And we shall see that all the examples given refer to the preliminary adjustment of terms, and not to the rectification of wrong.

πρᾶσις *ἀνὴ* *ἐμπόσις* *πενδία*, *δανεισμός* *μίσθωσις*, *ἐγγυή* *ρίσις*, *χρήσις* *consignatum* (loan for use as distinct from loan for consumption), *παρακαταθήκη* *depositum*, *μίσθωσις* *locatus conductus*.

τῶν δ' αἰουσίων κ.τ.λ. These correspond roughly to the *obligationes ex delicto*. The distinction between *λαθραία* and *βίαια* is like that between *furtum* (κλοπή) and *rapina* (ἀγναγή). Cf. also Plato, *Laws* 864 c.

III. § 1. Ὅτι δ' ὁ τ' ἀδίκος κ.τ.λ. We now begin the discussion of Distributive Justice.

§ 2. *ἀνευ λόγου*. Cf. 1143 b, 2 n. The view is universally held apart from any ground. Cf. Pol. 1282 b, 18 *δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσι ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι*.

δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ἡ
 μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλείον καὶ ἑλάττω), ἡ δ'
 ἴσον, δυοῖν, ἡ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον
 ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τευχάμε-
 20 ον, δύο ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αἰτιὰ
 ἐστὶ ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὥς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς
 οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν ἀλλ'
 ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μίχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἡ μὴ ἴσα ἴσῃ
 ἡ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχῃσι καὶ νέμονται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν
 25 τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι
 πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μόντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τῆς
 αὐτῆς λέγουσι πάντες [ὑπάρχειν], ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικῇ
 ἐλευθερίᾳ οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικῇ πλούτῳ οἱ δ' εὐγένειαν οἱ δ'

§ 4. καὶ πρὸς τι. This follows from the fact that all δικαιοσύνη is πρὸς ἄλλον, καὶ τισίν. This is explanatory of καὶ πρὸς τι. Translate 'the just is necessarily relative, i.e. just to certain individuals.' Pol. 1282 b, 20 τί γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον.

§ 5. ἐν οἷς explained by τὰ πράγματα (which may be an adscript); 'the objects' which are to be divided. For the use of ἐν cf. 1311 a, 1 n.

§ 6. ἡ αἰτιὰ ἰσότης, 'there will be the same equality in the persons and in the objects,' i.e. if the persons are equal, the objects will be equal; if the persons are unequal, the objects will be unequal.

ὡς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'there is the same ratio between the one pair, the objects, as there is between the other pair.' It is not necessary to follow K^b in omitting τὰ ἐν οἷς, nor is there any difficulty in the double ἀνὰ

διευθεῖν αἱ μίχαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1301 b, 28 ὅπως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν. Eur. Hec. 306--

Ἐν τῷδε γὰρ κάμνουσ' αἱ πολλαὶ πόλεις,

ἔσαν τῇ θεῇ καὶ φροθυμῷ ὡς ἀνὴρ μὴδ' ἐν φέρσται τῶν κακίδων πλόν.

§ 7. ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, 'from the

principle of according to merit.' Cf. Isokr. Nik. § 12 δικαιοσύνην μὴ κατ' ἀνομοίους τῶν ἡμεῶν τευχάμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ πράττειν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστου. Aristot. § 21 ὡς ἰσότητος νομιζομένων εἶναι καὶ τῇ μὲν ταύτῃ ἅπασιν ἀπονεμοῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ τὶ προσήκον ἰσότητος... τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕσασθαι τιμᾶσθαι καὶ πολεῖσθαι ἐν προύκοντι.

[ὑπάρχειν]. See Bywater, Contz. p. 44.

ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1282 a, 22 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν παντὶ τι δοῖσιν ὄντι, οἷον χρημασίῳ, ὅπως οἷοντι δοῖσιν εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἐν παντὶ τι ἴσῃ, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅπως ἴσῃ. Ib. 1317 a, 40 ὑπόβησιν μὲν οὖν τῇ δημοκρατικῇ πολιτείᾳ ἐλευθερία, ib. 1290 b, 2 ὁμοῦ μὲν ἔστωσαν αἱ ἐλευθερίαι κίρῃσι ὄντι, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν οἱ πλοῦστοι. ib. 1301 b, 2 ἴσοι δὲ τινες οἱ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχοντες αὐτὴ ἀξίῳσι τῶν ἴσων αὐτοῖς διὰ τὴν ἀριστοτητα ταύτην· ἐγγεγνῆς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει φροσύνη ἀρετῇ καὶ πολυτοῖ. ib. 1293 b, 40 ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν, ib. 1293 b, 9 καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατία... ὅταν γε πᾶσι μόνον πλεονέδῃ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστίνδῃ αἰρουμένη τὰς ἀρχάς.

τοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι—
 ἢ ἀνάλωγον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἰδίου, ἀλλ' ὃ
 ἀριθμοῦ—ἢ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν
 τρισὶν ἐλαχίστοις. ἢ μὲν οὖν διηρημένη ὅτι ἐν τετταρσί,
 α. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής· τῷ γὰρ ἐνὶ ὧς δυσὶ χρήται
 ἢς λέγει, οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ Α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Β, οὕτως ἡ 1131^b
 ὁ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Γ'. δις οὖν ἡ τοῦ Β εἴρηται· ὥστ' ἐὰν
 ἡ Β τεθῇ δις, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ
 καὶ ἐν τετταρσί ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός.

μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, 'abstract
 ε.' which is not a number of
 particular but a number of
 Cf. Met. 1029^b 1, ἰσότης ἀριθμῶν
 τρισὶν ὅροις 'in three number
 (thing)', ἢ τ. μ. α. ὡς ἡ πέντε (ε. g.
 proportion of five and eight in
 whole number. As this
 the object of ἀνάλωγος, it is
 ἀριθμῶν. On Aristotle
 Phil. 1, 50^b 1 of με (or πολλοί)
 σε μονάδες ἀριθμῶν ἀπαιτῶν
 οὐκ ἐπὶ ἀριθμῶν, οἷον στρατό-
 λε καὶ βίαις ἢ τοῖς οἰς (οἱ φιλο-
 ποι) οἱ αὐτοὶ εἰς τοὺς ἀνταπο-
 στάς, εἰ μὴ μονάδες μονάδες ἐκασ-
 τῶν ἀνταποσταντῶν ἀλλ' ὅλην ἀλλή-
 τῶν τοῦ θ. 1029^b 1. Cf. Met. 1029^b 1

ρ ε τ λ. This gives the reason
 sufficient made in α, 29. I
 therefore marked τὸ γὰρ ἀνὰ
 ἀριθμῶν as a parenthesis.

ἢς λόγων, 'equality of ratios'.
 Book V def. 3 defines ratio
 ὅταν ἐπὶ δύο μεγέθων ὁμογενῶν
 πηλίκοντα πρὸς ἀλλήλα ποσά
 and in def. 8 we have ἀνα-
 λόγον ἢ τὴν λόγων ταυτότητα
 as a technical reading ἢ τὴν
 ὁμοότητα. On the question
 of proportion as identity or
 of ratios, see Stewart's
 note.

διηρημένη συνεχής, 'con-

tinuous discrete.' Cf. Theon of
 Smyrna p. 92, 10 (H 147) λέγεται δὲ
 ἡ μετ' συνεχὴ ἀναλογία ἢ δι' διηρη-
 μένη. συνεχὴ μὲν ἡ ἐν ἐλαχίστοις
 τοῖς ὅροις, διηρημένη δὲ ἡ ἐν ἐλαχί-
 στοις τέσσαρσι. For instance the ana-
 logia 8, 4, 2 is 'continuous,' while
 6, 3, 4, 2 is 'discrete.' Theon points
 out, not as Aristotle does, that a
 continuous proportion may be re-
 garded as discrete, ἐπεὶ δὲ τριπλὸν
 τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ συνεχὴ ἐν τέσσαρσι ὅροις,
 δις λαμβανόμενου τοῦ μέσου. Other
 terms were in use for 'continuous'
 and 'discrete,' e. g. συνεχὴς and
 διεσπασμένη.

ἡ τοῦ Α, ἢ γραμμή, 'the line A.'
 The ellipse of γραμμή a regular, but
 the usual phrase is ἡ Α or ἡ ἐφ' ἧς
 (ἢ) Α (cf. 1132^b 6 sqq.). I suspect
 that τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν τὴν reading
 ἡ τοῦ πρώτου etc. found in L^b, and
 1132, as we can see from Michael of
 Ephesus, originated in the absurd
 idea that ἡ τοῦ πρώτου ὁλότης was
 intended. In the absence of a system
 of notation based on the zero,
 arithmetical questions must be treated
 geometrically. Jackson's defence of
 ἡ τοῦ πρώτου sc. ὅπου γραμμή in
 the sense of 'the line which we
 take for our first term, is not quite
 convincing, but the same would be
 the same.

5 διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως εἰς τε καὶ ᾧ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ πρῶτος πρὸς
 ἕρως πρὸς τὸν δευτέρου, οὕτως ὁ τρίτος πρὸς τὸν τέταρτον, καὶ
 ἐναλλὰξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ πρῶτος πρὸς τὸν τρίτον, ὁ δεύτερος πρὸς
 τὸν τέταρτον. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὕπερ ἢ νομῇ
 συνδυαζει, καὶ οὕτω συντεθῇ, δικάϊως συνδυαζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῖ
 πρῶτον ὅρου τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ ἡ τοῦ δευτέρου τῷ τέταρτῳ σύζευξις 12
 10 τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δικάϊον ἐστὶ, καὶ μέσον τὸ δικάϊον τοῦτ' ἐστὶ
 <τὸ δ' ἄδικον> τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνύλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνύλογον μίση
 τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνύλογον—(καλοῦσαι δὲ τὴν τῆς αὐτῆς ἀναλογίας 13
 γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συρ-

§ 10. διήρηται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is
 quoted in Pol. 1280 a, 17 διήρηται τὸν
 αὐτὸς τῶν ἐν τε τῶν πραγμάτων
 καὶ οἱ, καθάπερ αἰρεται πρῶτον ἐν
 τοῖς ἥθικοις. The *πραγμάτων* are here
 expressed by *ἐν* instead of *ἐν αὐτοῖς* as the
 verb lends itself to this. 'There is a
 similar division into persons and
 things,' i.e. the line which represents
 $A+C$ is similarly divided to that
 which represents $B+D$.

§ 11. ὡς ὁ πρῶτος ὅρος κ.τ.λ. In
 Mathematics *ὅρος* is the 'term' of a
 proportion and the word was trans-
 ferred by Aristotle from Mathematics
 to Logic. It is evident from 1133 a, 6
 that it was customary to arrange
 the 'terms' in a square, a fact which
 may explain the word *ὅρος* and the
 symbol: I have read α. β. γ. δ. as
 ordinals here with Jaekel, since we
 are now dealing with *ὅρος*, not *γράμμα*.

ἐναλλὰξ, *alternatim* i.e. A. Γ., B. Δ.
 Cf. An. Post. 74 a, 18 τοῦ ἀναλογίου δὲ
 ἐναλλάξ. Euc. 13 v, def. 13 ἐναλλάξ
 λόγοι ἐσσι λήψεις τῶν ἡγομένων πρὸς τὰ
 ἡγούμενα οἱ τοὶ ἐπιδιδόναι πρὸς τὸ
 ἐπιδόμενον.

τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, i.e. *super
 latius in seipso* (li. 14), i.e.
comprehensive, $A+B$: $B+D$: A : B
 Euclid calls this *συνθεσις* (cf. *synthesis*)
 here. Cf. V. def. 13 *συνθεσις* λόγου
 ἐστὶ λήψις τῶν ἡγομένων μετὰ τοῦ
 ἐπιδόμενου ὡς ἐπὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ το ἐπιδόμενον

super, i.e. the two terms in each
 ὅλον, 'the person and the thing. I
 have adopted Euclid's construction of
 his *super*. See *Intro* p. 44.

§ 12. σύζευξις. The 'conjunction'
 of the terms. The word refers us back
 to the drawing of Luca in the *geometrical*
 formula thus—

A	B
Γ	Δ

Cf. the note on *ἐπὶ πρὸς ἀμέτρον*
σύνεστι below (1133 a, 6).

<τὸ δ' ἄδικον>. For the reading,
 see *Newater*, *Intro*, p. 11.

§ 13. καλοῦσαι ἑκάτερον. This
 would be a footnote in a modern
 work. It breaks the connection, for
 it seems to make the next sentence
 say that *geometrical proportion* can
 not be *arithmetical*, which is absurd.
γεωμετρικὴν. Cf. *Theon* ad *Eucl.*
 p. 85, 8 (Hiller) *αναλογίας δὲ οὐ μὲν*
ἀριθμητικῆς φύσεως εἶναι προσηγορεύεται
ἐπὶ (1) ἀριθμητικῆς, (2) γεωμετρικῆς,
(3) ἀρρυθμίας. i.e. the first two are
arithmetical and is *arithmetical* by the same
nomen; is the second by the same
nomen, e.g. 2, 4, 6, 8 form an *arithme-*
tical *ἀναλογία* while 1, 4, 9, 16 form a
γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία. The *ἀριθμητικὴ*
προportion does not concern *arith-*
metical speaking the same *ἀναλογία*
 should be confined to *geometrical pro-*
portion, and so it was originally. The

βαίνει καὶ τὸ ἕλον πρὸς τὸ ἕλον ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἐκά-
 14 τερονι—ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχῆς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται ἰς
 εἰς ἀριθμῷ ὄντος, φ' καὶ β'. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο τὸ ἀνά-
 λογον· τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ
 μὲν πλεον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμ-
 βαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλεον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος
 15 ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ 20
 γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μείζον καλόν·
 16 ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ
 17 δ' αἰρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μείζον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν
 εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν.

IV. Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τῷ διορθωτικόν, δ γίνεται ἐν ταῖς 15
 2 συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἰκνουσίῳις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίῳις. τοῦτο δὲ
 τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτερον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανο-
 μητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ
 τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν εἰς αὐτὴν γίνηται
 ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὴν αὐτὴν ὥστερ' ἔχουσι 30

we see that by Aristotle's time it was already extended to series in an historical progression (cf. 1106 a, 35 n.). and later it was used for all manner of series. See Gow, *Greek Mathematics*, p. 52, n. 1.

§ 14. αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία, i.e. ἡ τοῦ διανομητικοῦ δικαίου, ποί ἡ γεωμετρική. We cannot have the continuous pro-
 portion—

$$A : B :: B : \Gamma$$

for the person (φ') and the thing (δ') cannot be an identical term, which is necessary for continuous proportion. Cf. 1131 a, 33 and *Phys.* 262 a, 19 τῶν γὰρ ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οὖν τελευτῇ, τὸ μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἀμφοῖν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ δι' αὐτό. The phrase ἀριθμῷ ἐν εἰρημένη ἡ συνεπὲς identity of a particular thing with itself (cf. *Met.* 999 b, 33 τὸ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν λέγειν οὐδὲν ἑαφέρει, αὐτοπροσώπου ὡς αὐτὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ), unity of genus and analogical unity

τὸ μὲν...τὸ δι... i.e. the one thing—the other thing. In unjust distribution of good things, if A is δ ἀδικῶν and B δ ἀδικούμενος, $\frac{A + \Gamma}{B + \Delta}$ becomes more than $\frac{A}{B}$.

§ 18 ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ. cf. 1129 b, 8

IV § 1. Τὸ λοιπὸν ἐν. These and the following words imply that there is but one other kind of justice, viz. τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον, and that it is applicable, not only to ἀεὶ οὐσία συναλλάγματα (which are treated first), but also to ἐκείναις συναλλάγμασι (for which see 1132 b, 30 sq.). The notes will show how I avoid making a third εἶδος ('Catalitic or Commutative Justice') with Professor Ritchie (*Classical Review*, vol. viii, pp. 285 sq.).

§ 2. τὴν εἰρημένην, sc. τὴν γεωμετρικήν.

πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσπνεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀνικαί-
μενον τῷ δικαίῳ τοῦτο τὸ παρὶ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. τὸ δ' ἐν 3
1132^a κον ἀνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἰ ἐπικικῆς φαῦλος
ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπικικῆ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμύχισεν ἐπικικῆς ἢ
φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλά-

τὸ εἰσπνεχθέντα. This word is
properly used of the *eisphora* or pro-
perty tax raised from the wealthier
citizens in time of war. But here it
cannot be intended as anything more
than an illustration, for it implies
that the principle of *kat' ἄξιν* is
understood of wealth. In Pol. 1280 a,
24 the argument of γὰρ εἰνα, *ἡλικίαν
ἴσος μετέχειν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν μὲν τῶν
εἰσπνεχθέντα μὲν μὲν τῷ δότι τὸ
λοιπὸν τῶν* is dismissed as ὁ τῶν
ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος.

§ 3 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν, i.e.
ἀναλογίαν. Cf. 1106 a, 35 n. An
arithmetical proportion we do not
usually call it a proportion is one
in which the first term exceeds the
second by the same number (or length)
that the third exceeds the fourth. Its
formula is $a - b = c - d$, not $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{c}{d}$. The
form is involved in such a proportion
arises from the fact that, if four
quantities are in 'arithmetical pro-
portion,' the sum of the means is
equal to the sum of the extremes,
 $a + d = b + c$, whereas in geometrical
proportion the equation is $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{c}{d}$.

οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει π.τ.λ. The
persons (οἱ) are regarded as equal,
but the things (τὰ οἷα, τὰ πράγματα)
are usually unequal. So Demosthenes,
Meid. § 46, speaking of the extension
of the γραφή βλάβου to slaves, says
οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ τῶν δούλων βλάβη
σπουδαία (ὡς νομοθετεῖ) ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα
ὁποῖόν τι τὸ γινόμενον. It is the

business of τὸ διορθωτικὸν δικαίον to
make the same difference between
the persons as exists between the
things, i.e. here (1) before they enter
into a συνέλλογμα at all (ἐν τῷ
ἐκείνῳ), or (2) before the συνέλλο-
γμα is dissolved by process of law (ἐν
τοῖς δικασίμοις). The διορθωτικὸν works
in the process of adding to A or sub-
tracting from B till an ἀρithmetic
ἀναλογία is established.

ἐπικικῆς φαῦλος. This is a dif-
ferent illustration of the principle
of τὸ διαπονητικὸν δικαίον (see n. 1)
implied by τὰ ἀποσπνεχθέντα above. It
is taken from ἀριστοκρατία, not from
ὀλιγαρχία, and *kat' ἄξιν* thus one
means *kat' ἀρετήν*.

τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν. This
is usually supposed to mean *ποσὴ*
'the amount of the damage' or the
difference produced by the hurt', but
surely Aristotle is not to be confused
with the childish doctrine that a court
of law simply awards compensation.
The Athenians were too well ac-
quainted to discussing the question in
κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἀποσπνεχθέντα by their or-
dinate process of *τίμις* and *ἀπο-
τίμις*, not to be aware that the
wrong done by the one party may be
much greater or much less than the
damage suffered by the other, and
Plato has preserved in the Laws such
formulas as *ἀρᾶς τὸν βλάβον*
ἔχειν οὐκ (843 d) τὸ βλάβος φερεσθῆναι
(843 c) and *τοῦ βλάβου ὁ πόσος*
οὐκ (867-9, 915 a) to be applied in
different circumstances. The *διαφορὰ*

τοι ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρήται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδί-
κείται, καὶ εἰ ἐβλάψεν ὁ δὲ βέβηλαται. ὥστε τὸ ἴδικον
τοῦτο ἄνισον ὅν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν
ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ δι-
ορταί τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ
ζήτησιν ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ὑπλῶς 10

to which the judge really looks in assessing the penalty is that between the *ἀδικία* (*intention*) and the *βλάβη* (*damage*), and Aristotle is on a following Greek idiom in omitting one of the terms (cf. 1137 a, 23 a.). Cf. Plato, Laws 862 b *πρὸς δὲ οὗ ταῦτα βλαπτόντων, πρὸς τὴν ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην*. Justice is not done either by transferring the gain of the wrong-doer to the injured party, or by making the wrong-doer compensate the injured party for his loss. We must assess 'the penalty due' (*ἀποθητικὴν ἀναλογία*, not *οὐκ ἐκτέτατη* (1130 b, 33)). *ἀδικίαν* and *βέβηλαται* are both perfect in voice.

εἰ ἐβλάψεν For the idiomatic expression of *εἰ μὲν*, cf. below *ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ*, and Vah on 99 Ford. 1447 b, 16.

ἢ πληγῇ πατάξῃ, 'has been wounded,' 'has wounded,' not 'has been beaten,' 'has beaten' which would be *πληγῇ ἐπατάξῃ*.. *πληγῇ* *λάβῃ*

ἀποθνή The archaic *κτείνω* (Attic prose has only *ἀποκτείνω*) is regularly cited as a legal term, and so occurs in Plato, Euthyphron 4 b *εἴτε ἐν δικῇ ἵσταται ὁ κτείνων* s.v.l. and often in the Laws. *ἀποθνή* is of course its passive.

τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις, lit. 'the being done to and the doing.' If the verbs had been used we should have had *ποιῶν*, not *πράττων*, but *πράξις* has to do duty as the noun of *ποιῶν*, since *ποιῶν* has been specialised in meaning. It has not, I think, been observed that this sentence is a highly

compressed reference to a passage in Plato's Laws, 876 d sqq., which leaves no doubt as to the meaning. The question there is how far we are to leave it to the judges *προσάσταν ἐκάστω τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων τῆς ἐξέτα τοῦ πάθους τοῦ καὶ πράξεως*, and this is illustrated by the various degrees of wounding and killing as here, and a law is given for the *γραφὴ τραύματος*. We have first the case of the man who wounds intending to kill, a case where the wrong done (*ἀδικία*) far exceeds the wrong suffered (*βλάβη*). The guilty man is not to be punished for murder, but he is not to be let off with the penalty of wounding. He is sentenced *τὸ βλάσκει ἐκτείνων τῷ βλαπθέντι*, and also to be banished. Then come cases such as that of a child wounding his parents, where the *ἀδικία* includes *ἀσέβεια* and the penalty is death. The whole passage will repay study.

εἰς ἄνισα. The *πάθος* and the *πράξις* are of course just the same thing looked at from different points of view, and yet they are represented by a line divided into unequal segments. The common view of the passage can afford no explanation of this; it would require an undivided line simply transferred from one side to the other, and thus making the two sides unequal. But nothing is said of this.

τῇ ζήτησιν ἰσάζειν, sc. *τὸ πάθος καὶ τὴν πράξιν*, 'to equate the wrong suffered and the wrong done by the penalty he imposes.' I think Michael

εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκείον ὄνομα εἴη.
 τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι·
 ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία
 τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττωτος τὸ ἴσον
 15 μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλείον τὸ δ' ἐλάττω
 του ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλείον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἐλάττω
 κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὡς ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, δ' ἐλα-
 γομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη
 τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν;
 20 ἐπὶ τῷ δικαστῇ καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν εἶναι
 εἶναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον

was right in taking τῇ ζημίᾳ here as instrumental damage, though the accepted interpretation seems to be that of Manchester and Jackson, *τοῦ μὲν τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν τὸ κέρδος ἀφαιρῶν αὐτοῦ*, 'to equalise the unjustly augmented advantages of the one (τὸ κέρδος) and the unjustly impaired advantages of the other (τῇ ζημίᾳ) by taking from the former and giving to the latter.' In any case the meaning will be the same, and it will not be that the judge forces A to make good the loss of B. What the judge has to do is τῷ μὲν ὅτι χρὴ πᾶσι δ' ἀπονομεῖν, and that means that, if the wrong done by A is greater than the damage suffered by B, A will have a severer penalty than merely τῷ μὲν τὸ βλάψον. How much severer, we shall see presently.

§ 6. ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, sc. τοῖς ἀπονομοῖσι. We find ἀπονομοῖν, λέγειν ἐπὶ τῷ in the same sense as ἐπὶ νόμοις. The words ζημία and κέρδος, 'loss' and 'profit' are properly used of ἐκδόσι συναλλαγμάτων. They are therefore not appropriate (οἰκείον) to all kinds of ἀδικασία, though they are so some (τινῶν), e.g. theft and fraud.

§ 7. ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ. The words ζημία and κέρδος can be applied as soon as the damage and the wrong have been assessed.

ὥστε κ.τ.λ. We have now got a more and a less, namely the profit of the wrong doer and the loss of his victim. We know that the just is the equal, and the equal is the mean between the more and the less. Therefore the just sentence will be that which makes up for the wrong doer, not the exact equivalent of the damage he has inflicted, but the arithmetical mean between the damage he has inflicted and the wrong he has committed. Cf. Plato's case of the man who wounds intending to kill.

ἐπανορθωτικόν. The narrower sense is correct when we are speaking of ἀπονομή συναλλαγμάτων. We then see how corrective justice is ἀπονομή συναλλαγμάτων is a μέσος, and this is the object of the ἐκδότης.

§ 7. διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ. An argument from popular language for the justice of those who are not impressed by mathematical formulae. A good judge is *μετρώς* — the really mean 'impartial'; but it will serve as a *λογιστὴς ἀριμετρώς* — but a good judge is living justice, therefore justice is a *μετρώς*. (Q.E.D.)

βούλεται εἶναι. Cf. 1135 b, 1160 b, 128. 1161 a, 28. 1171 a, 11. This is a Platonic way of expressing the ideal which anything aims at. Cf. Phd 74 c.

δικαίον ἐμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν
 ἵναι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἴαν τοῦ μέσου τύχῃσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξό-
 8 μενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δικαίον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. ὁ δὲ
 δικαστής ἐπανισοί, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄμισα τετμη- 25
 μήνης, ὃ τὸ μείζον τμήμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ'
 ἀφείλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττω τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ
 ἔχῃ διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτοῦ ὅταν
 9 λάβῃσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ
 ἐλάττωτος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ 30
 ἐκκαλεῖται δικαίον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις εἴποι
 10 δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστής διχαστής. ἐπὶ δὲ δύο ἴσων
 ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θατέρου δὲ προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τού-
 τοις ὑπερέχει θατέρου· εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρέθῃ μὲν, μὴ προστεθῇ
 δέ, ἐνὶ ἄν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐνὶ, καὶ τὸ μέσον, 1132^b

[ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον. For the
 περὶ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ ζητῶν, cf.
 1144 b. 7 - 1148 a. 33. For the
 γέννησις. Th. 14. 83 μὲν δικαστὴν
 ἐπιφέρει.]

ἵναι 'some peoples.' The word
 is constantly used to introduce terms
 belonging to some dialect (γλώσσῃ).

μεσιδίους. Cf. 1305 a. 26 ἐν δὲ
 τῇ εἰρήνῃ δὲ οὐκ ἐκείνῃ τῇ πρὸς
 ἀλλήλους ἐγγεμένοντι τῇ φιλικῇ (αὐ
 διανερχοῦν) στρατιώται καὶ ἀρχοῦν
 μεσιδαί. The context does not enable
 us to decide whether this was at Larissa
 or Attydos.

§ 8. ἐπανισοί, 'restore equality.'
 ὥσπερ γραμμῆς. Cf. 1138 b 8 n.
 The ἡμισία τοῦ πλάτους ἵσῃ ὑπερέ-
 χει τὴν ἡμισίαν τοῦ βάθους οὕτως οὕτως.
 Observe that it is the excess of the
 larger segment over the half, and not
 its excess over the lesser segment,
 which is subtracted from the one and
 added to the other.

δίχα, i.e. eis for. So in Phys.
 119 b. 18 we read that Zeno's second
 argument (the Achilles) differs from
 his first in τῷ διαιρεῖν μὴ δίχα (= μὴ δι-
 χοσταμίον) ἐν προλαβανόμενον μέγεθος.

§ 9. τῆς μείζονος π. γραμμῆς.

ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν. This is a Pytha-
 gorean fancy if we can trust Alexander.
 But it sounds more like Kintylos.

§ 10. ἴσων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We now
 get the mathematical proof of the
 formula, which may best be stated as
 follows. It is to be shown that,
 however the wrong and the damage
 may be apportioned, the just sentence
 will be that A shall pay and B shall
 receive the arithmetical mean of the
 difference between them. Let the
 whole βάθος καὶ πρῶτον (C + D) = 10,
 of which C (ἀδία) is estimated as ἐπεί-
 δου, = 7, while D (πλάτος) is estimated as
 (σημα) = 3. The parties come before
 the judge as A + 7 and B - 3. The
 problem is to restore equality by
 equating σημα and κέρδος. This im-
 plies the formula

$(A + 7) - (B - 3) = (C + 5) - (D - 5).$
 Therefore 5 is the μέσον (= δικαίον)
 required. However this 5 may be
 divided, A will always have as his
 ὑπεροχή twice the arithmetical mean.


τοῦ μέσου ἄρα κ.τ.λ. Fully ex-
 pressed this would be τοῦ μέσου ἄρα
 ἐνὶ ὑπερέχει θατέρου, καὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ

ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρεθῇ, ἐνί. τοῦτω ἄρα γνωρίζομεν τί τε ἀφελῶν 11
 δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προθεῖναι τῷ ἑλαττοῦ
 ἔχοντι· ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προθεῖναι
 5 δεῖ τῷ ἑλαττοῦ ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ' ὑπερίχεται, ἀφελῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ
 μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ ΒΒ ΓΓ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ 12
 ἀφηρήσθω τὸ ΑΕ, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ ΓΔ,
 ὥστε ὅλη ἡ ΔΓΓ τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερίχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ· τῆς
 ἄρα ΒΒ τῷ ΓΔ. [ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν·
 10 ἀντηρῶντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον,
 καὶ τὸ πύσχειν ἐπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.] ἑλη- 13
 λυθε δὲ τὰ οὐκίματα ταῦτα, ἧ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ
 τῆς ἑκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αἰτοῦ
 κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἑλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι,

ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρεθῇ ἐνί ὑπερίχει. For the ellipse of *τοῦ* (which *τὸ* would insert) before ἀφ' οὗ, cf. Bywater, *Comm.* p. 45 and 117 a. 30 n.

§ 11. τὸ μέσον ὑπερίχει, sc. τοῦ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρεθῇ. ᾧ δ' ὑπερίχεται sc. τὸ μέσον.

§ 12 αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ κ.τ.λ. sc. γραμμαί. τὸ ΑΕ, τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ ΓΔ, sc. τμήμα. The figure is



Now, in whatever proportions the *ταῦτα καὶ τῶντι* ΑΑ is divided, the line ΒΒ will always be the arithmetical mean between ΑΕ and ΔΓ, and will therefore represent τὸ ὁμοπαῖον. Mr Jackson says "In the following figure $\Gamma\Delta = \Gamma Z = \Delta E$. It is strange that this is not expressly mentioned in the text." But Aristotle had written a *διαγραφὴ* to refer to, and in that case it might seem superfluous to write down that $\Delta E = \Gamma Z$. And it is wrong to say that $\Gamma\Delta = \Delta E$, for the whole argument implies that $\Delta\Gamma = ΕΑ$, a very different thing. Aristotle is not putting in an ele-

mentary way the obvious fact that, if the gain and the loss are equal, the judge must take the gain from the one party and give it back to the other. He is discussing the more interesting case where the gain and the loss are unequal, and showing that however we split up, say the number 10, the same principle will apply. For instance we may get such equations as 17-10=10-3, or 16-10=10-4, or 15-10=10-5 or 14-10=10-6 etc. In all these cases 10 represents justice.

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. This seems to have been interpolated here from 1133 a. 15-16. But it is a very valuable interpolation, for it shows that whoever noted the sentence as a parallel passage here took the right view of *το ἀντιστοιχῶν* in its relation to τὸ διορθωτικὸν δικαίον. See the notes on 1133 b. 21 seq.

§ 13 ἀληθεῖ. Cf. 1133 a. 20, 1142 a. 8, 1143 a. 16, 1100 a. 1. Note in passing that, if the words *ζημία* and *έρδος* have been transcribed in this way from *ἐνδοσία* to *ἀνδοσία* *συναλλόγματα*, we have a strong presumption that these two fall under the same kind of justice.

οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν 15
 14 ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἑλάττω ἀλλ'
 αἷτα <τὰ> δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασιν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε
 ἡμιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κερδούς τινος καὶ ζημίας
 μσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν
 καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

V. Δικαίῃ δὲ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἀπλῶς δίκαιον,
 ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὠρίζοντο γὰρ ἰπλῶν τὸ δί-
 20 καιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλω. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρ-
 μόττει οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νευητικὸν δίκαιον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτι-

ἴδιον δίδωκεν. The judge does not restore equality in *ἐκούσιον συναλλαγμάτω*, they must be adjusted before-hand. Even if the purchaser makes a bad bargain, the law says *καυτεῖται*. Of course if the vendor is fraudulent, it is an *ἐκούσιον συναλλαγμάτω* and not a contract at all.

§ 14. *ἔσαν γέννηται*, so. *αὐτοῖς*, when the parties have got exactly what they gave, ~ τὰ ~ δι' αὐτῶν κ. γέννηται. *Καιῶν*'s assertion of τὰ is much simpler than any of the interpretations which have been proposed. Nothing is commoner than the omission of τὰ after *αὐτοῖς* by haplography.

τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον, i.e. τῶν ἐν τῷ ἐκούσιῳ συναλλαγμάτων, in *οὐκ ἐκπεποιθὸς ἐν δικαιο*. We are coming to the *ἐκούσιον* in the next chapter, and we shall see that the same holds good of them.

V. § 1. τὸ ἀντιπεποιθός, 'the inverse or 'reciprocal'. It is confusing to start from Euclid's definition of τὸ ἀντιπεποιθός, for that refers only to geometrical proportion. If we can speak of an arithmetical proportion at all, we can surely have an 'inverse' or 'reciprocal' arithmetical proportion of the form

$$a - b = d - c.$$

There seems to be an instance of this usage in Theon of Smyrna p. 87, 11 (Hultsch) τὸ δὲ ἀντιπεποιθός ἐστι

ταύτων· ὅταν ἂν τοῦ μεγέθους ἀφέλῃς τῆς ὅλης ἐν τῷ κατὰς χορδῇ, τοσούτων τοῦ τοῦ προσηκόντος, καὶ ἵσων ἂν τῷ μεγέθει τῆς χορδῆς προσθῇς τοσούτων τοῦ τοῦ ὑφαίρεται, which certainly appears to refer to addition and subtraction only. The phrase τὸ ἀντιπεποιθός ἄλλω would mean literally 'that which has had done to it the opposite of something else,' and would very well apply to a quantity from which the same sum was subtracted as had been added to another.

ἀπλῶς is the emphatic word and is repeated. Aristotle, as we shall see, has no objection to τὸ ἀντιπεποιθός, if we add *κατ' ἀναλογίαν*. To omit this qualification is to neglect the *διαφορὰ τοῦ βλαβένου*, i.e. to assume that the *κέρδιον* and the *ζημία* are equal.

οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι. According to Alexander's commentary on Met. 986 b, 26 the Pythagoreans regarded τὸ ἀντιπεποιθός and τὸ ἴσον ἴσοι (equality) as the proprium of Justice, whence some gave the number of Justice as 4 (the first *συνεγμάτω*), some as 9 (the first *ἀσπίς* square).

§ 2. οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νευητικόν. This is obvious, for distributive justice is *κατ' ἀξίαν* and is therefore determined by a (geometrical) proportion.

οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν, for the

25 κόν—καίτοι βούλονται γε τούτο λεγείν καὶ τὸ 'Ραδαμάνθυος
δίκαιον·

εἰ πε πάθῃ τὰ τ' ἴριξ, δίκη ε' ἰθὺς γίνετο

—πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν οἱ 4
δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἀρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι
30 μόνου δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ 5
ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολὺ. ἅλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς 6
ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς
κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ

ζημία and ἐνδοί have to be measured by the judge in each case. We must not assume that they are equal; for πολλὰχοῦ διαφωνεῖ. The βλάβος is exactly equal to the ἀδίκημα.

§ 2. καίτοι βούλονται γε, i.e. people generally, on the Pythagorean for this formulation of the *lex talionis*, 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,' cf. Hesiod fr. 219 Mark. The case is well stated in MM. 1194 a, 37 οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, εἰ τις τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐξέκομψεν τινος ἀντιπεπονθῆναι μόνον ἀλλὰ πλεονα ταπεινὸν ἀκολούθησαντα τῷ ἀναλογίῳ· καὶ γὰρ ἦρξε πρότερος καὶ ἡδίκησεν, ἀδικεῖ δὲ κατ' ἀμφοτέρω, ὥστε ἀνάλογον καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα, καὶ τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν πλεονεῖ ἀντιπεπονθὸς δίκαιον εἶναι.

οἷον δ' κ.τ.λ. There is no inconsistency between this and 1132 a, 5 χρῆται ὡς ἑαυτοῦ. The inequality does not lie between the officer and the private, but between the blow given and the blow received. If an officer strikes a private, that is not merely a blow, but may also be an act of discipline; if a private strikes an officer, that is not merely a blow, but also an act of mutiny. Cf. Probl. 951 b, τὸ εἶναι μὲν τις ἀρχοντα κακῶς εἰρη μογάλα τὰ ἐντίμια, εἶναι δὲ τις ἰδιώτην, εὐθὺς. καὶ αὐτῶς· οἷον γὰρ τότε οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸν ἀρχοντα ἔκαμασαν οἱ ἀπαγγελλοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐβρίβαν. The case of

Demosthenes v. Meidias is in point here. The judge must therefore 'measure' the *εἶδος* and *πρῶτος* before he can treat the parties as equal, and make the balance of *δίκη* and *εἶδος* between them. The amount of *εἶδος* (*πλάτος*) being the same, the amount of *πρῶτος* (*οἶκος*) is quite different. Accordingly we do not apply the principle of the arithmetic mean 'simply' (*ἀπλῶς*), but 'proportionally.'

§ 3. ἐν τῷ ἐκούσιον κ.τ.λ. is ἀκούσια ἐναλλάγματα (the *ἐκούσια* ἀδικεῖται *ἄνω*, but the *ἀδικία* *διὰ* either *ἄνω* or *ἄνω*). Here we see a clear case where the damage suffered may remain the same, while the wrong committed is quite different. Cf. Dem. Meid. § 43 οἱ νόμοι ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ βλάβῃ, διτλοῦν, ἢ δ' ἄνω, ἐκείνῳ τὸ βλάβῃ κτερούμεν ἐκείνῳ.

§ 4. ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς. These are precisely the same as τὰ ἀδικήματα ἐναλλάγματα described above (1132 a, 3 seq.) and they therefore belong to τὰ ἀκούσια ἀδικήματα in the widest sense (1131 a, 1 n.). We shall therefore find that they are regulated by the *arithmetical* mean, and this must therefore work out as a case of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθῆναι, τὰ ἀπλῶς indeed, but not ἀναλογίαν.

κατ' ἀναλογίαν κ.τ.λ. In the case of τὰ ἀκούσια, we must not assume that *ἀδίκημα* and *βλάβος* are equal, and

ἀνάλογον συμμέμεναι ἢ πόλεις. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν—εἰ
 ἢ μὴ, δουλεία ἔσκει εἶναι εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσεται—ἢ τὸ ἐδ—εἰ 1133^a
 ἢ μὴ, μεταδόσαι αὐτὸ γίνεται τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμέμνησιν.
 ἴσοι καὶ Χαρίων ἱερὸν ἐμποδῶν ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις
 ᾗ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀβυσθηρετῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ τῷ
 ἡχαρισμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρχει χαριζόμενον. ποιεῖ 5
 καὶ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύ-
 ζειξιν. αἰσχυρόμος ἐφ' ὃ Ἀ, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ὃ Β, οἰκία
 ἐφ' ὃ Γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ὃ Δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκο-
 ῶτον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν
 ἐκεῖνῳ μεταξιδόναι τοῦ αὐτοῦ. εἰν οὖν πρῶτον ἢ τὸ κατὰ τὴν 10

In the case of *ἐκείνου* we must not
 assume that the things to be exchanged
 are of equal value.

συμμέμνηται κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1261 a,
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ ἀντιπροσβόλου
 ἐστὶν τὰ πόλεις, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς πόλεσι
 ἀρεταί, πρότερον

τὸ κακῶς ἔσ. ἀντιποιεῖται I am not
 sure that Muretus was right in
 suggesting αἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσεται. It is
 redundant, of course, but the future
 indicative cause *δουλεία ἔσκει εἶναι μὴ
 ἀντιποιήσεται*, 'if I am not to retaliate,'
 is rather too idiomatic for an inter-
 pretator. For the omission of the
 subject of ἀντιποιήσεται, cf. 1110 a,
 1112 b.

§ 7 ἐμποδῶν ποιοῦνται. Zell
 notes that according to Pausanias
 there were temples of the Charites
 at the dyad at Sparta, Orchomenos
 and Olympia.

ἔρξαι, 'to take the initiative' Cf.
 1135 b, 16

§ 8 ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις,
 'diagonal conjunction.' If we arrange
 our data in the same way as above
 (1131 b, 9 n.), and we wish to effect a
σύζευξις, it is clear that we must
 'conjoin,' not A with F and B with Δ
 as we did in the case of *διαμετρικὸν
 ἴσον*—this might have been called
 (1) *συνέχων σύζευξις*), but A with
 Δ and B with F. Thus

R. A.



Now the condition of such a *σύζευξις*
 being just ('equal') is that the terms
 should form an ἀρμεστική ἀναλογία,
 for it is only in that case that the sum
 of the extremes will be equal to the
 sum of the means. The meaning of
 'diagonal conjunction' is well illus-
 trated by Jackson from EE 1242 b, 15,
 where we are told that in unequal
 friendships (φιλίας καὶ ὑπερεχέτω) the
 ὑπερέχων is apt to expect to get more
 services from his friend than he gives
 in proportion to his own superiority
 (on the principle of τὸ διαμετρικὸν
 ἴσον), whereas the ὑπερχόμενος
 τούτων σιαν στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ
 κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευγνυσιν, i.e. he
 says the rule is not $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{A + \Gamma}{B + \Delta}$

but $A + \Delta = B + \Gamma$.

Cf. below 1163 b, 33.

ἐφ' ὃ, sc. ὅρα. Mr Jackson says
 "ἐφ' ὃ Ἀ κ.τ.λ. are lines, not...points."
 But the line A is ἐφ' ὃ Ἀ (Stewart).
 The ὅρα are neither lines nor points,
 but data.

δεῖ οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'the problem is'
 τοῦ ἔργου, τοῦ αὐτοῦ. This is
 the reading both of K^b and L^b, and

ἀνυπολόγιον ἴσον, εἴτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονηδὸς γίνηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἴσον, οὔδ' ἐσθλόν· οὐθὲν γὰρ καλὸν κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου· διὰ οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ἀνθρωπίνου
 15 γὰρ ἄν. εἰ μὴ <δ> ἐποίει το ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πᾶσιν ἐπῆσχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐν δύο ἱατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἱατροῦ καὶ γεωργῆ

I do not think it impossible. Professor Bywater (Conte p. 45) reads τὸ ἔργον (so M⁴). τὸ αὐτοῦ on the authority of the *Vetus Versio*. This is certainly nearer, but the authority of the *Versio* is not based upon a point of this kind.

τῶν οὖν πρώτων κ.τ.λ. Before we can say that $A + \Delta = B + \Gamma$ we must make a διόρθωσις of the terms. In this διόρθωσις there are two stages. First (πρώτον), we must equate Γ and Δ . Say $1\Gamma = 2\Delta$. This is τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, the stage which the Pythagorean formula ignores. Secondly (ἄλφα), we must bring the terms A and B into inverse arithmetical ratio of 2 and 1. This will give us $A + (2 - 1) = B = \Gamma = \Delta$ (τὸ ἀντιπεπονηδόν). After this διόρθωσις 'diagonal conjunction' becomes possible (ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον) thus:

$$A + (2 - 1) + \Delta = B + \Gamma$$

οὔδ' ἐσθλόν, sc. τὸ συνάλλαγμα. The parties enter into a συνάλλαγμα or 'business relation' (συναλλάττονται) as soon as the one offers a house for shoes and the other shoes for a house. If, however, it is found impossible to effect the διόρθωσις or adjustment of terms, οὐκ ἐμμένοντες τῷ συναλλάγματι (having failed to come to terms), they break off negotiations (διαλύοντες τὸ συναλλάγμα). It is not critical to say, as Mr Jackson does, that "one of the two parties will be obliged to have recourse to corrective justice in order to obtain his rights"; for this is a case in which δίδωμι δίδωκεν δ

πόσει (1132 b, 15). Surely an action will not lie against a man with whom one has made a bad bargain unless force or fraud were used, in which case the συνάλλαγμα, being διαρκὲς ὄργανον, would be by definition annulled (ἔσται οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν).

§ 2. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. The case of a builder and a shoemaker is comparatively simple; for we may say roughly that a house is worth, say 125 pairs of shoes, and then

$$x - 1 = 124.$$

But the same principle applies to more complicated cases, like that of a doctor and a farmer, whose *erga* are not definite units, but things like *ὕγιαι* and *τροφή*. What weight can we assign to $1\Gamma = 2\Delta$ in that case? It seems as if Γ and Δ were incommensurable.

ἀνθρώπινον γὰρ ἐν κ.τ.λ. That can, I think, be no doubt. But, in this context, τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχειν must refer to the two terms A and B which are ἀντιπεπονηδόν to 1 and 2. The use of τὸ ποιοῦν in this sense will not seem very strange if we remember that the case primarily in view is that of the doctor who produces health and his 'patient'. Is the language of modern economics *ποιῶν* is Supply and τὸ πάσχειν Demand. What Aristotle really means, then, is that there would be an end of all commerce unless Supply and Demand can be made identical in every respect. The insertion of δ is due to Rawley.

καὶ ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι.
 10 ἐκ τῶν πάντων συμμέλητά δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὥς ἴσων ἀλλαγῇ. ἐφ'
 ὃ το νομισμὸν ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ 20
 μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, πόσα
 αὐτὰ δι' ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ
 οἰκοδόμους πρὸς σκυτοτόμους, τοσαυτὰ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ
 τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία.
 2 τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα ἐν τινι πάντα 25
 μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν
 ἀληθείᾳ ἡ χρεία, ἡ πάντα συνέχει—εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέοιντο
 ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγή ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οἶον δ'

τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι, i.e. εἶναι
 ἀμετρήτους ἀλλήλους, not κατ'
 ἴσους. We must equate the pro-
 ducts (τούτους) as well as the pro-
 ducts (ταῦτα δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι, 1133a, 13)
 to get the *analogia* required for pur-
 poses of exchange.

§ 10. συμμέλητά, 'comparable,'
 i.e. *συνμετρήτους* (*συνμετρεῖν*). The
 formula we have been working with
 assumes that the value of the one
 product can always be expressed as
 a multiple of the other. But, since
 the products are *incommensurable*, there must
 be some "common measure" of both
 if this is to prove true. The principle
 indicates that down in 1137. Cf. 1133a,
 10 c. *μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ποσόν* (*συμμέλητά*)
οὐκ ἐστὶ ταῦτά τι εἶναι ὑπερὸν τὰς
καὶ συνμέλητάς φ' μετρουμένης. The
 "common measure" is *money*, which
 turns as it were 'a middle term'
 between *what is measured* (*πόσων*) under which
 both the *erga* may be brought.

ἀλλήλους. Cf. 1133b, 11 n.

ποσὸν μέσον. This is the important
 point. The existence of money tends
 to emphasize the fact that justice in our
 economic transactions is an arith-
 metical mean like the other forms.
 τὴν ὑπεροχὴν . . . τὴν ἔλλειψιν. These
 words show we are dealing with *differ-*
ence not *ratio*.

πόσα αὐτὰ δι' κ.τ.λ. If the value
 of shoes is fixed in money, it becomes
 comparable, not only with the value of
 a house, but also with that of *τροφῇ*.

δεῖ τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., what is wanted,
 then, is that the proportion

$$A + x - 1) \cdot B = \Gamma - \Delta$$

should be generalised in such a way
 that it will represent not one equation
 only, but a whole series. We know
 already that 'x shoes' (τοσαυτὰ ὑπο-
 δῆματα) = 1 house. But, unless this
 can be extended, so that we can
 also equate shoes with *τροφῇ* etc.,
 commerce is impossible.

ὅπερ, i.e. *διαφέρει*. Identity of differ-
 ence, not of ratio, as above 1131 b, 14.

§ 11. ἡ χρεία. Aristotle derives
 this idea from Plato (*Rep.* 369). A
 modern economist would say rather
 that Normal Value is determined by
 Cost of Production (which some editors
 import into the argument here); but
 Aristotle is thinking of the more
 ultimate fact that, but for *χρεία*, the
 thing would have no value at all,
 whatever the cost of production might
 be, and infers from this that 'x shoes'
 = 1 house because the shoemaker's
 'need' of the builder exceeds the
 builder's 'need' of the shoemaker
 by $x - 1$.

ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, e.g. if the need of

- ἰπλάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γίγνεται κατὰ συνθήκην
 30 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τούνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ
 ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀχρηστον. ἔσται ἡ
 δὴ ἀντιπεπονητός, ὅταν ἴσασθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὶν
 σκυτοτόμῳ, τὸ ἔργον τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τοῦ γεωργεῖ.
 1133^b εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἡγεῖν ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται (αὐ
 δὲ μὴ, ἀμφοτέρως ἔχει τὰς ὑπεραχάς τὸ ἔσπερον ἄσπερον) ἀλλ'
 ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν. οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωμικοί. ὅτι αὐτῇ ἡ

the builder for the services of the shoemaker were not so great, the rate of exchange would not be the same. Aristotle does not seem to see that Cost of Production narrows this variation to a comparatively slight fluctuation.

ἰπλάλλαγμα, 'a pledge, security'. This is one of the non-Attic terms which Aristotle may have brought from Stagira. Papyriacci even says **ἰπλάλλαγμα** ἀναθῶν τινος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνέχυρον. The meaning is precisely the same as in 1133^b, 11 τὸ νόμισμα εἰς ἐγγυητικὴν εἶναι.

κατὰ συνθήκην οὐ φύσει ἄλλα νόμῳ. In 1101^b 1257^b Aristotle quotes this view in an extreme form, probably derived from the Cynics, **λήρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος πάντας, φύσει δ' οὐδέν. ἐπεὶ μεταθεμένῳ τε τῶν χρημάτων** ('adopting a new currency') **οὐδένος ἔστιν ὑβὸς χρησίμου πρὶν οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι, καὶ νομισματὸς πλουτῶν πολλὰκις ἐπορήσει τοῖς ἀναγκαίαις τροφῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιοῦντος εἶναι πλουτοῦ οὐ εὐσεβῶν ἡμῶν ἀποδείκνυται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδα μὴ λογοῦντος διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς ψυχῆς πάντων ἀντὶ γινόμενων τῶν παραθεμένων χρημάτων.** It is true that there is no element of **συνθήκη** or **νόμος** in currency—we may have a gold or a silver standard—but it has an intrinsic (**φύσει**) value also determined by its Cost of Production.

§ 12. **ἔσται δὲ κ.τ.λ.** After the

depression on currency, we are reminded of the two sides of the equation. The inverse arithmetic ratio will only be applicable (**ἔσται**) after the equation has been made in money value (**ὅταν ἴσασθῇ**). We can then work out the new relation of exchanging shoes and horses as easily as that of exchanging them with a definite horse like a house.

ὅπερ, ἢ διαφέρει. Cf. 1103^a, 21. The **διαφορά** is **ὑπεραχά** or **ἐλλείπει** of **χρεία**.

εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας κ.τ.λ. The transition certainly must not bring them into the figure of proportion after they have exchanged, but when they still have their own products, otherwise one of the extremes will have both extremes. This can only have any real meaning if we understand it of the generalization of the equation to other cases than that first stated. The **ἔργον** of the **συντομία** must not be equated with that of the **γεωργία**, as the latter received from its exchange with that of the **αἰσθητοῦ**, **οὐδὲν** is the **γεωργία** will have not only his excess over the builder, but the excess of the builder over the **συντομία** too. The **σχῆμα ἀναλογίας** then is

οὐκ ἰσοδυναμεῖται τροφῇ

It is only such a figure that can give any meaning to τὸ ἔσπερον ἄσπερον.

- ισότης δύναιται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς Α, τροφή Γ, σκυτοτόμος Β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ. αἱ δ' οὕτω 5
 13 μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεποιηθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωρία. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία συνέρχει ὥσπερ ἐν τι οὖν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ᾖσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφότεροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν οὐ <οὐκ> ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἶνον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξα-
 14 γωγὴν. διὰ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπερ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης 10 ἀλλαγῆς εἰ ἴδν μηδὲν δείται, ὅτι ἔσται ἂν δεσθῇ, τὸ νόμιμα οἶνον ἐγγρηγῆς ἰσθ' ἡμῖν· δεῖ γάρ τοῦτο φέρουσι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναιται· ἔμως δε βούλεται μείνειν μῦλλον. διὸ διὰ πάντα τετιμῆσθαι· οἴτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινω- 15 ρία. τὸ δὲ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μετρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἴσα-

γεωργὸς Α + γλ Having equated *ισότης* with *ἰσάμενος* to *εἶμαρ*, we can now explain τὸ ἀντιπεποιηθῆναι by 'dia gramal co-valuation' in the same way as we did before.

§ 13. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία κ + λ These constant equations would be very troublesome, and we therefore look for some common means, which will enable us to measure each commodity once for all.

ὥσπερ ὅταν κ + λ This must surely be an instance of future to effect an exchange (οὐκ ἀλλάττονται), and it must lead up to the view of money as ἐγγρηγῆς τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς. The meaning must therefore be 'no exchange takes place when the producer (τις) wants a some thing which the consumer (αὐτόν) has to give'. I have therefore written οὐ <οὐκ> ἔχει for οὐ ἔχει (1⁴), or οὐχί (1⁵).

ἔδωκεν ἐξαγωγὴν 'offering the produce of exporting corn.' The phrase *δίδωμι ἐξαγωγή* is technical in the sense of to permit exportation of a home-product. Cf. Isok. *Isagor.* § 55 where we read that Sagoras, king of Boeotia, and his father treated the Athenians as 'the most

lavoured nation' *οὐδὲν ἄλλω ἐμ- πόρων κατὰ κράτος ἐκτεμνοται*, *ὡς ἐξαγωγὴν ἰδούων*, Theophr. *Char.* 1211 and *διδόμενος αὐτῷ ἐξαγωγῆς εἶλον ἀνελούς* ('duty-free') Bywater (*Conit.*, p. 46) also compares CIG 3503 (= Cauer 116) and *Uittenberger, Sylloge* 60 d 1 and 354. 6. The plural participle referring to the same subject as a singular indefinite pronoun is quite a common construction, Cf. 1135 d, 31.

§ 14. οἶνον ἐγγρηγῆς, cf. *ἀπάλλαγμα* above 1133a, 29.

πᾶσχα...τὸ αὐτό, 'the same thing, indeed, happens to money,' as there is not always the same demand for it. I think that the context sufficiently justifies this interpretation; for 'in 1133 a, 28 the two cases have been already distinguished, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγῇ (failure to exchange, when wine is wanted and corn offered), ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτῇ (unfavourable exchange). See, however, Bywater, *Conit.*, p. 46.


τετιμῆσθαι, 'to have a price put on them,' not, we may be sure, by the 'bidding of the market.' Aristotle no doubt is thinking of a tariff prescribed by the magistrates.

ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦε, οὐτ' ἀλλαγῇ
 ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὐτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν
 οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσούτων διαφέροντα σύμμετρα
 20 γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδύχεται ἰκανῶς. ἐν εἰρήνῃ διδύ-
 μῃ, ταῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο
 γὰρ πάντα ποιῶν σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομί-
 σματι· οἰκία α, μυαὶ δέκα β, κλίνη γ. τὸ α τοῦ β ἡμισυ.
 εἰ πέντε μυῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἡ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δίκαιος
 25 μέρος, τὸ γ τοῦ β· δῆλον ταῖνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσων
 οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα
 εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας
 ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.

Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδίκον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται. 15
 30 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ
 τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεονέχειν τὸ δ'
 ἔλαττον ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τις ἐστίν, οἱ τε
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσον ἐστίν.
 1134^a ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἑνὸς

§ 15. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, i q. καθ' αὐτὸν εἰν-
 ὅρηται

οἰκία α καλ. The sum of 10
 minas is taken as the common measure
 of houses and beds, which are not
 directly commensurable. We know,
 however, that a house is worth five
 minas and a bed worth one, so we
 can say that $a = \frac{\beta}{5}$ and $\gamma = \frac{\beta}{10}$ from
 which it follows that $a = 5\gamma$. The
 diagram is given thus by the text:



The 10 minas take the place of 'a
 minas' in the earlier diagram.

ἡ ἴσον, 'worth five minas or 5
 minas' for the use of ἴσον in the
 sense of the sign =, cf. 1133 a, 23.
 οὕτως, i.e. five beds for a house.

§ 17. Τί μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We come
 to the question of the measure of
 δικαιοσύνη: That δικαιοπραγία, the
 ἀντιγεία, is a μέσον, we have already
 already shown, but what are we to
 say of the text?

οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. The dif-
 ference arises from the fact that δικαιο-
 σύνη is an ἀρετή πρὸς ἑαυτὸν. We
 have no suggestion of an equally a measure
 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, but as a rule we will
 involve a proposition, whether geo-
 metrical or arithmetical. Justice is
 τὸ μέσον because, whether in dis-
 tribution or in adjusting penalties and
 prices, it seeks to find the x , where
 $x + n$ of good things and $x - n$ of bad
 and to secure for others either $x + n$
 or $x - n$ of good things or bad, as the
 case may be.

καθ' ἑνός, i.e. ἑνός.

τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ 1134^b
 δ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν
 αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ εἰπερ δίκαιος (οἱ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνύλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ
 ἐτέρῳ κοινῇ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθόν 5
 γ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον)—μισθὸς ἄρα
 τις δοσέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ἔτι δὲ μὴ ἰκανὰ τὰ
 8 τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον
 καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταύτῳ τοιούτοις ἄλλ' ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν
 ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτήμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, 10
 9 ὥς ἂν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸν
 δ' οὐδεὶς προαιμεῖται βλαπτειν· διὸ οἷα ἐστὶν ἀδικία πρὸς
 αὐτά. οἱ δ' ἄρα ἀδικοῦν οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ
 νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος, οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν
 οἱς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον 15
 πρὸς γυναικὰ ἔστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο
 γάρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πο-

to mean 'contrary to the general principle' embodied in the law, τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου of Pol. 1286 a, 17. But surely this would not be sprung upon us without anything in the context to suggest it. For the confusion of νόμος and λόγος in the mss., see 1138 a, 10 n. In later times λόγος was supposed to mean 'reason.'

§ 7. μισθός· δοσέος. All this comes from Plato *Rep.* 345 e 2-37.

§ 8. τὸ δεσποτικὸν καὶ πατρικόν. Justice between master and slaves or between father and children resembles the *δικαίον* of the state. But it is not the same; for these *συνωνίαι* do not fall under the head of *ὁ ἐν ἀδικίᾳ*. There cannot be *ἀδικία ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ* of oneself, but only *ἀδικία πρὸς ἑαυτὸν*. The word *πατρικὸν* properly means 'hereditary,' but Aristotle gives it a new application.

ὥς ἂν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ χωρισθῇ, 'till it strikes a certain age and has been separated.' Cf. *in* *ισοτι* μὴ before *χω-*

μισθῇ, the scribe supposing *ὥς ἂν* to mean 'as long as.'

ὥσπερ μέρος. Cf. Pol. 1254 a, 9 τὴ δὲ στήμα λέγεται ὥστε καὶ τὸ μέρος.

§ 9. πρὸς αὐτό, Ramsauer's reading for *ἐν*, *πρὸς αὐτόν*, seems clearly right.

ἦν, ἦσαν, as we saw above a, 24 viii.

ἰσότης τοῦ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι. This is not quite how the equality was formulated above, but it comes to the same thing. For, in the Third Book of the *Politics*, Aristotle shows that the citizen is necessarily ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι (1283 b, 49).

μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκα. Cf. Pol. 1250 a, 39 γυναικὶς ἀρχεῖν καὶ τέκνῳ, ὡς ελευθέρῳ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρέφει τῇ ἀρχῇ, ἀλλὰ γυναικὶ μὲν πολιτικῶς, τέκνῳ δὲ φυσικῶς.

τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον. In Pol. 1283 b, 8 the *τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς* are thus given. *ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν δε-*

λιτικοῦ. VII. τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δίκαιόν τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ
 δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν,
 20 καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐδεὶς
 διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ
 μίαν λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα,
 ἐπὶ ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρα-
 σίδαν, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα 2
 25 τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν
 ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσας καίαι,
 τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρᾷσιν. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως 3
 ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς· καίτοι παρὰ γε ταῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδα-
 μῶς, παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κινήτων μίτοι
 30 πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποῖον 4
 δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὐ
 ἀλλὰ νομικόν καὶ συνθήκη, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινήτῃ ὁμοίως,
 δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει ἐνορισμός· φέ-
 σι γὰρ ἢ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφιδε-
 35 ξίους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ὥς 5
 1135^a δίκαιον ὁμοία ἐστὶ τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ

ποικίλῃ καὶ γαμικῇ (ἀπανομένων γὰρ ἡ
 γυναικὶ καὶ ἀνδρὶ σβένειν), καὶ τριτον
 πατρικῇ (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ἀνέμασται
 ἰδίῳ ἀνδρὶ). The word γαμικῇ pri-
 marily means not 'conjugal,' but 'peti-
 tioning to a wedding,' while πατρικῇ
 is properly 'heireditary.'

VII. § 1. φυσικὸν νομικόν. See
 1004 b, 16 n.

ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, 'when they have
 adopted it.'

μίαν λυτροῦσθαι. In Herodotus,
 vi, 79 we are told *ἔπειτα δὲ ἐπεὶ
 Πελοποννησίους δύο μύας τετραγμύνας
 παρ' ἀνδρᾶ αἰχμαλώτων ἔτινεν*. But
 Asia in the 4th century is not Pelopon-
 nesus in the 5th.

τὸ αἶγα θύειν κ.τ.λ. We do not
 know what this refers to.

τὸ θύειν Βρασίδαν, at Amphipolis.
 Cf. Thuc. v, 11.

τὰ ψηφισματώδη. On the dis-

tinction between ψηφίσματα καὶ νόμοι
 see below 1141 b, 17.

§ 2. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. I
 is true that τὰ δίκαια ἀκίνητα, but
 it is not true that τὸ δίκαιον ἰσχυρὸν
 On the contrary, τὰ φύσει ὅσα τινος
 φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ταῖς αἰσθεσίαις οὐκ
 αἰσθῶνται καὶ οὐδὲν αἰσθῶνται (Phya. 197 b, 17)

καίτοι παρὰ γε κ.τ.λ. In heaven
 there is 'immutable justice,' so the
 argument would not be true at all
 of the gods. There is nothing re-
 markable in the fact that Aristotle
 attributes justice to the gods in a de-
 lectical argument like this. It is true
 that he shows below (1138 b, 10) that
 it is absurd to talk of the gods being
 just, but ordinary speech does so, and
 that is enough to make an ἐλεγχος.

§ 4. ποῖον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle means
 τὰ ὡς ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον. Cf. Introd. § 16.

οἷητρά καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν ἀνοῦνται, μείζω, εὐ
 δὲ πολλοῖσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ'
 ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταῦτ' ἀπανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οἱδ' αἱ πολί-
 6 τείαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη. τῶν 5
 δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ'
 ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δ'
 7 ἕκαστον ἓν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ
 ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ
 ἐστὶ τῇ φέσει ἢ τᾷζεί· αὐτοῦ δὲ ταῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδί- 10
 κημ' ἴσται, τρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὕτω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως
 ἐξ καὶ δικαίωμα· καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα το
 κεινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ'
 ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἶδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα
 11 γιγχάνει ὄντα, ὑστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. VIII. ὄντων δὲ τῶν 15
 δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημίνων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ
 ὅταν ἐκὼν τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε
 δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέ-
 2 βηκε δικαίους εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ
 δικαιοπράγημα οἰρισταὶ τῇ ἐκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ· ὅταν γὰρ 20
 ἐκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ὅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότε ἐστίν· ὥστ'
 ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δ' οὕτω, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον
 3 προσῇ. λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται,
 δ' ἂν τις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ
 μήτε ὅν μήτε ὧ μήτε οὐ <ἐνεκα>, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ 25
 τίνας ἐνεκα, κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μηδὲ
 βίᾳ (ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτει ἕτερον,
 εὐχ' ἰαίῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ)· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον
 πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις

§ 6. οὐ μὲν ἀνοῦνται κ.τ.λ., i.e. which are and retail measures differ.

§ 7. τὸ κοινόν, κ. τῷ δικαιοπράγῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδικήματι. Aristotle had used δικαίωμα above to get a general notion to ἀδίκημα. But he admits that this is stretching the meaning of the word considerably.

VIII. οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'they perform

acts of which justice or injustice are accidental,' the regular way of explaining the term κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

§ 8. καὶ πρότερον IIII a, 1 sqq.

μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός represents μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν. He thinks some one ὧ συμβέβηκε γὰρ εἶναι, but not καθ' αἰτίαν.

- 30 γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διω-
 ρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρῆξιν ὅλην. τὸ δὲ
 ἀγνοοῦμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοοῦμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ
 βίᾳ, ἀκούσιον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων αἰδῶ-
 1135^b τες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθέν οὐθ' ἀκούσιον οὔτ'
 ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρῶν ἢ ὑποθιγέσκειν. ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως α
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκίαν·
 καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίῃ τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ
 5 φήβον, ὅν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον
 ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζό-
 μενον καὶ ἄκωντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ὑποδιδύοντα κατὰ
 συμβεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικοι πράττειν. τῶν 3
 δὲ ἐκούσιων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελό-
 10 μενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα
 δὲ ὅσ' ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς β
 κοιναισίαις τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτημάτων ἐστίν, ἥταν
 μήτε ὅν μήτε δ' μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γῆρ
 οὐ βιάλλειν ἢ οὐ τοῦτῃ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἔνεκα φήθῃ,
 15 ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα φήθῃ, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τραύσῃ ἀλλ'
 ἵνα κενθήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὄν, ἢ οὐχ ᾧ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως γ

μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν. This is the same class of things as is referred to at 1113 b, 26. It is explained in the next sentence; πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

οὐτ' ἀκούσιον. This has been suspected, but it seems to me quite correct. We cannot rightly call τὰ φύσει ὑπάρχοντα involuntary any more than voluntary. They are altogether outside that classification, for they happen *force* and not *via*. It would be absurd to say that we grow old intentionally.

§ α. καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, as well as τὸ κατὰ αἰδῶν.

§ β. τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι. For το ἐκούσιον is a wider term than το προαίρετον. See above 1111 a, 14 ἀκούσιον μὲν δὲ φαίνεται (τὸ προαιρετόν), τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον οὐ πάν προ

αιρετόν· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ το προβουλευόμενον).

§ γ. μετ' ἀγνοίας, κ.τ.λ. τῶν αἰδῶν ἐκαστα.

ἀμαρτήματα is here used in its widest sense (included by ἀνέχματα). Is legal testimony, ἀνέχματα is, as ἀμαρτήματα implies *εἰσῆς*, ἀδικεῖν implies *ἀδίκημα*. Cf. Menander fr. 426 *ἡ ἀνέχματα ἀδίκημα ἀδίκημα ἀσφοδὸν ἔχει τὸ μὲν διὰ τύχης γίγνεται, τὸ δ' αἰσίου*. The distinction was a commonplace of the δικαστήρια.

§ δ. παραλόγως. Cf. Rhet. 1374 b, ὅσοντι ἀνέχματα μὲν ὅσα παραλόγια καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ σοφίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παραλόγια καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ ποικιλίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴτε παραλόγια καὶ ποικιλίας τὸ ἐστίν. The παραλόγως is what is contrary to reasonable ex-

αι, ἀτύχημα· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἀνευ
ῥήτημα (ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ
αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἔξωθεν)· ὅταν δὲ
προβουλευσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, ὅσον ὅσα τε διὰ 20
πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει
ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνουν-
· καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστίν, οὐ μίντοι πᾶσι ἄδικοι
πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάβην
πειρίσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς 25
ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ
ργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ
ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ
ἴσθιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι
ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι 30
διὰ λήθην αὐτὰ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντος
κατος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτέρου δικαίου ἀμφισβη-

justice it is not
unintentionally kill
ex in the street,
if you shoot in an
ed a man suddenly
L
24 Mr Jackson
τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ. But
means simply 'the
as often in the

είσεαι 64. It does
to make an act
o not call a man
ci comes from a

30. The ἀναγκαῖα
h τὰ σωματικά, τὰ
αι τῆς τῶν ἀφροδι-
· 261. the φυσικά
that, ὅσα κούδ
νισθ (1149 E, 5).
though not ἀναγ-

the legal phrase,
'malice.'

οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει, i.e. τῇ αἰτίᾳ, 'is not
the aggressor.'

§ 10. οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ.
The issue of fact is not raised, but
only that of justification.

ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is the
phantasia of wrong suffered that is the
ἀρχὴ κινήσεως of that form of ἀρετὴ
called θυμός. The process is ex-
plained below 1149 a, 32.

ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν.
Cf. Rhett 1417 b, 27 πῶς λαμβάνεται
δ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβη-
τήσῃ μὲν (i.e. ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι)
τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι πονηρόν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν
ἀγνοία αἰτία ὥσπερ ἐν αἰτίαις περὶ
τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητήσεων (the present
case).

ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην κ.τ.λ., 'unless in
cases where the wrong has been done
from forgetfulness.' For instance a
man may forget to pay a bill, and in
that case is not μοχθηρός. There is
no difficulty about the plural, cf.
1133 b, 9 n.

περὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. For δὲ connecting a

τοῦσιν (ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλευσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ), ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ· ἐὼν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἀδικος, ὅταν παρὶ τὸ ἀναλογον ἢ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προσεχόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ· δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἐκὺς πρᾶττῃ. τῶν δ' ἀκούσιων τὰ μὲν ἔστι συγγνωμονικά τὰ δ' οὐ συγγνωμονικά· ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἀγνοίαν ἁμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἀγνοίαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος ἐλ μῆτε φυσικῶν μῆτ' ἀνθρώπων, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

IX. Ἀπορήσει δ' ἂν τις εἰ ἱκανῶς διώριστα περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

Μητέρα κατέταν τὴν ἐμὴν, βραχὺς λόγος.

—Ἐκὼν ἰκοῦσαν, ἢ <οὐχ> ἰκοῦσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν;

15 πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἰκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὐ ἄλλ' ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἰκούσιοι; καὶ ἄρα

finite verb with a participle, see 1116 a, 8 n.

§ 11. ἐπὶ δ' ἐπιβουλευσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ. Clearly δ' ἐπιβουλευσας is contrasted with δ' μὴ προβουλευσας above (b, 20). He is the man who has received no provocation and is the aggressor (ἀρχὴ). He cannot plead ἀγνοία, and the ἀμυνσθήσεις, if there is one, will be περὶ τοῦ ἡυνίσθαι not περὶ τοῦ δικαίου. The word ἐπιβουλεύειν implies an unprovoked act, not a retaliation of any kind.

§ 12. εἰς δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως κ.τ.λ. The presence of προαίρεσις, i.e. of βουλευτική ὁρμή, not mere ὁρμή like θυμὸς, at once makes the man ἄδικος, though his act may be an ἄδικημα even without προαίρεσις.

παρὰ τὸ ἀναλογον ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον, according as the citizens are equal κατ' ἀναλογίαν or κατ' ἀριθμὸν (1134 a, 27). The reference is not to Distributive and Corrective Justice.

ἂν μόνον ἐκὼν, i.e. even without προαίρεσις.

§ 12. εἰς δ' εἰς τὴν ἐκ. κ.τ.λ. An act of this kind would not be an ἄδικημα but something worse. In the *Verbal Book* these 'bestial' passages are discussed.

IX. § 1. Ἀπορήσει δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. In the light of the definitions just made certain old difficulties may be solved. The first is 'Can a man be wronged with his own consent?'

Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε. Cf. 1110 a, 18 n. The two lines seem to have formed part of a *συναίρεσις*. The *μὴ τιμὴ ἢ θάλασσαν*, but the *scelus* seems to require an antithesis to *δοῦναι*. Our text restored οὐ θάλασσαν, *scelus* and Bywater read οὐχ ἰκοῦσαν, comparing Hippol. 319 φίλος μ' ἀσέλιος ἐπὶ τοῦτον οὐχ ἐκόν. The speakers are probably Alkmeon and Phaedra.

καὶ ἄρα τῶν κ.τ.λ. On the *diagraphia* see Bywater, *Contr.* p. 47.

πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως [ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον,] ἢ
 2 τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιο-
 οῦσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ὥστ' εὐλογον
 ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον, τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δι- 20
 καιοῦσθαι ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ἐννι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται
 3 οὐχ ἐκόντες. ἔπειτα καὶ τὸδε διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, ποτερον ὁ
 τὸ ἀδικον πεπονηὸς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς, ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράτ-
 τειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστὶν· κατὰ συμβεβηκός γὰρ ἐν- 25
 ἔχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων· ὁμοίως
 δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν τὸ τὰ δίκαια
 πρῆττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀδίκαια πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι·
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνα-
 4 τον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικούντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιο- 30
 5 πραγούντος. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα
 τινά, τὸ δ' ἐκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς, ὁ δ' ἀκρα-
 τής ἐκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτόν, ἐκὼν τ' ἂν ἀδικῷτο κἄν ἐν-
 λεχέσθαι αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῶν ἀπο-
 5 ρουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἐκὼν ἂν τις 1136^b
 εἰ ἀκράσιον ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτεται ἐκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἐκόντ'
 ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ
 βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὥς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου

The alternative is whether (1) τὸ ἀδικεῖν is in every case necessitating one or the other, or whether (2) it is sometimes the one and sometimes the other.

§ 2. δικαιοῦσθαι, 'having justice done to one.' Aristotle requires an agent to τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι and not δικαιοῦσθαι in a sense of his own. So above (1135 a, 15) he used δικαίωμα as the opposite of ἀδικημα.

εὐλογον, opp. ἄτοπον (a, 32), marks a dialectical argument.

§ 3. ἔπειτα answering to πρῶτον μὲν a, 11. The reading is Bywater's correction of MA. ἐπεί. See CONTR. p. 47. The second ἔπειτα is 'Can we say that every man who suffers a

wrong is wronged?'

ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων, sc. ἐπὶ τοῖς πάσχειν καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράττειν. We have seen already that ἐπὶ τοῖς πράττειν it is possible to commit an ἀδικημα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, e.g. when we act δι' ἄγνοιαν. Is it also possible κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀδικεῖσθαι?

§ 4. ἀπλῶς, opp. to ἢ προσθετέον below (b, 31). If we say that a wrong is 'simply' ἀδικημα knowingly inflicted, we shall have to say that the ἀκράτης, who knowingly suffers ἀδικημα at the hands of another or his own, ἀδικεῖται. We must, however, regard ἐκόντος as well as ἀδικημα, and νολεῖται ποῦ τίς ἐκόντος.

§ 5. προσθετέον, i.e. προσδιοριστέον.

- 5 βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἰκὼν καὶ τὰδικα πάσχει, ὁ
 ἀδικεῖται ἔ' οὐδεὶς ἰκὼν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, εἰδὼς ὁ ἀκρατής,
 ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς
 ὁ μὴ οἶσται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὃ τε ἀκρατής οὐχ ἡ οἶσται δύν
 10 πράττει κρείττε· ὁ δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρὸς φησὶ;
 10 δοῦναι τὸν Ἰλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδεϊ "χρῦσας χαλκείων, ἱκα-
 τομβοὶ ἐννεαβοίων," οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ δι-
 δοῦναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα
 διὲ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἰκούσιον ὁ
 δῆλον.
- 15 Ἔτι δ' ὅν προειλέμεθα οὗ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερον τοῦ
 ἀδικεῖ ὁ νόμος παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν το πλείον ἢ ὁ ἔχων, κα-
 εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον
 20 λεχθέν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλεον,
 εἰ τις πλεον αὐτοῦ ἐτέρῳ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἰκὼν, οὗτος αὐτοῖ
 20 αὐτοῦ ἀδικεῖ· ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπικ-
 κῆς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦς; ἐτέρου γὰρ
 ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχει, πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ.
 ἐτι λύεται κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ
 τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διὰ γε τοῦτο.
- 25 ἀλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. φανερον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος
 25 μων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλεον ἔχων ἀεί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ το
 ἀδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ὅς τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν
 τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πρὶξως, ἢ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ διανέμῳ
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἐτι ὅπει πολλὰχὼς τὸ ποιεῖν
 30 λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἀψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ
 30 οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἀδικ-
 ἐτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν δακρυεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικόν ἡ 11

§ 6. βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We may consent to *diminuitur*; but, if it is essential to *iniuria* that it should be *παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν*, we cannot consent to that. For no one 'wishes' anything but τὸ φαιδύμενον ἀγαθόν.

§ 7. Ὀμηρος. II. vi, 236.

§ 8. ὅν προειλέμεθα. This has no reference. Aristotle forgets that he has

not enumerated the *ἀνομία*. He now mentions the third and fourth.

§ 9. ἐλαττωτικός, *opp. eleuante* κ.τ.λ.

§ 11. κτείνει, the legal word.

§ 12. ἀγνοῶν, *sc. τὰ τοῦ δακρυ*. The case supposed is one in which material facts were not before the court.

καιον οὐδ' ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἐστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν ἐκαίον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γνωστικὸν ἔκρι-
κεν ἄδικως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. 1137^a

- 13 ὥσπερ οὖν κὰν εἰ τις μερισαιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ
ταῦτα κρίνας ἄδικως πλείον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τὸν
14 ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἠγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. οἱ δ'
ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἰοῦνται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ καὶ τὸ 5
δίκαιον εἶναι ῥᾶδιον, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ
τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ
τὸ ἀργύριον ῥᾶδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδι ἔχοντας
15 ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥᾶδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ
γρῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδिका οἶδιν οἰόντας σοφὸν εἶναι, 10
ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι (ἀλλ' οὐ
ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· ἀλλὰ πῶς
πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νερόμενα δίκαια, ταῦτο δὴ πλείον ἔρ-
γον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι· ἐπεὶ καὶ κεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ
ἐλλέβορον καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομῇν εἰδέναι ῥᾶδιον, ἀλλὰ ποῖς 15
δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνοι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον
16 ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἰόνται
εἶναι οὐδὲν ἥττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἥττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ
καὶ μᾶλλον δύναιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον πράξαι τούτων· καὶ γὰρ
συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος τὴν 20

πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτός. The unjust judge δάξει, for he takes more than his share of the ἀδικῶν ἀγασθῶ. It is not essential that he should merely share the spoils of the ἀδικήμα. Even if he were to decide the case on these terms (ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ, it is not the law) to dispute but a money equivalent that he would receive. So the equivalent need not be more than the gratitude of the one party (χάρις) or the pleasure of punishing the other (τιμωρία). These are enough to constitute πλεονεκα.

§ 16. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὥδι κ.τ.λ. It is not easy to be ὥδιος, though it is easy to commit an ἀδικία.

§ 16. ἀλλ' οὐ εἰσλ., 'though these

things are not just, each is accept-
ably.' For a parenthesis introduced
by ἀλλὰ='though,' followed by a
main clause introduced by ἀλλὰ =
'but.' Rywater (Contr. p. 48) compares
1139 b, 1 1140 b, 6 seq.

τοῦτο δὴ, κ.τ.λ. τὸ γρῶναι πῶς πραττό-
μενα κ.τ.λ. The max. have τοῦτο δὴ,
but see Rywater, Contr. p. 49.

§ 16. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, i.e. because
they ignore the fact that it is easy to
do an unjust act, but not to be unjust.
Plato had already shown in the First
Book of the Republic that, if we
regard justice as a mere external
accomplishment or τέχνη the just
man will be the best thief (Rep.
934 a).

ἀσπίδα ἀφίηται καὶ στραφίς ἐφ' ὅπατεραοὺν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ
τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἄδικεῖν οἱ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστὶ. πλὴν
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὲ ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖ, ὥσ-
περ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεῦν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ
25 τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεῦν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεῦν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
ὡδί. ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν ταῦτοις οἷς μέτεστε τῶν ἀπλῶς
ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ταῦτοις καὶ ἑλλείψιν· τοῖς
μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς
δ' οὐδὲν μύριον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιήτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα
30 βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρη τοῦ· τούτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.

X. Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὴ
ἐπιεικεία πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,
ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταῦτόν ἀπλῶς οὐδ' ὡς
ἕτερον τῇ γένει φαίνεται σκοποῦμένοις· καὶ ὅτ' μὲν τὸ ἐπιει-
35 κὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ αἰδρεῖται τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τα
1137^b ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιει-
κέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες ὅτ' ἐπὶ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι
φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τι ὅν ἐπι-
νετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς [ὡς
5 δίκαιον] εἰ ἄλλο· ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταῦτόν ἐστιν. ἢ μὴ¹
οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς
ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπερναντία

§ 17. τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, i.e. τῶν
ἀγαθῶν, things which are good in them-
selves, though they may be bad in
relation to something else. Cf. 1119
b, 3.

ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ., 'but
admit of excess or defect in them.'
Of course ἔχουσι is the cause of the
participle, which is connected with
the finite verb by δέ. Cf. 1119a, 8.
τούτο δ'. This is the reason sug-
gested by the *Vetus Versio*, and I
have followed Stewart in preferring
it. The MSS. have διὰ τοῦτ', which
leaves ἐστίν without a subject. Others
read διό for διὰ.

X. § 1 Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας κ.τ.λ.

The questions of legal casuistry we
have been discussing lead ultimately
to the question of 'equity.'

ὥστε καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'so much so that
in pressing things we even transfer the
word ἐπιεικὲς to other things than
justice, and use it as equivalent to
ἀγαθόν.' Aristotle avoids the word
τὸν ἀγαθόν and κακόν and prefers
the milder terms ἐπιεικὲς, μέτρον τῶν
φαύλων or εὐταχέων. Aristotle also
uses ἐπιεικὲς in this sense. Cf. 1100a
10.

[ὡς δίκαιον]. These words are not
translated in the *Vetus Versio* and
seem better away, as G. phantasiau

ἐαυτοῖς· τὸ τε γὰρ ἐπικαὶν δικαίου τινὸς ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι ἐλ-
 καιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τε γένος ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου.
 ταύτων ἔρα δικαίον καὶ ἐπικαίς, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαῖον δυν- 10
 3 τοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπικαίς. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπι-
 καίς δικαίον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρ-
 4 θωμα νομῶν δικαίου. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πάς,
 περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷον τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν
 ἀναγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷον τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὅς ἐπὶ 15
 τὸ πλέον λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον.
 καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἥττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ
 νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματος
 5 ἐστίν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὅλη ἐστίν. ὅταν
 οὖν λεγῇ μιν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦτου παρὰ 20
 τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης
 καὶ ἔμμενεν ἀπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθῆν, ὃ καὶ
 ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς ἂν εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ᾗδεν, ἐνο-
 6 μοθέτησεν διὸ δικαίον μὲν ἐστὶ, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου,
 οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δεῖ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμαρτήματος. 25
 καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπικαικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμον,
 ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ
 πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι
 7 νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ

§ 2. δικαίου τινός, 'better than a species of justice.' It is *πῶς* a species of justice, not another genus.

§ 4. ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πάς π.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, *Polit.* 294 π νόμος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις τὸ τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ δικαιότερον ἀριστερὶ παύει ἀμαρτανόμενον τὸ βέλτερον ἐπιτάττει.

εὐθὺς 'from its very nature.' This use of *εὐθὺς* is derived from such phrases as *εὐθὺς ἐν γαστρί*, *εὐθὺς ἐν γυμνασίῳ*. Cf. 1140 b, 27.

ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὅλη, sc. τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ, for ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἡ σφαιρική.

§ 5. ὃ καὶ ὁ νομοθέτης π.τ.λ. Cf.

Rhet. 1374 b, 11 (ἐπικαίς) τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ('the letter') ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διαταγὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου. We see from the word *παρών* that Aristotle is thinking of the lawgiver's address in Plato, *Polit.* 294 π sqq., and that in turn is suggested by the story of Solon.

§ 6. ψηφίσματος δεῖ. A *ψήφισμα* is an executive, not a legislative, act. The *διαταγή* was an executive, not a legislative, body. Allowing for differences, we may think of an *εἰρηστής* in [Roman].

30 ὁ κανὼν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ πολυ-
βδίνος κανὼν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται
καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανὼν, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πραγματε.
τί μιν οὖν ἐστὶ το ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον καὶ τιμὸς βίλ-
τιον δίκαιον, δῆλον. φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς
35 ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς, καὶ
1138 ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικὸς, καίτε-
ρ' ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικὴς ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἔξις αὐτῇ ἐπι-
είκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὖσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἔξις.

XI. Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὐ, φανερὸν
5 ἐκ τῶν ἀρημμένων. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν δίκαιων τὰ κατὰ πό-
σαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει ἀπο-
κτινύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, αὐτὸ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. ἐν-
10 ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάβη μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων ἐπὶ τῶν, ἀδ-
κεί, ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὅτι καὶ ἴσ' ὁ δὲ δὲ ἄρχῃν ἑαυτὸν
10 σφάττει ἐκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον, ὁ οἷα εἰ

§ 7. τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας

This is said to refer to the 'cyclo-
pean' building e.g. at Thyra, where
polygonal stones were used and a
polybdomos would doubtless be of
service. But why should it be called
'Lesbian'? Stewart asks whether the
reference is not to the Lesbian κύμα
or 'moulding' (Det. Ant. 3. 4 Cyma).
The Lesbian κύμα was undulating,
not a simple hollow like the Dorian.
Surely this must be right. Cf. Aes-
chy us fr. 71, Diodori

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τὰ Λεσβίων φανέρωται
εὖτα' ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ ἑτεροαἰρέτου βοθητοῖς.

XI. § 1 Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται
κατ' Α. All the other ἀπορία lead up
to this one, and it derives its im-
portance from its bearing on Plato's
account of δικαιοσύνη.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ κατ' Α. Even in the
wide Platonic sense of justice it is
impossible.

αὐτὸ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. It is
now common to say after Victorius,

that οὐ κελεύει — ἀπαγορεύει just as we
say ἴσ' — καὶ ἴσ', and that the remark here
is merely an explanation of the. Is
then it would be mere tautology, and
if οὐ κελεύει is identical with ἀπαγορεύει
to ἀπαγορεύει, no explanation would
be needed. If we had to do here
with an explanation of an ἀπαγορεύει
οὐ κελεύει — ἀπαγορεύει, we should
most certainly have αὐτὸ δὲ μὴ κελεύει
not αὐτὸ δὲ μὴ κελεύει. Further, there
is really no authority for an ἀπαγορεύει
ἀπαγορεύει. The simple interpreta-
tion and the right one, is to say
ἀπαγορεύει after μὴ κελεύει.

The law forbids us to kill anything
which it does not expressly enjoin us
to kill. We must ask if there is
where the law gives us ὁδία. The
argument is that as sacrifice is not
expressly exempted from the penalty
of φόρος, it must come under them.

§ 2. παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον, a
violation of the same law as that of
ἀντιβλάπτων who βλάπτει παρὰ τὸν

30 δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου * * * καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν
ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ· ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον το
ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτός, καὶ
κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ὅταν
τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔχει κακίας καὶ
35 ἀδικίας. καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἦττον φαῦλον, 8
1138^b κατὰ συμβεβηκός δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει μείζον εἶναι κακόν.
ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρεῖται λόγῳ μείζον
νόσον προσπταισματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε θύτερον κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πρᾶν συμβαίῃ ὑπὸ
5 τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι ἢ ἀποθανεῖν.

Κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν οἷα αὐτῷ πρὸς 9
αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ
τὸ δεσποτικόν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις
διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλλογον· αἰ
10 ἢ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐν
τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἐαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ οὖν
ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ
τούτοις.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [τῶν ἠθικῶν 10
15 ἀρετῶν] διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον.

§ 7. καὶ ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. These words seem to have no grammatical connexion as they stand. Some phrase like τὸ δι δικαιοπραγεῖν μέσον (Russian) may have been lost by homoeoteleuton.

ἢ ἐγγύς, for the ἀδικημα may be three προαιρέσεις, in which case the agent is not ἀδικος.

§ 8. τῇ τέχνῃ, as usual τῇ πολιτείᾳ, but illustrated by ἰατρικῇ. No art as such takes account of συμβεβηκότα.

§ 9. Κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

We can now dispose finally of the account of δικαιοσύνη in Plato's Republic. It is based on a metaphor, and (1) it only refers to the relation between 'parts of the soul,' (2) it is not true *voluntarior* *δικαιοσύνη*, which implies equality.

τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν. For this Platonic phrase, cf. e.g. Crito 43 c ποῖ τῶν καὶ εἰς τι τῶν τοῦ ἀπεθάνοντος; 47 c ὅτι ποῖ ἔστι τῶν ἀπεθάνοντος.

ἐν τούτοις, τοῖς λόγοις, i.e. in the writings of Plato and his followers.

BOOK VI.

GOODNESS OF INTELLECT.

Introductory Note.

§ 1 Our account of goodness cannot be complete until we have described Goodness of Intellect as well as Goodness of Character. We know that Happiness is an activity according to the best form of goodness, and it may be that this will prove to be some kind of intellectual goodness. But there is a still more pressing need for such a discussion, since the nature of goodness of character cannot be made perfectly clear without it. We have assumed all along that the mean state in which goodness is to be found was determined by the "right rule" (*ὁρθὸς λόγος*), and we said also that this meant it was determined "by what the wise man would determine it by." Now Wisdom is certainly a form of intellectual goodness, and we must therefore discuss that if we are to make our previous inquiries thoroughly intelligible. The case is just like that of health. We may define that roughly as a mean, and we may say truly enough that we can feel when we are healthy and when we are not (*ἐν τῇ αἰσθησει ἢ κρισει*). This will even enable us to look after our own health to some extent, for we can always warm ourselves by exercise if we find we are too cold. But such an account of health will not be enough for us if we intend to become doctors. In that case we must have the form of health in our souls. Now the object of the present course is not to give empirical rules for action, but to train lawgivers; for we know that the fairest and grandest aim of practical science is to produce Happiness for a state. The lawgiver, then, must have the "right rule," the form of goodness, in his soul; and we cannot fulfil the task we set before us at the

beginning of the course if we do not address ourselves to the solution of this problem.

§ 2. We may convince ourselves by a process of dialectical reasoning that the forms of intellectual goodness are two in number, namely Practical and Theoretical. Wisdom (*sophia* and *σοφία*). This might have been deduced at once from the doctrine that all thought is either theoretical or practical (Intro. § 177). But it is more in accordance with our method to work it out from current philosophical views, and especially those of the Academy. In any case we find that there are these two forms of intellectual goodness; and if we compare them and ask how they are related to each other, we shall come very near the final answer to the question with which we started.

§ 3. All forms of thought, practical and theoretical, are perform their functions through syllogism, but there is a fundamental difference between the syllogism of action and that of knowledge. This is due to the fact that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a way, an action, and an action is necessarily particular, it is *this* action and not *another*. Now we know that there can be no demonstration of the particular, and therefore the thought which enters into the practical syllogism must be of a different character altogether from that which is operative in demonstration. Practical Wisdom, the virtue of that form of thought, must be capable, not only of apprehending the things that are good for man, the "right rule" (*ēthos logos*) to apply in each department of life, it must also enable us to see that the particular act under consideration is in the circumstances a case of that general rule. In theoretical science, it is to sense we must go for the particulars, but we can hardly call our perception of the character of a particular act by the name of sense. It is not unlike the intuition by which we apprehend mathematical relations, but even that is not the same. It is better to call it "practical thought," and to leave the explanation of its true nature to the physicist or the "first Philosopher." We all know quite well what is meant by it. And we now see how it is that the Mean is determined. The wise man, the lawgiver, has the form of goodness, the "right rule" in his soul, and he has also the power of seeing how that form is to be embodied in a particular act. And he has the form of goodness in his soul just because he knows the end of human life, for the form is

always determined by the end. The test, then, of whether a certain state of the soul is goodness or not is just the degree in which it is subservient to the supreme end of all human activity.

What, then, is that supreme end? We know that it is an activity according to the best form of goodness, and it looks as if we had already stated what that is. For it is clear that Theoretical Wisdom is something far higher than Practical. Practical Wisdom has to do with what is good for Man; but Man is far from being the highest thing in the world. We shall come back to this in Book X; meanwhile it is enough to point out that Practical Wisdom is, as it were, the handmaid of Theoretical Wisdom, and that all its commands are subservient to the realisation of the highest kind of activity by the highest thing in man.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἰρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἑλλείψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὑβρὺς λέγει. τοῦτο διελωμεν.

Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεισι, καθὼς καὶ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίσχιν, καὶ τις ἔστιν ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων.

1. § 1. ὡς ὁ λόγος...λόγου. 'as the rule says.' Cf. 1115 b, 24 n.

διελωμεν. This sense of διαρεῖν (διαμεῖναι) τε or περι τινος is often found in Herodotus (Hec. 1. 107, 16, 7) and seems to be derived from such phrases as διαρεῖν διαφορὰν, *discriminare sententias*. The oldest example is probably Herakleitos fr. 2 διαμεῖναι ἐντὶ φύσιν καὶ φρόσιν θεοὺς ἔχει. It cannot therefore come from διαμεῖναι in its special Platonic or Aristotelian sense, as Bonitz seems to suggest (Ind. 180 a, 93).

ταῖς ἐρημέναις ἔξεισι, sc. ταῖς ἡδαικαῖς ἀρεταῖς.

τῶν ἄλλων, e.g. health and strength, cf. 1104 a, 11.

σκοπός. Cf. 1004 a, 24 n. Here the metaphor changes at once from 'hitting the mark' to 'tuning a lyre,' from which we may infer that the literal meaning of σκοπός was already lost sight of. This is only natural, since the correlative verb τυγχάνειν was commonly used without any feeling for the metaphor. There is no justification for Grant's view that

the non-metaphorical use is a mark of Eudemian authenticity (see Stewart notes), for it is found already in Plato, e.g. Gorg. 507 d οὗτοι ἐμοῦ καὶ θεοῦ σκώπτειν εἰσὶν ὁρῶντες ἀλλήλους.

ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων, i.e. the man who has in his soul the λόγος (λόγος ὁ νόμος, εἶδος, formal cause) of goodness, as the doctor has the λόγος of health. Cf. 1138 b, 31 and 1010. The definition of φρόνη ἀρετὴ has already suggested that this is the φρόνιμος.

ἐπιτείνει ἀνίσχιν. The true μέτρον (harmonic) is a μέσος between τὸ εὖ and τὸ βαρὺ, and the μουσικός has in λόγος in his soul. The process of ἐπιτείνειν and ἀνίσχιν is that described 1109 a, 24 sqq.

ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων. This is also supposed to be a 'Eudemian' touch on the ground (1) that the word ὁρος in the sense of 'standard', 'determining principle,' is not found in the undisputed works of EN, and (2) that it is found in TE 1222 b, 7 (quoted on p. 105) and 1249 a, 21 (quoted on p. 95). But (1) though the word

ὅς μεταξὺ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως,
 2 οὕσας κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως 25
 ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπι-
 μελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν,

1138 b. 23. EE. 1249 a, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις ὅρος καὶ τῷ
 ἱατρῷ, πρὸς ὃν ἀναφέρονται κρίνει τὸ ὑγιαίνειν σωματι καὶ μή, καὶ πρὸς ὃν
 μέτρον πυστοῦ ποιητέον ἔασσεν καὶ εὐ (l. εἶναι) ὑγιαίνειν, εἰ δὲ ἴαται ἢ
 πλέον, οἴαται· οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἰρέσεις τῶν
 φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀπαινετῶν δὲ οἷα τίνα εἶναι ὅρον καὶ τῆς ἔξεως

is not found in EN, it is distinctly implied in the definition of φεικτὴ ἀρετὴ as το μισοῦσθαι ὑπερμεγῆ λόγῳ and ἡ δὲ δὴ οὐ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι and (1) the passages from EE can be most naturally explained as reproductions of the present passage. Indeed it seems incredible that Eudemos should have written 1249 a 21 seq. if he also wrote the passage before us as part of the same work. Further, there is no difficulty in supposing that Aristotle should have used the word ὅρος in the sense here given to it. It meant originally 'land mark,' and its metaphorical use in as old as Hesychiodes, τί το εἰς ὅροι, μετὰ βροτοῖσιν ἐστὶν εὐτυχεσι δὲ ἀνθρώποις τίς ἔχει ἀπὸ τῆς διατελέως δευτέρα βίωσις. So Demosthenes says (De Cor. § 19f) τὴν δ' εὐθυερπείαν καὶ τὴν μετρίαν ἐχούσαν δεσπομένη αὐτοῦ, ὁ καὶ σπουδαιότερον ἑλλοίπειν ὅροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔσαν αἱ σοφόνες, ἀνατεροφρόνες. In the more precise sense of 'standard,' 'regulative principle,' it is used by Plato (Iker., 383 a ὅρον πολιτείας ἀναρχικῆς καὶ ἀδυναμίας πλεονεχίας) and Aristotle (Pol. 1294 a, 10 ἐλευθερίας ὅροι ἀρετῆς, ἀναρχικαὶ δὲ σκλαβναι, cf. Jaeger). Note that the ὅρος and the σπουδή are the same thing and identical with whatever we may ultimately find to be man's chief end.

§ 2. ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές. This has been supposed to be a

enigma of Aristotle by Eudemos; but, as Eudemos repeats the sentence on the last page of his own Ethics 1249 b, 5 (quoted p. 252), it would seem as if he had applied the same enigma to himself. In this case too, it appears incredible that one writer should have written both passages as part of the same work. It is true that Eudemos is fond of the phrase, cf. 1216 b, 32 (p. 40), 1217 a, 19 (p. 14), 1220 a, 27, and that it occurs nowhere else in EN. But (1) it is a thoroughly Aristotelian way of speaking, cf. de An. 413 a, 21 ἐκ τῶν δοσῶν μιν φανερωτέρων δὲ γίνεται τὸ σαφές καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνωριμώτερον. And (2) there is no occasion for the alleged enigma, since the theory of the Mean is avowedly given as a provisional sketch or τύπος (EN 1.04 a, 1 seq., 1216 b, 27), and in Book X Aristotle explains what the ὅρος or σκοπὸς is much more fully than Eudemos ever does. We there learn that it is the θεωρητικὸς βίος on which the φρόνιμος keeps his eye, and the meaning of this is thoroughly worked out, while Eudemos dismisses in half a page his corresponding doctrine that the ὅρος τῆς πολιτείας (i.e. τῆς ἡθικῆς ἀρετῆς) is τὸς βίος θεωρητικὸς καὶ θεωρεῖν.

ἐπιμελείαις. The word is used both of Medicine and Politics.

ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ ποιεῖν οὐδὲ ραθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ
τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ὁ
30 τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλείον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφηρεσθαι πρὸς
τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς
ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. Διὸ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔξεις μί-
μόνου ἀληθὺς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαρισμένοι
τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὁρος.

35 Τὰς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι
1139^a τοῦ ἡθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰν

καὶ τῆς αἰδέσεως καὶ φυχῆς καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος
καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ "ὡς ὁ
λόγος." τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν
εἴπειεν "ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης." τοῦτο δ' ἀληθὺς λό-
γος σαφὲς δέ.

ποιεῖν ραθυμεῖν These words are
taken from the ἐπιτέλεια of the γυμνα-
στικῆς οἱ παιδείας, Cf. e.g. Πλάτ.,
Rep. 410 ὁ δὲ γυμνάσιον καὶ τοῦ
νόμου. Isokr. Dem. 5 12 τὰ μὲν
γὰρ σώματα καὶ συμμέτρους ποιοῖ
αἰεσθαι νόμον. Cassen says on Hipp.
proklesia, Epid. 6, 5 9 τὸ πᾶσι
ἄνθρωποι πολλὰς μὲν εἰδὼν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης
ἀντὶ τοῦ γυμνασίου λέγειν, ἐνίοτε ἀντὶ
τῆς ὁδοῦ (cf. 1154 b 7). Cf. 115 b 6, 6,
8 πόνοι, σκία, παύσι, ἀφροδίσια
πάντα μέτρα, cf. 1151. The πᾶσι
opposite of πᾶσι in the sense is ἀνά-
παυσιν (cf. 1117 b, 33 n., but cf. 1151.
1170 a, 14 (ἡδύα) ἀδύναμις καὶ ραθυμία.
We see that the use of ραθυμία in a
bad sense is secondary from e.g. Isokr.
Evag. 5 42 τὰς ἀληθείας τῶν ραθυμῶν
οὐκ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐνοῦνται.

οὐδὲν.. πλεον, 'would be none the
wiser'. Cf. the idiomatic οὐδὲν πλεον
τοῦτον, the negative of πλεον τι ποιεῖν
ἢ ἰατρικὴ ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. Ob-
serve that these take the place of ὁ
ὀρθὸς λόγος and ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων and
thus show how we are to understand
those expressions.

§ 2 καὶ πλεονεχί, i.e. with regard
to excess of the soul as well as those of
the body.

τούτου τίς ὁρος. The ὁρος is a
different from the ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων καὶ
the ὁρος τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου. The latter is
correct for the λόγος is the standard of
goodness, i.e. the Mean, existing in
the soul of the φρονίμος, just as the
art of medicine is the form of health
existing in the soul of the εὐαίμων.
Cf. Met. 1029 a, 19 ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ
λόγος τῆς ὑγιείας ἐστίν. 1030 b, 21
ὑγιεία γὰρ τοῦ ἡ ἰατρικῆς. (Introduction
Note, § 1)

§ 4. Τὰς δὲ κατ' α. There is nothing
in Rossow's view that an independent
introduction to Book VI begins here
(see Stewart's note on 1138 b, 21).
The connection of the thought is this.
We know from the definition that the
φρόνιμος has the ὁρος we are looking
for, and we know that φρόνιμος is a
διανοητικὴ ἀρετή (1103 a, 6) so we
must go on to discuss διανοητικὴ
ἀρετή.

ἔφαμεν, 1103 a, 3 n. 4.

διελυθόμεν, περί δὲ τοῦ λοιποῦ, περί ψυχῆς
εἰπόντες λόγουμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλεχθη
αι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἀλο-
γόν ἐπεὶ περί τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δια-
καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν ᾧ
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δυτῶν ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέ-
αλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ
γίνειν ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ
ὁ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα ἰο
εὐότητα ἢ γνώσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λογίσθω δὲ του-
μεν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέ-
ται λογίζεσθαι ταῦτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλευέται περί

πρότερον, 1103 a, 27 κρη-
τὸν τρόπον Aristotle did
[I] admit 'parts of the soul'
[I] respect (cf. 1103 a, 31 n.),
[I] will continue for the purpose
[I] to take his psychology from
[I] λόγος (1103 a, 26 n.).
[I] τῶν cf. 1103 b, 33 n.
[I] ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Introd.

χόμενα. sc. καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν
no difference whatever we
[I] large themselves as their
[I] necessary or contingent.
a, 34 n.

τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός.
a clear reference to the
of Plato, Rep. 428 c 47]
is γ 427 b ἐκ στήμης μετὰ δι-
[I] φαν. The principle is laid
[I] d. δυνάμει δ' εἰς ἐαυτοῦ
[I] τῶν τῶν ᾧ τε ὅτι (-πρὸς θ
[I] καὶ θ ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ τὴν
[I] αὐτῷ τεταγμένη καὶ τὸ
[I] σημαίνοντι τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ,
[I] ἐπὶ ἑτέρῃ καὶ ἑτέρῳ ὅπερ
[I] ἄλλῃ. The distinction,
[I] that between ἐπιστήμη and

καθ' ὁμοιότητα κ.τ.λ. Aris-
[I] did not hold the *timéa*
[I] theory of knowledge in this

naked form, the argument will pro-
ceeds on Platonian lines.

§ 6. λογίσθω. The imperative
marks the dialectical character of the
argument. Cf. ὑποκείσθω above.

λογιστικόν. We expect διδασκασίαν,
and so τὸ ἴα 'part' is raised below
1140 b, 26. In Plato the name
λογιστῶν is given to the highest of
the three parts of the soul, and
includes τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν instead of
being opposed to it. Aristotle never
uses the word elsewhere except in
discussing Platonic psychology, and
then he always uses it in the Platonic
sense, as opposed to τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν
and τὸ θυμικόν. He does, however,
speak of λογιστικὰ φαντάσματα (cf. A] p.
A), and this has led to the use of the
word here.

τὸ γὰρ λογίζεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle
appeals to the language of
common life to justify him in giving
a narrower sense to the word than
Plato had done. The phrases λογι-
ζεσθαι τὰ συμφέροντα, λογιστὴς τοῦ
συμφέροντος were of everyday occu-
rence.

οὐδεὶς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1103 a, 31.
This completes the proof that τὸ
λογιστικόν has to do with τὰ ἐνδεχέ-
μενα.

τῶν μὴ ὑποδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικὸν ἔστω
 15 εἶν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. ληπτέον ἄρ' ἑκατέρου τῶν
 τῶν τίς ἢ βελτίστη ἔξῃς· αὕτη γάρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἢ δ'
 ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκίον.

11. Τρία δὲ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τα κύρια πράξεις καὶ αἰσθησίς,
 20 αἰσθησις νοῦς ὁρεξις. τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῇ
 20 πρίξεται· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξιν
 δὲ μὴ κοιναίνειν. ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ

§ 7. βελτίστη ἔξῃς ἀρετῇ πρὸς
 τὰ ἔργα. Cf. 1097 b. 21 seq.

11. § 1. Τρία δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle approaches the question of the *αἰσθησις* *ἔργα* of the two 'parts' from the other side, that of the distinction between theoretical and practical (Introd. § 11), and bases it now upon his own psychology. There are two specifically human ends, namely *εὐδαιμονία* and *γνώσις*, or, as he here says, *πράξις* and *ἀλήθεια*. If we wish to find the *οἰκίον ἔργον* of any 'part' of the human soul, we must find what it contributes to either of these. That it is must be the connexion of thought is made clear, I think, by the difficulties into which we get if we take *πρίξεται καὶ ἀληθείας* as equivalent to *πρακτικῇ ἀληθείας* (see Stewart's note). It seems much more likely that Aristotle should here oppose *εὐδαιμονία* to *ἀλήθεια*. Though, as we shall see, *εὐδαιμονία* also implies *ἀλήθεια*, *ἀλήθεια* is not the *τέλος* in practical matters (τὸ τέλος αὐτὸ γινώσκου καὶ πράξιν). If Aristotle had written here *εὐδαιμονίας καὶ γνώσεως* there would have been less misunderstanding.

κύρια. The adjective *κύρια* corresponds to the substantive *ἀρχή*, especially in the sense of efficient cause. Cf. 1127 a, 26.

αἰσθησις. There can be no *γνώσις* without *αἰσθησις* (de An. 432 a, 7 μὴ αισθανόμενοι μηδὲν οὐδὲν ἂν μάθοι) nor without *νοῦς* (An. Post. 87 b. 28 seq. δὲ αἰσθῆσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστᾶσθαι).

Τρεῖς γὰρ νοῦς καὶ αἰσθησις καὶ οὐσία τῆς (θεωρητικῆς) ἀληθείας εἶναι τῆς γινώσκου. The position of the word *νοῦς* between *αἰσθησις* and *ἔργα* indicates that it is to be taken with both.

§ 2. τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθησις κ.τ.λ. We turn now to consider our next immediate object, the *αἰσθησις* *πράξις*, i.e. *νοῦς* and *ὁρεξις*. Cf. de An. 432 a. 9 φαίνεται δὲ γε δύο ταῦτα κινήματα ἢ ὁρεξις ἢ νοῦς. de Mot. An. 700 b. 8 ταῦτα δὲ πάντα (i.e. τὰ κινήματα) ἐστὶ γὰρ εἰς νοῦς καὶ ὁρεξιν.

οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῇ πρίξεται. This is not fully explained here and must be supplemented from the de Anima and the de Motu Animalium, for which see App. A and B. The lower animals have *τὴν αὐτὴν νότον αἰσθησιν*, but this is to be explained by *αἰσθησις* and *ὁρεξις* alone. There can be no *ὁρεξις* without a *phantasia*, but *phantasia* may be either *αἰσθητικὴ* or *λογιστικὴ* (de Leventia). It is only the latter of these that implies *νοῦς*, and we do not find it named by the name of *πράξις* since it arises from an *ὁρεξις* instead of *νοῦς*, i.e. by a *λογιστικὴ φαντασία*.

ἔστι δ' ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. To find the *οἰκίον ἔργον* of τὸ λογιστικόν, i.e. *νοῦς* so far as it is a *κίνησις* *πράξις*, we now analyse the contributions of *νοῦς* and *ὁρεξις* to *πράξις*. Now the characteristics of *νοῦς* are affirmation and negation, while those of *ὁρεξις* are pursuit and avoidance, and these are evidently 'anankous'

σεις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρίξει διώξεις καὶ φνιγῇ· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξίς προαιρετικὴν, ἢ ἐὶ προαίρεσις ὀρεξίς βουλευ-
δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τιν τε λόγον ἀληθὴ εἶναι καὶ τὴν
ὀρθὴν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τα αὐτὰ τὸν 23
ἀναί τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αἴτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ
πρακτικὴ· τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακ-
μῆδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθὲς ἐστὶ καὶ
ε—ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ πάντες διανοητικοῦ ἔργου—τοῦ δε-
τεοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἀληθεία ὁμολογῶς ἔχουσα τῇ 30
τῇ ὀρθῇ. πραξίως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν ἡ
κ ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷ εἶκα—προαιρέσεως δὲ ὁμῆς καὶ λόγος

6. Hence their relation is
as a proportion
νοία. There is no distinction
between διάνοια and νοία.

ἐπειδὴ κ τ.λ. As Epictetus
is in the term of this argu-
ment, ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἐξίς προαι-
ρεσὶς (L. 31), and that προαίρεσις
ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ (1113 a, 10). It
is a general proposition (and
εἰς ὅσον πραξίς) (1113 a, 11) an-
d, i.e. διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, and
ἀρετὴν λόγος, or true judgment
a certain class of persons a
class of acts is good. The
of good here is strictly ana-
logous to its function in creating
practical truth. In the latter case
a practical universal latent
principle produces a λόγος,
which becomes an ἀρχὴ ἐπο-
τεῖς the former it makes ex-
plicit the universal latent
principle, which produces a rule of conduct
λόγος, which in turn becomes
ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, the major premise
practical syllogism.

μὲν οὖν κ τ.λ. Practical
truth for its function the con-
cept of ἀρετὴ into a λόγος or
rule of conduct. This is
the 1113 a and the οἰκίαν ἔργον of

το λογιστικῶν which we are seeking
§ 2. τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς κ τ.λ. In-
1113 a, 11. In both its aspects the
οἰκίαν ἔργον of διάνοια is, truth.

§ 4. πραξίως ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις,
1113 a, 11.

ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷ εἶκα. The final cause
of πραξίς is το ὀρεκτόν, i.e. το φαιδόν
μὲν ἀγαθόν.

προαιρέσεως δὲ κ τ.λ. The ἀρχὴ
προαιρέσεως is ὀρίξει (as ἐπὶ τῇ
ἀρετῇ) and a λόγος ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ (as ἐπὶ τῇ
ἀρετῇ). For the different way in
which these 'move,' cf. Arg. A.

λόγος ὁ ἀρετῆς νόμος. This is a
general rule of conduct, such as πρὸς
ἀνθρώπων συμφέροντα (1147 a, 3),
the λόγος which tells us what sort of
thing we must do if we are to attain
the object of ὀρίξει, and which there-
fore forms the major premise of the
practical syllogism. It is the fact of
its being ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ that things such
as πρὸς ἀνθρώπων συμφέροντα (cf. 1140
a, 18 δὲν τοῦτοι εἶκα πράττειν). The
principle however of πρὸς ἀνθρώπων
something distinctly formulated by
thought; for the ὀρεκτόν can only
become an efficient cause ἐφ' ὅσον
ἡ φαντασθήναι (Lc. An. 433 b, 19), and
if it is only in φαντασία we have no
πρὸς ἀνθρώπων. We must not infer from this,
however, that thought constitutes the

ὁ ἐνεκά τινος. διὸ αὐτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὐτ' ἐκὸς
 ἠθικῆς ἴσταιν ἔξαις ἢ προαιρέσεις· εὐπραγία γὰρ καὶ τὸ
 35 ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἡθους οὐκ ἔστιν. διὰ
 νοῖα δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὺν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐνεκά του καὶ τρακτική·
 1139^b αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἀρχεῖ· ἐνεκά γὰρ του περὶ
 πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ
 τινος—τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραγία τέλος,
 ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. διὰ ἡ ἐρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ
 5 ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος.

end. Thought simply universalises and formulates the material furnished by *ὄρεξις* in the same way as it universalises and formulates the material furnished by *αἰσθησις*. In itself it is indifferent to right or wrong and we shall see that it can universalise wrong *ὄρεξις* as well as right, and formulate false λόγος as well as true.

οὐτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας. Two words for the same thing.

οὐτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἔστιν. This secures that the *ὄρεξις* which thought has to universalise into rules of conduct are right, and has that τὸ φανόμενον ἀγαθόν will be the same as the true good: τὸ τοῦ φαν. ἀγαθόν.

§ 8 διανοία δ' αὕτη, thought by itself, 'thought alone,' i.e. without *ὄρεξις*.

ἡ ἐνεκά του, cf. λόγος δ' ἐνεκά του above.

αὕτη, ὡς ἡ ἐνεκά του διανοία. This completes the proof that διανοία αὐτὴ οὐθὺν κινεῖ. We have seen that this is true of πρακτικῆς διανοίας, and it is also true of ποιητικῆς διανοίας. The end of the *ἀρχὴ* is ἡ ἐνεκά του διανοία and that implies *ὄρεξις* as well as νοῦς. The end of the hunter or the doctor is the reason of the form, whether of a house or of health, existing in his soul. The formal becomes the final cause and that can be effected by *ὄρεξις* alone. It is not necessary to

prove that the third kind of thought, θεωρητικὴ διανοία, οὐθὺν κινεῖ by itself for its objects are either αἰνέματα or have their *ἀρχὴ* ενῶσται in themselves. (cf. Introd. § 10)

οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς. The process of production (τὸ ποιητόν) is not an end in the unqualified sense in which *πράξις* is so. It is relative (πρὸς τι) and it is the production of something (τινός). By τὸ ποιητόν here we must not understand the thing produced (*ἔργον*). It is used in the same way as τὸ πρακτόν and means the thing done, not the thing made, the building not the house. We may say *εἰδος ποιεῖ ποιῆσιν* or *ποιεῖν ποιῆμα, ἔργον*. Here τὸ ποιῆμα corresponds to the internal accusative.

ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ λ. The thought is, as we have seen, 'For the structure of this house.'

ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν, ὡς τέλος αἰνέου. The end of the *πράξις* is the *τέλειον* itself, not an external *ἔργον*.

ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. 'The sort of efficient cause is Man.' But the other way (1132, 31) Aristotle sometimes calls this efficient cause νοῦς or διανοία (see the note referred to). In those cases we must understand the qualification *ἐνεκά του*. The language here brings out well the absolute interdependence of νοῦς and *ὄρεξις* in *προαίρεσις*.

ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγνηὺς, οἷον οἰδεὶς προαι-
 "ταίου πεπορθέναι· οἱ δὲ γὰρ βουλευέται περὶ τοῦ
 τοῦ ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γε-
 νῆ ἐκ ἐκδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὁρθῶς Ἀγαθῶν

μόνον γὰρ αἰτῶν καὶ θύς σταμίσκται,

10

ἀρέντη ποιῶν ἄλλ' ἢ πεπραγμένα.

ρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. καθ'
 μάλιστα ἔχεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκατέρον, αὐταὶ ἀρεταὶ ἀμφὺν
 . Ἀρξίμενοι οὖν αἰωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν.
 ἢ) εἰς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ καταφάναι ἢ ἀπαφάναι 15
 τῶν ἀρεθῶν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις
 νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξη ἐκδέχεται διαψεῦδεσθαι.
 ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερον, εἰ δὲ
 λογίσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. παν-

Μηδὲν δὲ α.τ.λ. This seems
 detached fragment loosely
 [as usual to the end of a
] appears to be part of a
 at historical thought does
 δόξαν, for which doctrine
 [3 12.

13, fr. 5. The quotation
 includes a favourite γῶμα.
 [see also Pindar, Ol. 11, 17;
 in fr. 11. Soph. Ant. 378,
 140, Plato, Protog. 314 b,
 3 a.

νοητικῶν μορίων, sc. τοῦ ἐν-
 οῦ καὶ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ. As
 equivalent to διάνοια, so is
 το διανοητός.

τὸ οὖν α.τ.λ. for ἡ ἀρετὴ προ-
 το οἰαίω 1139 a, 17.

§ 1. ἀνωθεν, cf. 1155 b, 3 n.
 ἢ, the regular formula in in-
 a dialectical πρότασις, in
 and case a λογικὴ πρότασις
 109 b, 20) used also in Au.
 10, 30-37 b, 9. We must
 this as a mere preliminary
 form of states with a prima-
 to be regarded as διαση-
 τικὴ and not as Aristotelian

own list. We shall find that he re-
 duces them to two, φωνήσις and
 σοφία (so Prant). For a similar pre-
 liminary list afterwards reduced to
 two, cf. Met. An. 700 b, 17 (App. E).

ὑπολήψει δόξη. Here there are
 introduced as coincident, quite in ac-
 cordance with the tentative character
 of the present discussion. Later we
 shall see that ἐπιστήμη is the genus of
 which ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and φρόνησις
 are species.

§ 2. Ἐπιστήμη α.τ.λ. It is natural
 to start with the familiar pair ἐπιστήμη
 and τέχνη, which look as if they might
 be the two ἀρεταὶ we are working for.

ἀ δὲ ἀκριβολογίσθαι. We are
 now going to fix the precise meaning of
 these vague popular terms. The name
 of ἐπιστήμη is given to many things
 and ὁμοιότητα (1115 a, 19 n.) which
 are not ἐπιστήμη at all τῷ ἀκριβοῦς
 λόγῳ, e.g. it is given to πολιτικὴ itself.
 This passage is referred to in Met.
 981 b, 23 εἰρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἡθικαῖς
 τῇ διαφορᾷ τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμοιωμένων. True, so
 far as it goes, in evidence of the
 Aristotelian character of Book vi.

20 τις γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν δ' ἐπιστάμεθα μὴ ἐνδύχεισθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχίματα ἄλλως ὅταν ἔξῃ τοῦ θεωρεῖν γινῆται, λαυθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἡ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἐπιστήτον, αἰδίου ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅσα ἀπλῶς πάντα αἰδία, τὰ δ' αἰδία ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀφθάρτα. 25 ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήτον, μαθητόν. ἐκ προσηλωσκειμένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὡς περ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λεγομένη—ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῷ· ἡ μὲν δὲ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχὴ ἔστι

πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ. As usual in discussing a ζήτη, the first question is περὶ ποῦ, cf. 1112 a, 3 n.

ἔξῃ τοῦ θεωρεῖν, 'when separated from actual observation'. The verb θεωρεῖν expresses the ἐνέργεια of knowledge (cf. 1146 b, 31 n.). A triangle has its angles equal to two right angles whether any one actually knows Eucl. 1. 31 or not. We cannot say the same of τὰ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὰ πολλὰ, the facts of nature and of human life.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα, cf. An. Post. 73 a, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἀπλῶς ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν τὸ ἐπιστήτον τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδείξεσιν τεκμήριον ἐπιστήμης.

αἰδίου ἄρα. On the αἰδία see 1121 a, 21 n.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπλῶς, 'necessary in an unqualified sense' as opposed to ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον, cf. An. Post. 73 a, 21 quoted above. That the angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles is necessary ἀπλῶς, that a saw should be of iron if it is to cut is necessary ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (Physics 100 a, 12). The results of πολιτικὴ are only ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα, but πολιτικὴ is not τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἐπιστήμη. Note that the ὑπόθεσις in this phrase is the Q. E. P., the problem to be solved.

ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀφθάρτα, not subject to γένεσις and φθόρος, 'coming into being' and 'ceasing to be'. Cf. Part

An. 639 b, 23 ὁμοίᾳ δὲ τὰ μετὰ τελευτῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰδίων, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἐπιθέσεως καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὡς περ ἐν τοῖς τελεστικοῖς, ὅσα κατὰ σ. 7 λ.

§ 3. διδακτὴ Met. 981 b, 7 δῶκε τε σημείον τοῦ αἰδίου τοῦ ἀναγκαίου διδασκῆναι ἔστιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχην τῇ μνηστικῇ ὁμοιωθεὶς πολλὰ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι δυνατὸν γάρ, καὶ οὐ δύναται διδασκῆναι. The introduction us to the second question, πότες.

ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς. An. Post. 71 a, 1 εἴσα διδασκαλία καὶ τὰς μάθησις διαφορτικὴ ἐκ προσηλωσκειν γίνεταί γινώσκων.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ σ. διδασκαλία καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Aristotle never admits that ἐπιστήμη can be got δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, but it is always apodictic. For the present statement cf. An. Post. 91 a, 6 ἀμφότεροι γὰρ (sc. οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ οἱ διὰ συλλογισμῶν λόγοι) διὰ προσηλωσκειμένων ποιῶνται τὴν ἀποδείξεσιν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ἐκ τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς, οἱ δὲ δεξιανόντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τὸν ἐγγὺς εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ.

ἀρχὴ ἔστι σ. τ. λ. Cf. Rhet. 1353 a, 26 ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή. This phrase is a proof that ἡ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς διδασκαλία is ἐκ προσηλωσκειμένων just as περὶ τὴν ἡ συλλογισμῷ, as the reading of 12, ἀρχὴ ἔστω, cannot be right. To say that ἐπαγωγὴ 'is of the ἀρχὴ and the universal' is true but not is the point here. The ἀρχὴ must be used

ὁ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθέλου—εἰσὶν
ρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι συλλογι- 30
ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα, ἢ μὴ ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἐξὶς ἀπο-
ρή, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιωρίζεσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυ-
ῶσιν γὰρ πως πιστεύη καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὧσιν αἱ
ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπερίσματος,
συμβεβηκὸς ἔξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην.

35

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον
τοῦ ὁ ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν 1140
μακτόν· ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποιήσεις καὶ πρᾶξις—πιστεύομεν
ὅτι αὐτὸν καὶ τοῖν ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις—ἔσπε καὶ ἡ

In the προτάχουσα γνώσι, it is no difficulty in taking it ἀρχή usually means 'a starting-point' of our knowledge of πῶς as to call τὸ καθόλου the principle of demonstration. In πῶς of διδασκαλία there is an ἀρχή. The meaning of καὶ τὸ πῶς becomes clear. The ἀρχή has an ἀρχή (principle) and πῶς as much as syllogism demonstration has, and that ἀρχή πῶς. The reading of L² must be a corrector who thought πῶς could be used only in the sense of ἀρχή ἀποδείξεως.

Ἄρα ἀρχή. Introd. § 22. no inconsistency between the πῶς been that ἐπαγωγὴ is τῶς πῶς the statement made 1141 a, ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶς ἀρχῆς. No amount πῶς could give us an ἀρχή πῶς, but on the other hand πῶς have done.

καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα, i.e. ἐξ ἀληθῶν πῶς καὶ ἀμείνων καὶ γνωρίμων ἀποδείξεως καὶ ἀλὲν οὐδ' ἔσπε καὶ ἡ (An. Post. 71 b, 20). 'in a certain way,' i.e. in the sense of the quotation from physics above, especially as

γνωρίμων, as we see from the next sentence. Not every kind of πῶς is ἐπιστήμη.

μᾶλλον, i.e. γνώριμοι.

κατὰ συμβεβηκός. He will have something which as a matter of fact is knowledge (ἢ συμβεβηκός ἐπιστήμη εἶναι), but he will not have it as knowledge (κατ' αὐτὸν). Cf. An. Post. 71 b, 23 τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστάσθαι ὡς ἀποδείξεως ἐστὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τὸ ἔχειν ἀποδείξιν ἐστὶ, ib. 99 b, 20 οὐδ' ἐνδεχομένως ἐπιστάσθαι δι' ἀποδείξεως μὴ γινώσκοντι τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀμείνων.

IV. § 2. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης π. π. λ. The positive result of this discussion is that, though (1) ἐπιστήμη is πῶς τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν and πῶς far fulfils the requirements of the ἀρχή τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ, yet (2) it always implies a προτάχουσα γνώσι upon which all its necessity depends, and therefore cannot be the ἀρχή itself.

τοῦ ὁ ἐνδεχομένου π. π. λ. We might suppose that πῶς was the ἀρχή of the λογιστικῆς, but we are met by the distinction between πῶς and πῶς. A little dialectic will show that πῶς has to do only with the former, and therefore will not cover the whole ground of τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. Observe that the distinction is taken from ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. Cf. Introd. § 11.

μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγον ποιη-
5 τικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑν' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ
ἢ πρᾶξις ποιήσιν οὔτε ἢ ποιήσιν πρᾶξις ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἰς
οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστὶ καὶ ὕπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγον
ποιητικῆ, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λό-
γου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἢ οὐ τέχνη, ταύτην
10 ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικῆ. ἐστὶ
δε τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεω-

§ 2 μετὰ λόγου ἕξις. This is the correct Aristotelian designation for what popular philosophy has called ἕξις τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. As we are coming to a dialectical κατασκευή of the definition in due form, it is necessary to substitute the true genus. It was not necessary to define ἐπιστήμη, as we could refer to the Analytics for a sufficient ἐκδοξόν, but it is necessary to define τέχνη. On the distinction between μετὰ λόγον and ἐντὶ λόγῳ see 1144 b, 26.

ἕτερον ἐστίν. The εἶδος here is ἐκείνη ἐνὶ τῶν πρῶτων καὶ εὐστράχειαν, which is applied to the πρόβλημα of εὐστράχης ὁ ἕτερος in Top. 151 b, 30. Assuming, on the basis of θεωρητικὸν λόγον, that πρᾶξις καὶ ποιήσις are γένεα ἑτερα (cf. 1140 b, 3), it follows that ἕξις πρακτικὴ καὶ ἕξις ποιητικὴ are γένεα ἑτερα, for the ἑτερότητα καὶ the ἕξις are σύνοισις.

ἑκὸς δ' ὁ ἄλλος κ.λ. "Therefore neither is contained in the other." This follows from the fact that they have ἀποδηρημέναι διαφοραί. They are co-ordinate γένεα falling under the higher genus from which they are differentiated. For the phraseology, see next note.

§ 3. ἐπὶ δ' ὅτι κ.λ. Building is an εἶδος both of τέχνη and of ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ. The same εἶδος cannot be in two γένεα neither of which is contained in the other—we last note). Therefore τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ are the same γένεα. For the principle here applied cf. Top. 144 a,

11 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταύτων ἐν ἑνῷ γένει εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντα ἀλλήλους. See 1140 a, 1, 144 b, 14 145 a, 26.

ἕπερ τις. The principle does a useful work in marking predication ἐν τῷ τί ὄντι, and when τίς is added as here it marks that the γένος is predicated of the species or of the subgenus (cf. 1143 b, 6 and Bonitz, loc. cit. 231 a 35-37). It is necessary to mark that the γένος and the διαφοραὶ are predications ἐν τῷ τί ὄντι, for otherwise we should have συστηματικόν. Cf. Arist. Pol. 97 a, 29 αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ κατασκευασθὲν ἢ καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ στοιχείῳ, (2) τοῦ λαβεῖν τὰ κατηγορημένα ἐν τῷ τί ὄντι, (3) ταῦτα εἶναι τίς τῶν ἡ ἑτερόν, καὶ (3) ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰτίας. Here we see that (1) ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ is predications of accidents ἐν τῷ τί ὄντι, and that (2) it is first, for ἐστὶ πλέον λόγου καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν μᾶλλον.

καὶ οὐδένα κ.λ. This is added to secure the third requirement for the κατασκευή of a definition ἐν τῷ ταῦτα πάντα. Cf. Top. 145 a, 27 ἡ γὰρ ἐκείνη κατὰ τὸ εἶναι εἶδος καὶ ἐπὶ κατηγορεῖσθαι τὸν ὅλον. καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς ταύταις ἀνωμαλίαις, αὐτὸ μᾶλλον εἶναι ὁ ἀποδοχὴς ὅλος.

μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς. The qualification ἀληθοῦς may be added because ἀλήθεια is the ἔργον of θεωρεῖν whether theoretical or practical (1134 a 29).

§ 4. περὶ γένεων. Arist. Poet. 100 a, 6 τὸ πᾶν τὸν τέχνην ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐν

ρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηται τι τῶν ὑνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῇ ποιούντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῇ ποιούμενῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἢ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι 15 ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πράξις ἕτερον, αἰτιασι τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγαθῶν φησὶ

τύχη τύχην ἰσχυρὰ καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

20

ὁ ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἔξισ τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοῦναντίου μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἔστι, περὶ τὸ ὑνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν

V. Περί δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὲ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ 25

στραπὸν τὸν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν τέχνη, τὸν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐρωτήματα.

τὸ τεχνικὸν καὶ θεωρεῖν. Most editors bracket καὶ with Μίτλεϊς, making τὸ τεχνικὸν a new subject. See, however, Bywater, *Constr.* p. 49.

ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ε.τ.λ. This is added to distinguish the sphere of τέχνη from that of φύσις, which is also περὶ γένεσιν. *Introd.* § 10.

§ 8. τρόπον τινὰ. Cf. *Part. An.* 640 a, 28 ὅτι γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτοισιν γίνονται ταῦτα τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης, εἰον ἡλίου. *Phys.* 197 a, 3 ἡ τύχη εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ὄντων τῶν ὄντων. διό περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διδόναι καὶ τὸν· ἡ γὰρ προσωρεῖται οὐκ ὅτι ἡλίου. *Met.* 1362 a, 3 πάντα δ' αὐτὸς ἡ τύχη εἶναι ὧν καὶ αἱ τέχναι. Both have to do with τὰ ὑνδεχόμενα ὄντων καὶ μὴ ὄντων. The limits of the operation of τέχνη in the sphere of γένεσιν are indicated in *Met.* 1034 a, 2-494.

Ἀγαθῶν, fr. 6.

V. § 2. Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως ε.τ.λ. We shall see that φρόνησις is the ἰσχύς of the 'calculative part'; but

we must first discover its precise meaning. In Plato the word φρόνησις is exactly equivalent to σοφία, but Xenocrates had already marked a difference between the two. Cf. *Clem. Strom.* p. 441, 20 Pott. ἐπὶ καὶ Ζενοκράτης ἐν τῇ περὶ φρονήσεως τὴν σοφίαν ἐρωτήματα τῶν πρώτων αἰτιῶν καὶ τῇ νοητῇ οὐσίᾳ εἶναι φησὶν, τὴν φρόνησιν· ὑποκείμενος δὲ τῇ· τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν, τὴν δὲ θεωρητικὴν· ἣν δὲ σοφίαν ὑπάρχειν ἀνθρώπινον· εἰς τὴν ἡ μὲν σοφία φρόνησις· ὁ δὲ μὲν πάντα φρόνησις σοφία. We see here that φρόνησις, though still regarded as both theoretical and practical, is made something specifically human. Aristotle also makes φρόνησις something human; but he confines it to the practical, a restriction which he justifies as usual by an appeal to the use of the word in current language.

οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, 'the way to get a definition of φρόνησις is—' For the use of λαβεῖν in the dialectical sense (opp. ἀποδοῦναι) with περὶ, cf. 1142 a, 32 v. The method is similar ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν, cf. 1123 a, 33 v.

δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἡγαθὴ καὶ
 συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ἐγγίαν, τρι-
 ισχιν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημειῶν δ' ὅτι καὶ
 τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπου-
 30 δαίον εὖ λογιῶνται, ὡς μὴ ἔστι τέχνη. οἷσπε καὶ ὅλως δι-
 εἶη φρονίμος ὁ βουλευτικός. βουλευέται δ' οὐθαίς περὶ τῶν
 ἀδυνατῶν ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ
 πράξει. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μιν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὡς δ'
 αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τοιῶν μὴ ἔστιν ἀπο-
 35 δειξίς—πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν—καὶ οὕ-
 1140^b ἔστι βουλευσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴ-
 ῃ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μιν ὅτι ἐν-
 δέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τι
 γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως.λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι
 3 ἔξιν ἡληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ

καλῶς βουλευσασθαι, cf. the defini-
 tion in Rhetic 1366^b, 20 φρονήσις
 δ' ἐστὶ ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθ' ἣν εὖ
 βουλευέσθαι δύναται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ
 κακῶν τῶν ἀνημμένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

ὅλως, sup. καθὰ μέρος.

§ 2. σημειῶν δ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ. This is
 the argument from προθεσις and ἀφαί-
 ρεσις (cf. 1094^b, 28 n.). If the various
 φρόνησις περὶ τι are all βουλευτικοὶ περὶ
 τι, we may generalize this and say
 that βουλευτικός (ἀσπλῶς) will be
 φρόνησις (ἀσπλῶς). The words ὥστε
 καὶ ὅλως work the argument as an
 ἐπαγωγή.

ὡς μὴ ἔστι τέχνη, i.e. where πράξις
 and notποίησις is concerned.

§ 3. βουλευέται δ' οὐθαίς κ.τ.λ. We
 pass to the first question asked with
 regard to every ζῆσι, viz. περὶ ποῖα:

ὥστ' εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. The argument is
 that φρόνησις is deliberative (i.e. not
 τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης), ἐπιστήμη is demon-
 strative (i.e. τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης), therefore
 φρόνησις is not ἐπιστήμη.

πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. If the ἀρχή is
 contingent, so is everything that
 follows from it. This is added to

anticipate the objection that, though
 the ἀρχή may be contingent, viz.
 when once it is determined, what
 follows may be necessary, and there-
 fore capable of demonstration. This,
 however, is not what Aristotle means
 by necessity. It only gives us the
 προθεσις necessary, while the effect
 of knowledge must be cf. ἀνάγκη
 ἀσπλῶς. Cf. 1139^b, 23 n.

καὶ οὐκ ἔστι. As this is a con-
 ptothesis dependent on ἀσπρ, we might
 expect μὴ instead of οὐκ. But the
 use of οὐ after εἴ (εἴπερ) in a causal
 sense is well attested in classical
 Attic (Kühner § 212, 4), and in
 post-classical Greek becomes the rule
 (Jannaris Hist. Gr. Gr. § 180; etc.).
 There is therefore no need to connect
 the parenthesis down to ὅτι with
 Ramsdale and Stewart.

§ 4. ἔξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου. There
 is no difficulty in the substitution of
 this phrase for ζῆσι μετὰ λόγου ἀσπλῶς
 above. The ζῆσι in which the word
 ἀληθῆς (1139^b, 22) may be called
 ἀληθῆ just as well as the λόγος.

κακί. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ
 ζῶεος οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῇ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. διὰ
 οὗ Περιμέλεια καὶ τοῖς τοιοῖσι τοὺς φρονέοντας οἰόμεθα εἶναι,
 τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεω-
 εῖναι διὰ τοιαύτους ἡγαθήμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς 10
 τιμικούς. ἔτιθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τοιῶτον προσαγορεύο-
 τῶν ὁνοματι, ὡς σφίζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν, σφίζει δὲ τὴν
 ἱππὴν ὑπόληψιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄπασαν ὑπελήψιν διαφθείρει
 διαστρέφει τὸ ἥδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τριγώ-
 δον ὄρθως ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τας περὶ τὸ πρακ- 15
 αῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα τῆς
 τιμῆς· τῶν δὲ διαφθαρμένων δι' ἡδονῆν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς
 καίμεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτου ἐνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ'
 εἶναι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ
 τ. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἐξίεν εἶναι μετὰ λόγον 20
 ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴν. ἀλλὰ μὴν

τὰ ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ. These are necessary to complete the idea for all these are relative, & διαφορὰ means the relative which is a relative. Cf. Top. 148 a, γὰρ οὐκ τι καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ πρός ἄλλας οὐκ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ (in the exact). θεωρητικὴ γὰρ καὶ πρακ- αῖ ποιητικὴ λέγεται, διαφορὰ δὲ πρὸς τι σημαίνει· θεωρητικὴ καὶ πρακ- 20

μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This remark is to justify the way in which the idea of φρόνησις has been made. As the end of πρακτὶς is the good for Man this is the proper quantity. We cannot determine the idea of τέχνη in so simple a way.

διὰ τοῦτο, since φρόνησις is good to human good. Indeed, as opposed to σοφία like and Αναξαγόρας. Cf. 1141 b 4. νομοματὶς πολιτικοῦς. These notions of φρόνησις κατὰ μέρος.

§ 6 ἔτιθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ. From Ethic. Nicom. 411 c σωφροσύνη ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ νοῦ διὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, φρονέσεις.

ὅσο ὄρθως ἔχει. For the reading cf. Bywater, Comm. p. 49.

ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν. Introd. § 22. οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, so τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα. His φαντασία is warped (διστραφεία) by pleasure, so that his φανώμενον ἀγαθόν is not the true good.

φθαρτικὴ ἀρχή. Cf. 1141 a, 18 σοφίᾳ τὴν ἀρετήν.

ὥστ' ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ. We now get the complete definition by genus (ἔστι μετὰ λόγον ἀληθῆ) and differentia (περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴ).

§ 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. This is the first of the ἔπειτα we are considering to which we are able to give the name of ἀρετή. Incidentally this section gives the reason for refusing that name to τέχνη. It is really the addition of the words περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ that shows φρόνησις to be an ἀρετή for all ἀρετὴ is relative to the οἰκίον ἔργον, and it is clear that

τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν
 τέχνῃ ὁ ἕκων ἁμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν
 ἥττον ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. ὁ γὰρ οὖν ὅτι ἀρετὴ
 25 τις ἔστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆ, ἡ
 τῶν λόγων ἔχουται, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετὴ, τοῦ δοξαστικῆς
 ἢ τε γὰρ δοξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ
 φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔξε μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημῶν
 δ' ὅτι λήθῃ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἐξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ'
 30 οὐκ ἔστιν.

VI. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἔστιν ἐπι-

τέχνη is not in the same way relative to the *oikion ergon* of Man.

τέχνη ἀρετὴ We learn from 1141 a, 13 sqq. that *sophia* in its original sense is the ἀρετὴ τέχνης, and that it constitutes ἀρετήν. In other words, we may say that τέχνη admits of *teleiōsis* just as ἐπιστήμη does, and therefore neither is an ἀρετὴ in the full sense (see §. 63 sqq.). On the other hand, φρόνησις requires no such *teleiōsis*, for it implies its own ἀρετή as we have just seen. It is therefore a complete ἀρετὴ.

ὁ ἐκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος. This is a Socratic paradox (Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 20) which was used in various forms by Plato, but most explicitly in the 'Hippias Major,' to show that goodness was no mere art or external accomplishment. The reason why the ἐκὼν ἁμαρτάνων is αἰρετώτερος is that he has the δύναμις, while the ἄκων ἁμαρτάνων has not, and πᾶσα δύναμις τῶν ἀρετῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῶν φαύλων δυνάμεις αἰστανται διὰ καὶ τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἔχει φαῦλα αἰσάν· ἡνισταὶ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ φαῦλα πρᾶσσιν (109 106 a, 36). Now the φρόνιμος necessarily has a good προαίρεσις, and so he cannot go wrong intentionally, but this is not so with the σφοδρῶν. He may have a *ἔξε μετὰ λόγου* ἀληθὲς ποιητικὴ μέτρον, and yet deliberately build a bad house

On the relation of δύναμις to προαίρεσις, cf. 112; b, 14 n.

§ 8. τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ The distinction of the name *δοξαστικός* for λογιστικός makes a more Platonic antithesis to the ἐπιστημονικός. The term itself is not, however, Platonic, nor does Aristotle ever refer to it elsewhere. We have to pass lightly over the fact that the Platonic distinction between *επιστήμη* and *δόξα* does not correspond to the Aristotelian distinction between *θεωρητικὴ* and *πολιτικὴ* *ἁρετή*. We are able to ignore the difference only because the *φύσει γινόμενα* do not at present enter into the inquiry.

λήθῃ ἔστι. Cf. 100 b, 17 καὶ γὰρ (ὡς τὸ μάλιστα καὶ ἀσχετέστατος καταρτὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μετέωροις) καὶ οὐ αὐτῷ τοῦ μὴ γινέσθαι περὶ αἰσάν (ὡς τοῖς τρωπαῖας τῶν καὶ ἀρετῶν ἀντιγινώσκων) λήθῃ. From this it would follow that here (as the point is that the ἐνέργεια of φρόνησις is more continuous than that of other *ἔξε μετὰ λόγου* ἐπιστήμης and τέχνης) must be caused it is *προαίρεσις*. We shall see later (cf. 1175 a, 4 sqq.) that a continuous ἐνέργεια is impossible to man, and *ἔχνη* depends upon external conditions.

VI. § 1. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη α.τ.λ. We have seen that *ἐπιστήμη* αὐτοτελὴς ἔχει αὐτοαρκούντα γινόμενα

ληψίς καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείκ-
 τῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ), τῆς
 ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὗτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμῃ εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε
 φρονησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδείκτου, αἱ δὲ τυγχά- 33
 νουσιν οὕσας περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλων ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ 1141^a
 σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ πάντων ἔχειν ἀπύ-
 2 δεξιὴν ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ) οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαφευ-
 δαμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἅλλως
 ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ φρονησις ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τοί- 3
 των δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία
 φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν),λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν
 ἀρχῶν.

and cannot therefore be the complete
 ἀρχή of τὰ ἐπιστημολογία. We have
 now to consider what is lacking to
 ἐπιστήμη in this respect. We shall
 then be able to discover the ἀρχή
 which is coordinate with φρόνησις.

περὶ τῶν κοβόλου ὑπολήψεις. This
 point was not specially mentioned in
 the account of ἐπιστήμη given above,
 and it is no doubt brought in now
 because it is of importance in the
 contrast between φρόνησις and ἐπι-
 στήμη (cf. 1141 b 14 seqq. for the
 doctrine cf. Met. 1059 b, 23 was γὰρ
 λόγος καὶ πάσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν κοβόλου
 καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἐνδεχόμεν, 1060 b, 30 τὸ
 τέλος ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τῶν κοβόλου καὶ
 τοῦ κοβόλου. An ὑπολήψις that this
 triangle has its angles equal to two
 right angles is not ἐπιστήμη we only
 have that when we know it of this
 triangle as a whole. Knowledge
 does not descend to particulars, there
 is no knowledge of 'a this' (τοῦτο τι),
 but only of 'a such' (τοιαῦτα τι).

μετὰ λόγον γάρ. This puts shortly
 the point given above 1139 b, 23 seqq.
 All ἐπιστήμη implies a ground (λογος)
 and therefore in a ultimate ground, for
 otherwise we should have a process
 ad infinitum (introd. § 21. Now

the ultimate ground cannot have a
 ground and therefore (ἐπιστήμη being
 μετὰ λόγου) it cannot be the object of
 ἐπιστήμη. It must be the 'starting-
 point' (ἀρχή) of ἐπιστήμη or ἀπό-
 δεξις.

§ 2. αἱ δὲ κατὰ. Note that τέχνη
 is tacitly dropped from the ἁπόδειξις
 which we are using as a major pre-
 missa. This may be accidental, or it
 may be due to the fact that σοφία is
 the ἀρχή τέχνης.

νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν. In An.
 Post. 100 b, 3 the same result is
 reached by a similar dialectical pro-
 cess. 'Ἐπει δὲ πῶς περὶ τὴν δόξαν
 εἴπωσιν αὐτὸν ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς
 εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδεχόμεναι τὸ ψεῦδος οὐκ
 ὁδοὶ καὶ λογισμοὶ, ἀληθὴ δ' αὖ ἐπι-
 στήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη
 ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς αἱ δ'
 ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γινώσκόμεναι,
 ἐπιστήμη δ' ἔκαστα μετὰ λόγου ἐστὶ,
 τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη,
 εἴη δ' οὐδὲν ἀκριβέστερον ἐπιδεχόμεναι
 εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦς, νοῦς δὲ εἴη
 τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν τε τῶντων σκοποῦσι καὶ
 οὐτ' ἀποδείξουσιν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀποδείξει, ὥστ'
 οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμη. To understand
 the meaning of the doctrine
 νοῦς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, we must remem-

VII. Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστά-
 10 τοις τῆς τέχνης ὑποδιδόμεν, ὅλον ψεύδιον λιθοργῶν σοφῶν
 καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἄλλο
 σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι ἡ

best that truth and falsehood are both
 'impossible' (ἀνευ λόγου). We can-
 not give a ground for the 'impossibility of
 contradiction' any more than we can
 give a ground for our perception of
 this triangle. This immediate cog-
 nition Aristotle described in a meta-
 phor taken from sense καὶ 'contact'
 (θίγειν). No error (ψεύδος) is possible
 about the ἀρχαί, we either apprehend
 them or we do not, in which case we
 have, not ψεύδος or ἀπάρη, but ἀγνοία.
 Cf. Met. 1051 b. 24 with Ross's
 note, Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. trans.
 vol. 1, p. 197.

VII. § 1. Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν κ.τ.λ.
 A consideration of the use of the
 word σοφία in current language will
 show that it connotes ἀκρίβεια or
 'truth,' and that therefore it will be a
 better name for the complete ἀρετὴ
 we are seeking.

ἐν τε ταῖς τέχναις, *scilicet*, after
 the parenthesis ἐνταῦθα μὲν κ.τ.λ.,
 per anacoluthum by εἶναι δὲ instead
 of εἶναι. The first use of the word
 σοφός in current language is of the
 skill of the cunning workman. This
 is a correct observation. The word
 σοφία occurs only once in Homer, and
 then it is used of a carpenter (Il. xv,
 412). The method here is just like
 that by which we discovered the
 meaning of φρονεῖν, cf. 1140 a. 24 ff.
 We ask to whom we give the name
 σοφός, and we find in the first place
 that we give it to θερμοὺς καὶ
 τεχνίτας in virtue of their ἀκρίβεια.

§ 2. εἶναι δὲ τίνας κ.τ.λ. Just as
 we found the current cognate re-
 cognition φρονεῖν ἀπλῶς as well as
 φρονεῖν περὶ τι, so we find that it

recognizes σοφός ἀπλῶς as well as
 σοφία λιθοργῶν and ἀνδριαντοῦ.
 Here as there we are entitled to use
 the name of πρόθεσις and σφαῖρα,
 and we may infer that they are used
 σοφία in virtue of their ἀκρίβεια and
 truth. Light is thrown upon the
 passage by the discussion of *lógos*
 concerning the σοφός in Met. 981 a.
 4-999. These are: (1) ἐπιστάτης
 πάντων τῶν σοφῶν, (2) τὸν τὴν χάριτι
 πρῶτα διδάσκον τινὸς σοφόν, (3) ὅτι
 τοὺς ἀκριβεστέρους καὶ διαφασιστοτέρους
 σοφώτερον εἶναι, (4) οὐ δὲν ἐπὶ τῇ
 σοφίᾳ τὸν σοφόν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῇ αἰσθε-
 σίᾳ. From the examination of these which
 follows 982 b. 25) we learn that
 ἀκριβεστάται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστάτων εἰ-
 μάχιστα τῶν πρῶτων εἰσὶν αἱ γὰρ εἰ
 ἐλαττόνως ἀκριβεστέρως τῶν ἐκ προ-
 θέσεως λαμβανόμενον, ὅλον ἀκρίβειαν
 γινώσκουσιν (cf. 1078 a. 4 καὶ δὲν ἔστι
 αὐτὸν περὶ πρῶτον τῆς λόγου καὶ ἀκρίβει-
 τέρων, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον ἔχει ταύτης
 οὕτως δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἶναι). The dis-
 cussion is (982 b. 8) εἰ ἀπλῶς οὐκ
 τῶν ἐπὶ μέντοι ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἐπιστάται
 πιστεῖ τὸ ἴσην οὐκ ὁρᾶται· δεῖ γὰρ
 ταύτην τῶν πρῶτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτίας
 εἶναι θεωρητικῆν. We may infer
 from the fact that when σοφία is pre-
 dicated of τεχνίταις i. connotes ἀκρί-
 βεια, infers that when it is predicated
 ἀπλῶς i. connotes the same thing, i.
 that means that it is knowledge of
 the most primary and *κατὰ φύσιν*
 (2) dependent in the universe law
 principles of all knowledge, for which
 knowledge alone can have perfect
 ἀκρίβεια. It alone can be free from
 irrelevant *εἶναι*.

τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οἷδ' ἄλλο τι σοφοί, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν ἐν τῇ Μαργίτῃ

τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ' σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θίσαν οὐτ' ἀροτῆρα
οὐτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

15

ὥστε ὁῦλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σο-
φία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶδε-
ναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ
σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη
τῶν τιμωτάτων· ἀποπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν zo
φρονησιν σπουδαιοτάτην αἰεταί εἶναι εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀριστον τῶν
ἐν τῇ κοσμῷ ἀνθρώπος ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἰγα-
θὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εἰθὺ
ταῖτί·ν ἀεί, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταῦτόν πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρό-
νιμον δὲ ἕτερον—τὸ γάρ περὶ [αὐτὸ] ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν 25

ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος. That the Homeric authorship of the 'Margites' was taken quite seriously by Aristotle is clear from Poet. 1448 b, 28 seq. The end of the second verse, πάσης δ' ἐμάσταν τέχνης, is preserved by Clem. Strom. i, 282 a. The quotation is humorously made for the sound rather than the sense. Aristotle seems to have been suddenly reminded of it by his own words οἷδ' ἄλλο τι σοφός, and he did not shrink from enlivening his lecture by a joke at the expense of his own favourite purveyor. Of course the quotation also illustrates the primitive meaning of σοφός.

§ 2. δεῖ ἄρα κ.τ.λ. The argument is that the σοφός must be in a true state as to the δοξαί, for otherwise his knowledge would not be ἀκριβές, and there would be nothing in common between the σοφός περὶ τι and the σοφός ἀπλῶς.

κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα. Cf. Rhet. 1415 b. 8 ὅσα ἔχρ' ὥσπερ σώμα κεφαλὴν (sc. ὁ λόγος). It is comes from Plato, Gorg. 465 ὁ ἐπιθίσταν κεφαλῶν, ὅς μὴ ἀντι κεφαλῇ παρῶν (sc. ὁ λόγος). Philab.

66 d ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημόνοις. Τιμ. 69 a τελευταίη ἡδὲ κεφαλὴν τε ..εἰπεῖναι τοῖς πρόσθεν.

τῶν τιμωτάτων. This is added because the διαφορά of σοφία must be made relative as well as its genus ξέν (cf. 1140 b, 5 n.). The section beginning at ἀποπον γάρ κ.τ.λ. justifies our making it relative in this particular way. By τὰ τιμωτάτα Aristotle means as usual God, the πρῶτος οὐρανός and the like. Cf. Met. 1016 a, 21 τὴν τιμωτάτην (sc. ἐπιστήμην) δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμωτάτων γένος εἶναι. For the meaning of τιμωί, cf. 1101 b, 11 n.

§ 3. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. I follow Zell in taking this as a long protest going down to προνοητικὴν. The argument is that, when the φρονήσις we have been studying is relative to Man, there are other φρονήσεις relative to each species of living beings. Now we have no right to assume that Man is the highest thing in the world.

τὸ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα κ.τ.λ. 'For that which sees the good (τὸ εὖ) of (περὶ) a given class of beings (ἕκαστα),

φαίεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τοῦτω ἐπιτρέψειαν <ἂν> αὖτα, διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἓνα φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περι τὰ αὐτῶν βιον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δυναμὴν προνοητικὴν—φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ
 30 τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλοὶ ἔσονται σοφιοί· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἀπᾶντων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ παντῶν τῶν ζῴων, εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἀνθρώπου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζῴων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα παλὶ
 1141^b θεϊότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἔξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμωτάτων τῇ φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρο-

they would call "wise" (i.e. φρόνιμοι περὶ ἡπάντων, προνοηταί) and would entrust that class (αὐτά, to him) (as groom or shepherd). I still think (see Classical Review vol. III, p. 373, that περὶ αὐτῶν and περὶ ἕκαστου are alternative readings, of which the latter deserves the preference. The words περὶ ἕκαστου τὸ εὖ will then be equivalent to τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἀγαθόν in accordance with the regular periphrasis of the genitive by περὶ c. acc. Bywater, however, reads τὰ for τὸ at the beginning of the sentence and compares τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστα, 'particulars concerning itself' (Contr. p. 30). He also reads with K^h φῶς and ἐπιτρέψει which may well be right. It is worth while noting that this is simply the old Socratic problem of the ἐπιστάτης, for which cf. e.g. Plato, Apol. 20 b of μὴ σου τὸ βίσι πάλω ἡμόσχευ ἐγείρασθην, εἰχομαι ἂν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθωσασθαι καὶ δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν, τίνα ἄσπον ἂν ὑφ' ἔχει ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν;

τῶν θηρίων βιον. Not only the ἐπιστάτης, but even the beasts themselves are called φρόνιμα if they have the capacity of foresight, e.g. ants, bees

etc. Cf. Gen. An. III, 2 quoted in the Introductory Note to Book VII, Hist. An. 488 b, 14 τὰ δὲ φρόνιμα καὶ βέλτα, αἰὶν διαφοί, δασύτοι, and often in the biological works. So too in Met. 980 b, 31 we read that animals which have memory are φρονιμώτεροι τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν. Cf. Plato, Pol. 263 d εἰ τοι φρονίμους ἐστί τι ζῶον θένον.

οἷον φανερώτατά γε. 'i.e. to take the most visible things only, the bodies of which the heavens are composed.' That the stars are meant is clear from Met. 1026 a, 12, where they are called τὰ φανερά τῶν ἀστρον and Phys. 196 a, 33 τὰ θεώτατα τῶν φανερών. The First Mover is ἀφανὴς but the stars are visible. In them we already see τὸ θεῖον. Cf. also de Caelo 290 a, 32, Ζεὺς (Eng. Trans. I, p. 504).

§ 8. ἔηλον. This shows that the purpose of the preceding section is to justify the inclusion of τῶν τιμωτάτων in the definition of σοφία.

Ἀναξαγόραν Θαλῆν. This seems to be suggested by Plato, Hipp. Maj. 261 c εἰ πάλαιος εἴποιτο, ὧν ἀνθρώπου μεγάλο λέγεται εἶναι σοφίαν, τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν Μιλήσιων Θαλῆν καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἑσπερίων

εἰμονες δ' οὐ φασι εἶναι, ὅταν ἰδῶσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμ-
φέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ
καὶ δαιμόνια εἶδέναι αὐτοὺς φασι, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τα
ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

6 Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐστὶ
βουλευεσθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναι ἰο-
φαιμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλευεσθαι, βουλευέσθαι δ' αἰδέεις περὶ τῶν
ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, αἰδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο
πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἀπλῶς εὐβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου
ἀνθρώπου τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὴν λογισμὸν.

7 Οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθολοῦ μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ ἵς
τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γὰρ, ἡ δὲ πρῶξις περὶ
τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἐνιοὶ οὐκ εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδότες
πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἐμπειροὶ· εἰ γὰρ εἰδῆίῃ
ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα κρέα καὶ ἱγικενί, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα

μέγα Ἀναξαγόρου, φαίνεται ἀπεχθ-
μεται τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων. For
the anecdote tends to show the 'use-
lessness' of σοφία, cf. my "Early
Greek Philosophy" pp. 41 n. 29, 53
n. 8. Thales and Anaxagoras are
contrasted with Pericles (1140 b, 8).
§ 8. καὶ περὶ ὧν κτλ. This
limits τὰ ἀνθρώπινα by excluding
everything which is not δι' αὐτοῦ
πρακτόν. Cf. 1112 a, 26-31.

ἀπλῶς, as opposed to κατὰ μέρος,
explained above 1140 a, 27.

στοχαστικὸς, 1106 b, 15 n.

κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν, equivalent here
to κατὰ τὴν βουλεύειν, cf. 1139 a, 12 τὸ
γὰρ βουλευέσθαι τοὶ λογίζεσθαι ταῦτον.

§ 7 Οὐδ' ἐστὶν κτλ. A second
point of difference between φρόνησις
and σοφία.

τῶν καθολοῦ μόνον. This of course
implies that φρόνησις is also τῶν
καθολοῦ, and hitherto that is the
aspect of it we have been examining.
We have only spoken of φρόνησις as
περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ, and both
ἀνθρώπων and ἀγαθὰ are universalis-

We must not suppose, however, that
it is φρόνησις which makes us aim at
the φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν (that is the
ephemera of ὁρμή), nor that it makes
our φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν the true good
(that is the function of ἦθος). What
ἡ καθολοῦ φρόνησις does is, given the
true good as an ὁρατόν, to frame
general rules for its attainment. This
is the aspect in which it resembles
science, for πόσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθό-
λου (Met. 1029 b, 16 et passim).

περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Cf. 1116 b,
6 αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα.
The phrase (περὶ) of matter (ἐν) of
πράξις is always the particular, for
we cannot perform any act that is
not a particular act. Hence our
dehydrative analysis cannot be com-
plete till we have carried it as far as
the particular. In science this is
impossible, for particulars are the
objects of εἰσότης alone.

διὸ καὶ κτλ. For the opposition
of ἐμπειρία and ἐργη see p. 67.

εἰδῆίῃ, 1110 a, 14 n.

20 ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγιέναι, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀριζόμενα κοῖφε καὶ ὑγιέναι ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φράσησι πρακτικῇ· ὥστι δεῖ ἀμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' αὖ τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονικῇ.

VIII Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρονησις ἡ αἴτη μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταῦτόν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ 25 πόλιν ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικῇ φρονησις νομοθετικῇ, ἡ δὲ ὡς [τὰ] καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτικῇ. αὕτη δὲ πρακτικῇ καὶ βουλευτικῇ· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν

κοῖφε καὶ. It does not seem necessary to bracket these words with Tien-delenburg. The case gover. is the analysis of τὰ ὑγιέναι in the sense of τὰ ποιεῖν καὶ φιλαδικὰ ὑγιέναι and its terms are (1) light, (2) light, (3) poultry. The empirical practitioner may be supposed to know steps 2 and 3, and his treatment will therefore be more successful than that of the theorist who knows only steps 1, 2, but stops short of the particular 3. What the ἔμπειρος does not know is the middle term connecting κοῖφε and ὑγιέναι.

ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον, sc. τὴν περὶ τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ.

καὶ ἐνταῦθα, 'in this case' as well as in that of diet, there is a master art (i.e. walking) which it will be better to know, for it will teach us the αἴτις. Aristotle returns to this point at 180 b, 13 sqq. On ἀρχιτεκτονικῇ (sc. τὴν γὰρ) see Introd. § 13.

VIII § 1. τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταῦτόν. Cf. 130 a, 12 n. Here the meaning is that ἡ περὶ πόλιν φρόνησις or πολιτικῇ is a special application of φρόνησις generally. There is also φρόνησις concerned with the family (οἰκονομία) and the individual.

§ 2. ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονικῇ, corresponding to the natural science of physiology in the case of medicine.

ὡς καθ' ἕκαστα. The words καθ' ἕκαστα are treated as a single in-

declinable adjective. Cf. 109, 2, 14 n. I have followed Mr Stewart's suggestion in bracketing τὰ 1110 b 3 ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα ὄνομα.

τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα. In Aristotelian terminology πολιτικῇ includes νομοθετικῇ, but he is here speaking of ordinary language. The chief magistrate has usurped the name which belongs equally to the architectonic πρακτικῇ καὶ βουλευτικῇ, while νομοθετικῇ is concerned with τὸ καθολοῦν and therefore not πρακτικῇ.

τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα κτλ. The name corresponds to the major premise of the political syllogism and the γένοςμα to the minor. We must always remember that the Athenian ἐκκλησία was not a legislature, and that its ψηφίσματα were executive acts applicable to particular cases. Cf. 137 b, 19, 135 a, 10. Now the restriction of the name πολιτικός to the practical politician, the ῥήτωρ or συμβούλος to the ἐκκλησία, is only one effect of the general tendency of the Athenian democracy to put ψηφίσματα in the place of the νόμοι. Demosthenes complains of this in his speech against Leptines § 91 καὶ γὰρ τοὶ τότε μὴ νόμοι τὸν τρόπον ταῦτα ἐνομοκράτου. τοῖς μὲν ἐπάρχουσιν νόμοι ἐχρήσθη, λαίονες δ' οἱ αἰετίνεσαν, whereas now ψηφισμάτων ἐκδ' ὅπως διαφέρουσιν οἱ νόμοι, ἀλλὰ κινεῖται οἱ νόμοι, καθ' οὗς τοὶ ψηφίσματα διὰ γραφισσῶν, τὰς

δ' ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τοίτους μοίους λέγουσιν· γὰρ πραττουσιν οἱ τοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι. δοκεῖ ἐν φρονήσεσι μάλιστα εἶναι ἡ περὶ αἰτῶν καὶ ἕνα· καὶ 30 αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· κείνων δὲ ἡ μὲν νομία ἡ δὲ νομοθεσία ἡ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἡ βουλευτική ἡ δὲ δικαστική. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη πως τὸ αὐτῷ εἶδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν, δοκεῖ δ' τὸ περὶ αἶτον εἶδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος 1142·, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης—

παύει αὐτῶν ὡς εἰσιν. In Pol. 1253 Aristotle speaks strongly same subject. He says that the king of democrats is a tyrant; people is poor εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος τὴν πωμὴν) comes about ὅταν τὰ ματα εὐρία ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἥμος then becomes a monarch, πρὸς τοὺς πολλῶν. Διαφασίματα πλαγίως to the political objects (μάταια) of a tyrant, and the word to his followers. Democritus (fr. 1, 17) attributes to Aristotle the view that, of the two great forms of Athens, which and laws, is used while the laws are

τὸ ἔσχατον, i.e. ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει, ultimate, the last step of the process. Cf. 1111 b, 13 καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι γενέσθαι. De An. 433 a, 15 οὐ φέρει αὐτὴ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ the efficient cause which sets us at work), τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ μείων. The last thing we come out with is that in τῷ ἡμῖν is the step on the process and the step in action. The πολιτικοὶ live thus in a ψήφισμα.

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ α. τ. λ. 'There does that —.' Cf. course this is Aristotle's view, but a popular use would be like the restriction of the πρακτικὴν to 'practical politics,' if since one branch has occupied the δόγμα.

κεῖνων, 'the other species.' The μείων refers vaguely to all forms of φρόνησις which have to do with more than the individual, whether the family (οἰκονομία), or the state (νομοθεσία and πολιτεία).

βουλευτικὴ δικαστικὴ. Cf. Pol. 1297 b, 40. We should say 'executive and judicial,' the functions of the ἐκτελέσια and the δικαστήρια. The 'legislative function' was not exercised by the δῆμος but by the νομοθέτης.

§ 4. εἶδος μὲν οὖν α. τ. λ. To know one's own good is a species of φρόνησις just as οἰκονομία and πολιτεία are, but it is as differentiated from the other species that it is taken for a different genus and incorrectly called by the κοινὸν ὄνομα. There is no difficulty in γνώσεσθαι, which is simply the noun of εἶδέναι. The various φρονησεως is probably a conjecture.

ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν. There are degrees in the differentiation of εἶδη within a γένος. The greatest difference in a given γένος makes the εἶδη into ἐνστάς.

τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν τ. λ. τὸ αὐτὸ. I read τὸ with K¹; the reading τὰ doubtless originated from a misunderstanding of the periphrasis περὶ αὐτῶν τ. λ.

Εὐριπίδης. The quotation as given by Aristotle is as usual defective, indeed in the present case it is unintelligible. The whole passage can be restored from Plutarch and Stobaeus with the help of Leon Chrys-

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοῖν, ὃ παρὴν ἀπραγμάτως
 ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖσι ἡμιθιμημένον στρατοῦ
 ἴσον μετασχεῖν.

5

τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πρᾶσσοντας πλέον.

ζητοῦσι γὰρ το αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται ταῦτα διὰ πρᾶ-
 τειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δεξῆς ἐλήλυθε τὸ τοιούτους φρονι-
 μους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονο-
 μίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ πῶς δεῖ ἐνοικεῖν,
 ἄδελον καὶ σκεπτεῖν.

Σημεῖον δ' ἔστι τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν
 νέαι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρονιμοὶ
 δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἔστι
 15 ἡ φρονησις, ἣ γίνεται γινώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας. ἵσος δ' ἐμπειρο-
 οὐκ ἔστιν· πλήθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιῶν τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ
 τοῦτ' ἂν τις σκεψάσθαι, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖν γίνεται

knows (Or. 25), from whom we learn
 that the words are spoken by Odysseus
 in the Prologue to the *Politeia*.
 In this

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοῖν, ὃ παρὴν ἀπραγμά-
 τως
 ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖσι ἡμιθιμημένον στρατοῦ
 ἴσον μετασχεῖν τῷ σοφωτάτῳ τύχῃ:

οὐδὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸν χρόνον ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς
 τοῦ γὰρ περισσοῦ καὶ τι πρᾶσσοντας
 πλέον

τιμώμεν, ἀνδρὶς τ' ἐν πόλει νομίζομεν.
 The quotation is made solely to
 illustrate the sense repeatedly given
 to φρονεῖν. 'How can I be wise,
 seeing I have preferred *pragmata* to
 minding my own business?'

ζητοῦσι, *sc.* οἱ ἄνθρωποι implied in
 δοκεῖ. 1141 B. 1. It is the practice
 and belief of the many that gives rise
 to the popular abuse of the term
 φρονιμοί.

ἀδελφόν. Cf. 1141 B. 12 A.

καίτοι κ.τ.λ. The reason is that
 πᾶσι is φρονεῖν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἰκονο-
 μίας πολιτικῆς (1152 A. 17)

καὶ σκεπτεῖν. This seems to refer
 to the discussion at the end of the

Politics in the sum of the former
 and the state is producing *πολιτεία*.

§ 8. τῶν εἰρημένων, *sc.* τῶν τοῦ
 φρονεῖν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον. This
 is plainly the meaning, though the
 reference is a little obscure. That
 does not justify us, however, in
 bracketing the highly characteristic
 passage (1141 B. 24-2, 1142 A. 1
 a locution not a treatise.

ἵσος, only here in the *Politeia*, but
 though common enough elsewhere is
 Aristotle, especially after *σοφία*.

δοκεῖ. For the change of number
 cf. 1141 B. 18.

καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, *sc.* ὡς ἂν ἕκαστος
 εὐδελος. Young men may know the
 general principles of wisdom but they
 do not know the facts of life, and we
 not therefore complete the education we
 analyze. They may know that we
 should not drink too much, they do
 not see that 'This is too much for me.'

§ 8. ἐπὶ καὶ τ.λ. We may wish
 the question and ask not only why
 they may be a mathematician but
 he cannot be φρονιμος, but also why
 he cannot be a σοφός (*sc.* θεωρητικός
 even a *φυσικός*).

οφους δ' ἡ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἡ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, δι' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, των δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἀόηλον; ἐπεὶ το αργία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθολὸν ἐν τῷ βουλευσασθαι ἢ περὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον· ἡ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ἴδατο α, ἡ ὅτι τοῦτι βαρύσταθμον. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἔφη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται·

σοφία. Cf. Met. 1005 b, 1. σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' ἢν. The object of φυσική is which has its ἀρχή πινύσσει, that of the πρώτη φιλοσοφία ἡ ἐν, 'Reality as such.'

φαιρίστως αἰσθάνει. Cf. Met. 1010 b 20 μνηστικῶς περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἡμῶν τῆς θεωρίας παύεται· περι- ρεῖ πάντες τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ, οἱ καὶ αὐτοφύκτες κ.τ.λ. μὲν αἰσθάνει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές. Mathematician sits by the αἰσθητὰ their sensible ἐναντιώσεως and them as mere phenomena. It is taking away' which is called αἰσθητῶν. The opposite process is πρόσθεσις, cf. De Caelo 28 τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀραιότητος λέγε- ται μαθηματικά, τὰ δὲ φινύατα ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως (motion is 'added to' ex-). Aristotle means here that mathematics so much is 'taken that a minimum of experience ἔφη; he does not mean to say ἀρχαὶ of mathematics are in part of experience, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ πλείους λεγόμενα εἶναι δι' ἐπα- γωγὴν τοιούτων (An. Post. 81 b,

5 αἱ ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. The metaphoric and principles of βεβαιὰ ἐκ πειρῶν αἰσθάνει αἱ κοινὰ Μαθηματικά, require a πρῶτη before they can be applied by οἱ αἰσθάνει. 'have no connection.' Cf. 1147 a, 18 τὸ δὲ λέγειν ἡμεῖς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθη-
1. A.

κοντες συνεκρύπτει μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ δ' οὐκ.

τὸ τί ἐστίν, 'the definition' (ὁ οὐρισμός δηλοῖ τὸ τί ἐστίν), e.g. the definitions of the point, line, etc. which are the ἀρχαὶ of mathematics.

§ 7. ὅτι ἡ ἀμάρτυς κ.τ.λ. There are two opportunities for going wrong in deliberative analysis, (1) with regard to the general rule (2) with regard to its particular application. In mathematics the second does not exist. We must know the definition of a line, but the question 'is this a line?' is irrelevant.

ἡ γὰρ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Note the brachylogy. The full sense is ἡ γὰρ ἡ ἀμάρτυς περὶ τὸ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

τὸ βαρύσταθμα. Theophrastus ap. Athen. 43 c χεῖρ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ βαρυσταθμότερον (ὁδοὶ) δυσκατεργαστότερον γὰρ ἐστὶ... τῷ πολλῷ τὸ γινώσκειν.

§ 8. τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου. Cf. De An. 433 a, 25. App. A. Like ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις implies both the universal and the particular, but, while ἐπιστήμη only uses τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν in order to arrive at τὸ καθολόν (there being no ἐπιστήμη οἱ τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν), φρόνησις is emphatically τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸν. Its analysis is not complete till it reaches τὸ ἐσχάτον, the ultimate individual which can be analysed no further, for an act is always a particular act and φρόνησις is practical. Then what is ἐσχάτον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει becomes πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γινώσει.

25 τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῦν ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄρων, ἃν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχυρτοῦ οὐ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἰσθησις, οὐχ ἢ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κακεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἰσθήσις 30 ἢ φρόνησις. ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

IX. Τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εἰδῶν

§ 2. τῷ νῦν in the special sense in which νοῦς εἰσι τὰς ἀρχὰς.

τῶν ὄρων, i.e. τῶν ἀμείνων ἀρχῶν. Cf. i. 434, 36 τῶν πρώτων ὄρων νοῦς ἐστι καὶ οὐ λόγος. These are the distinctive (δρῶν = ορισμοὶ) which are the starting point of every science.

λόγος, i. q. συλλογισμοί, ἀποδειξίς. It is impossible λόγῳ ἀποδεδεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

οὐχ ἢ τῶν ἰδίων, sc. αἰσθητῶν. An ἰδιὸν αἰσθητὸν is one δ μὴ ἀνδύχεται ἐτέρῳ αἰσθῆσαι αἰσθάνεσθαι, e.g. colour, sound, taste; τὰ κοινὰ αἰσθητὰ αἰσθῆται ἀλλήλοις στίμα μέγιστοι. These are αἰσθητὰ, but are not perceived by one special αἰσθητηρίου. On θεωρία and θεωρητικά θεωρητικά see De An. 418 a, 7 sqq., and on the 'intuitive' element in φρόνησις introd. § 23.

οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα κ.τ.λ., i.e. like the perception of the fact that the infinite figure in mathematics is a triangle. Introd. §§ 22, 23. Bywater brackets ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς because the words seem to imply that there is no mathematical object except a triangle. See *Conte*, p. 31. We must bear in mind the ἀνάλογον ὡς περὶ διαγράμματος of 1113 b, 30. The case supposed is that of the geometer who breaks up his figure till he comes to something—say a triangle—which enables him to start the construction or proof at which he aims. It is in this way, for instance, that the properties of parallelograms are discovered.

στήσεται γὰρ κακεῖ 'for on this

side too there will be a stop. We reach the limit of analysis not so much when we descend to mathematics as when we ascend to the αρχὴ as πρώτη δρῶν. It is as impossible to give a reason why a triangle should be divided any further as it is to give a reason for the existence. For the impersonal use of στήσεται see e.g. *De An.* 1104 a, 30 and cf. e.g. *De An.* 1141 a, 17 ὡς δὲ οὐ δύναται προεῖναι ἀλλὰ στήσεται τι.

ἀλλ' αὕτη κ.τ.λ. Mathematical intuition (αὕτη) is more proper called αἰσθήσις than φρόνησις can be. It really is αἰσθήσις, though not τῶν ἰδίων, while φρόνησις is of course intellectual, not venous. I have hesitated in preferring the reading of K¹, δ, to that of L¹, α. But, I think, would be δ 2.

ἐκείνης, sc. τῆς φρονητικῆς. Mathematical and practical intuition belong to the same genus, but they are philosophically different, their difference being αἰσθητικὴ and διανοητικὴ.

Id. § 1 ζητεῖν τι, a species of θεωρεῖν. It is necessary to put θεωρεῖν into its genus, in order that we may have the needed προτάσεις in the following piece of dialectic. We shall see that the qualities now to be discussed are the natural basis of φρόνησις. They are διανοήσις and εὐνοία by nature.

λαβεῖν, scilicet Cf. 1140 a, 14. Here the sense is made more explicit by the addition of τι ἐστίν, cf. 1113 a

δοξα εστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἢ εἰβουλία. διασείει
 ἄρα λίσπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὕτω φύσις. καὶ γὰρ ἡ δοξα
 οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φύσις τις ἤδη, ὃ ἔστι βουλευόμενος, εἴητι
 15 εὐ εἴντε καὶ κακῶς βουλευεται. ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται
 ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τις ἐστίν ἢ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· εἰδὶ ἢ βουλή ζη-
 τητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς
 δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πάσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὁ προ-
 τίθεται δεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύχεται, ἄσπε ὀρθοῖς ἐσται

mind one way or the other, but the object of βουλή is εἰδὶ, εἰρηστος, for ὁ βουλευόμενος has not yet determined which course to adopt.

οἷδ' ἄνευ λόγου, even though it is not the rightness of either knowledge or belief, it is μετὰ λόγου, i.e. it proceeds upon grounds and can give a reason for what it does.

διανοίας ἄρα λίσπεται, sc. ἀπὸ τῆς ὀρθότητος εἶναι. This implies an exhaustive division of ἔξει μετὰ λόγου into ἐπιστήμη, δοξα, and διάνοια. Such a division is to be found only in Plato, and we have seen that we are here criticizing him. For the definition of διάνοια in this sense cf. Theaet. 189 c (τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καλῶς) λόγῳ δὲ αὐτῇ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχῇ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν αὐτοσκόπῃ. Soph. 263 σ δ μετ' ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διαλογεῖ ἄνευ φωνῆς γινόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖς ἐκνοούμεσθ, διάνοια. All the difficulties of this section disappear if the reference to Plato is borne in mind. The older commentators took the sentence to mean 'it falls short of thought,' while modern editors suppose Aristotle to be using διάνοια here in the unparalleled sense of the 'discursive faculty.' In Aristotle διάνοια includes all intellect theoretical and practical, intuitive and discursive, but here the terminology is not his own. See next note for the relation of διάνοια to δοξα in Plato.

φύσις τις ἤδη. This is also from Plato. Cf. Soph. 263 ε καὶ μὴν ἐν

λογίῃ γε αὐτὸς ἐπεὶ τοῦτο—Τὸ σημαίνει—Φασιν τε καὶ ἐποφασιν. Ἰσχυρὸν—Ἰσχυρὸν οὐκ εἴητο ἐν γὰρ κατὰ λόγον ἀγγέλλεται μετὰ σοφίας, καὶ οὐκ ἔχει δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτό. Hence ἐξεί is called διάνοια ἀποτελειώμενη 2. 264 b. Note the idiomatic εἶναι and ἤδη. Ibid. 2. 264.

ζητεῖ τι. Here again we make use of the meaning το βουλευόμενος ἵσχυρῳ. (1142 2, 31).

ἢ ὀρθότης βουλῆς. There is no contradiction, for the Platonic διάνοια includes the Aristotelian βουλή. Ζητητέα. Aristotle may have limited his meaning to all is a lecture the usual statements that so one deliberates about what is necessary or due to chance, etc. At any rate, he goes on to discuss ἀκράτης and αὐτὸς βουλή.

πλεοναχῶς καὶ ἄνευ. Cf. 1125 1, 14 n.

ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής καὶ λ. The former requirement is that the end should be right. We do not call the bad man εἰρηστος, though he gains his end by deliberation (φαῦλος here is equivalent to ἀεὶ κακός). Nor do we call the morally weak man (the ἀκράτης) or this name. As we shall see, the ἀκράτης, though against his better knowledge, aims at the pleasure of the moment, and the ἀεὶ κακός aims on principle.

ὁ προτιθέμενος εἶναι. This passage is implied by the Verba Veritas, which the MSS. have the meaningless ὁ

βεβουλευμένος, κακόν δι μέγα εὐληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν το
 τε τὸ εὖ βεβουλευσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς
 εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τεκνική. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδοῦς
 συλλογισμὸς τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δεῖ
 οὐ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῇ τὸν μῖσον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ'
 αὕτη πῶ εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὐ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μὲν 25
 6 τοι δεῖ οὐ εἶναι. ὅτι ἔστι πολλὸν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν,
 τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πῶ εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθό-
 7 της ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὥς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι
 ἔστι καὶ ἀπλῶς εὖ βεβουλευσθαι καὶ πρὸς τι τέλος. ἡ μὲν
 δὴ ἀπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τίς δὲ 30
 ἡ πρὸς τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλευ-
 σθαι ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς
 τὸ τέλος αὐτῇ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑποληψίς ἐστιν.

It is true, as Bywater points out (Comm. p. 31), that δεῖ strictly speaking implies ὀφείδεται, but (1) we can hardly credit the author of the *Versio* with the emendation *δεῖ* for *ἔδει*, and (2) the pleonasm of *δεῖ* is extremely common with *οὐκ* as *ἀνεπαρκῆς*, and is still easier with *κεῖνα* *προσφωσμέ*. Jackson quotes Plato, *Soph.* 221 a *ἵνα ὅρα φρονέμεθα εἰς τὴν εὐερίαν*. The absence of *τούτου* is *εὐβουλία*, cf. 1117 b, 30 a.

§ 8. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ κ.τ.λ. The second requirement is that the means shall be right as well as the end.

δ τυχεῖν. For the ellipse of *ταύτου* cf. b, 19 above.

ψευδῇ τὸν μῖσον ὅρον. Strictly speaking the *ὅρος* can neither be true nor false; the meaning is that the wrong middle term altogether may be taken, so that one or both of the *προτάσεις* of the practical syllogism are *ψεῖδος*, though the *συμπερασμα* is a true statement of the particular act that must be done to reach the end. Aristotle even speaks of *παράματα* as *ψεῖδος* when they are not what

we take them to be (Met. 1024 b, 25).

§ 9. ἔτι ἔστι κ.τ.λ. The third requirement is that the time should be right.

ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον κ.τ.λ. This sums up the three requirements of ὀρθότης, (1) end (ὅς), (2) means (ὡς), (3) time (ὅτε).

§ 10. ὅτι ἔστι κ.τ.λ. A fourth requirement is that it must be directed to the end, not merely to an end, to *εὐδαιμονίαν*, not merely to e.g. health or strength. Cf. 1140 a, 27.

κατορθοῦσα, 1098 b, 39 a.

ὅς ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ἐπαληψίς, αἰ. τοῦ συμφέροντος πρὸς τὸ τέλος. This avoids the contradiction of making *φρόνησις* a true conception of the end of Man. Others read *πρὸς τι τέλος*. It is not *φρόνησις* but *ἥθος* which makes us aim at the good, and it is not *φρόνησις* but *ἥθος* which makes our good the true good. But, on the other hand, τὸ δραστέον can only become an efficient cause *εἴη βοηθῆσαι ἢ φαντασθῆναι* (A. pp. A.), and neither *δράζει* nor

Χ Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εἰσυνεσία, καθ' ἧς λ-
 1143^α γομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνέτους. οὐθ' ὅλως το αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη
 ἢ δόξη—πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν σικτικοί—οὔτε τις μια τῶν
 κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ἰγκενῶν, ἢ γε-
 μετρια περὶ μεγέθη· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντων καὶ
 5 ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσις ἐστὶν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁσίων,
 ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις καὶ βουλεῖσθαιτο. διὰ τὰ
 τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστιν, οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ ταυτὸν σίεσις
 καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν, τι γὰρ
 δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μὴ, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ σίεσις
 10 κριτικὴ μόνον. ταυτὸν γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ σιγ-
 ετοὶ καὶ εὐσιγέτοισι. ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν
 οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μαθήσκειν
 λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῇ
 15 φρόνησιν ἐστίν, ἑλλοῦ λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ

ἦθος could give us an ἀλήθεια ἐπό-
 λησις of τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος
 such as the rule ποτε ἀδυνάτω
 συμφέρει τὸ ξηρό. That is the
 function of the πρακτικὴ νοῦς, and
 φρόνησις is the ἀρετὴ which enables it
 to discharge it. In *Met. An.* 100 b,
 22 τὸ τῶν πρακτικῶν τέλει is dismis-
 sioned an object of thought (δι-
 ορησθέν).

X. § 1. **σύνεσις.** This term was a so
 somewhat loosely used by Plato. Cf.
Phileb. 19 d ποῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν,
 τέχνην καὶ πάσα αὐτὰ ταῦτα συγγενή,
 and Aristotle himself had enumerated
 it provisionally along with σοφία and
 τέχνη as a διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ (1102 a,
 3). It is therefore important to show
 how it is really related to ἐπιστήμη
 and φρόνησις. The word was very
 popular in the 4th century, as may be
 seen from Demosthenes and Aeschines.
 πάντες γὰρ κ + λ. This must refer y
 refer to διότι αὐτοῖς. Everyone has at
 least δόξα.

οὔτε περὶ θεοῦ, 'not any of
 every γιγνομένων.' It has nothing to
 do with τὰ φύσει οὐκ αὐτὰ τὰ γὰρ γί-
 νεται, nor even with such usual
 affairs as are beyond our reach.

§ 2. **ἐπιτακτικὴ κριτικὴ** *Αρι-
 στοτέλης* here uses the Platonic language.
 Cf. *1st. Eth.* 1163 b ἀπ' οὗ συνίσταται τῇ
 γυναικὶ εἰς τὸ μετ' ἐπιστήμης μὲν
 τὸ δὲ κριτικῶν διακρινόμενοι προσέτι
 ἐμμελῶς ἂν φαίμεν ἀρετὴν. The
 fact of its being a πρακτικὴ ἀρετὴ
 shows that it belongs to what Cf.
Met. An. 100 b, 20 (*App.* 11).

§ 3. **ὥσπερ τὸ μαθήσκειν κτλ.**
 The point is the distinction of the
 two meanings of μαθήσκειν, (1) 'to
 understand,' (2) 'to learn.' Cf. *1st. Eth.*
 1163 b, 32 τὸ γὰρ μαθήσκειν ὁμοῦται
 (1) το συνιέναι χρόνιον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ
 (2) τὸ λαμβάνειν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ἑλλοῦ λέγοντος This is the main
 point and makes σύνεσις as a virtue lead
 to φρόνησις. The volitions need not
 be συνετοί, the συμφορὰς αὐτοῖς αὐ-

καλῶς ταῦτον. καὶ ἐνταῦθεν ἐλήλυθε ταῖσδε ἡ
καθ' ἣν εἰσύνεσται, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθανεῖν· λέγοντες
ἡ μανθάνειν συνεῖναι πολλὰς.

1. Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ
φαιμέν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπεικούς ἐστι κρίσις ὁρθή. 20
πρὸς τοῦ γὰρ ἐπεικῆ μάλιστά φημεν εἶναι σιγ-
ραῖαν, καὶ ἐπεικὸς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἓνα συγγνώμην.
συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπεικούς ὁρθή·
δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

ὅς δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλογίαις εἰς ταῦτά τείνουσαι· 25
ἐν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σίνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν
οἱς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἥδη
ραῖσιν καὶ συνετούς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται

1. As Stewart well says,
is the continuous source of the

§ 1. γνώμη. Plato had used
it too in a way which suggested
was equivalent to σύνεσις.
1143 b οὐκοῦν τούτου μετὰ τῆς
καὶ γινώσκοντο γνώμην ὅτι
καὶ εἶναι τοῦ δὲ δοῦναι ὡς
πρὸς. Aristotle is usual wishes
it to the sense it had in actual
in that sense it corresponds
feeling; when we call anyone
of fine feeling' or say some
one feeling. If the use of
κρίσις σύνεσις and ἀγνοῦν
ing, 'harsh'. The συγγνώμη
the συγγνώμην, 'gives his
his out mind. It is probable
the meaning of the word is con-
with its use in the homeric
καὶ πρὸς δόσιν ἐρίων in cases
his is only law. "If σύνεσις is
by the spirit in the ἐσθήσις,
is especially that in the dia-
Stewart.

ἀνθρώπου, neither not masculine,
own by the last words of the

αἱ. This, therefore, is also a
of οὐν. Cf. 1143 a, 10 n.

ὁρθή δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, i.e. τοῦ ἐν
ἀληθείᾳ εἰσιεσθῆναι. There is no diffi-
culty in the fact that the definitions
given of γνώμη and σιγῆσις are the
same: they are related just in the
same way as σύνεσις and εἰσένοσις.
Cf. the opening words of 1143 a, 11
and 1143 a, 10. On εἰσένοσις cf.
1137 a, 31 n.

§ 2. πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις. We see from
what follows that this means νοῦς,
γνώμη, σύνεσις, i.e. all the practical
ἕξεις which apprehend facts of ex-
ternals immediately. Epistémē is not included
for that is μετὰ λόγον.

εὐλόγως, 1046 a, 3 n.

εἰς ταῦτά τείνουσαι. Cf. 1096 b,
27 πρὸς τὸ συνελεῖν and the note there.
All these ἕξεις are πρὸς τὸν λόγον, i.e.
πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν.

λέγοντες ἐπιφέροντες. The con-
struction is a little curious; for some
of the objects are governed by λέγοντες
and some by ἐπιφέροντες. For ἐπι-
φέρειν cf. φέρειν 1193, 34 n. The
phrase οὐν ἥδη is explained by ὅτι
ἡ ἡλικία οὐκ ἔχει (1143 b, 8).

δυνάμεις. They were called ἕξεις
above, but δυνάμεις is the more correct
term, for φυσικά δοκίμια εἶναι ταῦτα
1143 b, 6 and 10 ἀπὸ φύσεως παρ-

τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἑαστων· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ
 30 κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνεπὲς καὶ [ἐγγνώμων
 ἢ] συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴ κοῖμα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπαν-
 των ἴσθιν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἑαस्ता καὶ
 τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμος
 δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ
 35 πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἑσχατα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' αὐ-
 τὰ ἡμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὄρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων
 1143^b νοῦς ἐστι καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις
 τῶν ἀκινήτων ὄρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς
 τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως·

γίγνεται. They are *πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα* as a.l. *εὐφρα* is to its formal *ἐξ* (cf. 1144 b. 4). As a *διανοητικὴ ἀρετή*, *φρόνησις* is gained mainly by teaching (1103 a. 15 ff.) such teaching as we find in the *ethics*—but the teaching requires as a foundation (1) *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή* and (2) *εὐφρα*.

[*συγγνώμων ἢ*]. Bywater, *Contr.* p. 52.

τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show that the sphere of *γνώμη* is really as wide as that of *φρόνησις*.

§ 3. καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον κ.τ.λ. Here we see another difference between these *dōnai* and *φρόνησις*. They are restricted to the particular, *φρόνησις* has to do with the universal besides.

§ 4. καὶ ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. The difficulties which have been raised about this passage are mainly imaginary. The chief point to remember is that *νοῦς* in its restricted sense—not when it is equivalent to *διάνοια*—is a *dōnai* which apprehends its object immediately (*τῷ θεῶν*) like *αἰσθῆσις*, not mediately like *ἀπόδειξις* or *σουλανσις*. Now, both in theory and in practice we must assume such a faculty. We have seen that in theory it is called *νοῦς*, and everyone knows that a man

who can see the right thing to do is said *νοῦν ἔχειν*. We need not dispute now whether this is strictly speaking the same *νοῦς*. It is in any case an element in *φρόνησις* and bears the same name as the other.

τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἡμφότερα. In τὰ ἑρῶτα are *ἐσχατα* viewed from beneath, they are the elements of demonstrative *ἐπιστήμη*.

ὁ κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις, that describes 1140 b. 31 sqq.

ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς Cf. 1147 a. 28 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς. These two phrases must surely have the same explanation, and there can be little doubt that in the latter the word *προτάσεις* is to be understood. At this whole passage really dealt with *προτάσεις* also, it does not seem impossible to suppose such an ellipse, especially in so concerned a piece of writing. We can hardly suppose even Aristotle to have meant such a *contradictio in adiecto* as *practical ἐπιστήμη* would involve.

τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως. 'the minor premises, usually called *ἡ δυνάμις πρότασις*.' Its formula in the *Practical Syllogism* is *ἐγὼ δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ τίς τοιοῦτος*, and this is just what the *νοῦς ἔχειν* acc.

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὐ ἔνικα αὐταί· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ
 5 τὰ καθόλου· τοῖτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθῆσθαι, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. ὡς
 καὶ φυσικῶς δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φησὶ σοφῶς μὲν
 6 οὐδείς, γνωμῇ δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ'
 ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ ἔδε ἡ ἡλικία
 τοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας ούσης. [διὸ
 καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τοιῶν γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις
 καὶ περὶ τούτων.] ὥστε δεῖ προσεχεῖν τῶν ἐμπειρῶν καὶ
 7 τρεσβυτέρων [ἢ φρονίμων] ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φύσεσι καὶ
 δοξαῖς οἷα ἦττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ το ἔχειν ἐκ
 8 τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὀρθῶςιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ
 φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τίνα ἑκατέρω τιγχίμε
 9 οῦσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα,
 εἴρηται.

XII. Διαπορήσεις δ' ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τι χρήσιμοι

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1139 b, 18
 ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου
 The universal rules of conduct and the
 definition of εὐδαιμονία can only be
 found by a dialectical process which
 starts from particular moral maxims.
 We generalize 'I ought to do this'
 into 'all men must do this and so on.'

§ 8 ἔχον αἰσθῆσθαι, used in the wide
 sense, i.e. αἰσθάνεσθαι, and including
 νοῦν. So we say 'I see,' when we
 mean an intellectual not a sensuous
 perception. The sense in which
 αἰσθῆται is used here has been ex-
 plained above, 1140 n, 25 seq. We
 were told there that this αἰσθῆσθαι
 ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ, here that it is νοῦς
 But Aristotle is only examining the
 subject dialectically from every side,
 and we are left with a very clear and
 definite idea of a certain aspect of
 φρόνησις, however vague the termin-
 ology may be. And the vagueness is
 not in Aristotle's own mind, but in
 the popular language from which he
 feels bound to start.

§ 9 τοῖς ἡλικίαις... ἀκολουθεῖν.
 This puts the acquisition of σοφία,

γνώμη and νοῦς (not φρόνησις) on the
 same level as τὸ πηλοῦσθαι ἀνθρώπων,
 which is the starting point of τὰ ὡς
 ἐπὶ τὸ πολλὸν γιγνώμενα in the sphere of
 φύσις (A. P. 31 b, 6).

§ 10 καὶ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. These words
 break the argument here, not do they
 come in very well, after αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ
 νοῦς above, where knowledge and bywater
 would place them. In that position
 they would commit us to the strange
 doctrine that ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ
 ἀποδείξεις.

§ 11 διὸ καὶ προσέχειν κ.τ.λ. This
 goes closely with τὰς ἡλικίας
 ἀκολουθεῖν κ.τ.λ.

ἡ φρονίμων. These words are sus-
 picious. The φρόνιμοι can always put
 his advice in syllogistic form, and so
 one can become φρόνιμος merely by
 getting old. Perhaps, however the
 word is used in its popular sense.

§ 12. τί μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This re-
 capitulation strongly favours the view
 that there are only two διαρηκτικαὶ
 ἀρεταί, σοφία and φρόνησις.

—XII. § 1. Διαπορήσεις δ' ἂν τις
 κ.τ.λ. The ἀπορία concerning σοφία

εἰσιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ ἔξ ὧν ἴσται εἰδᾶμεν
 20 ἄνθρωπος οὐδεμίαι γὰρ ἐστὶ γενεσιῶν—ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοιο-
 μὴν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρο-
 νησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ὠφελῆ ἀν-
 θρώπου, ταῦτα δ' ἴσται ἢ τοῦ ὠφελοῦ ἐστὶν ἀδρόνως πρότερον,
 οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ ἔσμεν, εἴπερ ἔστι
 25 αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἰδὲ τὰ ὑγιεῖνα οἰδὲ τὰ εἰκαστα,
 ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ὁπὸ τῆς ἑξέως εἶναι λέγεσθαι·
 οἷθεν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ γυμνα-
 στικὴν ἔσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμος θετέον ἄλλο
 30 τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οἷσι σπουδαίοις οὐθεν ἂν εἴη χρίσθαι·
 ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ διδύσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν
 ἢ ἄλλους ἔχουσι. πείθεσθαι ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχειν ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ
 καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ
 μαυθάνομεν ἱατρικὴν. πρὸς δὲ τοιούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι. ὥ-
 35 ξειεν εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὐσα κυριώτερα αὐτῆς ἐσ-
 σὶ ἢ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει. περὶ δεαστον. περὶ δὲ

and φρόνησις are (1) What is the use of σοφία since it can produce nothing and of φρόνησις regarded as the power of apprehending τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς? (2) What is the use of φρόνησις even if we regard it as the power of apprehending τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν? (3) How are we to reconcile the imperative character of φρόνησις with its inferiority to σοφία?

ὥσπερ ἔστιν αἱ ἀρεταί. The whole ἄτοπον turns on this, for ἔστιν inevitably give rise to τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑξέως. If we have the ἔστι, intellectual knowledge of the ἀρεταί which will follow from it is superfluous. They will follow whether we know them or not.

ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν εἰσὶν. This is added to make it clear that τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ὠφελῆ are to be taken in a sense analogous to that of τὰ ὑγιεῖνα καὶ εὐκατα, as called τῷ σημείῳ εἶναι τῆς ὑγίαιας καὶ ευκαταί (τῷ ἀφ' ἑνός

εἶναι τοῦδ' ἡ, 27 n. l. as when we speak of a 'healthy complexion' or a 'healthy head' (ὑγιαίνειν ὁμοίως). We do not take them in the sense of τὰ ποιητὰ καὶ φιλοποιεῖται τὰς ἀρετὰς.

§ 2. τούτων χάριν, i.e. τῷ εἶναι τῆς ἑξέως τοῦ γίνεσθαι, equivalent to τῷ ποιητικῷ καὶ φιλοποιεῖν καὶ τῷ πρακτικῷ καὶ πολιτικῷ, the sense in which ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὐκατα εἶναι and ἡ φιλοσοφία εἶναι καὶ εὐκατα εἶναι.

τοῖς οὐδὲ σπουδαίοις τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν. Αἰτιολογούμεν τοῖς μὴ οὐδὲ, which gives a clearer view. The healthy man does not even so know what produces health, the healthy man cannot be a doctor.

§ 3. χείρων τῆς σοφίας εἶναι. as was shown above 214. 2, 20 sqq.

ἡ γὰρ σοφία, i.e. ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς σοφίας. Of course σοφία can have no imperative character; it is a theoretical

τοῦτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἡπύρῃται περὶ αὐτῶν μένον.
 4 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὐτὸς ἀναγκαῖον αἰκτὸς 1144^a
 αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετὰς γ' οὐσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου,
 5 καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιῶσι μῦθον μηδέτερα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ποιῶσι
 μὲν, αἰχ' ὥς ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίαιαν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἡ ὑγίαια, αὐταῖς
 ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὐσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς 5
 6 τῷ ἔχουσθαι κοινὴ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαιμονοῦν. ἔτι τὸ ἔργον
 ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ
 μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ
 πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετιόρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οἷ' ἔστιν
 ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· οἶδεν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πρῶτο- 10
 7 ται ἢ μὴ πράττειν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μῆθιν εἶναι πρακτικωτέ-
 ρον διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνω-
 θεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ
 δίκαια λεγόμεν πράττοντάς τινας οὕτω δίκαιους εἶναι, οἷον

αἰκτῶν. The τοῦτοι here is of τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ το δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔχον τοῦτοδὲ ἢ ὡς ἐν ὑγείᾳ, μᾶλλον τοιαῦτα (i.e. αἰκτῶν) ἔχοντα ποιεῖ ἢ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ (For iii. 5.)
 § 4. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first λόγος. The τοῦτοι is τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰκτεῖν.

§ 5. ἔπειτα καὶ. The second λόγος. Such is not the efficient but the formal cause of εὐδαιμονία. The λόγος of health as it exists in the soul of the doctor is ἰατρικὴ and an efficient cause, when realized in the body of his patient it is a formal cause.

ὡς ἡ ὑγίαια, i.e. τὸ ἔχουσθαι τοῦ.

τῷ ἔχουσθαι, 'by being possessed' [It is to be understood τῷ ἐνεργεῖν as τῷ εἶναι αὐτῇ ἐνεργεῖν τὸν ἔχοντα.]

§ 6. ἔτι. The third λόγος. The function of Man (which we know to be πρακτικὴ εἰς τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος) cannot be discharged by ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ alone. Note the positive result, which is emerging from these three λόγοι. We begin to see (1) that the διανοητικὴ ἀρεταὶ are necessary to the τελείωσις of Man, (2) that σοφία

is the ἀρίστη ἀρετὴ, and therefore that εὐδαιμονία will be above all ἐνεργεῖα κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, and (3) that φρόνησις is ancillary to σοφία. All this will be worked out later.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. While φρόνη ἀρετὴ can ensure the rightness of the end (for the σοφία of the good man is τὸ εἶναι ἀλήθειαν βουλευτὴν), yet this is not enough. Goodness cannot do without Wisdom, which ensures the rightness of τὸ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν.

τοῦ δὲ τετιόρτου κ.τ.λ. The four μόρια (we are using popular language) are τὸ τειστομενικόν (goodness σοφία), τὸ λογιστικόν (goodness φρόνησις), τὸ ἀρετικόν (goodness ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ), and τὸ θρεπτικόν. The point of its being mentioned here is that, as it is not an ἔργον of Man, its function is not the ἔργον of Man. Cf. 1097 b, 24.

§ 7. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μῆθιν κ.τ.λ. The fourth and most complete λόγος, involving the other three.

μικρὸν ἀνωθεν ἀρκτέον. Cf. 1139 b, 14.

λέγωμεν. 1134 a, 27-27η

15 τοὺς τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιούστας ἢ ἀκούσας
 ἢ δι' ἄρτιαν ἢ δι' ἑτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αἰτὰ (καίτοι τρι-
 τουσί γε ὁ διὲ καὶ ὅσα χρή τὸν σπουδαῖον). αὐτὰς, ὡς
 εἰκεν, ἔστι το πῶς ἔχοντα πρῆττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἡγα-
 θόν, λέγω δ' οἶον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αἰτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν
 20 πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετὴ. ὁ
 τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πρῆττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς
 ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτεον δ' ἐπιστήσας σα-
 φέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὲ δυνάμις ἣν καλοῦσι διει-
 25 νοτήτα· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα
 σκοπὸν συνετείναντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχά-
 νειν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾖ καλός, ἐπιεικὴς ἔστιν
 εἶναι δὲ φαῦλος, πανοιργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς
 καὶ πανοιργούς φημὶ εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρονησις οἷχ ἢ δύν-
 30 αμις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἔξισ τῷ
 ὁμμάτι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὅτι
 εἴρηται τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρα-
 κτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσι, ἐπειδὴ τοιοῦνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ το
 ἀριστον, ὁ-ιδήποτε δὴ (ἴσται γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν)

δι' ἑτερόν τι i.e. κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
 e.g. τιμὴ καὶ δόξα χάριν.

οἶον, 'that is' (not 'for instance').
 § 8. ἐπιστήσας, sc. τὴν διδόντας
 (Met. 987 b, 2), τὴν παρέχον (Met.
 1090 a, 2), τὸν λόγον. The object is
 often omitted as here, cf. H. A. 487a,
 22 περὶ ὧν τοῦτο μὲν εἰπόμεν πρότερον,
 ὅστερον δὲ περὶ ταύτων φέροι διειρη-
 σάντες δεῖναι.

§ 9. δυνάμις in the strict sense as
 opposed to εἶναι. Being a μετὰ λόγου
 δύναμις it is τὸν ἰσχυρισμὸν. See above
 1103 a, 20 καὶ ἀπὸ ποίας.

ἣν καλοῦσι διειρήνητα, sc. the
 members of the Academy, cf. [Plato]
 Def. 413 a διειρήνητα διόλεον καὶ ἣν ὁ
 ἔχων στοχαστικὴ ἵστος τοῦ ἰδίου τέλους.
 This was doubtless suggested by the
 famous discussion in the Theaetetus.

πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν. All
 πράγματα are only ἐκ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα.

αἰτῶν. Hywater reads αἰτῶν, sc.
 τοῦ σπουδαίου.

δεινοὺς καὶ πανοιργούς. Cf. Plato,
 Theaet. 177 a δεινοὶ καὶ πανοιργῆται,
 Dem. Olynth. 1 § 3 πανοιργῆται ὡς καὶ
 δεινοὶ πράγμασιν χορήθαι. Aristotle
 is referring to the rhetorical device of
 frightening people by the comparison with
 out reference to the premises.

§ 10. ἡ δ' ἔξισ, sc. ὁμόσηται
 τῷ ὁμμάτι τούτῳ, sc. τῷ ὅμ. Cf.
 1096 b, 29. In the face of the constant
 description of τοῦτο as ὁμμάτι τῆς ψυχῆς,
 we can hardly understand this other-
 wise. Nor is there any inconsistency
 for διειρήνητα is a δυνάμις of ποῦς.

οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ κ. τ. λ. On the
 practical syllogism see Intro. § 12.

ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες. The two words
 have sense of this one. The ἀρχή is the
 definition of εὐδαιμονία.

τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ
 μωχοληρία καὶ διαψευδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρ- 35
 χάς. ὥστε φανερόν ἐστι ἀδύνατον φρονιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα
 ἀγαθόν. XIII σκέπτεον δὲ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ 1144^b
 γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησιω· ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν
 δεινότητα· οἱ ταῦτον μὲν, ὅμοιον δὲ οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ
 ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἴκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν
 ὑπάρχειν φύσει πᾶσι· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ 5
 ἀνδρείοι καὶ τάλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως
 ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τοῦ κυρίως ἀγαθόν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον
 τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ
 ὑπάρχουσιν ἔξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβερὰ φαίνονται οὖσαι.
 πλὴν τοσούτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ 10
 ἄνευ ὀφθαλμοῦ κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφίλλεσθαι ἰσχυρὸς διὰ
 2 τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα· εἰάν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν,
 ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει· ἡ δ' ἔξις ὁμοία οὖσα τὰτ' ἔσται
 κυρίως ἀρετὴ. ὥστε καθότι περ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν

XIII § 1 σκεπτεόν δὲ πάλιν
 We now see the purpose of the discussion of deuntē. Just as the
 δύναμις of διοσις cannot become
 the ἐξίς of φρονησις without ἡθική
 ἀρετή, so—and this is the main point
 for our present purpose, the λόγος of
 the ἀρετή, —the δύναμις of φυσική
 ἀρετή cannot become the ἐξίς of ἡθική
 ἀρετή without φρονησις. Observe that,
 with characteristic carelessness, the
 terms of the ἀναλογία are given in
 the wrong order.

ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ. The *locus classicus*
 on this subject is H. A. 1188 a. 15-1190.
 ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ζῴων ἔχον τὴν περὶ τὴν μηχανή
 νησίαν, ἀπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει
 φρονητικὴν τὴν διαφοράν· καὶ γὰρ
 ἡμετέρας καὶ ὄρνιθας καὶ περὶ τὴν καὶ
 χαλκιστῆς, καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ διελίας, καὶ
 φειδίας καὶ θαλάσσης, καὶ θημῶν καὶ παροικ-
 ρησις, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν διαίτην συνήθειας
 ἔστιν ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτῶν ὁμοιωμένη, τὰ
 ἀπαιτεῖται ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν ἐλέγχον· τὰ

μὲν γὰρ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἦντο διαφέρει
 πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος
 πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων ἔστι γὰρ τῶν
 νοσίων ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ,
 ἔστι δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις μᾶλλον, τὰ
 δὲ τῷ ἀναλόγῳ διαφέρει, ὡς γὰρ ἐν
 ἀνθρώπῳ τέχνη καὶ σοφία καὶ συνέσις
 οὕτως ἐνίοις τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶ τις ἑτέρα
 τοιαύτη φυσικὴ δύναμις φανερώτατος
 ὅ ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν παιδῶν
 ἡλικίας βλέψαντες· ἐν ταῖσι γὰρ τῶν
 μὲν ὁσέσων ἔξιν ἐσμένους ὅτιον ἴσιν
 οἷον ἔχον καὶ σπέρματα, διαφέρει δ'
 οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπὼν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς τῶν θηρίων
 ψυχῆς αὐτὰ τὸν χρόνον ταύτην, ὡς
 οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἰ τὰ μὲν ταῦτα τὰ δὲ
 παρατήρησις τὰ δ' ἀναλόγῳ ὑπάρχει
 τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις.

σωφρονικοί. The termination con-
 veniently marks the φυσικὴ δύναμις.

ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι. For the pic-
 dicative οὕτως ἄλλος ζητεῖν, cf. 1133 a,
 11 n.

§ 2, ὁμοία οὖσα, i.e. τῷ ὄψιν ἡ
 κινῶν λαβόντι.

15 εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, εὖτε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡθικοῦ διο-
 20 ῥοτὶ, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τοιούτων ἡ
 κυρία οἱ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. εὐὲρ τινὲς φασὶ πα 3
 σαι τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτην τῇ μὲν
 ὀρθῶς ἐξήτει τῇ δ' ἡμαρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο
 25 εἶναι πᾶσαι τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἡμαρτανεν, ὅτε δ' οἷα ἄνευ φρο-
 νήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σιμεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ οὖν πάντες, 4
 ὅταν ὀρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθίασιν, τὴν ἔξω εἰσάγετε
 καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ
 κατὰ τὴν φρονήσιν. εἰκόσιν δὴ μαιτανίσθαι πως ἄπατες
 35 ὅτι ἡ τοιαυτὴ ἔστι ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρονήσιν. οὐκ 5
 ἐξ μικρὸν μεταβήκοι. ἐστὶ γὰρ οἱ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
 λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγον ἔστι ἀρετὴ [ἐστίν]· ὀρθὸς
 δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρονήσις ἐστίν. Σωκράτης
 μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι
 30 πᾶσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγον. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων 6

ὅς γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. Above (1144 a, 10) we found that φρόνησις οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἀρετῆς. We may express the relation of the two by saying that ἀρετὴ without φρόνησις is blind, φρόνησις without ἀρετὴ is empty. Our naturally good tendencies cannot become goodness unless φρόνησις is present to show us both the general rules of conduct which must be obeyed if we are to attain the good, and also what particular acts come under those rules. It was this fact which made Sokrates identify goodness and know-
 ledge.

§ 6. καὶ γὰρ οὖν πάντες. In Met. 992 a, 33 and 1009 a, 26 we read that γίγνται τὰ νοήματα τοῖς οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία, and that οἱ οὖν τὸ πᾶν μᾶλλον οὐλοῖται πύλασιν. These passages show that οἱ οὖν are certainly not the Peripatetics, but the contemporary Academy. We have been told already (1103 b, 31) that the doctrine of τὰ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον εἰσάγετε (note 1171) and we may infer that it belonged to

the Academy.

προσ-τιθίασιν. 'after naming the ἔξω and that to which it is relative add the qualification κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.'

§ 6. ἐστὶ μετὰ βήκοι. 'we must take a little step on advance' (cf. 1007 a, 14 n. 1). The Platonist κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον implies a merely external standard; we say that the ἀρετὴ is μετὰ λόγον, and that good sense is inseparably bound up with wisdom.

ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος ἡ φρόνησις. It is true that the ὀρθὸς λόγος is not as ἀρετὴ nor identical with φρόνησις, but yet this way of speaking is quite Aristotelian. The ὀρθὸς λόγος of health is τέρπειν and so the ὀρθὸς λόγος of action may be regarded as the form of goodness existing in the soul of the φρονίμος and identical with the φρονίμος of the man who 'has the λόγος.' (cf. 1138 b, 31 n.)

ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπαι-

εὐχ αὖν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κίριως ἀνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ
 μοι ἀνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος
 ὅτι λύοιτ' ἄν, ὃ διαλεχθεῖη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλ-
 λ' αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφύεστατος πρὸς ἀπά-
 ῳς τε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὐπω εἰληφώς ἔσται· τοῦτο 35
 κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς
 πλεῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἡμα γὰρ τῇ 1145·
 ἥσει μὲν οὐσιν πᾶσαι ὑπερβύουσιν. δῆλον δέ, ἂν
 ἡ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου
 ἦν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἀνευ
 ἡσέως οὐδ' ἀνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἡ δὲ 5
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πραττεῖν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κίρια
 ἐν τῇ σοφίᾳ οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτιώσεως μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
 ὑγίαιας ἢ ἰατρικῆ· οὐ γὰρ χρήται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὅρᾳ
 γίνεσθαι· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη.
 ὁμοίον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φάη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν 10
 ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

ὁ λόγος ὃ διαλεχθεῖη τις ἂν,
 διελέχθαι, argue out that might
 all to show —.

χωρίζονται αἱ ἀρεταί. The
 he here indicated is that of the
 εὐχία τῶν ἀρετῶν, as it was
 later in the school. Alexander
 in 1011 wrote a special treatise
 διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν βίαν
 (1011), in which he quotes
 Theophrastus ποιεῖ γὰρ μόνον
 τῶν τὰς διαφορὰς οὕτω λαβεῖν
 κατὰ τὴν κοινότητα αὐτῶν ἀλλήλων,
 καὶ ὅτι οὗτοι αἱ προσηγορίαι κατὰ
 τὴν κοινότητα (Heylbut in Arch. 1,
 1). The doctrine of the ἀρετῶν
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων was fully worked
 by Plato, though the term is
 ἐπιτάττειν.

ἡ βίαν reads ὑπαρχόντων
 10.

§ 7. δῆλον δὲ κ.τ.λ., a resumption
 of the first lesson

§ 8. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. The λόγος
 of the ἀρετῶν was 1143 b, 34. The
 moderating function of φρονήσις is well
 brought out in a fragment of Theo-
 phrastus preserved by the scholiast
 on Aod. Vindob. gr. phil. 313 (Heylbut
 loc. cit.) ὁ δὲ γὰρ Θεοφράστος λέγει τὴν
 φρονήσιον «ἐχέει» πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν ὡς
 ἐχέουσιν οἱ κυβερνηταὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν
 δεσποτῶν πρὸς τοὺς δεσποτάς· ἐκείνοι
 γὰρ πάντα πράττουσιν ὡς δεῖ γίνεσθαι
 ἐν τῇ πόλει· ὡς οἱ δεσποταὶ σκελετὸν
 ἀγνοοῦν πρὸς τὰ εὐεθέρεα ἐπιτηδεύματα,
 ἢ γὰρ φρονήσιον τὰ πρακτικὰ ταῦτα ἐστὶ
 σοφία σχολῆς ἀπὸ πρὸς τῇ βίᾳ τῶν
 ἡμετέρων. It is significant that
 this illustration has been embodied in
 M.M. 1198 b, 919q.

BOOK VII.

WEAKNESS AND BADNESS OF WILL.

Introductory Note.

§ 1 We have seen that the efficient cause of human action is Will (*προαίρεσις*) and that Will is the union of an intellectual and an appetitive element. We have seen further that Practical Truth, which gives the standard and measure of all goodness, is the harmony of a true judgment with a right appetite. We know that our task as lawgivers, who aim at creating happiness for the state, will be to produce in the citizens a good will which shall be in harmony with the principles embodied in our laws. But our task will not be complete until we have studied the obstacles in the way of this, and the *ἐσθλότητες* (Phys. 246a, 17; cf. pp. 70, 71) which thus arise. And this is not quite so simple a matter as might be supposed. We have to deal not only or mainly with the fact of practical falsehood in harmony with a wrong appetite, though that must be considered too. We have a much more serious difficulty to face, namely the fact that the action may be bad, though the will is good. It is the case that the Good Will may be overmastered by Desire, and this fact, to which we give the name of "Weakness" (*ἀκρασία*) or want of self-control, will require careful consideration as well as the more simple case of actual badness (*κακία*, *ἀσολασία*). We must also take into account the possibility of "portents" (*τέρατα*) of goodness or badness. The occurrence of a superhumanly good person in our state would alter all its arrangements, as he and he alone would be its ideal ruler. Further, the statesman must know something of the failures of nature, her incomplete (*ἀτελής*) or mutilated products (*μηρώσεις*) which are more brutes than men, just as the others are rather divine than human.

The result of our inquiry will be that desire for pleasure is the cause of moral weakness. Are we to say, then, that all pleasure is bad? This *θέρις* has actually been maintained, so the refutation of it, though a digression, will not be misplaced.

H

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέου, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, 15
τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἔστιν εἶδη κακία ἀκρα-
θριώτης, τα δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μιν δυσι δῆλα· τὸ μὲν
ἀρετὴν το δ' ἐγκρατεῖαν καλοῖμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριώ-
ε μάλιστα ἂν ἀρμοστοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν,
καὶ τινὰ καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ Ὁμηρὸς περὶ Ἑκτοροῦ 20
οἶσκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός

οἷδ' ἰώκει

αἰετός γε θνητοῦ παις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεῖο.

ἢ εἰ, καθάπερ φασί, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρετῆς
ββολήν, τοιαύτη τις δὲ εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει

§ 2 ἄλλην ἀρχήν *lit.* *another fresh*
ἄλλον ἀρχὴν ἀρχεσθαι, ποι-
μ, *lexicon Bon Ind.* 112 b 31 to
to clearly has a new division of
subject being approached.

πὲρ τὰ ἤθη, *lit.* *with regard to* Cf.
1 v 113.

μουσῆν καὶ θεῖον The idea of
human goodness and wisdom
passed among the mystics of the
Platonist, *Platonist* (see *Platonist*
y. 4 141) But in his later
life, especially the *Stoic*, had
placed on the possibility of a
republic, and Aristotle held (Pol.
iv 1301) that of *more than* *others*
for *the* *best* *of* *the* *others* *of* *the* *others*
to be *the* *best* *of* *the* *others* *of* *the* *others*

τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, δῆλον δὲ
βελτίον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀρχῶν
τοὺς δ' ἀρχεσθαι This would be the
Rule of the State, and if there were
one such transcendent man, we should
have the *μεγαλειαι*.

Ὁμηρὸς. *lit.* *112 v 113.*

περὶ Ἑκτοροῦ *lit.* *112 v 113.*
περὶ τοῦ Ἑκτοροῦ "it accordance
with Fitzgerald's principle," to which
this is the only apparent exception
(*Contr.* p. 113).

§ 2. ἐξ ἀνθρώπων θεοί. This idea
was quite foreign to the primitive and
popular religion of the Hellenes, and
also had its origin in the 6th century
mysticism. Rohde's *Psyche* contains
the best account of these beliefs.

25 ἀντιτιθεμένη ἔστι· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία
οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἢ
δ' ἑτερόν τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θῆος
ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθύπερ οἱ λύκωνες εἰσβάσι προσαγορεύειν
ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφοδρὰ του—“σεῖον ἄνῃρ” φασιν—οὕτω καί
30 ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος· μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς
βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ' ἔτι καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρω-
σεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλον-
τας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς διαβίαι

ἀντιτιθεμένη. The use of this present participle (omitted in Bon. Ind.) where we should look for ἀντιτιθεμένη can be paralleled from Pseudo-Aristotle, 25^a b τῷ κατὰ ἀντιτιθεμένους. It may be explained on the same principle as ὁ καταθέμενος (=καταληψόμενος) and the like.

ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οὕτως οὐδὲ. For the repetition of οὐδὲ in both clauses of the comparison, cf. the note on καὶ below. The idea that Man is intermediate between Beast and God is another survival of 6th century mysticism which strongly influenced both Plato and Aristotle. Cf. the well known passage Phil. 125^a 2. 27 ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινοῦναι ἢ μηδὲν διδόμενος δι' ἀνταρκτικὴν οὐδὲν μίσηται πόλιν, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.

τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς. The best commentary is 1101 b, 18 sqq.

ἑτερόν τι γένος κακίας, a different genus 'from badness.' Note the hyperbation; κακίας is governed by ἑτερόν, not by γένος.

§ 2. ἐπεὶ καὶ οὕτω καί. The repetition of καί in both clauses of a comparison is frequent in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 327^b 15, 24). For οὕτως after ἐπεὶ cf. Bon. Ind. 346 b, 22.

καθ' ὅτι οἱ λύκωνες. This is from Plato, Meno 99 d καὶ αἱ γὰρ γυναικες θητος, ὃ μέγα καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἀνθρώποις θητοῖσι καλοῦσι καὶ οἱ ἄσπονδοι ὅταν τὰ ἐγνωρίζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος

(scilicet ἄσπονδος) ἀνδρ., 100a, 25-26. Hjalmar inserts αὐτοῖς ὅταν καὶ συνηθίσαι αὐτοῖς (scilicet) αὐτοῖς αὐτοῖς from Plato after φασιν. These corrections are of the previous kind, but Aristotle is very careful in his way of quoting. It is characteristic that the old Homeric way of speaking should survive on the lips of a student and a philosophical biologist. In Democritus Athens θῆος was technical. Cf. also in Miletus Hamblanc 1. p. 184.

διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις. For the meaning of νόσος ('distant point' or 'arrested development') in Aristotle's ontology cf. 1029 b, 18 n. Certainty is found in human beings who are either 'morbid' (διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις ἀνθρώποις). Next are children.

καὶ τοὺς δὲ καὶ τὰ. This is only an illustrative remark; it does not give another species of 'certainty.'

ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. This seems to be a Greek expression. The verb δυσφημεῖν means 'to give a bad name to' to use the expression of a 'euphemism' (εὐφροσύνη has this name according to Deut. F. L. 32 48, 50, and the verb has the same force as εὐφροσύνη. The meaning is that we condemn all the extreme words, ὑπερβαίνειν καὶ ὑπερβαίνειν, by a more exact and really appropriate term, the more exact expression to the use of which we should ἀγαθόν (cf. 1101 a, 25-26).

τοιαυτῆς ὑστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν περὶ δε κακίας
 ται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκрасίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυ- 35
 λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ
 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔξωον τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἴκα- 1145
 ν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτίον, οὐθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος. δεῖ δ',
 περ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶ-
 διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύειν μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ
 ἔφα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰ πλείστα καὶ 5
 ἰωτάτα· εἰν γὰρ λύηται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κατα-
 γη-αι τὰ ἐνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.

Δοκεῖ δὴ ἡ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων
 ἵπαικτων εἶναι, ἡ δ' ἀκрасία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν
 ἁνων καὶ ψεκτων, καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἐμμενεντικός 10

h. ἀρετῆς πρότερον, i.e. in the
 account of the ἀρετῆς.

p. ἔξωον ἕτερον γένος. When
 παρ᾽ αὐτῶν is qualified by an ad-
 jective, it takes περί τινος, otherwise
 it takes ἀπὸ τινος (Bon Ind.
 b. 30 234). We may say either
 ἡ γένος ὑποληπτίον or ὡς περὶ
 ἡ γένος ὑποληπτίον. Here we
 see a mixture of the two con-
 structions. There is no difficulty in
 regarding ἱπαικτων, for μαλακία
 ἡττοφ are subordinate to ἀκрасία,
 ἡττοφ to ἐγκρατεία. The point is
 ἀκрасία and κακία (μοχθηρία),
 ἀρετία and ἀρετία, which are all
 really human, differ from only;
 γένος, as divine goodness and
 beauty differ from them (1145 n.).

B. δεῖ δ', ὡς περ 35 A
 [sketch of the dialectical method
 see cf. Intro. § 3] Here τὰ
 ἔφα are equivalent to τὰ ἐνδοξα
 in cf. An. Pr. 245, 11 ἄφω τοῦ
 πρᾶκτου καὶ ἐνδοξοῦ, though pro-
 bably speaking the term has a wider
 scope. Not all φαινόμενα are ἐνδοξα,
 only τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς and τὰ τοῖς
 ἁπλοῦς φαινόμενα.

ταῦτα τὰ πάθη. The word πάθος
 is loosely used here of all states of
 soul as in De An. 1. 1. Really they
 are ἐξωον

τὰ δυσχερῆ are identical with α.
 ετορία, cf. Eth. 2. 2, 30 ταῦτά τε
 δὲ συμβαίνει, δυσχερῆ. Elsewhere
 they are called διακρίσεις as in Eth.
 2. 2, 7 δεῖ δὲ πειρασθαι τὴν σέβην
 οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι, ὥστε τὰ τε ἀποροῦ-
 μένα λυθῆναι καὶ ὅπως τὰ δοκούντα ὄν-
 τας εἶναι ὑποφάσθαι δοταί, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ
 εἶναι δύσκολον εἶναι cf. 1144, 23 τὰ
 αἰτίον τοῦ ψυχῆος καὶ τῶν ἀπορημάτων
 δοταί φανερῶν.

§ 6 Δοκεῖ δὴ καὶ A. A strong of
 δοκούντα follows.

ἡ τε ἐγκράτεια τῶν σπουδαίων
 καὶ A. This needs no illustration.
 Though obvious, it is not, however,
 stated for nothing. We shall see that
 several of the ἀπορίαι arise from an
 apparent contradiction between this
 and other δοκούντα.

ἐμμενεντικός τῷ λογισμῷ. [Intro].
 Here καὶ ἐγκρατεία ἀπολοῦνται τῷ
 ὁρθῷ λογισμῷ· ἀπαιτεῖται ἀντιφράγνους
 τοῦ ὑπαληφθέντος ὁρθῷ λογισμῷ. 11.
 423 ὁ ἐγκρατὴς ὁ πρᾶκτων ἀντιφράγνους
 τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων τῷ ὁρθῷ

τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ ἀκρατῆς καὶ ἐκστατικός τοῦ λογισμοῦ
καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ ταῦτα,
ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀετοῦν
θεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. καὶ τὸν σωφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ κα-
15 καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἱ δ' οὐ
καὶ τὸν ἀπολαστον ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀπολαστον συγχε-
χυμένους, οἱ δ' ἑτέροις εἶναι φασιν. τὸν δὲ φροῦνον ὅτι μὴ
οὐ φασιν ἐνδέχασθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ, ὅτ' ὁ ἐνός φροῦνός
δυτὰς καὶ δεινούς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ
20 θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ'
ἐστίν.

II. Ἀπορήσει δ' ἂν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάναν ὁρθῶς ἀκρε-
τεύεται τκ. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὐ φασὶ τικτὸς οὖν π

λογισμῷ, 416 a ἀκρασία ἐξ ἐκστατικῆ
παρὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λογισμὸν πρὸς τὰ
δοκοῦντα ἴδια εἶναι. We are here,
then, on Academic ground. Cf. also
Isotik. περὶ ἀπείδ. § 321, ὅτι πολλοὶ τῶν
ἀσθεῖων διὰ τὰς ἀκράσεις οὐκ ἐμ-
μένοντες τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀλλ' ἀμελεῖ
συντεῖ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐπὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
ὁρμῶσιν.

ἐκστατικός in this sense comes
from ἐξιστάσθαι used as we find it
in Thuc. ii, 62 ἔγω μὲν δ' αἰετὸς εἰμι
(sc. τῇ γνώμῃ) αἰετὸς εἰςιστομαι. So
Rhet. ad Alex. 1419 a, 16 τὰ κοινὰ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάθη, δι' ὧν ἐξιστα-
μεθα τοῦ λογισμοῦ.

εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα. This is really
implied in the phrases αὐτοῦ ἀκρατεῖν,
κρίττεται εἶναι (ἡττάσθαι ἦττων εἶναι),
for they imply a struggle in which
our 'better knowledge' is victorious
or vanquished. It is then the proper
etymological sense of the word.

καὶ τὸν σωφρονα κ.τ.λ. In the
σωφρων and the ἀπολαστός there is
properly speaking no struggle; the
one is bad as the other is good, with-
out an effort. But common language
often uses the word promiscuously
(συγχευμένως). Even Plato does so,

cf. e.g. Rep. 410 c ἐσθλοὶ καὶ κακοὶ
σωφρόνη ἐστί καὶ ἰδμεν τανν καὶ
λυτῶν ἐγκράτια.

πάντα σωφρονα. 'In all respects
σωφρων' 'in full possession of reason'
συνα, 'for ἀνορέτεια might be regarded
as partial σωφροσύνη.

§ 7 τὸν δὲ φροῦνον κ.τ.λ. We find
a hint of the λόγος in the account of
the words καὶ δεινούς (cf. 1144 a, 27).

ἐπὶ ἀκρατεῖ κ.τ.λ. We find ἀ-
κρατεῖ θυμοῦ in Plato, Laws 649 a
and Isotikates, Demost. § 21 speaks of
ἀνορέτεια κέρδους, εὐθυ. In fact,
ἀκρατής may be used whenever φῶν
εἶναι, c. 826, 'to have a weakness'
for, 'to be incapable of resisting'
may be used. Cf. e.g. ἡττων τοῦ
γενέου 1129 a, 14.

II. § 1 Ἀπορήσει δ' ἂν τις
κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία refers to the
difficulty that ἀκρατεῖς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα
πράττει.

ὑπολαμβάναν. This word is
stated for εἰδὼς because it is not
φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δοξα, all of
which are discussed in the present
passage.

ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The
first form of ὑπολήψαι, ἐπιστήμη.

δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ἦτο Σωκράτης,
 -ι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.
 ἰάτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οἱ κ 25
 5 ἀκрасίας· οὐθίνα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοιτα πράττειν παρὰ
 ἔλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἄγνοϊαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος
 εἰρητῇ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δεῖν ζητεῖν περὶ
 εἶδος, εἰ δὲ ἄγνοϊαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας—
 ἢ οὐκ οἶεται γε ὁ ἀκρατεύμενος πρὶν ἐν τῇ πάθει 30
 ὕπαι, φανερόν. εἰσὶ δὲ τινεὶ οὗ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι
 οὐ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθέν εἶναι κριττον ὁμο-

ζοτο Σωκράτης. This is from
 Boetius 342 b δὲ οὐκ οἶται
 ὁ περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτον τι
 ἦναι οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸς οὐδ' ἀρχικὸς
 οὐδ' ὡς περὶ τοιοῦτον ὅτος δι-
 11, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης πολλὰ καὶ ἄ-
 ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ
 ἀρχικῶν ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν
 τινεὶ δὲ εἶδεν, τοτὲ δὲ ἔπειτα,
 δὲ εἶδεν, πολλὰ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ,
 12 διανοούμενοι περὶ οὗ ἐπι-
 ὡς περὶ ἀνδράποδον περι-
 13 τῇ ὡς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.
 14 ἀναγὰς οὐκ ἐστὶν μετὰ 11, 47 b,
 15 ἀναγὰς μετὰ τὴν 11' reading
 (ἀναγὰς οὐκ) in the next line.
 16 ἰάτης μὲν γὰρ κ τ λ. An-
 17 11, 48 κ 48 ἀνδράποδον δὲ οἱ
 18 ἰατροὶ μὲν δὲ οἱ πράττειν,
 19 καὶ δὲ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὐκ οἶται καὶ
 20 οὐκ οἶται οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται καὶ
 21 οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται
 22 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 23 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 24 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 25 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 26 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 27 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 28 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 29 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 30 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται

ἀναγὰς, κ. πράττειν παρὰ
 11, 48 κ 48 ἀνδράποδον δὲ οἱ
 12 διανοούμενοι περὶ οὗ ἐπι-
 13 ὡς περὶ ἀνδράποδον περι-
 14 ἀναγὰς οὐκ ἐστὶν μετὰ 11, 47 b,
 15 ἀναγὰς μετὰ τὴν 11' reading
 (ἀναγὰς οὐκ) in the next line.
 16 ἰάτης μὲν γὰρ κ τ λ. An-
 17 11, 48 κ 48 ἀνδράποδον δὲ οἱ
 18 ἰατροὶ μὲν δὲ οἱ πράττειν,
 19 καὶ δὲ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὐκ οἶται καὶ
 20 οὐκ οἶται οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται καὶ
 21 οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται
 22 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 23 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 24 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 25 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 26 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 27 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 28 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 29 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται
 30 οὐκ οἶται καὶ οὐκ οἶται, οὐκ οἶται

μετουφραντίζον ἐσθλὸς (Top. 104 b, 13).
 For the phraseology cf. Plon. 253 b,
 29 τὸ φανερὸν ἀλλοιούσθαι ἴσας
 ἐστὶ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἀμφισβητεῖν. 254 a,
 8 μάλιστα τοῖς φανεροῖς ὁ ἀμφισβητεῖν.
 Met. 1091 a, 6 μάλιστα τοῖς ἐσθλοῖς.

δεῖν can hardly stand for δεῖν ἐπεὶ,
 cf. 1107 a, 32 π. ἵσως, therefore,
 ὡς καὶ, tal. ex δεῖν as accusative
 absolute, while Bywater suggests the
 transposition of γίνεται from the next
 clause where it is not really wanted.
 I suspect, however, that Aristotle
 really meant to say δεῖν ζητεῖν κ τ λ,
 ἴσας ἀπλῶς ἴσως, or something of
 the sort, but that the sentence was
 never finished owing to the paren-
 thesis ὡς φανερόν.

ὡς ὁ τρόπος κ τ λ, equivalent to
 πῶς ἄγνοια ἀκρατεῖται τις. Cf. Gen.
 An. 380 b, 12 τὸν δὲ τρόπον λόγῳ τὸ
 ὡς καὶ ὅτι. Socrates went wrong,
 then, because he spoke thus openly
 (cf. Ban. Ind. 77 b, 5).

οὐκ οἶεται γε, sc. εἶναι πρὸς τὸν δ
 πράττειν, cf. 1136 b, 8 ὅτε ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ
 ὁ οἶται, δεῖν πράττειν πράττειν. The
 logic of the sentence requires οὐκ
 ἄγνοια but the phrase οἶεται δεῖν was
 so common in the discussion of this
 subject that it easily slipped in, even in
 an elliptical form. Cf. also 1142 a, 5.

κ 2 εἰσὶ δὲ τινεὶ κ τ λ. The
 notes will show that these are Plato's
 followers rather than Plato himself.

λογοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δοῖαν βέλτιον
οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασιν οὐκ εἶ-
35 στήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δοῖαν
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶγε δοῖα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μὲδ' ἰσχυρὰ ἰσχύ-
1148^a λήψιν ἢ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ' ἡρεμμία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς δι-
στάζουσιν συγγνώμη τῇ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθε-
μίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οἶδε τὸς
ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτείνουσι·
5 αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. ἀλλ' ἀτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς
ἄμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσετε δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἴε φρονίμην
εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἐκόντα τὰ φαυλοτάτα. πρὸς δὲ τούτους

παρὰ τὸ δοῖαν βέλτιον The aorist participle has as well temporal force. It would not be admitted that a man could act *παρὰ τὸ δοῖαν βέλτιον*.

§ 4. ἰσχυρὰ ἐπιλήψιν ἡρεμία. It is certainly not an adequate account of Plato's distinction between *ἐπιστήμη* and *δοξα* to say that the one is 'certain' and the other 'mild'. The present discussion will therefore be intelligible unless we suppose that the Academy had already come to make this purely psychological distinction between them. But there is, fortunately, sufficient evidence to justify us in saying that the Academy did now regard *ἐπιστήμη* as differing from *δοξα* mainly in the strength of the *πίστις* which it implies, and its consequent power of resistance. Cf. [Plat.] Def. 414 b *ἐπιστήμη ὑπόληψις ψυχῇ ἀμετάπτωτος ἐπὶ λόγου*,—*δοξα ὑπόληψις μεταπίπτουσα ἐπὶ λόγου*, definitions of which the authenticity is guaranteed by Ar. Top. 139 b 33 *οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀμετάπτωτον εἰρηκεν*, 130 b, 16 (*ἐπὶ φαύλῃ*) *ὁ θεὸς ἐπιστήμης ἰδὼν ὑπόληψιν ἀμετάπτωτον ἐπὶ λόγου*. Now in Top. 126 b, 13 Aristotle criticises a definition of *πιστις* as *σφοδρότης ὑπολήψεως* and since *ἡρεμία* is the opposite of *σφόδρα*, a *ὑπόληψις*

ἀμετάπτωτος (i.e. deficient in *πιστις*) will be an *ἡρεμὴς ὑπόληψις*.

ἢ ἀντιτείνουσα, a Platonic word. Cf. 1101 b, 18 n. and the Academic definition of the *ἐγερσις* given there 1145 b, 30 n.

ἐν τοῖς διατάζουσιν. This confirms the view that the Academy distinguished *δοξα* from *ἐπιστήμη* in the absence of *πίστις*, which is defined in [Plat.] Def. 412 a *ὡς ἀλλήλησιν ὁρῶντες ὅπως ἔστιν ἡ αὐτῇ φαύλεια*.

ἐν αὐταῖς, i.e. *τῇ δοξῇ* and *τῇ ἐπιλήψει*.

τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ. The word *μοχθηρία* (debauchery) is opposed to *ἡρεμία*, hence the addition of the phrase *οἶδε τὸς ἄλλων κτλ.*

§ 5. φρονήσεως ἄρα κτλ. This must depend on the definition which is given in De An. 427 b, 14 *ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ὑπολήψει ἀεὶ ὁρῶσα ἐαυτὴν καὶ δοξα εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ ταύτης τοῦτων*. We have seen previously that a *ὑπόληψις* *ἀπορία*, 1142 b, 33. This leads us to the second remark in the contradictory *ἐκόντα* 'that the *οἶδε* *μοι* cannot be *ἀκρατής* and that *οὐκ* *φρόνιμος* *ἂν* *εἰρηκεν*'.

ἰσχυρότατον. Cf. EE 1245 b, 3, *ἐκθῶν τὸ Σωκρατικόν οὐκ οἶδε ἰσχυρὸν τινος φρονήσεως*.

διδείται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικὸς γὰρ ὁ φρόνιμος (τῶν γὰρ ἰσχυάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς.

3 Ἐτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυράς καὶ φαῖλας ὁ 10 ἔγκρατης, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἔγκρατης οὐδ' ὁ ἔγκρατης σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρωνος οὔτε τὸ φαῖλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὲν δι' ἧς εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρισταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι φαῦλη ἢ κωλύοντα ἔξιν μὴ ὑπολυνθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ ἔγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαῖον· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' 15 εἰ φαῖλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οἶδεν μέγα.

Ἐτι εἰ πάσης ἑξῆς ἐμμενενικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ ἔγκρατεια, φαῦλη, οὐκ εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης ἑξῆς ἡ ἰκράσια ἐκατα- 20 τικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἰκράσια, ὅσον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεο- πτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετός γὰρ οἶκ' ἐμμετων αἱ 20 ἐπέσθῃ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύος διὰ το λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος.

3 Ἐτι ὁ συφιστικὸς λόγος [ψευδόμενος] ἀπορία—διὰ γὰρ

δίδεται πρότερον, 1145 b, 14 sqq. 1145 z, 31 sqq. 1145 b, 30 sqq.

§ 4. Ἐν αὐτῇ κ.τ.λ. The ἀπορία caused by the contradiction between the *ἐνδοξα* that *ἐγκράτεια* is good, and that the *ἐγκράτης* is the *εὐφρων*.

ἐν τῷ ἔχειν. Cf. Pol. 1145 b, 31 ὁ γὰρ διακρίνει οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀπαιτεῖν τοὺς δοκούς, what makes a master a master is not owning slaves.

τὸ ἄγαν, κ. ἐπιθυμίας. This is explained in τὸ ἰσχυρὰς ἔχειν, scilicet from a reminiscence of τὸ Χιλιόπουν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄγαν.

ἀλλὰ μὲν δι' ἧς, sc. ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν φαῖλας αἱ ἰσχυράς τῶν ἐγκρατῶν. Ὁ ἔγκρατης ἐγκρατὴς would not be τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ἐπαινετῶν 1145 b, 37.

οὐ πᾶσα. This is all that is required for the *ἀποκρίσις* of a universal affirmative *πρότασις*.

§ 5. Ἐν αὐτῇ κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία arises from the contradiction between ἡ ἔγκρατεια τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς ἐμμενενικὸς τῷ λόγῳ καὶ οἱ ἐμμενενικὸς ἀποκρίσις.

ἐκαταμύον, sc. ποιεῖ.

ἔσται τις. This is all that is required for the *ἀποκρίσις* of the universal affirmative *πρότασις*, ἡ ἀπορία τῶν φαῖλων καὶ ψευδῶν.

ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ. "But Odyseus knew that Philoctetes would not listen to him, and would be too proud to return after such treatment. Therefore he had recourse to guile, and persuaded Neoptolemos to second him by false pretences. The interest of the drama lies in the gradual effect produced upon the heart of the boy by the sufferings of Philoctetes, by his frank belief in the fictitious tale, by his open-hearted friendship, and by his unbounded trust in one who is deceiving him, until at length, in spite of the strongest motives, it becomes a moral impossibility for Neoptolemos to persevere in his attempt." L. Campbell.

§ 6. Ἐν αὐτῇ κ.τ.λ. This ἀπορία results from an artificial contradiction between the views that the *ἐγκράτης* ποιεῖ εἰδώς (cf. ὑπολαμβάνων, ὅτι φαῖλα) and the view that ἡ ἀπορία τῶν φαῖλων καὶ ψευδῶν.

τὸ παρῶδοξα βούλεσθαι ἀλέγχει, ἥα δεινὸν ᾧσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· διέτα.
 25 γὰρ ἡ εἰάνοια, ὅταν μίνειν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρίσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν, προείναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λύσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον συμβαίνει δ' ἕκ τινος λόγου ἢ ἀφροσύνη⁹ μετ' ἀκρασίους ἀρετῇ· τᾶναντία γὰρ πρέττει ὅν ἔλα λαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκрасίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τὰγαθὰ κακὰ
 30 ζῆναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πρέττειν, ὥστε τὰγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει.

Ἐπὶ ὁ τῷ πεπεισθαι πρᾶττων καὶ δαίμων τὰ ἡδία καὶ 10
 προαιρουμένους βαλτίων ἂν δοξέειν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκрасίαν· εἰατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι αἶν. ὁ
 35 δ' ἀκράτης ἐνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ἣ φάμεν "ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ

ψυδόμενος was rightly bracketed by Cornae as a mere dittography of ψυδόμενος above. There can be no reference to the *Stenismi* of Sabou-Ides (Hiller and Fowler § 131). "What follows this is a digression suggested by the word ἀπορία." By water, Contr. p. 13.

παρῶδοξα ἀλέγχει. We must take παρῶδοξα as internal accusative. They desire to frame σοφιστικοὶ ἀλεγχοί of a paradoxical kind, as opposed to τὰ τοῦδα. An ἀλέγχει is a συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφασίας, i.e. a syllogistic proof of the contradictory, in the present case the contradictory of our ἐνδοξα. Note the word βούλεσθαι it is the προαίρεσις and not the δύναμις that makes the sophist. Cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, 'when they succeed,' does not seem very pointed. Should we not read ἐπιτύχωσι? The proper word for a dialectical 'counter' is ἐντενεία, cf. Top. 101 a, 17 (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ χρήσιμος) πρὸς τὰς ἐντενείας.

βέβαιον γὰρ κ + λ. Cf. Met 995 a, 31: ἢ γὰρ ἀρετὴ (ἢ δαίμων), ταύτῃ παραπλήσιον πέποιθε τοῖς δεδομένοις

ἀδισταται γὰρ ἀφροσύνην ἐνδοξὸν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον. This is still a note explaining the meaning of ἀπορία ἐνδοξοί.

§ 9. ἀφροσύνη μὲν ἀκρασία ἀρετῇ. In the *Topics* (150 b 27-28) Aristotle discusses at length this type of definition, which he calls τὰ ἐν τῷ τοῦδα. The example there given is that of ἀνθρώπου as τὸ ἄνθρωπος μετὰ λόγου ὄντος. It is worth noting that there are two or three definitions of this type in the Platonic *Topics*. See e.g. 129a 27-28: ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου μετ' ἐννοίας, ἢ φιλοσόφου ἀνθρώπου μετ' ἐννοίας.

ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ κ.τ.λ., οὐ δὲ τὴν ἀφροσύνην.

§ 10. Ἐπὶ κ + λ. This ἀρετὴ arises from the contradiction becomes the identification of the ἀρετὴ with the ἀσολαστος and the view that the ἀρετὴ acts διὰ πάθος, κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν.

τῷ πεπεισθαι, 'I am convinced' (πιστῇ).

τῇ παροιμίᾳ. This sentence does not seem to be found elsewhere, but its application is obvious. You can not cure the ἀκράτης by giving him

ἢ τί δαί ἐπιπίκειν;" εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπεπειστο ἡ πράττει, 1146^b
 τεισθεὶς αὖ ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ [πεπεισμένος] οὐδὲν ἤττον
 πράττει.

ἵτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ
 κ ἀκρατής; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας,
 οὐ δ' εἶναι τινες ἀπλῶς.

Ἰ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τιαυταὶ τινες συμβαίνουσι τούτων
 | μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς
 | ας εὐρεσίᾳ ἐστίν.

[1]. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτικὸν ποτερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ
 εἰδότες· εἴτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατὴ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ
 ο, λέγω δε ποτερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περὶ 10
 ἀφωρισμένους, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν,
 | ον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ο δσα συγγενῆ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. ἐστὶ δ' ἀρχὴ

conviction, for he has it al-

αυτο, κ. διὰ πρῶτον. Εἰκ-
 κὴ μὴ ἐπιπίεστο with L², but
 I note.

αυμῶτες ὅλα πρᾶττει. Rami-
 ρος ὅλα θεωρεῖται πρᾶττειν, a
 ore accepted by Bynaeus, who
 α ὅλα before πρᾶττει, thus
 | the corruption, if there is one,
 | is transcription. The Verbo
 α αὐτῶν, α πεπεισμένοι, I
 I ampter to bracket πρᾶττει.

The meaning is sufficient y
 η νῦν δὲ, 'as it is'

"Ἔτι δ α.λ. The ἀπορία
 by the use of expressions like
 | θεωρεῖν, αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν.

α γὰρ α.λ. We do, α α
 of fact, speaks of αρατῆς with-
 | qualifying restriction (απλῶς).
 α not mean by this αρατῆς
 | there must be a proper ap-
 α of the word to a special class
 α.

τὸ μὲν ἀνελεῖν α.λ. The
 α is more fully expressed above

1148 b, 6. The λύσις of the ἀπορία
 will leave us with the ἀπορία stripped
 of their difficulties.

III § 1 Πρῶτον μὲν εἰτα . .
 This section gives the two divisions of
 the following discussion. The first is
 the discussion of the question ποτερον
 εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πως εἰδότες (cf.
 1149 b, 29 αὖ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀγωγῆς).
 This extends from 1146 b, 24 to
 1147 b, 19. The second is the dis-
 cussion περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ θεωρεῖν
 α.λ. with a number of kindred
 questions (δσα συγγενῆ). This ex-
 tends from 1147 b, 20 to 1153 a, 36.
 It is important to observe that the
 twofold character of this division is
 clearly marked by the language, see
 next note.

§ 2. Ἔτι δ' ἀρχὴ α.λ. This has
 been regarded as a duplicate of the
 preceding section, and it has been
 said that it outlines a discussion
 which does not exist. This view
 overlooks the fact of the twofold
 division made in the last section and
 the natural reference of this section to

15 τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς εἴαι τῷ τῆρ
 ἢ τῷ πῶς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφορὰν. λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ τι-
 ταδε εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς ἢ αἰ
 ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ παντ' ἐστὶν ἀκρασία καὶ
 ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὐ. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρο-
 20 τής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἕπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα
 ἀπλῶς ἔχειν (ταῦτ' οὖν γὰρ ἐν ἡν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ
 οἷδι ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἐν
 δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἥδ' οὐκ οἶεται μὲν, δίδωκεν
 δέ.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δοξᾶν ἀληθῆ ὅλλα μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι 3
 25 παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεῖονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἐνν
 γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἶονται ἀκριβῶς
 εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα πιστεύειν αἱ δοξαζόντες μᾶλλον 4

the second part of it only (εἴτα περὶ
 πῶς κ.τ.λ.). We have first to deal
 with the great ἀπορία, πότερον εἰδότες
 ἢ οὐ, and then we can take all the
 rest together. As, however, they
 seem at first somewhat miscellaneous,
 it is important to find a 'starting-
 point for the discussion' (ἀρχὴ τῆς
 σκέψεως), a point of vantage (τόπος)
 from which we can attack them all.
 Thus Aristotle finds in the fact that
 the states now under discussion are
 εἶναι and must be discussed as such
 (see next note).

πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς κ.τ.λ. We
 are already familiar from the dis-
 cussion of the ἀρεταί with this division
 of the discussion into (1) *πῶς*, and (2) *πῶς*. Cf. 1113 a, 5 ff. We
 know that it is the proper way to
 discuss any εἶναι. I have retained the
 κ.τ.λ. reading τῷ πῶς (Bywater writes
 τῷ ὥς) because I hold that the word
 to be supplied is ἔχειν, and that τῷ
 ὥς (κ.τ.λ.) below is different. The
 ellipse of ἔχειν with πῶς is common.
 εἴαι ἔχοντες Cf. 1144 a, 32
 ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες εἴαι.

παντ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.

If we find that the difference of *εἶναι*
 is τὸ πῶς ἔχειν and not τὸ περὶ τὰ
 εἶναι, we must still go on to ask the
 question *πῶς* πῶς, since *εἶναι* is
 to be differentiated, not only into
 ἀκρασία, but from other *εἶναι*. The
 answer to the question is indicated at
 once. It differs from ἀκρασία κ.
 πῶς i.e. by the absence of *προαίρεσις*,
 and from other *εἶναι* by being
 limited to the same objects as *ε-*
κολασία.

§ 2. Περὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We
 now begin the discussion of the first
 main point, πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ. But
 first we must clear the ground by
 finding the limits of the *συνεπὶ* about
 δοξαζόντων 1149 b, 36. It is not true
 to say that *δοξα* is an *ἐπιτομή* *συν-*
ληψίς, and so the substitution of *εἶναι*
 for *ἐπιστήμη* makes no difference.
 Observe that Aristotle himself would
 not call it *ἐπιστήμη*, but he is here
 adopting the Academic standpoint for
 the sake of argument.

οἱ διστάζουσιν, cf. 1146 a, 1 *καὶ*
στὴν ἐν τούτοις δισσοφορίᾳ.

§ 3. εἰ οὖν ἀρξόμεθα. Not
 the future, 'If we are going to say

ἐπισταμέτων παρά τὴν ὑπόληψιν πρήξουσιν, οὐθεν
 κε ἐπιστήμη δ' ἔστι· ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδεν ἔττον
 οἷον οἷον ἢ ἕτεροι οὐκ ἐπιστάνται· ἐπὶ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. p
 ἄλλ' ἐπὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων
 οἱ χρώμενος δε τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται
 τασθαι) διαισιν τὸ ἔχοντα μὴ μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ
 θεωροῦντα ἢ μὴ εἰδὲ πρᾶττειν [τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα].
 οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν.
 35
 ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφο- 1147·

is from the madness of their
 that they act etc.

οὐ διοίσει κ.τ.λ. 'we shall find
 speaking in experience) that there
 is no better than *doxa* in respect
 to (οφειδότης ἐπὶ τοῦ ψεύους). It
 is to notice that *doxa* here
 will surpass.'

ἐπὶ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. One nega-
 stance enough for the *doxa* of
 definition ἡ δόξα ἡ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν.

The Academy will not say
 Heraclitus had *ἐπιστήμη*, and
 had 'conviction' (πιστις σφα-
 ῖστος) the highest degree
 of peculiar style of Heraclitus,
 of Early Greek Philosophy p.

'Ἄλλ' ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. These words
 are the first of four distinct *doxai*
 to each other by *ἐπὶ* as usual.
 There are three are dialectical and
 upon the theory of 'potential
 edge' which was first worked
 into in the Theaetetus. The
 is the real *doxa* and is of a
 psychological character. We
 expect to find the three first
 consistent with each other or
 the fourth. Aristotle is only
 met in the first instance to show
 clearly how they may keep to
 but yet account for *doxa*
 or own principles. If we com-
 the successive *doxai* with the

successive definitions of Knowledge
 in the Theaetetus, we shall see how
 fundamental and essential a thing to
 διαλέγεσθαι is in Greek philosophy.

ἔχων χρώμενος. The distinction
 between knowledge potential and
 actual originates in the Theaetetus,
 197 b 24, where, however, *ἔχων* is
 equivalent to *χρῆσθαι* here, and what
 is here called *ἔχων* is called *εἰσέσθαι*.
 For the opposition of *χρῆσθαι* (=ἐν-
 γνῆναι) to *εἰσέσθαι* cf. 109 a b, 33 b. We very
 commonly find τὸ θεωρεῖν described
 as the *ἐνέργεια* of *ἐπιστήμη*, as in the
 present passage. Cf. *Phyl.* 255 b, 2
 ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωρῶν
 δύναται εἶναι ἐπιστήμων. Met. 1048 a,
 31 λέγομεν δὲ δύναται ἐπιστήμων καὶ
 τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, εἰς δύνατον ἢ θεωρεῖν.
 de An. 413 a, 22 λέγεται διχῶς, ἢ μὲν
 ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἢ ὡς ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν.

τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα. For
 the reading see Bywater *Cont.* p. 55.

§ 5. ἔτι ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. The second
doxa goes a little deeper. A man
 may know the major premises actually
 and the minor premises only potentially.
 For the two kinds of *propositiones* see
 1143 b, 3 a. It is no valid objection
 to Aristotle's argument here to say
 that in the case supposed the act
 would be *doxastic*. We are only
 considering whether it is possible to
 act *παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην*, not whether
 we are responsible for it if we do.

τέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει τρίττειν παρὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρωμεῖται
μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· τραπεῖα γὰρ τα
καθ' ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰς
5 ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πραγμάτων ἔστιν· οἷον ὅτι παντὶ
ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ἢ ὅτι
ξηρὸν τὸ τοιοῦδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τὸδε τοιοῦδε, ἢ οἷα ἔχει ἢ οἷα
ἐνεργεῖ. κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διώκει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμύχαναι
ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως ἢ
10 θαυμαστόν.

Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλου τρόπου τῶν ἰσθ'.

πρακτὰ γὰρ κ τ λ. The particular
practical intellect apprehends the minor
premises, acts are necessarily particular,
and therefore there can be no act
unless the minor premise is actual.

διαφέρει τὸ καθόλου. By τὸ καθόλου
λου (not ἡ καθόλου) is meant the
universal which forms the middle
term. The general rule παντὶ ἀν-
θρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά contains two
universals and therefore requires two
minor premises to connect it with a
particular agent and a particular act.
The first of these takes as middle
term the universal which is predicated
of the agent (ἐφ' αὐτοῦ). This minor
premise is obvious and does not detain
us, cf. de Mot. An. 301 a. 15. Διόπερ
δὲ τῶν ἐρωτῶντων ἐννοεῖ, οὕτω τὴν
ἐξέτασιν πρότερον ἢ μὴ δῆλον οὐδ' ἡ διάνους
ἐφεστώσα εἰσπείρει οὐδὲν οἷον εἰ τὸ
βαδίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς
ἀνθρώπος οἷα ἐννοεῖται. But the
other universal (τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος)
is of a different character. Ἐπιστήμη
takes us no further than ξηρὸν τὸ
τοιοῦδε, and this can yield only the
conclusion αὐτὸς συμφέρει τὸ τοιοῦδε,
not an act. We are in that case left
in the position of the doctor who only
knows that light food is digestible
without knowing what food is light
(1141 b. 19 n). This is a case, then,
when a man acts wrongly, though he
has ἐπιστήμη of what is right. Of

course Aristotle himself would say
such an act was δεινόν and not
ἐκράσια, but that is not the question
at present. We are only showing
how it is possible to act τὰ κατὰ τὴν
ἐπιστήμην, and ξηρὸν τὸ τοιοῦδε is
ἐπιστήμη while τὸδε τοιοῦδε is ἐπὶ.
Even if the man does 'use' the minor
premise that will not be enough to
make him act rightly.

ἢ ὅτι κ τ λ. 'or (he in actual pos-
sibility) is particular of the thing, e.g. ξηρὸν
τὸ τοιοῦδε.' This is, of course, a
minor premise. The question now
introduces the other species of καθόλου,
ἐννοεῖται, i.e. τὸν δεικνύει.

§ 7 Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν κ τ λ. The
second locus, which goes a little deeper
by recognizing two kinds of potential
knowledge. When we say a man has
knowledge potentially we may mean
either that he 'has' it but does not
'use' it or merely that he is capable
of having it as διὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην
but does not actually 'have' it at the
time. This distinction is best brought
out in Greek. An 365 a. 9. ἔγγυς ἐστὶ
καὶ πορρωτέρω (τῆς ἐγγύτης) αὐτοῦ
ἐκδέχεται εἰς διάνους, ὡς περὶ αὐτὸν
γεμεῖται ἐγγυτέρωτοί πορρωτέρω
οὕτως τὸν θεωρούμεν. The case con-
sidered in this section is parallel to that
of the sleeping geometrist (1141 a. 20
καθόλου), the case considered in the
two preceding sections was that of

- ῥηθέντων ἵπარχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὴ
 μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὁρίμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ
 ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, ὡς τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινό-
 μενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ γε ἐν
 τοῖς παθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων 15
 καὶ ἕνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδηλῶς καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεριστάσιν,
 ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μαινίαι ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν
 8 λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τοῦτοισι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς
 ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς παθεσι
 τοῦ-οις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, το
 καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθάνοντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι
 δ' οὐπὼ· δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δέεται· ὥστε
 καθάτερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λεγείν καὶ
 τοὺς ἀκρατευσμένους.
- 9 Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἂν τις ἐπιβλέψῃ τὴν αἰτίαν. ἡ

the premises ἐγγρηγοῦς μὲν μὴ θεωρῶν
 δὲ Cf. α καὶ ἀδυνα. 108 b, 35

κα. τὸ σῶμα μεριστάσιν. Cf. MoI
 An. 701 b, 29 δεῖται γίνεσθαι ἀλλήλων
 περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, πολλὰν ποιεῖ τοῦ
 σώματος διαφέρειν ἐνότημας καὶ ὠχρῶ-
 ρησι καὶ φιλίας καὶ τριμοῖς καὶ τοῖς
 πολλοῖς ἐναυτοῖς. This brings us to
 the verge of Aristotle's own physi-
 ological λόγος. See the whole passage
 in App. B.

§ 8. οὐδὲν σημείον, κα. τοῦ ἔχειν
 in the sense previously given to
 the word. Τα ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξιν are
 generally speaking σημαῖα τῆς ἕξιν,
 but the ἕξιν may be a mere δυναμῖς.
 The γεόμετροι may be talking in his
 sleep. The ἀποδείξεις here mentioned
 are probably to be understood as geo-
 metrical for Aristotle cannot mean us
 to take the word with ἔμπεδοκλέους.
 The τῶν Ἐμπεδοκλέους are just about
 the last thing Aristotle would call
 ἀποδείξεις.

κα. οἱ πρῶτον μαθάνοντες κ.τ.λ.
 This is another way in which Aristotle
 uses than once describes merely po-
 tential knowledge. Cf. Phys. 255 a,

33 ὅτι δὲ διδάσκει ἄλλως ὁ μαθάνων
 ἐπιστήμων καὶ ὁ ἔχων ἤδη καὶ μὴ θεωρῶν
 ... ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωρῶν δὲ
 διδάσκει ἵστίον ἐπιστήμων πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ
 ὡς καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν, δὲ An. 429 b, 8
 διδάσκει πως (κα. ἐπιστήμην), οὐ μὴν
 ἐμμεῖται καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ὅ ἐόντων.
 Thurot's conjecture μαθάνοντες δὲ
 μαθάνειν accords to me certain. We
 can hardly identify οἱ πρῶτον μαθάνοντες
 with οἱ μαθάνοντες πρὶν μαθεῖν.

ταῦτα...βίαια. For the reading cf.
 Bywater, Contr. p. 55.

§ 9. Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε κ.τ.λ. The
 fourth and real λόγος. We now drop
 'potential knowledge' altogether, and
 the explanation is in perfect harmony
 with that given in the de Mot. An.
 (cf. App. B). It should be observed
 however, that the latter previous λόγος,
 though provisional, have gradually
 prepared us for this one.

φυσικῶς. This word alone im-
 plies that the preceding λόγος are
 διαλεκτικώτεροι. To consider a thing
 φυσικῶς is to consider it in the light
 of its αἰτίας ἀρχαί, i.e. of φυσικὰ
 πρότασις (Top. 102 b, 22), in the

25 μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δοξα, ἣ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑαστά ἐστιν, ὡν αἰσθησις ἤδη κερία· ὅταν δι' ἑνὴν γίνεται ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπεραίνειν ἐνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν, εἰ ἐν ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθιγ· οἶον, εἰ πάντος γλυκεῖος

present case, of course, from a psychological point of view. Hence φυσικῶς αἰσθησις ὁρμηται το λογικῶς (= διαλεκτικῶς). Cf. Phys. 204 b, ε λογικῶς μὲν οὖν σκοπούμενοι πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον δόξαιεν ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι (τὸ θνατόν). b, το φυσικῶς δὲ πολλὸν θεωροῦσιν ἐκ τῶνδε. Gen. Crit. 316 a, το δοξὸν διαφύκειν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες.

ἣ καθόλου, sc. πρότασις. The major premises is not ἐπιστήμη, but the other form of ὑπόληψις called δοξα, which is περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ ἀλλως ἔχει, and may be true or false. We have seen already, however, that this does not imply that it is a mere ἡμεῖμα ὑπόληψις.

ἣ δ' ἑτέρα, sc. πρότασις, cf. 1143 b, 3 n. In a real, practical syllogism, the major premises cannot be of the form ξηρὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον, which is all that ἐπιστήμη could give us. It must be of the form ξηρὸν εὐθιγ, and that is a matter for αἰσθησις.

ἐνθα μὲν, i.e. ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς πρότασιν.

ἐν ταῖς ποιητικαῖς. The simplest way of taking this is to supply πρότασιν as above (πρότασιν are the subject of the sentence) and to translate 'in the case of practical premises,' cf. de Mot. An. 201 a, 23 αὐτὸ δὲ πρότασιν αἰσθητικὴν καὶ λ. I have thought, of course, of θεωρητικαῖς πρότασιν, the major a δοξα such as 'the east wind brings rain,' and the minor an αἰσθησις, 'The wind is from the east.' The conclusion is 'It will rain.' (If we may have 'It is bad for a man to get wet,' 'It is raining,' the conclusion of which is that I put on my cloak.

εἰ πάντος γλυκεῖος κ.τ.λ. This is an illustration of a case where there is no impement or conflict. We have a practical major premise αὐτῶν γλυκεῖος γίνεσθαι δεῖ. As a δοξα, it may be true or false, but it is a universal imperative, just as much as αὐτῶν δεινὸν εὐφραίνειν τὰ ἔργα. We have to ask, then, (1) whence it derives its universality, (2) whence it derives its epistemic force. Its universality must be due, as universality always is to the action of nature. It is true that generalises particular desires for a sweet wine into the universal proposition (καθόλου δοξα, ἀρχὴν γλυκεῖον ἡδύ. It makes explicit the universal implicit in particular desires exactly in the same way as it makes explicit the universal implicit in particular αἰσθησεις. But this is not all. The verb δεῖ means ἀναγκάζει, and the epistemic character of the proposition can only be due to its presentation by εὐθιγ (or φανερόν) to βούλησιν as its ὁρατόν. This form implies that the person who has such a major premise is one whose φαντασματικὸν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ ἔχει. In other words, this is the major premise of δεσποσμία. If this καθόλου δοξα is in the soul, and a minor premise τοιοῦτον δεῖ ἡδύ is supplied by αἰσθησις, the act of fasting necessarily follows as a conclusion. We see, then, that a bad act may be produced by a practical syllogism as well as a good one. The problem of ἀρραμία therefore assumes this form: 'Is it possible for a man to gain the conclusion of which is a bad act to exist side by side with the knowledge of the major premise of

λαί δεῖ, τοῦτ' ὅτι γλυκὺ ὡς ἐν τῇ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστον, 10
 ὅταν οὖν καὶ μὴ κωλύμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ
 εἶναι. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθύλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γένεσθαι,
 εἴη πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ· τοῦτ' ὅτι γλυκὺ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεί),
 ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἡ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεῖγναι τοῦτο, ἡ δ'
 αἰετ' αἶγει· κινεῖν γὰρ δραστικὸν δύναται τῶν μορίων· 35
 συμβαίνειν ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεῦσθαι, οἷα 1147^b

the principle which that act

ὅταν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The answer to the question asked at the end of the note is that it is impossible if the premises of the bad act and of premises which it violates are contradictory. No one can have all at once and the same time conditions *παρὰ γλυκὺς γενέσθαι* and *οὐ συμφέροι τὸ γλυκεῖν*. If the latter is present, the truth of the bad act will depend on whether it can result from some other premises. Now the premise *γλυκὺ ἡδύ* is not for its reason to *οὐ συμφέροι τὸ γλυκεῖν*, may quite well coexist. The question, then, is whether the bad act can follow from *γλυκὺ ἡδύ* and *οὐ συμφέροι τὸ γλυκεῖν* together.

ἢ ἐνεργεί, in the sense explained by the third *ἀντι*. The point is really that of *ἐπιθυμία*, as before.

ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα. 'and since (for pleasure) is present now,' not *βουλῆσι* or *δράσει*. It all depends, then, on the *δράσει* at the moment.

ἀλλοι φεῖγναι. The syllogism *οὐ συμφέροι τὸ γλυκεῖν, τοῦτ' ὅτι γλυκὺ ἡδύ* may even be bad; but in the absence of the good to which it can present itself happens. For *διὰ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι*.

ἐπιθυμία ἔχει. The presence

of *ἐπιθυμία* is enough to replace the absence of the epistemic element in *γλυκὺ ἡδύ*. The way in which this happens is explained in *de Mot. An.* 701 a. 31 (*App. B*) *ἀντ' ἐρωτῆσαι γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ τῆς ὁμῆσεως γίνεσθαι ἐνεργεία*. In itself (*καθ' αὐτὴν*) *γλυκὺ ἡδύ*, *τοῦτ' ὅτι γλυκὺ*, *τοῦτ' ἡδύ* is quite compatible with the other syllogism, but for *ἐπιθυμία* it has a different meaning. The object of *ἐπιθυμία* is just *τὸ ἡδύ* and so it moves it at once. As it is put in the *de Mot. An.* (loc. cit.) "Ποτέα μοι, κατὰ δέσιν, τοῦτ' ὅτι ποτέα, εἰς ἀσθενείας οὐ φαρμακία πρὸς τὸν. Ἐσθὲν εἶπαι."

κινεῖν γὰρ δύναται. As an *ὁρμή* (which is *κινεῖται* and *ἐν τῷ σώματι*) it can set in motion the body (which is *κινεῖται* and not *κινεῖται*). This does not mean, of course, that *ἐπιθυμία* has this power more than any other form of *ὁρμή*. The point is that *σοφία* cannot move the body except through *δράσει*. A judgment that something is good cannot move the body unless *βουλῆσι* *τάχα* is present but the case supposed is one where *ἐπιθυμία* *τὸ ἡδύ* occupies the soul.

ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης. This is really Aristotle's great contribution to moral psychology. There is an intellectual element in badness as well as in goodness. The bad man and the morally weak man have major premises as well as the good. The bad man has only one major premiss which is the contradictory of the good man's. The morally weak man has

ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ ἡ
ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ διὰ τῷ ἐρῶν λόγῳ· ὥστε
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ βηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῇ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθολοί
ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.

Πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἀγνοία καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ
ἀκρατής, ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰκουμενου καὶ καθιέου-
τος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φιλο-
λόγων ἀκούειν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία προτασις δύο τε αἰσθητοῦ κα. 11

two. These cannot be contradictory in themselves (καθ' αὐτό), but only κατὰ συμβεβηκός, i.e. ὅτι συμβαίνει τῷ ἡδὲ ἐπ' αὐτῶν εἶναι.

§ 11. *καὶ οὐκ οὖν.* We have seen already that the lower animals are incapable of goodness or badness just because they have not *νοῦς* (1139a, 30). They cannot get beyond an image in the soul of something once felt as sweet (*ἡδυστάτης*) or an association of something now perceived with such an image (*μνημα*). Memory is not an intellectual act, but belongs to the same "part" of the soul as *Imagination* or (*φαντασία*). *Ἡ τοῦ πρῶτου ἀσθητικῆς, διὰ καὶ ἰστέρας τινὲς ὑπέδειξε τὴν ψυχὴν (ἐν δὲ αὐτῇ χύβητον αἰσθητικὴν καὶ οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀσθητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἔχοντες διὰ τὴν ἡ φαντασίαν (de Mem. 449 b, 1 450 a, 22).* The *δρεκτικὸς* can only move the lower animals to *φειρανθήσθαι*, *ἢ καὶ ἡ σὺν ἡσυχίᾳ*

§ 12. Πῶς δὲ λέγεται π. κ. λ. This is put in the popular form as the word ἄγνοια shows. The meaning must be 'How does ἐπιθυμία τοῦ θύου give place to βούλησις πάσηςαιας?' For an explanation we are referred to 'the physicians' and their account of drunkenness and sleep. The drunken man who seizes Emperocles gets sober; the sleeping geometrist wakes. This is how Aristotle discusses a question which is φυσικῶς ἀπορίας and goes beyond πολιτικῶς. To us, of

court, it is just the furthest question, for the answer to a question explains why the ordinary man who is neither good nor bad sometimes does right and sometimes wrong. Now we take Aristotle's hint and go to the de homino for an explanation. We find that the alteration of sleep and waking is due to the fact that no animal is one *euryctes* *therios*. Physiologically speaking, what happens is that the warm exhalation from food rises into the head, and therefore makes heavy. As this cools in the brain, whence it returns to the heart, the consequent cooling of the heart produces a more surplus for the heart in the upper extremity. So this why arises for the first degree of sleep. Bk 3 ch. 11. The analysis of pleasure will show us that *euryctes* too has a physiological side. It is caused by the pain produced by fever and it ceases with the pleasure produced by drink. *Physiology* (ed) can being explained. Cf also *Phys.* 109b. 37-500.

§ 12. 'Evel 6' q' a' a' l. The section is intended to bring out the truth underlying the parables of so kindred. I (KOD) receive a d' a' and Ramsauer and make the question of even to forget loss.

1. *Object of perception* The *form* of
 the *matter* is *perceived* as *matter*

κυρία τῶν πράξεων ταύτην <δ'> ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὧν. 10
ἢ αὐτως ἔχει ὥς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν
ἥσπερ ὁ αἰνωμένος τὰ ἑμπεδοκλέους καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθολοῦ
μὴδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθολοῦ τὸν
14 ἔσχατον ὅρον καὶ δοκεῖν δ' ἐξῆται Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ
γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρουσίας γίνεται 15
τὸ πάθος, οἷδ' αὕτη περιέχεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς
αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἶδους καὶ μή, καὶ πῶς εἶδὸς
ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεῖσθαι τασαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

IV Ποτερον δ' ἐστὶ τις ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ 20
μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἐστὶ, περὶ τοιά ἐστι, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν
οὖν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπης εἰσὶν οἱ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρ-
2 τερικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερον. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ

is e.g. τοῦτο γινώσκει (1147 a, 29), and then differentiates it from the minor premises of a scientific syllogism such as [ἀνὴρ τὸ καθόλου] (1147 a 35)

ὥς οὖν ἦν. For the imperfect cf. 1147 a 35

τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον, i.e. the τὸδε or τοῦτο which is in τοῖς καθ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστάται ὧς αἰσθάνεται ἡδονήματα. This is not καθόλου 253 therefore not ἐπιστημονικόν for there can be no ἐπιστήμη of τὸ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ.

§ 12. τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης, 'epistēmē in its proper sense,' all the terms of which are universal, γὰρ καθόλου.

παρουσίας. The text is sufficiently guaranteed by ἐπιστάται 1148 b, 23, which also settles the meaning here. Stewart's very generous περιγίνεται τὸ πάθος is quite unnecessary if the interpretation given above is correct. There can be no κυρίως ἐπιστήμη where the major premise is given by δόξα and the minor by αἰσθήσις.

ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς i.e. ἐπιστάται. This is a new name for the αἰσθήσις ὡς καθ' ἑαυτοῦ by which we apprehend the minor premise ἐγὼ δὲ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τὸδε τοιαῦτα. The phrase

is probably used with some reference to the ἐπιστημονικὴ αἰσθησις of Speusippus (cf. Ritter and Preller § 286). That was a doctrine intended to bridge over the gap between the particular and the universal, much of the same nature as Aristotle's own δ' αἰσθάνεται, though we only perceive a particular, yet it is only the universal element in it, the form, that really enters into perception.

—IV. § 2. Ποτερον δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. We now come to the second division περὶ τοια τὸν ἀκρατὴ ὁτιόν (1148 b, 9)

§ 2. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., 'whereas—.' The apodosis is not reached till 1147 b, 31 τοῖς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is not meant to be a complete classification of the objects of desire, as we can see at once from the omission of pleasures intrinsically bad. It is only a preliminary statement as to two classes of pleasures, which is sufficient for the purpose immediately in hand, namely the ascertaining of the proper objects of ἀκρατεῖα in its literal sense.

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἵδμεν, τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν
 25 καθ' αἷτα ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ συ-
 ματικά—λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὰ τε περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ
 τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρῆσιν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωσι-
 τικῶν περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην—
 τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί, αἰρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ λέγου ἔ-
 30 λου νίκην τιμὴν πλούτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν
 ἡδέων τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον
 ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀρε-
 τείς, προστιθέντες δὲ [τὸ] χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδιαι
 καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ὡς ἑτέροις καὶ καθ'
 35 ὁμοιότητα λεγόμενοις, ὥσπερ Ἀνθρῶπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα κ.τ.λ. The use of this name for the bodily pleasures arises from such phrases as ἀναγκαῖα τροφή. Plato Rep. 359aqq. speaks in this sense of ἀναγκαῖα ἐπιθυμία, and in Hsch. ὁ δὲ ἀναγκαῖα ὁδὸν are mentioned as a recognized class. The present classification is not, however, to be found in Plato.

αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ. These will be the higher pleasures, since τὰ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὰ is always the best. ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολὴν, 'but admitting of excess.' For this sense of ἔχει cf. Ind. iv. The excess of these pleasures will be φρενὴς, but only κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

ἔθμεν, 1117 b 27-29q

τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς. It is necessary to add this; for, unless they had the ὀρθὸν λόγον 'in themselves,' there would be no likeness or analogy between the κατὰ τὴν ἀκρατείαν and the ἀπλῶς ἀκρατεῖς. The ἀκρατεῖς θυμοῦ etc. must have a true basis with regard to the object of θυμός, as well as a false one.

προστιθέντες ἀπλῶς. For the opposition of ἀπλῶς to κατὰ προσθεσιν, cf. 1095a, 9b, and for the omission of

τὸ. Bywater, Contr. p. 25. It causes us to take προστιθέντες as absolute καθ' ὁμοιότητα, cf. Ind. iv. 1095a.

ὥσπερ Ἀνθρῶπος κ.τ.λ. This is perfectly διέφικον and ἦν εὖ καὶ ἡμῶν that refers to some previous discussion or discussion (cf. Ind. iv. 1095). All the Greek commentators except the Neoplatonists tell us that there was an Olympic victor called Ἀνθρῶπος and this view goes back to no less an authority than Alexander, who says in his exegesis of the Iliad (p. 72a 8 Waller) ἦ γὰρ καὶ τὸν ὄνομα τὸν τοῦ Ὀλυμπιακοῦ νικῆται οὗ ἐπὶ τῷ Ἰλιάδι μνημονεύει. This statement is repeated by A. eximius on his exegesis (see the Index in Wallace) and has just received most remarkable confirmation from a statement now in an Oxyrhynchus papyrus communicated to the Classical Review by the Rev. J. H. M. (Greenfield) and M. J. "This is a fragment of a list of Olympic victors, written in the third century A.D. and referring, with some lacunae, to a period of about three years in the first half of the fifth century B.C. According to this list

περὶ ἀφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τοῖς
 10 διάνοιαν, ἡκράτης λέγεται, εὐ κατὰ προσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ
 ταῦτε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δὲ
 καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ'
 οἰδεμῖαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰς ταυτὸν τὸν ἡκράτη καὶ τὸς ἡσ-
 15 λαστον τίθενται καὶ ὀγκρατῆ καὶ σάφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνους
 οἰδεύειν, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αἰτίας πως ἤδοντας καὶ λύπας εἶναι
 οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταῦτά, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἶσιν, ἀλλ'
 οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκό-

pleasures belonging to the sense of touch, and stand exactly on the same footing as the pleasures of nutrition and reproduction. To look at the matter φυσικώτερον, this is because ἔργον καὶ ζῆλον καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν συνθέτων σωμάτων ἐστίν (Part. An. 646 a, 16). We find also that τὸ θερμὸν has the most intimate connexion with τροφή, since ἡ γὰρ τροφή κενεῖται καὶ θερμότητι. The pains of hunger, thirst, warmth and cold are therefore exactly the four we should expect to find mentioned. Another more sign that ἀλγία καὶ ψυχὴ are pleasures of this class is that they are of those ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνοῦσι. Even oysters and molluscs live at the mouths of rivers; for they seek ἑμὰ τὴν τ' ἀλγίαν καὶ τὴν τροφήν (Gen. An. 751 b, 3), and fish change about from the deep sea to the shore φορῶντες τὰς υπερβολὰς (observe the phrase) πρὸ ψυχροῦ καὶ πρὸ ἀλγίας. Lastly, it is only if we suppose that some warmth may be the object of ἀσπλαγία, that we can see any point in the exception of θερμότητα produced by gymnastics (1118 b, 6). We may remember too, that Philoxenos was κάμνους οὐκ ἄνθρωπος.

κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, i.e. contrary to the λόγος ὃ ἐνεδέχοντο which διάνοια has affirmed in harmony with βουλήσις.

κατὰ προσθεσιν ὁλως Cf. Ind. 1 vv.

καθάπερ ὀργῆς. Cf. Theoc. 12. 12, τὴν ἀσθμαστικὴν φύσιν ἀσπαστὴν ἐκείνῳ ἀκρατῇ μετ' ὀργῆς ὄντα, μετ' ὀργῆς δὲ τὸν ἀκρατῆ.

ἡ δὲ σημεῖον δὲ π + λ. We should say that this is inconsistent with the account of μαλακία given later and merely states a fact of language which Aristotle regarded as significant. And it merely is a fact that the word μαλακία is not used of the ἀκρατῆ θνητῶν etc. See Stewart's note.

ἐκ ταυτὸν τίθενται. The phrase ἐκ ταυτὸν τίθενται is frequent, especially in the Ethics.

οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται. The question has been raised how the ἀσπλαγία can have προαίρεσιν since this is not the pleasure of the intellect. The answer is that προαίρεσις is not necessarily a σπουδαία προαίρεσις, and the object of βουλήσις is τὸ φανερόν ἀγαθόν, which is only the true good to the good man. The difference between the ἀσπλαγία and the ἀσπλάστος is just this, that to the former pleasure appears in its true character, simply as the object of ἀσπλάστως, while to the latter the pursuit of pleasure presents itself as τὸ ἀγαθόν, the object of βουλήσις. The major premise πρὸς γλυστον γενέσθαι δὲν, which is that of the ἀσπλάστως, is equivalent to πρὸς

εν ἂν εἴποιμεν ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμια διώκει τὰς
 βολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ
 ὑθυμῶν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσ- 20
 το ἐπιθυμία νευακὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐν-
 λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδο-
 νῶν μὲν εἰσι <τῶν> τῷ γένει καλοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου—τῶν
 ἡδέων ἐνία φύσει αἰρετά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ
 βύ, καθάπερ διαίλομεν πρότερον—οἶον χρήματα καὶ 25
 κ καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή, πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
 τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ φιλεῖν
 νται, ἀλλὰ τῇ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβύλλειν (ὁ δὲ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ

ἀγαθῶν, ποὶ το πῶς γλινδ

ἄλλων α τ λ Stewart is plainly
 taking ἄλλων with ὁ εἰσπομεν
 ε with ἀδολαστοι. There is no
 m of degrees of ἀδολαστω. Ti.
 would rather give the name of
 ποε to the man who etc'. By
 ὅστις α τ λ is meant some
 whom we are in doubt whether
 ὁστις or ἀδολαστοι, and whom
 ade to be only ἀδολαστοι. It
 is impossible to mistake the
 ad psychology of making the
 for a man of good desires.
 him pleasure has become the
 of βούλησις the φανόμενον
 and he pursues it as a 'cool
 m.

φονγα μετρίας λύπας. The
 only changed τῶν λύπων
 ὁλύων (1. 40, 2) for they
 are strong enough to produce
 but desire for the opposite
 es. The ἀδολαστοι shuns all
 on principle.

ἰσχυρά, i.e. α υπερβολή such
 as the αμαρτί.

ἐπεὶ δὲ α τ λ. The section
 here duplicate of 1147 b, 23
 see note) but the necessary
 ation to the discussion of the
 m, incidentally recapitulating

and putting in a clearer light what
 has been said already. We now
 have for the first time a complete
 classification of desires into (1) those
 of the ὁ τῷ γένει καλῶ φύσει αἰρετά
 (2) of τὰ ἐναντία τούτων, i.e. those of
 things τῷ γένει αἰσχρο, φύσει φεικτά,
 not previously mentioned, (3) of τὰ με-
 ταξὺ, i.e. τὰ ἀναγκαία (τὰ σωματικά).
 These last are properly described as
 'intermediate' between τὰ καλὰ and
 τὰ αἰσχρο, for they are ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
 ἀγαθὰ, the pleasures of τὰ ὁπρ.
 not of τὰ αἰσχρο. They are therefore
 indifferent in themselves, but become
 good when sought τῷ καλῷ ὁφει.
 For the punctuation see Stewart's
 note. The apodosis οὐ he long
 previous is not reached till 1148 b, 2
 μοχθηρία μὲν οὐκ α τ λ being delayed
 by the enormous parenthesis 1148 a,
 28 διὰ ὅτι b, 2 μορβαίνεν.

οἶον χρήματα α τ λ. These are
 φωνι αἰρετά, ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν.

τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβαλλαν. 'For being
 so in a certain way, i.e. in excess.'

διὸ ὅσοι α τ λ. There is no verb for
 this nominative, the construction being
 forgotten owing to the parenthesis
 within a parenthesis καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὁπρ
 σπουδαζούτε. The thought requires
 us to supply μοχθηροὶ οὐκ εἰσιν, the
 place of which is taken by the re-

τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ δαίκονσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν
 30 καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς σπουδαίοντας
 ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ
 ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδαίοντες—ἀλλ' ὁμοίᾳ ἐστὶ
 τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νισβὴ μά-
 χαιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλο-
 1148^b πάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λῆαν γὰρ ἐδῶκε
 μωραίνευν)—μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ ἐκ
 τῶ ἐιρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἰρετῶν ἕκαστον ἐστὶ δι' αὐτὸ
 φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσιν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. ὁμοίως
 5 δ' οὐδ' ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν· δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσ-
 επιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἕκαστον λεγούσιν, οἷον κατὰ
 ἱατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑπακριτήν, ὅν ἡπλὺς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν

συμπρὶν ἀποδοῖς μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν
 κ. τ. λ.

ὥσπερ ἡ Νισβὴ, an instance of
 ὑπερβολὴ περὶ τέκνα.

ὥσπερ Σάτυρος, an instance of
 ὑπερβολὴ περὶ γονεῖς. *Αἰνιγμῶν* (158,
 16 *Heyl*) says Σάτυρος δὲ οὐδὲ
 ζῆν εἶπετο ἀποθανόντος τοῦ πατρὸς.
The Anonymus (11. 426 24) says οἷτοι
 γὰρ τῶν τιμῶν κόρη καὶ πρὸς τὴν
 μοιχείαν τιμὴν τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα Σα-
 τυροῦτον εὐτεργούοντα, τοσοῦτον ἐστὶν
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐφίλησεν, ὥστε καὶ
 τοῦ πατρὸς τελευτήσαντος αὐτὸν κατε-
 κρημισε καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἀπεστέρησε.
 (The words like a reminiscence from
 the New Comedy.) Heliodorus on
 the other hand has ὁ Σάτυρος ὡς θεὸν
 ἐπικαλούμενος τὸν πατέρα, as if his
 text did not contain περὶ. It seems
 just possible that this may be right.
 As Stewart remarks the kings of
 Persia during the 4th century were
 called Satyros. I would add that
 Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ looks very like
 a royal title, and if the reference were
 to the deification of a dead king by

his son, the parallel to the case of a
 Νισβὴ would be striking. *Fr. 40*.
καλεῖσθαι, instance of *EE*. 1241 1243
ἐπικαλεσθῆναι τοῖς Διοσκόροις.

μοχθηρία, i.e. ἀεικλῆσια, *casia*.
 φαῦλαι δὲ κ. τ. λ., cf. 1147 2, 15
 ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν.

§ 6. τῶν φευκτῶν. There seems to
 be a slight inconsistency between 1147
 and 1148 a, 28 ὡς φαίνεται τὸ πᾶν
 ὑπερβάλλειν. The explanation may
 be found above 1148 a, 3. We may
 say that τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸν πατέρα
 λόγον τὸν ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς πατρὸς
 ψευδὲς ὡς ἀκριβὲς but not vice versa.
 It is thus not really *ὡς φαίνεται*.

προσ επιτιθέντες κ. τ. λ., 'they call
 it ἀκρασία with the additional quali-
 fication *περὶ πατέρα, in a special sense*.'
 Here again *περὶ πατέρα* is *ἐν ἰδιότητι* =
ειδικῶς.

οἷον κακὸν ἱατρὸν κ. τ. λ. (1148
 11 17; b, 13 ὅρ. *ὅσον ἀγαθὸν ὡς*
σοφία μοχθηρίᾳ εἶναι, εἴς δ' ἀπο
ἀγαθὸν ὡς σοφὸν μοχθηρίᾳ ὡς εἶναι
ἀγαθὸν σοφίᾳ μοχθηρίᾳ).

κακον. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' εἰταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι
ἐκάστην αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνύλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δι' ἅλον ὅτι 10
κακίᾳ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἁκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι
ἣτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταῦτά τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ
θυμοῦ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῇ
θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.

V. Ἴπεί δ' ἐστὶν ἕνα μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ 15
μὲν ἀπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζῴων καὶ ἀνθρώπων,
τὰ δ' οἷς ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεως τὰ δὲ δι' ἐθῆ
γίνονται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων
2 ἑκαπτα παραπλησίως ἰδεῖν ἔξεις· λέγω δὲ τῆς θηριώδους,
οἷον τὴν ἀνθρωπὸν ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυούσας ἀνασχίζουσας τὰ 20
παιδιά κατεσθίειν, ἢ οἷς χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίοις τῶν ἀπη-
γαγμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοῖς μὲν ὁμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώ-
πων κρέσιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλοισι εἰς εἰ-
3 χίαι, ἢ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις,
αἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται (καὶ διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ 25

ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ὅτω κακίαι. Cf.
1145 a, 14 n.

ἐκάστην, sc. τῆς τοῦ ἱατροῦ καὶ τῆς
τῶν ὑποκράτοις κακίας.

τῷ ἀναλογον ὁμοίαν. The analogy
is e.g. as the ἀκρατής is to the
ἐκαστατοι so is the ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ to
the ἀργέλιος, the ἀρμενὴς τμήν to the
ἐκαστοί (i.e. the bad spirit), the
ἀκρατὴς κέρδους to the ἀνελούθετος.

V. § 1 ἡδέα φύσει, the φύσει
ἀφροῦ of 1142 a, 24.

τὰ δ' οἷς ἔστιν, i.e. the ἑκαστα
τούτων of 1143 a, 24. We now see
why these were added to the list.

τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεως κ.τ.λ. The
division is not very clear; but the
chief distinction is clearly between
'bestial' (μοχθηρὰς, who have unnatural
desires by nature, or 'manic,' and
'psychic' people who have unnatural
desires from disease mental or bodily.

παραπλησίως, sc. unnatural.

§ 2. τὴν ἀνθρωπὸν, 'the female.'
It seems very doubtful, as I indicated
above, whether this can be the female
of folk-lore.

τῶν...περὶ τὸν Πόντον. Cf. Pol.
1338 b, 19 πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ
πρὸς τὸ κτελεῖν οὐκ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπο-
φιλίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ
τὸν Πόντον Ἀχαιοὶ τοὶ καὶ Ἡνίοχοι
κ.τ.λ. Hist. 10, 18, 106 ἀνθρωπῶν
δὲ ἀγριώτατα πάντες ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσι
ἦθες, οὗτοι δίκην νομίζοντες οὗτοι νόμῳ
οὐδενὶ χροόμενοι.

τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν. This must surely
refer to the bull. See 1149 a, 14 n.

§ 2. αὗται μὲν . . . αἱ βέλαι. We pass
here from the strictly 'bestial' to the
'moniac.' The instances given seem
to be similar. They probably come
from the collections made by the
school.

τὴν μητέρα καθυμνύσας καὶ φαγῶν, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου
τὲ ἦπαρ) αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, ὅσον τριχῶν τίλ-
σεις καὶ αἰέχων τραχίς, ἐτε δ' αἰφράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς ἃ
τούτοις ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσις
30 τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, ὅσον τοῖς ὑδριζομένοις ἐκ
παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἴτια, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ὡς
εἶπεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας ὅτι οἷα ὀπύον-
σιν ἀλλ' ὀπύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδεις
ἔχουσι δι' ἔθους. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἐξ ἡ τῆς
1149* ἄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· τοῦ δ'
ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οἷχ ἡ ὑπὸ ἡ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἡ
καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμούς ἔχοντα
τούτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῇ δ' οὐ λεπτέον. πᾶσα
5 γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολο-
σία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις
εἰσὶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, ἀνδρ'
ψοφήσῃ μὲν, θηριώδῃ δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐν-
δίδει διὰ ἰόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλό-
10 γιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἵνα

αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους.
This seems to be a third class which
may arise either from disease, or habit,
which is a second nature.

τριχῶν τίλσεις. Victorinus says
'hinc vitio virgines non paucae affines
sunt quae inde pubertate absterren
possunt.' Aristotle is possibly alluding
to the morbid appetites connected
with puberty and pregnancy.

§ 2. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. These
are cases of πῆρωσις. What follows
is quite in accordance with Aristotle's
view of the distinction between the
sexes. Cf. Gen. An. 737 a, 27 τὸ
θῆλυ ὥσπερ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ πεπωμένον,
775 a, 12 δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν ὥσπερ
ἀσσηρίας εἶναι τὴν θηλιότητα φυσικὴν.
§ 3. ἀκρασία. We expect καὶ
ἐγερταῖς to correspond with κραινέων,
but Aristotle does not care for formal
symmetry.

τοῦ πάθους, i.e. θυμοῦ, ac. ἀκρατῇ
λατῶν, ἀκρατῇ δ' ἀνδρὶ ὡς λατῶν.
'We must call him ἀκρατῇ of his
feeling, not ἀκρατῇ τῆς ἐξουσίας.'

πᾶσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is the case
where we apply the word σωματῇ to
excess of madness (ἐπιδησημονία),
Cf. 1145 a, 33.

§ 4. καὶ ψοφήσῃ μὲν. Cf. Pol.
1325 a, 19 δεδιότα τὰς παρατηρούμεναι
μύας. The ψοφοδῆς has the kind of
fear we find in certain beasts. Soph.
fr. 58 ἄσφατα γὰρ τοὶ τῷ φοβῶμενῳ
ψοφαί.

ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν κ.τ.λ. This is
'timid,' not 'timid' like the fear
of the ψοφοδῆς. The reference is to
morbid 'antipathies' to certain ani-
mals. Stewart quotes a fragment of
Plutarch, οἱ ἔνιοι καὶ ἀνδρῶς φότος ἔμμεν
φοβούμεναι φαλὰς ὅτι, ὅσον γαλῆν ἢ
ἐλεφάντην ἐκ' οὐδέποτε φανεράς αἰτίας.

πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος. ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῖσιν
 30 οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτήτα τῆς φύσεως
 ἀκοῖσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπιταγμα εἰ ἀκοῖσας, ὁρμῇ πρὸς τὴν
 τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλι-
 γωρία ἐδήλωσεν ὁ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ
 τοιοῦτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὖβρις· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐστὶν
 35 μόνον εἴπη ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἰσθησις, ὁρμῇ πρὸς τὴν
 1149^b ἀπολαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λογῷ πως, ἢ
 δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. αἰσχίων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατῆς
 τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττάται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.

ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ. 'If there is only
 a knock at the door,' *εἰ φωνὴ κρη-
 ρηστῆρι*. It seems plain that ψοφεῖν
 is here used impersonally and that it
 is used in the sense which properly
 belongs to *ἀκούειν*.

οὐκ ἐπιταγμα δ' ἀκοῖσας. We
 see, then, that its *παρεκδοχὴ* consists
 in its hearing something real, namely
 a judgment that so-and-so is an insult,
 but not what it thinks it hears, namely
 an order.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἐδήλωσεν. Cf.
Plot. 344 b, 13 διὰ τί ἀκρατεῖς λέγον-
 ται κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μέσσοι, οὐσθ' ἐπὶ
 ἀκρατεῖς καὶ περὶ τὴν ὁρμῇ; ἢ ὅτι
 ἀκρατεῖς μὲν ὅταν ὁ παρὰ τὸν λόγον τι
 πράττωσιν, καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ἢ παρὰ τὸν λόγον
 ὡν γὰρ, οὐτοὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπιθυμίας ὥς
 ἐπίπαι εἶπειν παρὰ τὸν λόγον, αἱ δ'
 ἐργαὶ μετὰ λόγου, οἷός τις πεθεύσαντος
 τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐγλωσσάμενος τὸν
 προσηλασμένον ἢ τὴν αἰτίαν.

ἢ ἡ φαντασία. Cf. *Rhet.* 1378 a.
 31 ὅστις δὴ ὁρμῇ ὁρμῇ μετὰ λύπῃ
 τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένης
 ὀλιγωρίας. Like all other ὁρμῇ,
 τιμωρία can only move τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ
 φαντασθῆναι. The difference between
 it and τὸ ἡδὺ is that it implies also a
 φαντασία of the αἰτία which must be
 some sort of ὀλιγωρία (see *παράφρασις*,
ἐπιφρασμός, ὅπως all described *Rhet.*
 1378 b, 14 sqq.). Now it is just here
 that the dependence of θυμὸς on τὸ

λογιστικὸν comes in. 'Ὀλιγωρία is
 defined as ἐνέργεια δοξῆς περὶ τὸ κα-
 θεῖον ὅτιον φαινομένην, and (hence) α
 μηδὲν ἄλλω which is not good and
 constitutes little or nothing to what
 is good (*Rhet.* 1378 b, 13). All this
 θυμὸς must get from οὐτοί. The pre-
 miss τὸν γλυκὸν ἡδὺ is merely a gen-
 eralisation of particular desires for sweet
 things; the premiss 'such conduct is
 ὕβρις' is no mere generalisation from
 particular feelings of resentment, but
 the result of deliberation. But such a
 premiss is not enough to justify anger.
 It may be that the man is beneath
 contempt, or that for some other reason
 the ὁρμῇ λόγος would prescribe the
 exercise of *σφόδρη*, and this is a
 matter for further deliberation. What
 we may call ἀκρασία θυμοῦ consists
 in not waiting for this; for the φαι-
 νωσις of ὀλιγωρία is sufficient to move
 θυμῷ, and θυμῷ can move the body.
 Still the φαντασία which moves θυμῷ
 is the result of deliberation, though
 incomplete.

ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἰσθησις. There is
 no contradiction in saying that a
 λόγος may furnish the motive of ἐπι-
 θυμῷ. The example already given,
 τὸν γλυκὸν ἡδὺ, shows this. But it is
 not *the* λόγος, i.e. ὁρμῇ λόγος, which
 is the sense in which the word is used
 elsewhere in this passage.

- 2 ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμῃ ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρίζεσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὄσαι κοιναὶ ὅς πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ ἢ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τυπτοί "καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἔφη "τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κἀκείνος τὸν ἄνω-θεν," καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας "καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ" ἔφη "ὅταν ἀνὴρ 10 γίνηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν." καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ νιοῦ ταιεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλκύν-
3 σαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι ἰδιώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλοτεροι· ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμῷδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμὸς, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην 15 φασίν· "δολοπλοκοῦ γὰρ κυπρογενεὺς·" καὶ τὸν "κεστὸν ἱμάντα" Ὀμηρος· "πάρφασις ἢ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πικὰ περ φρονέοιτος." ὥστ' ἔπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἢ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ

§ 2. Ἐτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς κ.τ.λ. The second reason.

Ἐπει καὶ κ.τ.λ. Even among desires the most universal are the most excusable. For the distinction between κοινὰ ἐπιθυμίαι and ἴδια καὶ ἐπιβουλοί, cf. 1135 b, 8 seq.

τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς, κ.τ.λ. των ἀναγκαίων. The words καὶ των μὴ ἀναγκαιῶν expressly explain this. I do not think that they refer to τὰ φύσει αἰσρέα.

ὥσπερ ἀπολογούμενος κ.τ.λ. The writer of MM. seems to have taken this illustration seriously; for he adds that the plea 'It runs in the family' was admitted, ἀποφύγειν δὲ δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν φυσικὴν εἶναι τὴν αμαρτίαν.

καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος κ.τ.λ. Zell says that the same story occurs in a German Volkslied and refers to 'Der Knecht Wunderruth' vol. 2, p. 259. Clearly, then, Aristotle is drawing on folk lore for his illustrations, the stuff

of which Maehchen and Faubus are made.

§ 3. Ἐτι ἀδικωτέροι κ.τ.λ. The third reason.

Δολοπλοκοῦ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The author of this lyrical fragment is unknown. Zell compares Sappho's Ποικιλοθεοὶ ἄθροον Ἀφροδίτην | καὶ Δίῳ δολοπλοκοῖ, λίσσονται. The quotations are given in the usual script, and abrupt way, κ.ε.τ.λ. ἱμάντα. Il. vii, 214—

ἦ, καὶ ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φέρεται κ.ε.τ.λ. ἱμάντα, ποικίλος, ὅσα δὲ εἰ θελητήρια πάντα ἐνέκω.

ἐνθ' ἐνὶ μὲν φιλότῃ, ἐν δ' ἱμερῇ, ἐν δ' ὀφισσίν.

πάρφασι, ἢ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πικὰ περ φρονέοιτος.

περὶ τὸν θυμὸν, i.e. τοῦ θυμοῦ. Cf. Ind. x v περὶ

καὶ κοινὰ π.π. This is the point to which the whole discussion is meant to lead us. It is not κακὰ ἀπλῶς because it is ἀναπροσβατόν.

20 κακία πως. ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ πεῖσθαι
 πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἱ
 ὀργιζέσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερον, καὶ ἡ ἀκρα-
 σία ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ἔθρις. ὡς μὲν 5
 τοῖνυν αἰσχύων ἢ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν ἐν-
 25 μόν, καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρωσία περὶ ἐπιθυ-
 μίας καὶ ἡδονῶν σωματικές, δῆλον· αὐτῶν δὲ τοιούτων τὰς
 διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, εἰ
 μὲν ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ
 μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεως καὶ νοση-
 30 ματα. τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολα-
 σία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ' ἀκο-
 λαστα λέγομεν ἄλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τι δλας
 ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων ἔχῃται καὶ σι-

§ 4. ἔτι οὐδεὶς κτλ. The *ῥησὶς* is
 reason. The argument requires that
 ἔθρις should be an instance of *ακρωσία*
 δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, but it is absurd to
 suppose that ἔθρις here means *μολι-*
χέου, as the old commentators do.
 The explanation is to be found in
 Khet. 1380a, 34 καὶ τοὶ δι' ὀργὴν ποιεῖ-
 σαι ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ ἥτονος ὀργίζον-
 ται· εἰ γὰρ δι' ὀργὴν ποιεῖται
 πρᾶξις, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργίζομενος ὀργίζει.
 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὀλιγωρία δυνάτω, ἢ δ' ὀργῇ
 μετὰ λόγου. Now ὀργῇ (unprovoked)
 insult, is a species of ὀλιγωρία, the
 others being *απαφίσησις* and *ἐπι-*
προσμοι, and, if we substitute ὀργῇ for
 ὀλιγωρία in the above sentence, we
 get the same statement as that in the
 text. That ὀργῇ comes from ἐπιθυμία
 appears from another passage (Khet.
 1378b, 23) ἐστὶ γὰρ ὀργῇ τὸ πλάττειν
 καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἀσχυρὴ ἐστὶ τῷ πᾶσι
 χοντι, μὴ ἴσα τι γίγνηται ἀπ' ἄλλο ἢ
 ὅτι ἐμμετῆς, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἡσθῇ. The
 ὀργῇ, then, is the pleasure of humili-
 ating another, and therefore the
 ὀργῇ in ἐπιθυμία. It is true, of
 course, as Aristotle says (Khet. 1378b,
 1) that all anger is accompanied by

the pleasure of hope, but this do
 not get angry for the sake of that.

εἰ οὖν οἷα κτλ. For the expression
 cf. 1119a, 21 κτλ.

§ 5. κατ' ἀρχάς, 1145a, 10 κτλ.
 καὶ τῷ μεγέθει. This is added be-
 cause we call men brutes (*ἄνθρωποι*)
 μωροὶ 1149a, 41 though these brutes
 are not genetically (*γένει*) different
 from those of normal human beings,
 but only different in scale *μεγέθει*,
 i.e. τῷ ὀγκοῦ καὶ τῷ μεγέθει.

τὰς πρώτας, sc. τὰς ἀνθρώπιναι καὶ
 φυσικὰς.

εἴ τι is Bywater's certain correction
 of καὶ τι. Aristotle means that
 we speak of certain kinds of animals
 as *ἄνθρωποι* by analogy, i.e. if their
 desires are related to normal as the
 desires of those of the *ἄνθρωποι* are
 to normal human desires. This is
 sufficiently illustrated by the opening
 chapters of the *de Gen. An.*, where
 we find of the physiological charac-
 teristics of animals ἀπὸ ἀνθρωπίνων
 οἷων, 717ⁿ, 27).

ἔθρις. Aristotle is doubtless bring-
 ing of asses. The phrase *τῶν θη-
 ῥιοντι* was proverbial.

μαρτυρεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός το
 τοσ κατερεῖν ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν. ἡ δ' ἐγκρατεῖα
 τῇ κρατεῖ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥστε
 τὸ μὴ ἐκτάσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἰρετώτερον ἐγκρα-
 τείας εὐτελείας ἔστιν. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐκ-
 αὐτοῦ καὶ διδανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τριφῶν· καί
 τοσ ἡ τριφὴ μαλακία τίς ἐστιν· ὅς ἐστι το ἱμάτιον, ἵνα
 μὴ τοσση τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰρεῖν λύπην, καὶ μινουμένη τοσ
 εὐτελείας οὐκ οἶται ἀβλίος εἶναι, ἀβλίῳ ὁμοῖος ὢν. ὁμοῖος
 ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἰ τις
 ἰσχυρῶν καὶ υπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λιγῶν
 παρμαστίῳ—ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικῶν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥστε ο
 Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχειν πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ

to men on the part of the ἀκρατής.
 The same pains due to the desire for
 excessive pleasures are not the only
 pains. There is a pain of hunger as
 well as a pain which arises from the
 unfulfilled desire of eating to excess.
 It is with this pain, accordingly,
 the κατερεῖν and μαλακία have to do.
 The ἐγκρατής is the man who gets the
 better of a desire for a positive excess
 of pleasure, the ἀκρατής resists the
 desire for the absence of a positive
 pain when it is right to do so. It is
 strong desire for the excess of a
 particular pleasant drink (καὶ γλυκὺ
 πᾶν, τοσ δὲ γλυκὺ that overcomes
 the ἀκρατής, while it is ἡ τεχνία
 ἀφ᾽ αὐτοῦ, as Aspasius rightly says, that
 proves too much for the μαλακός.

§ 6 ὁ δ' ἀλλήλων π. τ. λ. The
 object of this section is to show that
 τριφὴ is a form of μαλακία, contrary
 to the general opinion which represents
 it as something grand (κατασκευαῖον).

ὁμα το ἱμάτιον, 'lets his cloak
 be a recognized sign of τριφὴ.
 Philo. Nic. I 132 b, α' δ' αὖ τοσ
 εὐτελείας ὁμοῖος εἶναι τριφῶν καὶ
 τοσ ἱματίον ὁ Φιλόκτες π. τ. λ. Dem.
 L. § 361 κα τῇ ἀφ᾽ αὐτοῦ κατερεῖται

θυμάτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τῶν σφιν
 Academic points are accepted only
 so now for similar reasons.

§ 6 ὁμοῖος δ' ἔχει, i.e. the
 standard here too is that of a μαλακός.
 οὐ γὰρ εἰ τις π. τ. λ. The apostle
 does not begin with 1:40 b, 12:24 d
 π. τ. λ.

ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικῶν π. τ. λ. and
 introducing a parenthetical remark
 ἀλλὰ introducing the main statement,
 cf. 113, a. 114. The examples which
 follow are not examples of μαλακία,
 for the pains are such that a μαλακός
 would not resist them.

εἰ ἀντιτείνων, cf. 114, a.

ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης. The ex-
 amples of Philoctetes, Hector and Ulysses
 belonged to Aristotle's own circle,
 and it often referred to. Like other
 tragedians of his time, he came from
 the school of Isocrates, and a more
 characteristic was the method of the
 rhetorical method into tragedy. Cf.
 H. G. L. Tragic Drama pp. 424-5.
 The Alibi which tells us the
 breakdown of the text was given
 by the words ὁμοῖος τῷ ἐκ τῆς
 Cf. Nauck P. T. p. 803.

καὶ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδεν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαί- 20
 τον ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν,
 ὥστ' ἰνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἐμεταμέληται ἰνίατος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπειν
 ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μίσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύ-
 γων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἥτταν ἰλλὰ διὰ προ- 25
 3 αἵρεσιν. (τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ἡ μὲν αἴχεται διὰ τὴν 25
 ἡδονὴν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπι-
 θυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δοξείε χεί-
 ρων εἶναι εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα κρᾶττοι τι αἰσχροῦ,
 ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ
 εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει αὖν; διὸ ὁ ἀκό- 30
 λαστος χειρὸν τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς)—τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν
 4 μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ

καὶ διὰ προαίρεσιν. I read καὶ for
 ἐν with ἀκρασία. For the meaning of
 1102 a, 31 ἐστὶν ἵαν προαιρουμένης,
 αὖν προαιρουμένης δι' αὐτὰς.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This justifies
 the name ἀκόλαστος (i.e. not being able to).
 It is the presence of προαίρεσις which
 makes it not ἐμεταμέληται γὰρ τῇ προαίρεσει
 1150 b, 30.

§ 2. τῶν δὲ μὴ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.
 The passage leaves us not quite sure of
 the argument, but that is no reason
 for its rejection. It is a reminder of
 what we have been told of the distinc-
 tion between the ἀκόλαστος and the
 ἀκρατής, such a reminder as often
 occurs in lectures. It is suggested
 here by the remark ὥστ' ἀνίσταται
 which has called to mind the aporia
 1146 a, 31 which is now solved.

διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. sc. αὖν προαι-
 ρουμένων καὶ οὐ μὴ. The difference is
 explained in παντὶ δ' ἂν δοξείε κ.τ.λ.
 αὖν το μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν. (1) above,
 1148 a, 17 κτλ.

αὖν μὴ ὀργιζόμενος. This suggests
 a sort of μελέσια θυμῶν (αὖν ὁμοιωμένη
 of course) καὶ τὸ εἶδος.

τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων, above 1150 a,
 19. τὸ μὲν, i.e. τὸ φεύγειν εἰς (μεταφύγειν)

λύπαι διὰ προαίρεσιν, δὲ δὲ, i.e. ὁ δὲ ἀκόλα-
 στος (ὡς μεταμέληται) φεύγει διὰ προαι-
 ρουμένης.

μαλακίας εἶδος. It is not μαλακία
 ἀπλῶς, for that is not διὰ προαίρεσιν,
 as we shall see. Strictly it is μαλακία
 καθ' ὁμοιωμένη.

§ 2. ἀνίσταται δὲ κ.τ.λ. To
 understand this section we must bear
 in mind that the ἀκρατής and ἀκρατος
 are ἐπὶ ἡδονῆς while the ἀσπρονικός
 and the μαλακός are ἐπὶ λύπας. It
 has been said that there is no value in
 the distinction drawn here between
 the ἀσπρονικός and the μαλακός, since
 to conquer pleasure (κρατῶν, νικῶν)
 is the same thing as to bear up against
 pain (ἀντέχων, μὴ ἡττάσθαι). But
 this criticism assumes that the pain
 which the ἀσπρονικός bears up against is
 identical with the pain of ἐπιθυμία felt
 by the ἀκρατής, and there is nothing
 to justify any such assumption. It is
 true that the pain felt by the ἀκόλαστος
 and the ἀκρατής is simply caused by
 the absence of the pleasure which
 they desire (τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή
 1148 b, 42), and we could not draw
 any valid distinction between the victo-
 ry over pleasure and the resistance

25 ἂν ἦδυν ἢ οὐτ' ἂν λιπηρύν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ἑξεῖς καὶ μελοχολικοὶ τὴν προπιτῇ ἀκρασίαν εἰσιν ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτήτα οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα εἰς ἀσμεύουσιν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι το ἀκολουθήτικοι εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

VIII. Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκολαυτος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη. οὐ μὲν 30 ταμελητικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατής μελητικὸς πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν οὕτω καὶ ἐχρ. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνίαςτος ὁ δ' ἰατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθήρια τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ἰδεῖν καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς ἡ δ' οὐ συνεχὴς 35 πυρηνία. καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κυκίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λαμβάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λαμβάνει. 1151· αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ἵπ' ἐλάττονος γὰρ παθεῖς ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπρὸ βούλονται ὥσπερ ἄτεροι· ὁμοῖος γὰρ

Γροθί. 963 a, 11 διὰ τὸ εἶς αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ὑπόλοιποι γαργαλίζει· ἢ ὅτι καὶ ὅτ' ἄλλου ἦντο εἰς προαιρέσει, μᾶλλον δ' ἂν μὴ ὁρῇ· ὥσθ' ἥιστα γαργαλισθήσεται ὅσοι μὴ λαμβάνω τοῦτο πᾶσι. The προπιτῇ are like those who are tickled unaware, if they had known the πᾶσι was coming it would not have affected them.

μελαγχολικός, 'excitable,' 'hot-headed.' According to early medical theory excitability of this kind was produced by the heating of the 'black bile.' The word μελαγχολία was quite common in the sense of 'to be crazy' (cf. Aristophanes, Birds 14, Plautus 13, 366, 903). Aristotle uses it in the popular sense. The theory of the 'four temperaments,' which makes its appearance first in Galen, in time gave the word a different meaning. Here it corresponds to the 'choleric' and 'sanguine' as opposed to the 'bilious' and 'phlegmatic.' We may gather the explanation of the προπιτῇ of μελαγχολικός from de Memor. 433 a, 19 γινώσκουσιν γὰρ φαντάσματα καὶ μάλιστα. Now-a-days we say

'nerveous,' but Aristotle had never heard of nerves.

VIII §1 Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν α + λ. We now pass from the first question περὶ τοῦ ὁ ἀκρατής, to the second question περὶ τοῦ ἐστατός (1151 a, 50). Here take this as the subject of the present chapter, it will be found that the organization of thought is sufficiently clear ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, 1150 a, 21.

ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, 1145 a, 31 ἀπὸ λαμβάνει, sc. τὸν ἔχοντα.

§ 2. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων, sc. τὸν ἀκρατῆς, to be supplied from ἀκρασία. The connection is quite straightforward word for the subject of the chapter is τὸν ἔχοντα ἀκρατεῖσθαι τιν.

οἱ ἐστατικοί, i.e. οἱ προπιτῇ, οἱ ἑξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοί. Cf. 1145 b 11 a.

οἱ μὴ ἐμμένοντες, i.e. οἱ ἀσθενεῖς, ἡττῶνται, sc. οἱ ἀσθενεῖς.

ὁμοῖος γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The ἀσθενεῖς then, possesses the characteristics of the ἀκρατής in the most distinct form and is the typical ἀκρατής. The προπιτῇ is not the ἀκρατής as we are studying just now.

ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ' ολίγου
 ἵνουν καὶ ἐλιέττορας ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτε μὲν οὖν κακία ἢ 5
 ἔκραςία οὐκ ἐστι, φανερόν (ἀλλὰ πῃ ἴσως). τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δι' κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐστίν. εὐ μὲν
 ἄλλ' ὁμοίον γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μι-
 λησίους "Μιλήσιοι ἀξίνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρώσω δ' οἷάπερ
 ἀξίνετοι," καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἀδικοὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικοῖσι δέ. 10
 ἱπεί δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεισθαι διώκειν
 τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωμα-
 τικὰς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷος
 διώκειν αὐτάς. ἐκείνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, οἷτος δὲ οὐ·

1151 a, 11. Cf. EF. 1227 b, 12 τοῦτων δὲ διορισμένων,
 λέγομεν πότερον ἢ ἀρετὴν ἐναμέτητον ποιᾷ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ
 τέλος ὀρθόν, οἷως ᾧτε οἱ ἐνεκα δεῖ προαίρεσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισι,
 τὸν λόγον. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο ἐγκράτεια· αὕτη γὰρ οἱ διαφθείρει τὸν
 λόγον. ἐστὶ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἑτέρα. λεκτέον ὅ ὕστερον περὶ
 αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὀρθόν τιμᾶν ἢ ἀρετὴν, τοῦτο
 αὐτῶν. ἢ μὲν <γὰρ> ἐγκράτεια τοιοῦτον, τῶν ἐπαινετῶν δ' ἢ
 ἐγκράτεια. λέγομεν δὲ προσηγορησάντες. ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν
 ὀρθόν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμετρίναι· ἐστὶ δὲ τὸν μὲν
 σκοπὸν ἡμαρτηθῆναι, τὸ δὲ πρὶν ἐκείνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς εἶναι, καὶ
 μηδέτερον. πότερον δ' ἢ ἀρετὴν ποιᾷ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν
 σκοπὸν; τίθεμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπὸν, διότι τοῦτου οὐκ ἐστὶ συλ-
 λογισμὸς οἷδε λογος· ἀλλὰ εἴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω. οὔτε
 γὰρ ἰατρὸς σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ μὴ, ἀλλ' εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μὴ. οὔτε
 ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ δεῖ εἰ ἔχει ἢ μὴ, ἀλλ' εἰ παλαῦσαι ἢ μὴ. ὁμοίως δ'
 οἷδ' ἄλλη οὐδὲμία περὶ τοῦ τελους· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἷς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ
 ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις.
 ἵππειδ' εἰ τὸδε ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοῦδε ὑπάρχειν εἰ ἐστὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ
 ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἐστὶ τὸ τρίγωνον δυο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοῦδε εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν

42. ἄλλα πῃ ἴσως, cf. κακία πῃς
 1149 b, 20. ἢ ὡς πῃ we must understand
 κακία ἢ πῃ ἴσως τὸ κακίον.

ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου. Bergk-
 Cramer p. 47.—

Καὶ τότε Δημοδοκοῦ· Μιλήσιοι ἀξίνετοι
 μὲν
 οὐκ εἰσίν· ὁρῶσω δ' οἷάπερ ἀξίνετοι.

84. ὁ μὲν, sc. ὁ ἀκρατής.

διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. It is his
 ἥθος that makes them his φαινόμενον
 σηθόν.

ἐκείνος μὲν οὖν, 'it is, on the
 contrary, the former that —.' The
 corrective particles μὲν οὖν make this
 as the direct answer to the ἀρετὰ

15 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μαχθρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ μὲν φθείρει ἢ δὲ σφίζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε ἐξ ἐκεί ὁ λόγος ἐδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικῇ

νοήσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἢ τῆς νοήσεως τελευτῇ. αὐτὸν πάσης ὁρθότητος ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μὴ ὁ λόγος, ἀπὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὅν ὁρθὸν εἶναι τὸ τέλος ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ πρὶν τὸ τέλος. τῶς ἔστι τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα. ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τοιοῦτο καὶ ἕνεκα τούτου οὐ μὲν οὐν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τῇ προαίρεσθαι οὐ ἕνεκα. ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις αὐτῆς αἰτίας ἀλλὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἵνα τὸ μὲν οὐν τοιούτων ταύτων ἀλλήλῃ δυνάμει, ὅσα ἕνεκα τοῖς τοῖς δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὁρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαίρεσεως ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαίρεσεως κίνησιν ποιεῖ τὰ τοῖτο ὅ ἐστι τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα πράττει, ἀλλ' οὐ τί πράττει. ὁμοίως ἐκ αὐτῆς καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐναντίων ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν. εἰ δὲ τις, ὅς αὐτῷ ἐν πράττειν μὲν τὰ καλὰ ἀπραγχεῖν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρά, τοιούτων ποιεῖ, ὅλῳ ὅτι οὐ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὥστ' ἀσχετὴ τὴν τε κακίαν ἐκουσίον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν· οὐδὲμία γὰρ εἰσάγει τὰ μαχθρὰ πράττειν. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ψεκτὸν ἢ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκαινετόν· τὰ γὰρ ἀκούσια αἰσχρὰ καὶ καλὰ οὐ ψεκτὰ οἷον τὰ ἀκούσια ἐπαινεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκούσια.

1151 a, 27. EE. 1227 a, 8 περὶ μὲν τοῖς τέλει οἷον βουλείᾳ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑποθέσεις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις.

We have only to change the acts of the *ἀπαρτή* and not his character. Therefore he can be cured.

ὥσπερ αἱ ὑποθέσεις, sc. ἀρχαί. The second interpretation suggested by Professor Stewart, though with some doubt, seems to be certainly right. An *ὁπότε* in mathematics is certainly the assumption of the thing to be proved or the thing to be done from which an analytical proof starts. Cf. 1112 b, 10 ἀπαρτή. . . ὥσπερ διδύκω and the note there. It should be added that Eudemus (loc. cit.) certainly took the words in

this sense, for he gives as an example *εἰ ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰ, ὅστις τοῦ εἶναι*. We have seen already that in the phrase *τὰς ὑποθέσεων εἶναι* (1144 a, 24) and *ἐκ ὑποθέσεων ἀναγω* (1139 b, 13 n.) the *ὑπόθεσις* is the Q. E. F. of the problem, which has to be analysed till we come to a construction which is in our power. Similarly in a theorem the *ὑπόθεσις* is the Q. E. D. assumed to be true and analysed till we come either to something already demonstrated or to an axiom, or to something contradictory of these ('stupid'), or

ἡ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. σωφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ
 5 τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκ-
 στατικός παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὴ πράττειν
 κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦ-
 τον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδυ-
 νὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων <ὢν> τοῦ
 ἀκαλλήστου, οὐδὲ φαύλος ὡς πλὴν· σφύζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, 25
 ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος ὁ ἐμμενετικός καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικός
 διὰ γε τὸ πάθος. φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία
 ἔξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.

IX. Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ καὶ
 ὁποιοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατής δὲ 30
 ὁ ὁποιοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ
 τῇ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ
 ἠγορήθη πρότερον· ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιοῦν,

which case the contrary story of the hypothesis is proved. This method was first formulated by Plato (Cantor, *Vorlesungen* I p. 189 sq.).

ὅστις δὲ ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. Professor Stewart thinks this sentence 'may be thought to point the other way,' i.e. to favour the interpretation of *υποθεσις* as equivalent to definitions and axioms. But the word ἀρχή, 'starting point,' is wide enough to cover the hypothesis of an analytical proof (cf. last note), and such an hypothesis is not based upon any 'ground' (λόγος). The figures into which the *διαγράμμα* has to be analysed are given by mathematical induction (cf. 1141 a, 28 sq.).

ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστή, grammar requires us to supply διδασκαλικὴ ἐρετὴ, but nothing more is really meant than *erba ferre*. There is nothing paradoxical in a saying like this, and the sentence does not fit as it is believed that *ἐθιστή ἀρετὴ* is *ἡ διδασκαλία*. As to φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ cf. 1144 b. 1 sqq. People are born with a tendency to aim at the right end, the right ἀρχή

nature in presents itself to them, but *ἐθισμένη* is required to fit ἀρετὴ in a certain ἦθος.

§ 8. ὅστις δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι δεῖν. This sums up admirably Aristotle's teaching as to the relation between ἦθος and διάνοια. It is ἦθος (τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι) that makes possible the *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν* of the ἀκόλαστοι. Then διάνοια formulates this as a λόγος *ἐν ἐκείνῳ, δεῖν τοιοῦτον εἶναι πάντοτε πράττειν* (cf. 1140 b, 18).

IX. § 2. Πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ. The basis of the dispute caused 1145 a, 16 sqq.

τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ κ.τ.λ. I have followed Bywater in adopting the reading of I.°. For another view see Stewart's note.

κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The ἐγκρατής may abide by a λόγος which as a matter of fact is false (ὡς συμβαίνει ψευδεῖ εἶναι) but only because he thinks it true. He abides by something which happens to be untrue but only because he thinks it leads to something which he is seeking κατ' αὐτό.

καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει
 35 ὁ μὲν ἐμένει ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμένει; εἰ γὰρ τις τοῦτι διὰ τοῦ
 1151^b αἰρίεται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἰρίεται,
 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν το
 καθ' αὐτό. ἅπτε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὅτι καὶ τὴν διέξῃ ἡ μὲν ἐμένει
 ὁ δ' ἐξίσταται ἀπλῶς δὲ [ὁ] τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες αἱ
 5 ἱμμεναιτικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσὶν, οὗς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἷον
 δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμεταπειστοί· οἱ ὁμοῖον μὲν τι ἔχουσιν
 τῷ ἡκράτει, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ ἔρρων
 τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δια
 πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει [ὁ ἡκράτης] ἰτι
 10 εὐπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἡκράτης· οἱ δὲ οὐχ ἰτα
 λήγουν, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοί
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. οἱ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες αἱ ἰδιογενήματα
 καὶ οἱ ἡμαθῆες καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογενήματα ἐν
 ἡδοῇ καὶ λυπῇ· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἐν μὴ μετα
 15 πείθονται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἐν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ἕστιν
 ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἡκράτει ἰάκασιν ἢ τῷ ἡ
 κράτει. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες αἱ τοῖς δεξασιν οὐκ ἐμένουσιν οἱ δὲ

εἰ γὰρ τις κτλ. Suppose, for
 instance, that a man thinks he ought
 to work a certain number of hours
 every day, which is really too much
 for him, as we to call him ἡκράτης
 for sticking to his resolution though
 the λόγος is false? The answer is in
 the affirmative; for the number of
 hours he works is merely a means to
 an end, and it is really the true λόγος
 of the end that he actually has καθ' αὐτό.

§ 3. ἰσχυρογνώμονας. The word
 does not occur in earlier literature.

ἐν εὐπειστος κτλ. You may
 change the views of the ἡκράτης, on
 occasion, by argument. It is desire
 that he cannot be changed by. On
 the contrary, it is just argument that
 has no effect on the obstinate; in de
 sires and pleasures they are much
 more susceptible.

§ 3. ἰδιογενήματα. Cf. Phrynichos

(com.) Μορμυρική 1, Ζῴῃ Τιμω
 ρισί 1 Ἀγέλαστο, ἀλλήλων δαυον
 μονα

οἱ ἡκράτοι. Cf. Khr. 1295 a, δα
 γὰρ ἡρμῶνι μάλα τὰ γυναικῶν ἐν
 βυδῶν ἀποφαινοῦται

ἄκυρα ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα. Cf.
 e.g. Dem. c. Arist. § 40 ἐμὲ
 ἐστὶ το σφῆμα πρὸς δὲ καὶ γὰρ
 ἐστὶ, ὁ νόμος δ' ἐπὶ τῷ κέντρῳ τῷ
 (the N) γ' εἶναι ψηφίσματα. In Ann. de
 d'Armen. p. 121 "et al. et al."

ὥστε μᾶλλον κτλ. (Obstinacy is
 rather a form of ἀκρασία than of ἡ
 ἐκείνη for the obstinate are those
 who cannot resist the desire for the
 pleasure of victory.

§ 4. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες κτλ. We have
 seen that there are cases of ἐκείνη
 which are not ἡκράτεια, we know
 that there are cases of τὸ μὴ ἐκείνη
 which are not ἀκρασία.

ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεο-
πτολεμος· καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οἶκ' ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλὴν· τὸ
γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἵ, ἐπέσθη δ' ἐκ τοῦ Ὀδυσ- 20
σέως ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονὴν τι πράττων οὐτ'
ἀκολαστος οὐτε φαῦλος οὐτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχυρίαν.

- 5 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἦττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σω-
ματικοῖς χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ ὁ [τοιούτου]
τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρα- 25
τὴς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ
τὸ ἴστων τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἑτερου με-
ταβάλλει. δεῖ δὲ εἶπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέ-
ρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἐξεῖς φαῦλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνον-
ται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ την ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγίαις εἶναι 30
φανερὰν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον
ὅτι εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. ἐπεὶ δὲ
καθ' ὁμοιοτητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ
σωφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἡκολούθηκεν· ὁ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατής
οἷος μᾶλλον παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς 35
ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οἶκ' ἔχων 1152·
φαῦλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιούτος οἷος μὴ ἡδισθαι
παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος ἡδισθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀγασθαι.
ὁμοιοὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής καὶ ἀκίλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες,
ἀμφοτέροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδὲ διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ 5
οἰόμενος εἶναι, ὁ δ' οἶκ' οἰόμενος. X. οὐδ' ἄμα φρόνιμον καὶ

εἰδέναι δι' ἡδονὴν. We know nat-
urally that to the good man as well as
evils are ἡδοναὶ καθ' αἰσάν (1099 a,
704q.); we shall see presently in what
sense the good man may be said to
act δι' ἡδονήν.

§ 5. ὁ [τοιούτου] τούτου. On the
reading see Hywater, *Conte* p. 37.
The discussion of the question whether
ἐχων, even as usual with an exami-
nation of the relation between the
mean and the extremes τὰς ἀπο-
κρίσεις, cf. 1104 b, 11 n.

διὰ το μᾶλλον τι διὰ το ἦττον τι,
sc. τοῦ δέχεται τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρειν.

This new type of character is the man
who knows that he ought to take more
bodily pleasures, but whose desires
are not strong enough. Of course
οὐδὲ δι' ἑτερον is the regular Attic
phrase for δι' αἰσχυρίαν.

διὰ τὸ την ἑτέραν κ.τ.λ. For this
sutra, cf. 1109 a, 10 n.

§ 6. ἡκολούθηκεν, 't is a natural
consequence that we speak of the
ἐγκρατεια if the σώφρων. This is the
basis of the aporia raised by the fact
that some use the terms συγχερούμενοι
(1145 b, 16).

X. § 2. οὐδ' ἄμα κ.τ.λ. The

ἀκρατῇ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἥθος διδύκεται ὦν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἶδέναι μοι 3 φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικὸς
 10 —τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῇ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσι εἰσὶν φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναι τινες ἀκρατεῖς δε. διὰ τὸ τὴν εἰ-
 νότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημίνον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς
 πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἰγγίσι εἶναι, ἡδ-
 15 ρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθυδὼν ἢ οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν ἴσ-
 ταν γὰρ τίνα εἰδὼς καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ποιητὸς δ' οὐ·
 ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὡσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικοι·
 οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικός οἷε ἂν
 βουλευσῆται, ὁ δὲ μεταγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὄλως. καὶ
 20 ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἢ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἡπιστα τὰ
 δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρήτας δὲ οὐδέε, ὥσπερ
 Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν

ἢ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ἢ νύμων οὐδὲν μέλει.

ὁ δὲ ποιητὸς χρωμένη μὲν τοῖς νόμοις ποιητοῖς δὲ χρωμένη 4
 25 ἔστι δ' ἀκрасία καὶ ἡγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τὴν τῷ

loss of the *ἀκρατία* caused by some people using the word *φρόνιμος* of the *ἀκρατῆς* (i. 48 a. 171).

βέβαιον, i. 44 b. 30.

§ 2. τῷ πρακτικῷ, sc. εἶναι.

τὸν δὲ δεινὸν κ.τ.λ. Cf. i. 144 a. 13 149. This is one of Aristotle's long parentheses. And yet the parenthesis contains the locus.

κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον 'in definition.' The difference is that the one is a piece of *δύναμις* while the other implies *προαίρεσις*. If we desire the *φρόνιμοι* in the same way as the *δίκαιοι*, we lay ourselves open to the *ἐστραπὴ*, cf. τῶν δὲ αὐτῶ ἀρετῶν οἷε δύναμις ἔθηκεν Top. 126 b. 41. For *δύναμις* and *προαίρεσις* cf. i. 127 b. 14 n.

§ 2. οὐδὲ δε κ.τ.λ., closely with ο' ἀκρατῇ οὐ πρακτικῷ above.

ἐκὼν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has already refused to allow that τὰ δε' εἰ-

θεύματα ἀεὶ αἰσθητά.

ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπαινετὴ [1] fictions have been made about this but really there is none, for *προαίρεσις* does not exist only as the act of choice, but is often used in the sense of *ἡγετοπροαίρεσις*. Now in this sense, the *προαίρεσις* of the *ἀκρατῆς* is good; but it is prevented from becoming an efficient cause of action by the fact that he is always in the time *κωλύει* than *προαίρεσις*.

οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος (i. 144 a. 30) ὁ μὲν γὰρ κ. δ. καθυδὼν ὁ δὲ μεταγχολικός, sc. ο' *προαίρεσις*.

χρήτας δὲ οὐδέε. This is a *παρρησία* compliant in the comic parts and Demosthenes. Cf. i. 144 b. 17 n.

Ἀναξανδρίδης is quoted in § 4. τῆς τῶν πολλῶν *ἔρις* cf. i. 113 b. 23 n.

πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἦττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. εὐστατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν ἦν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύοντες τῶν βουλευσμένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δὲ ἐθισμού ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾶον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινήσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος το χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει τοικεον, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐδήνης λέγει

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελίτην ζῆναί, φίλε, καὶ δὴ ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

5 τί μὲν οὖν ἴσθιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὐταὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται.

XI. Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρήσαι τοῦ τὴν πολυ- 1152^b
τικὴν φιλοσοφούντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων,
πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς
2 λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ
αὐτῶν· τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ 5
λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἐθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλείστοι

τῶν φυσικῶν, i.e. τῶν φύσεω, which
ἐκμασσεύεται τοιαύτα.

ἡ φύσις τοικεον, cf. de Mem. 482a,
ἡ φύσις γὰρ φυσικὴ ἡδονὰς ἐθέλει, 'nature
is a kind of nature'.

Εὐδήνης. Cf. Bergk-Crusius p. 134.

XI. § 1. Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης. Eudemus regarded a discussion of pleasure as a necessary supplement to the discussion of *akrasia* as proved by I.E. 1131 b, 1 ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἵσταται διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς λεγόμενοις ὑστερον περὶ ἀκρατίας καὶ ἀκρασίας. From this it has been inferred that the present book is 'Eudemian,' but it may also be inferred that Eudemus followed Aristotle's order of treatment. And the latter inference is far more probable, for, as we shall see, the views criticised are distinctly those of *Epicharmus*, which must have lost some of their 'actuality' by the time of Eudemus. The connection of thought I take to be this: We have found that *akrasia*

and *akolasia* are bad, and that they are due to desire for pleasure. And we to say, then, that pleasure is bad?

τοῦ φιλοσοφούντος. The discussion opens, however, with a general statement that the political philosopher must consider pleasure and pain. This is quite in Aristotle's way. He is always anxious to show that he is keeping in view the practical end of this *akrasia*, and discussions which are necessary for other reasons are introduced by a series of remarks as to their practical bearing on statesmanship p. A notable instance is the beginning of Book III (where see notes).

ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς. If we say a thing is 'good' *simpliciter*, we mean good in relation to the chief end. If we mean 'good' for anything else, we must 'add' what it is good for. It is then ἀγαθὸν κατὰ πρόθεσιν.

§ 2. Ἰδμεν. 1104 b, 3 αἴφ.

μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναι φασιν· διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ἡγομάκασιν
ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδενμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι.
ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὐτό οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι
10 ταῦτόν ἀγαθόν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔτιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ
πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν
ὁμῶν μὴ εἰδελχίσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. ὅλας μὲν οὖν
οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητῆ

ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἂν εἴποι
μὰ χαίροντα (Δαρ. 123, 7). It is
quite possible that Aristotle had this
etymology in his mind; for it is quite
in his style (cf. 131 B, 32, 1140 B,
11, 1161, loc. cit. Etymologica).

§ 3. τοῖς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is not the Cyprian view as is commonly said. In spite of the catchword μακάριον μάλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖνον (RP 217 a), Antiphanes said ἡδονὰς τὰς μὲν τὰς πόσεως διακρίνειν ἀλλ' ὡς τὰς προ τῶν πόσεως, and τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησὶνεν ἀποδείκναι τὴν ἡμετέραν (Athen. 51.3). He would therefore admit that ἡδονή might be mentally good. It was Democritus who held field pleasure and gain to be two evils opposed to each other and to the good (1104 b, 13 a). Aulus Gellius ix, § 4 προσερχομαι νεύουσαι omnia academia voracitatem et dolorem, deo mala esse dicunt opposita inter se.

τοὺς δ' ἄνθρωποι κ.τ.λ. This second *sympōsion* seems to be meant for that of Plato in the *Phaedrus*, where 'pure' or 'unmixed' pleasures, i.e. pleasures not involving pain, are distinguished from 'mixed' or 'impure' pleasures.

el kai wāron k'ēl. This is the conclusion to which Aristotle himself comes in Book X, and is in agreement with the conclusion of the *Philebos*. Cf. 1172 a. 28 seq.

§ 4. *ὁλας μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* Six arguments (each introduced as usual, by *ἔτι*) for the *first* view, that no pleasure is good. The arguments

cannot be those of Antithesis, for they are Positive in character and presuppose the Thesis. On the other hand they are not the arguments of the Thesis itself. Therefore they must be the arguments of a fourth of Plato.

γένεσις οὐ φέρει αἰσθητήν. a full
 process is a natural state. The subject
 conjecture (conjectura) habet a
 phibition, but is a natural condition
 (phibition), in enim habet volun-
 tatum et non volun- ita, sed volun-
 tatem in ma a Platone (The-
 ory of natural) essent y in
 the work. So too Cassius is al-
 probability the subject, and perhaps
 the actual subject of the subject in
 here refer to co. The did not
 regard all pleasures as good, but
 only the 'impure or mixed' on
 the other hand the distinction is
 evidently based on the distinction be-
 tween of 'good' and 'bad'. We find the
 definition given as well as the
 definition purposes in the 10th to 11
 ἀποκρίσεις δ' ἡν ἡσυχία καὶ ἡ
 ἀνθρώπων τὰς τῶν ψυχῶν οὐκ ἀποκρίσεις
 ἀποκρίσεις καὶ αἰσθητὴς ἐν τῇ ἀποκρίσει
 φέρει. So too Plato. But in 11 φέρει
 τὰς αἰσθητὴς οὐδὲν ἡν ἡσυχία, καὶ ἡ
 αἰσθητὴ.

αὐτὸ φησιν. The use of φησιν in the
phrase οὐ "οὐτως ἀλλὰ" is found in
Dionysius, L. L. Gen. 1. 1. 21
(Kp. 185 a, Στοιχειώτης τῶν λέξε-
ων φησιν ἕκαστος αἰὶς· τίλλας δὲ τοὺς
κατὰ φύσιν ἄνθρωπος ὅτι δὲ αὐτοὶ δὲ
συνὴ ὅπαντες ἀνθρώπων ὅμοιος ἔχου

οὐδεμία ἐξ γενέσεως συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεισιν, οὐκ οὐδεμία οὐκ οὐδὲ
 μῆσις αἰκία. ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος 15
 τὸ ἀλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ, ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῇ φρονεῖν αἱ
 ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσην μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, ὅταν τὴν τῶν ἀφροδι-
 σίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαι τι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη
 οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία
 5 καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πίαςας σπουδαίαια, το
 ὅτι αἰσι καὶ αἰσχυραὶ καὶ οὐνεκιδόμεναι, καὶ ἔτι βλαβεραὶ·

οὐδεμία γένεσις συγγενὴς κ.τ.λ. This argument is taken from Plato with just such modifications of terminology as we should expect from a Peripatetic. Cf. Philch. 33 c ἀρα παρ' ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀπαύδαται καὶ αἱ γυμναστικαὶ, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παύειν ἡδονῆς. 34 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἀπὸ γυμναστικῆς, ἐνέκα τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη γυμναστικῆς ἡδονῆς. 35 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἀπὸ γυμναστικῆς, ἐνέκα τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη γυμναστικῆς ἡδονῆς. 36 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἀπὸ γυμναστικῆς, ἐνέκα τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη γυμναστικῆς ἡδονῆς. 37 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἀπὸ γυμναστικῆς, ἐνέκα τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη γυμναστικῆς ἡδονῆς. 38 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἀπὸ γυμναστικῆς, ἐνέκα τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη γυμναστικῆς ἡδονῆς. 39 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἀπὸ γυμναστικῆς, ἐνέκα τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη γυμναστικῆς ἡδονῆς. 40 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἀπὸ γυμναστικῆς, ἐνέκα τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη γυμναστικῆς ἡδονῆς. 41 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἀπὸ γυμναστικῆς, ἐνέκα τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη γυμναστικῆς ἡδονῆς. 42 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἀπὸ γυμναστικῆς, ἐνέκα τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη γυμναστικῆς ἡδονῆς. 43 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἀπὸ γυμναστικῆς, ἐνέκα τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη γυμναστικῆς ἡδονῆς. 44 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἀπὸ 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οὐκ κ.τ.λ. Cf. the illustration in Philch. 34 c πότμος πλοῦτος καὶ πτωχὸς ὅσον φησὶ γυμναστικῆς μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῦτος ὅσον πτωχὸς.

ἔτι ὁ σώφρων κ.τ.λ. This version of the argument has already been shown to be highly probable (1104 b 24 n), and, if he did, the necessity for discussing his view of pleasure at the present stage becomes apparent.

ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος κ.τ.λ. Cf. Clem. Strom. 100: αὐτὸς Στωικὸν φησὶ σπουδαίον τὸ ἐκλεγεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν, [Plato] Def. 412 c αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀφροδιστικὸς ἐκλεγεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν.

ἔτι ἐμπόδιον κ.τ.λ. This really comes from Plato, Phil. 64 a τί δὲ δὴ πᾶσι αὐτοῖς τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρετὴν, πᾶσι δὲ ἐμπόδιον τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῆς, κ.τ.λ. 70 c (just after ἐμπόδιον τοῦ σώματος τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρετῆς) καὶ οὐκ οὐδὲν αὐτὸς εἰδωλὸν

παρὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ φρονήσεως ἀρετῆς πολλὴν, ὥστε τοῦ σώματος ὡς ἀληθὴς τῶν αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀρετῆς συγγενῆς, οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς. The similarity of language is too striking to be accidental, and yet in the Phaedo it is not specially pleasant that is ἐμπόδιον τῆς φρονήσεως, but the body. The natural inference is that a follower of Plato made use of the Phaedo in drawing an indignant argument against pleasure.

ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ. This is just as clearly based on the Gorgias 492 b 19 ff., where rhetoric and other arts which aim at τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῆς are declared not to be arts, but merely ἐμπόδια τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῆς καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀρετῆς. Here again a Platonic argument which has a different purpose to Plato, is used as part of an indictment against pleasure.

ἔτι παιδία κ.τ.λ. Here again we may compare Gorgias 464 d 10 ff. εἰ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐκλεγεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀρετῆς, οὐκ οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς. The general indictment then, which we get from these ex arguments is that they are Platonic materials worked up into an indictment against pleasure, and some of the arguments seem safely attributable to Peripatetics.

§ 8. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πίαςας κ.τ.λ. An argument for the second inference.

νοσώδη γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων. ὅτι δ' οἷα ἄριστον ἡδέον, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λογόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

- 25 XII. Ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνειε διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἔξεις ἀκολουθήσουσι, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς φαῖλαι
30 τινὲ δ' οὐ ἀλλ' αἶρεται τῷδε, εἶναι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὶ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον αἶρεται, <ἀπλῶς> δ' οὐ· αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἐνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τὰς καμνύοντων. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὰ δ' ἔξις κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστάσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἔξιν ἡδέειν

ὅτι δ' οἷα ἄριστον κ.τ.λ. An argument for the *third* *hypothesis*. These two are dismissed shortly; for they do not immediately concern us at present. Our task now is to examine the thesis that all pleasures had *per se*.

XII. § 1. Ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ. We have now three *hypotheses* to the first argument, οὐδὲν γένεσις συγγενὴ τοῖς τέλει. As usual, the first two are mainly dialectical, but lead up to the third, which is the real *locus*.

μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον This is added for dialectical purposes. If the argument fails even to disprove that pleasure is the best, it fails a *prima* to disprove that it is good. This point is taken up 1153 b, 7 sqq., and is the real reason why the *third* *hypothesis* is mentioned at all.

πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ. The position that no pleasure is good because it is a *γένεσις* and not a *τέλος* is first attacked by the *repetitio* of τὰ πλεοναχῶν λογόμενα. The word 'good' is ambiguous and therefore, even if we are justified in saying 'no pleasure is good' in one sense of the word, we may be wrong if we take the other sense of it. It may be true that no

pleasure is *ἀπλῶς* *εἰρηδόν*, but it does not follow that no pleasure is *ἀγαθόν* *τινί*, and even pleasures which are not *ἀγαθόν* *τινί* may possibly be *ἀγαθόν* *ποτὶ*.

ἀκολουθήσουσιν, 'it will follow that they also are called good in an ambiguous sense.' If a term is ambiguous, it will be predicated ambiguously of every subject. Good is ambiguous, so therefore will 'good ἔξις' and 'good γένεσις' be.

αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί κ.τ.λ. This is a different point. Certain pleasures are *φύσει* *ἀσθητά* which are obviously not good are not pleasures at all, though τῷδε (τῷ *κατασκευῇ*) and ποτὶ (for *ταῖς* *νόσοις*) they may appear to be so.

§ 2. ὅτι εἶναι κ.τ.λ. This argument is not so dialectical as the last. It depends upon the view of the good as an *ἐνέργεια* as opposed to the definition of it by the Academy as a *ἔξω* (i.e. *οὐδὲν* *ὄν*). Besides the *ἔξω* of *πίστις* which is *μετὰ γένεσις* *ἐκείνη* *αὐτῆς* there is another, namely *ἐνέργεια*, which implies that the *ἔξω* is complete.

κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κ.τ.λ. The pleasures which Speusippus takes as typical are only pleasant *per accidens*.

αἰσιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου 35
 ἔξω· καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν
 ἡδοναί. οἷον ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν [ἐνέργεια], τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδοῦς 1153·
 οὐδ' οὐκ. σημεῖν δ' ὅτι οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ἡδονῇ χαίρουσιν ἀναπληρου-
 μένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας
 μὲν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἡδέσι, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντιοῖς·
 καὶ γὰρ ὀφείσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ 5
 οὐδ' ἀπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὥς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς 3
 3 ληλα διέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπο τούτων. ἔτι οὐκ
 ἀνάγκη ἑτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασὶ
 τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως. οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν εἶδε μετὰ γενέ- 10
 σεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνεργεῖαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινόμενον συμ-
 βαίνεισιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένον· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἑτερόν τι,
 ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελείωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ

αἱ καθεστῶσαι. This term was used by Speusippus (Clem. Strom. loc. cit. τὸ δὲ καταστάσεις ὁρεῖν ἔχειν) and he took it from Plato, cf. *Phileas*, 42 d αἱ δὲ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν φύσει βέλτερον εἶναι τὰς τῶν καταστάσεων ἡδονῶν ἀναδίδουσα τὰς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

τῇ ὑπολοίπου ζωῇ καὶ φύσει (i.e. φυσικῇ ἔχειν, 'the normal state which remains unimpaired.' The best commentary is the *glossa* του ἑωυμ-
 ρετου ἱεροῦ 1154 b. 18. The desires which are gratified by the pleasure of restoration to a normal state are the desires of as much of us as has remained normal.

ὅσα καὶ, 'for that matter,' 'for the matter of that.' We shall see that there are pleasures which are independent of desire and do not therefore imply pain or a disturbance of the normal state.

ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν, i.e. ἡδονή. K² has ὁ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργεια and L² αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι. But Aspasius says οἷον αἱ θεωρεῖται (i.e. ἡδοναί).

3 δ. ἐτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ. The third and decisive *ἐνστάσις*. We must substitute ἐνέργεια for κατὰ.

We need not discuss whether this is or is not 'inconsistent' with Book X, where the ἡδονή is distinguished from the ἐνέργεια which it accompanies. Aristotle is dealing here with the argument of Speusippus, and he only modifies his statement so far as is necessary for his immediate purpose.

ἑτερόν τι βέλτιον, i.e. τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν φύσιν ἔχει.

τὸ τέλος i.e. βέλτιον εἶναι.

οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, e.g. αἱ θεωρητικαί. Aristotle does not deny that some pleasures are accompanied by a γένεσις, though he does deny that any pleasure is a γένεσις.

χρωμένον, i.e. ἡμῶν. We have seen that χρήσις (opp. ἔστι) is equivalent to ἐνέργεια (cf. 1098 b, 32 n), and that it was an Academic term.

τῶν ἀγομένων, i.e. τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν ἀγομένων, 'the pleasures of those who are being led etc.'

τὴν τελείωσιν...τῆς φύσεως. Here again we have the terminology of Speusippus. Cf. Clem. Strom. loc. cit.) ἔστι τέλος ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν.

οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν,
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λικτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως,
 15 ἂντι δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τισιν
 εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἰοίται
 εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον. τὸ δ' εἶναι φαῦλας ὅτι νοσηδὴ εἶναι
 ἡδύα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγίειν ἔστι φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν.
 ταύτην οὖν φαῖλα ἀμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατὰ γὰρ ταῦτα,
 20 ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θωπεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίαν. ἐμποδίζει
 δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἕξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἢ ἀφ' ἑκάστης ἡδοῇ, ἀλλ'

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λικτέον. The reasons for altering the genus in the definition of *hēdonē* have been given in §4. We expect, of course, that this will involve a change in the differential, for there is no reason to suppose that the differential of the genus *ἐνέργεια* will be the same as (some of) the genus *γένεσις*. No reason, however, is given for the choice of the particular differential *ἀνεμπόδιστος*. The word only occurs elsewhere in Pol. 1295a, 32 *ei γὰρ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς ἡδοναῖς εἶναι τὸ τὸν εὐδαιμονία βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον*. Now as Stewart points out, *ἀνεμπόδιστος* here is equivalent to *τελείον*, and *τελεία* and *ἀτελής* are often used as differentiae of *ἐνέργεια*. This must have been in Aristotle's mind, but the full meaning of the teleiotes of an *ἐνέργεια* is not worked out till Book X.

§6. *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* This is added to show what a very ambiguous thing the *γένεσις* argument is. Some, and (I grant is right in thinking the Cyrenaics are meant), just the very thinkers from whom Plato took the view that *ἡδονή* is a *γένεσις*, had asserted it to be a *γένεσις* just because it was good. The reference of this to the Cyrenaics seems to me certain (cf. also Zeller, *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil.* I, 176). It is in Plato's ironical way to take his argument against pleasure from the hedonist Antisthenes, and it is characteristic of Aristotle to insist on the

equivocal nature of the argument. According to the Cyrenaics the good was to be found only in the feeling of the moment, and feeling is necessarily into consciousness (*αἰσθάνει ἐκ αἰσθήσεως ἀσθητόμενη*). Since, then, pleasure is the good it must be a *αἰσθησις*. But pain is also a *αἰσθησις*, and pleasure must be what the Cyrenaics called the *ἡδύα αἰσθησις* and is impaired by *λεῖψις* (*ἐμψυγὲς τῆς οὐσίας ἀσθενείας*). In Plato's *Republic* it is *αἰσθησις ἐκ φύσεως* or *αἰσθησις ἐκ οὐσίας*, by the way, of the (Megarian) distinction between *γένεσις* and *οὐσία*. It is therefore quite correct to say that the Cyrenaics held pleasure to be a *γένεσις* just because it was the good. Aristotle points out that what they were taking to caritas was that it is an *ἐνέργεια*. It is worth noting that *Stenographia* had written against Antisthenes (cf. D. L. iv, 4) *εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν δὲ εὐαγγέλιον ἐμπεριέχεται καὶ διαλογεῖται πλεονεξία, ἐκ οὗ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν Κυρηναῖον*.

§ 7. *τὸ δ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ.* The answer to the fourth argument, preceded by a remark of even wider application.

τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. 'in the same as (to say that wise men's things are bad) because (for) some wise men's things stand in the way of making money.'

κατὰ γὰρ ταῦτα, 'for does not prove them bad in themselves.'

§ 8. *φρονήσει ἕκ.* This is used in the sense given

τρια, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μαρθάνειν μᾶλλον
τοι θεωρεῖν καὶ μαρθάνειν. τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι
δεινὴν μηδεμίαν εἰλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀλ-
ργείας εὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς δυνάμεως· 25
καὶ ἡ μυρευσικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδο-
ναι τὸ δὲ τὸν σὺφφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον
τον ἀλιπτον βίου, καὶ τὰ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώ-
αὐτῷ λίσσεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ
καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας 30
θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυσίαν
μοι, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης, καὶ τὰς σωμα-
τοιαῦται γὰρ αἴται), καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ'
τόλαστος ἀκολαστος διὸ ὁ σὺφφρων φεύγει ταύτας,
ἐν ἡδοναί καὶ σὺφφρονος. XIII. ἀλλὰ μὲν ὅτι καὶ 1153^b
κακὸν ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς
δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστικῇ, τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον

y the Academy, Writing n
κων Aristotle would have
1 σφίλῃ ενεργείᾳ

τὸ δὲ τέχνης κ.τ.λ. The
is the 374 argument. No
but an ἐνέργεια but only a
The art of medicine makes
le to heal, but it does not
re act of healing. For that
above is required. Cf. MM.
1 οὐδέ γὰρ ἀλλῇ ἐπιστήμῃ
1 χρῆσιν παραδίδωσι ἀλλὰ
1 the relation of θεωρεῖν
sis in art, cf. 1127 b, 14 n
recurrent τὰ καὶ in dialectical
h, which this is shown to be
τὸν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν (cf.
12 n.

ε.τ.λ. Aristotle too cement-
passage in the *Enigmas*. Cf
12 n.

τὸ δὲ τὸν σὺφφρονα κ.τ.λ.
is raised by the *enigma*, *Enigmas*
arguments are all solved by
them, namely our distinction
treasures good in themselves

and treasures which are not so. It is
the excess of the latter alone to which
the statements in question really
apply.

εἴρηται above 1148 a 23-19

XIII § 1. ἀλλὰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. The
main position of *Spens prius* is now
attacked from the *τόσοι* of *ἐναντίον*.
The position is thus stated in Aulus
Gellius ix, 2 'Spens prius voluptatem
et dolorem duo maxime opposita
inter se, hinc autem ex eo quod
utimur incipimus fore.' It is ad-
mitted then, that pain is an evil.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ. All pain
is ἀπλῶς κακόν, though some pain may
be ἀγαθόν τι, e.g. the pain of a
surgical operation. Even that, how-
ever, though incidentally good, is bad
τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστικῇ (because), i.e. κατὰ
συμβέβηκεν

τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ κ.τ.λ. The argument
is based on the rule given in Top.
123 b, 5 ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον εἶναι
ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει, ὥστε ὃ ἐναντίον
τε τῷ γένει. Now κακόν is a genus,

ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. αἰσώκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν
 ὡς ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ Σπενσιππος ἔλεγε, οὐ συμβαίνει ὁ
 λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μείζον τῷ ἐλάττω καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· εἰ
 γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

Τάριστον τ' οὐδὲν πωλεῖ ἡδονὴν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἐστὶ
 φαῖλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνέων φαῖλαι

and it has a genus opposite to it, namely ἀγαθόν (see next note), therefore the opposite of every εἶδος τι will be ἀγαθόν τι.

ἢ φευκτόν τι κ.τ.λ. It is necessary to add this, for of course pain, pleasure and pain are opposite to εὖ and κακόν (see next note), but this means merely that ἢ πάθη they are opposed to ἀνάσσεια.

ὡς γὰρ Σπενσιππος ἔλεγε κ.τ.λ. This locus, though without the name of Speusippus, is more fully stated in Book X (1173 a, 6 sq.).

ὥσπερ τὸ μείζον κ.τ.λ. This illustration is inapplicable because τὸ μείζον, τὸ ἴσον and τὸ ἐλάττω are not instances of ἀνάσσεια in the strict sense. They are not contraries, but 'relative opposites' (ἀντιπαρασέμενα ὡς τὰ πρὸς αἰ), i.e. αὐτὰ ὅπερ εἶσιν ἐτέρων λέγεται (Cat. 6 a, 36). Thus τὸ μείζον is μείζον τοῦ ἐλάττωτος and τὸ ἐλάττω is ἐλάττω τοῦ μείζονος, and it is only in that sense that they are opposites. The opposition of the greater or less to the equal in of another kind still. Together they make up τὸ ἄνωγον and are opposed as εἶς and ἐτέρας (on the whole subject, see Met. 2, 5). It is in this way that badness is opposed to badness and εὖ to goodness (cf. 1108 b, 31 n.), but pointing to cases like this does not get us out of the difficulty, for they do not show that the same thing can have more than one opposite κατὰ τὰς αἰτίας, i.e. ἢ φευκτόν τι ἢ κακόν as in the present case.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη κ.τ.λ. To make his locus complete, he would have to say that τὸ κακόν was predicated of

pleasure (cf. Cat. 10 a, 31 ὅτι τὸ εἶδος τι δ' 1140 a, 7 n.), i.e. that it was εἶδος τι. But pleasure cannot be in essential opposition to the good unless it is either (1) τὸ εἶδος ὅτι γένος, i.e. τὸ εἶδος ὅτι γένος, or (2) αὐτὸ γένος. The second possibility is alone in question here, and unless pleasure is a species of τὸ κακόν it cannot be the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν. But Speusippus did not say this, for he would then have to say also that pain is δεινὸν ἀγαθόν τι. Further Speusippus himself gave γένος as the genus of pleasure and the same species cannot be in two genera neither of which contains it contained in the other (cf. 1140 a, 4 n.). To make εἶδος the genus either of pleasure or pain would be to take the διαφορά for the γένος.

§ 2. Τάριστον τ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ. For the reading cf. Envy, Contr. p. 108. This is an argument *a fortiori* and is strictly *ad hominem*. So far from the definition of pleasure as a γένος proving that it is not good, it has even to prove that it is not the highest good. Indeed if we substitute, as we must, ἀνέργεια for γένος, it will be hard to resist the inference that pleasure is the highest good. We shall find Aristotle's own teaching about this in Book X. At present we are only getting rid of the idea, which the account given of pleasure might suggest, that all pleasure is bad.

ὥσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Just as there is nothing to prevent some form of knowledge being the highest good. The Platonists say that the highest

περιπίπτουτα εἶδα'μονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ἢ ἀγαθὸς ἢ
ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδέσθαι τῇ 4
τύχῃς δοκεῖ τισι ταῦτόν εἶναι ἢ εὐτυχία τῇ εἰδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ
οὔσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμποδίσκος ἐστίν, καὶ ἴσως
25 οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εἰδαιμονίαν
ὁ ὄρος αὐτῇ. καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώ- 5
πους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημεῖον τι τοῦ εἶναι πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτῇ.

φήμη δ' οὔτις πάντων ἀπόλλυται, ἢν τινα λαοὶ
πολλοὶ

30 ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσει οὐδ' ἔξῃς ἢ ἁρίστη οὐτ' ἐστίν 6
οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴ διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν
μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἡν οἴεται οὐδ' ἢ
ἂν φαίεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θίον·
ἀλλ' ἐλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαί
35 ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτάς τε
πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γροηζήμονας εἶναι
1154* ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν]

The τροχὸς is often mentioned in Aristophanes and the *Diataxa* ἐπὶ τὸν τροχὸν ἀσπρῆναι, i.e. τοῦ τροχοῦ σπριλνισθαι.

§ 4. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδέσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. note on ἴδω καὶ ἀπορίσαι κ.τ.λ. (1099 b, 3).

ὁ ὄρος αὐτῇς. On the meaning of ὄρος cf. a note 1138 b, 23 n. The standard by which we determine whether τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ really constitute εὐτυχία is their relation to εἰδαιμονία.

§ 5. καὶ τὸ διώκειν κ.τ.λ. This is the argument of Eudaimonia, as we shall see in Book X.

ως. Aristotle himself might allow that pleasure was τὸ ἄριστον πως. Exactly how, we shall see in Book X.

φήμη δ' οὔτις κ.τ.λ. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 763. The end of the second line is φησὶ οὖν θεὸς οὗ τίς ἐστι καὶ αἰσθή. The verse expresses one of Aristotle's deepest convictions. Cf. 1098 b, 18.

§ 6. φύσει ἔξῃς ἁρίστη. (Cf. note that these are treated as terms of art as they are in *Anal. post.* 1004^a 20.)

ἔχει τι θίον. This is a *harmful* idea. Cf. 1121^a 30 b 10 καὶ ἐν τῷ εὐσταχείῳ θένει καὶ τῷ κακῷ (cf. also below 1123 a, 4).

τὴν κληρονομίαν. On the new phras here implied cf. 1124 b, 17 αὐτὴν παραβάλλειν. This verb usually means 'to compare', but here it means 'to have to', 'to have to go along with'. Usually pleasure acts as the point in which most men steer.

§ 7. φανερόν δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The main point of this argument is as follows. It is admitted that εἰδαιμονία (joy is pleasant), but pleasure is not good, it is not necessary part of εὐδαιμονία. It is also admitted that the wise men were divine, i.e. that he enjoys εὐδαιμονία. If pleasure is not good, pain is not bad, so why should he then be?

καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὴν εὐδαιμόνια -
 γὰρ ἔνικα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν; ἀλλὰ
 πηρὶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν. οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὐτ' ἀγαθόν ἡ
 εἴπερ μὴδ' ἡδυνή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οἶδε δὲ ὁ
 ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι

V. Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον
 ἔχουσιν ὅτι ἐνικαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ
 ἄλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἧς ὁ ἀκόλαστος, διὰ τί 10
 ἐναντίας λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον.
 ὁ ἀγαθὸν αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν
 ἢ μέχρι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔξωθεν καὶ κινήσεων
 ἢ ἔστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή. οἶδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων
 , καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν 15
 ἡ, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἔστιν.

ἐνέργεια, sc. ἡ ἀνεκτόπιστοι.
 Is are explanatory of ἡδονή.

γὰρ ἀγαθόν. I take these
 as rhetorical. If pleasure
 καὶ, what good will it be to
 mortal? Then with ἐνδέχεται
 must supply τὴν εὐδαιμόνια.

§ 1. Περὶ δὲ τῆς κ.τ.λ. We
 as to the view that, though
 pleasures are good (the 'un-
 pleasures'), yet most (i.e. the
 or 'necessary' pleasures) are
 ab. 10]

ὁ δὲ κ.τ.λ., closely with
 for see Stewart's note).
 do say that bodily pleasures
 pleasures must explain the
 their opposite pains are bad.
 pleasure of eating is bad as
 it can we account for hunger
 § 10)?

γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. Cf.
 viii.

φ. ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ. Two λόγους
 cited, 1) that the opposition
 bodily pains and bodily
 may be merely that of
 and κατάφασα, in which

enough we may call bodily pleasures
 'good' in the sense of 'not bad,' and
 (2) that bodily pleasures are *positively*
 good up to a certain point, and only
 become bad beyond that point. The
 second alternative is as usual the one
 that Aristotle accepts; but the first
 contributes an important element to
 the solution.

τῶν ἔξωθεν καὶ κινήσεων. The
 terminology is Academic, but Ari-
 stotle's meaning is clear. No *ἔξωθεν*
 pleasures can admit of excess:
 for it is something τέλειον. There
 cannot be excess, mean and defect in
 the mean itself (1107a, 30-1107b, 1). From
 this it follows that no pleasures which
 belong to such a *ἔξωθεν*, i.e. the *ἐνέργειαι*
 which are ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξωθεν, can admit of
 excess either. We cannot exceed
 what is good in performing e.g. just
 acts, and therefore the pleasure of
 performing just acts cannot be ex-
 cessive. We can eat too much, and
 therefore the pleasure of eating may
 be excessive.

ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν... ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.
 'It is not the pursuit of necessary

ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίαις· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὄψοι
καὶ οἴροις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς δεῖ. ἐναντίας ὁ
ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅταν
20 οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἡ τῷ δυνάσκει
τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τάληθές εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον
τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν—
ὅταν γὰρ εὐλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθές οὐκ ὄν
25 ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον—ἵνα λεκτικόν
διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ ἀρετώτεραι. πρῶτον 4

pleasures that makes a bad man, but the pursuit of them in excess.

ἐναντίας δ' ἐπὶ τῇ λύπῃ κ.τ.λ.

This important doctrine is stated very briefly here, but its real meaning comes out more and more in the sequel. The opposite of excessive bodily pleasure is not positive pain, but merely the negative pain of the absence of that excess (τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ 1118b, 32), which is not pain at all to any one else. We can now solve the difficulty about the opposition between bodily pleasure and bodily pain stated above (1154 a, 20) by the help of the two lessons there given. In the case of the normal man the pain which is opposite to the right amount of bodily pleasure is positively bad, and the pleasure is positively good. In the case of the bad man, the excess of positive pleasure which he seeks is positively bad, and the opposite pain which he shuns is only the negation of that pleasure and therefore not positively bad.

§ 3. Ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. There is a slight ambivalence in this sentence. The long parenthesis (εὐλόγον γὰρ μᾶλλον) breaks the construction, which is resumed by ὥστε λεκτικόν κ.τ.λ. 25. It does not precede.

οὐ μόνον δεῖ κ.τ.λ. The necessity of showing the cause of error is especially urgent for Aristotle in view

of the conviction which he has just expressed as to the value of pleasure (10 E. 116 b 30 εὖ καὶ εὐλογον οἶσθαι τοὺς πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν). Cf. Eucken, *Method der Ar. Forschung* p. 10.

ὥστε λεκτικόν κ.τ.λ. I take it that the ψεύδος of which we have to discover the αἴτιον must be the view that all pleasure is bad, and I think that this is borne out by the words. We have done for the present with the view that some pleasures are good while others are bad, and return to the main subject of discussion, namely the *deia* of *ὑπερμαρτυρία* that excessive pleasure is bad. Now we have seen already that this view is only more plausible by restricting the quantity of bodily pleasures (1152 b, 23 κτλ.) and this again is only plausible because most people know no other (1152 b, 23 seq.). Therefore, in order to explain the origin of the error, we must first show what makes men give the preference to bodily pleasures. Two reasons are given by him, (1) that they are *ἀσθενέστερα* of pain and therefore appear strong by contrast, (2) that if the pain is excessive, the pleasure has to be excessive too.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first reason is simply that they escape pain, which the 'unmixed' pleasures

μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ εἰς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς
τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὕσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερ-
βάλλουσιν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικὴν. σφοδρὰ δὲ γίνονται
αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὶ τῷ ἰσχυρίῳ
φαίνεσθαι, καὶ νῦν σπουδαῖον δὲ δοκεῖ ἡ ἐξουσία διὰ δύο ταῦτα,
ὥσπερ εἰρη-αι, ὅτι αἱ μὴ φαύλης φύσεως εἰσι πράξεις (ἡ
ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ ἐκ ἔθους, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων
ἀνθρώπων), αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι ἐνδεοὺς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ
γίνεσθαι. αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουν τελευτούμεναι· κατὰ συμβεβηκός 1154^b
οὖν σπουδαῖαι. ἐπεὶ διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδρὰ εἶναι ὑπὸ
τῶν ἁλλὰ μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς εἴψας
τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ἔταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον,
ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον. οὕτως γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς 5

do not, seeing they do not imply a previous pain. The mere contrast with the opposite pain makes them appear stronger than they really are; for we estimate their strength by their distance from the opposite pain and not by their distance from the neutral state.

ἀκροῦ, cf. 1129 b, 10 n.

καὶ εἰς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς κ.τ.λ. This is the second reason. The first merely explains why bodily pleasures seem stronger than others, this is the reason why the excess of bodily pleasures seems good. It is because they are regarded as ἰατρεῖαι, and it is the practice of some doctors to cure one disease by its opposite. Cf. Philol. 35^a a. 2 δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐστὶν τῶν ἐνίων ἰατρικὴν τοιαύτην ἢ τέχνην· ὑπερβολαῖς γὰρ ἰσχυρὰ εἶναι ἢ ὑδάτος ἢ ἀλμυρῆς ἢ σιτοῦ ἢ λιμοῦ. This is fallacious, as we know, but it accounts for the popular error.

ὡς οὕσης ἰατρικῆς, sc. ἐπὶ ἡδονῇ.

εἰς τὸ παρὰ τῷ ἰσχυρίῳ κ.τ.λ., 'from being seen in contrast with the opposite.'

καὶ ἐκ σπουδαίων δι' κ.τ.λ. We see here that the real question is how

all pleasure has come to be thought bad. It is because bodily pleasures, and bodily pleasures in excess, are commonly supposed to be the only pleasures. Now (1) ὑπερβολαῖς show a φαῦλη φύσις and are therefore bad altogether, while (2) ἰατρεῖαι show an ἐνδεής φύσις and are therefore bad in themselves, even though they may be regarded as good κατὰ συμβεβηκός. They are ἀγαθὰ τινι, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ. On the reading and interpretation see Bywater, Contr. p. 36.

ἐκ γενετῆς, the case of θηρίων.

ἡ ἐκ ἔθους, the case of ἀνθρώπων.

εἰς τὸ κ.τ.λ. See Bywater loc. cit.

5 d. ἐπεὶ διώκονται κ.τ.λ. Another reason why bodily pleasures are supposed to be the only ones, and all pleasure is therefore supposed to be bad.

εἴψας. I see no reason for taking this metaphorically. An Aspidochelone suggests, a fish acquired by eating salt fish is βλαβερὰ, while one acquired by bodily exercise is ἀβλαβής. For 'innocuous pleasures,' cf. Plato, Rep. 347 b αἱ ἡδοναὶ δοῦναι ἀβλαβεῖς. Phil. 1339 b, 35 δοῦναι ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδονῶν.

χαίρουσιν, τὸ τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν.
αἱ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῶν ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι μα-
τυροῦσι, τὸ ἡρῶν, τὸ ἀκούειν φασκόντες εἶναι λυπηρὸν
ἀλλ' ἔδη συνήθειε ἐσμέν, ὥς φασιν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μιν ἡ
10 νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰκωμένοι διακίευνται, καὶ
ἡδὺ ἡ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δέονται αἱ
ιατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνομινον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν
κρᾶσιν, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρὰ εἰσιν. ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδὺ
λύπην ἢ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, ἐν ᾧ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ
15 ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται. αἱ δ' αἰεὶ λυπῶν
οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολὴν· αὐταὶ δὲ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ
μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἥτις
τὰ ἱατρεύοντα· ὅτι γινώσκουσιν ἱατρικῶς τοῦ το-
κίου μένοντος ὑγιούς πράττοντός τε, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι·
20 τοῦ φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως. οἷον

τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον κ.τ.λ. The neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain, though merely negative, appears to many as positive pain. Cf. 1150a, 33n.

αἱ... πονεῖ τὸ ζῶν. Aristotle says ὁ γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρας εἰλετο αἰεὶ ποιεῖν τὸ ζῶν διὰ τὸν αἰσθητικόν, and the reference to Anaxagoras is confirmed by Theophrastus, de Sensibus § 29 (Diels, Dox. p. 307, 21) ἅπαντα δ' αἰσθεῖν μετὰ λύπης ('Anaxagoras φησί'). This is a very interesting anticipation of modern views as to the sub-conscious. All vital processes involve pain, but in a well-regulated organism this does not rise above the 'threshold of consciousness' as *λύπη*.

§ 6. ὁμοίως... ὥσπερ οἱ οἰκωμένοι. We have seen already that *πῶς* arises τῶν ἐνυ θερμανθέντων (cf. 1147 b, 28n.), and the 'sanguine temperament' of youth is also due to its 'hot-headedness.' Cf. Probl. 954 b, 39 τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὸ περὶ τὸν τόπον ὡς φρονούμεν καὶ ἐλπίζομεν ποιεῖ εὐθύμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς μέτρον τὰςτες ἔχουσι προθυμίαν, ὅτι πάντας δ' αἰσθεῖ ὁ πολὺν ἐνδεδιδόναι ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοῦτο ποιεῖ.

ἐν μιν τῇ νεότητι.—*οἰκωμένοι* is cf. 1150a, 33n.

οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοί. Cf. 1150 b, 28 n.

ἐξελάνει κ.τ.λ. Aristotle says from the *liberal* of Theophrastus ἐξελάνει ἡδὺν λυπῶν ἢ γὰρ (καὶ) ἐναντία, ὅταν ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πόνου τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, τοιαύτη ἦται ἐν τῇ ἰσχυρᾷ, ὥστε αὐτὴ ποιεῖν ἐξελάνει καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡδύς ἐν φόρῳ ἢ ὁλῶν τῶν ἀποκρίσεων διαφερόντως χαρῶν. This shows that Aristotle either wrote this passage or something uncommonly like it (cf. *Isidore*, § 4, n. 5).

§ 7. τοῦ ὑπομένουτος ἡδύς. Cf. above 1147 b, 35 τῆς ὑποκινουμένης καὶ ἔξω. It is the unimagined *πῶς* that *πᾶν* is, and therefore *πῶς* is pleasant; but as the *πῶς* is *πῶς* on at the same time, we think that it is pleasant.

ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν κ.τ.λ. Things which stimulate the activity of a *πῶς* (or *φύσις*) are pleasant by nature, e.g. music is naturally pleasant to a musical nature.

ἀεὶ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλήν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναι τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὼ φθαρτοί, ὥστε ἂν τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τοῦτο τῇ ἐτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὐθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἀπλή εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πράξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. 25 διὰ δὲ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλήν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιος, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινα· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη 30 μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλή οὐδ' ἐπιεικής.

- 9 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκрасίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.

ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, 'when the two elements are equally balanced.'

διὸ δὲ θεὸς κ.τ.λ. Cf. Met. 1072 b,

15 διαγωγὴ δὲ ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἁρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῶν.

μεταβολὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Eur. Or. 234.

BOOKS VIII—IX.

FRIENDSHIP

Introductory Note.

As usual, several good reasons are given why a discussion of *φιλία* should form part of a course on *εὐδαιμονία*, but we are left to guess why it should come between the discussion of Will and Desire and the final account of the Good for Man. That this is characteristic of the method we have seen already (cf. Book II, Introductory Note p. 108, 1152 b, 1 n.), otherwise we might be tempted to think that the proper place for the treatment of *φιλία* was just after that of *δυστυχία*, with which it has so many points of contact, and it might be urged that a transposition of vi—vii and viii—ix would have the further advantage of bringing the two discussions of Pleasure together. The hypothesis, however, is excluded by the fact that *φιλία* was taken up at the same point of the course by Eudemus. This shows that the present arrangement is not due to any accident of editing, so there must be some connexion of thought, other than that given in the text, which made this the right place for the discussion. Following a hint of Teichmüller's (*Neue Studien* ii., p. 129), we may, I think, give the following account of the matter. According to Aristotle the growth of *φιλία* keeps pace with the growth of *φρονήσις*. The lowest animals care for their young at least at the time of birth, and the higher we rise in the scale of animals *φρόνησις* (cf. 2140 a, 27 n.) the wider and more permanent does *φιλία* become, till at last in man it appears as the feeling of union with his kind upon which the family, the state, and all other human associations rest. Cf. Gen. An. 753 a, 7 *ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις βούλεσθαι τῇ τῶς τῶντων αἰσθησὶν ἐπιμελητικὴν παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλὰ (1) τοῖς μὲν χείροσι*

οὐτ' ἐμποιοῖ μέχρι τοῦ τακεῖν μόνον, (2) τοῖς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τελείωσιν, 3) ὅσα δὲ φρονιμώτερα, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκτροφήν, (4) τοῖς δὲ δὴ ἰάλιστα κοινωνοῦσι φρονήσεως καὶ πρὸς τελειωθέντα γίνεται συνήθεια αἱ φιλία, καθάπερ τοῖς τ' ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῶν τετραπόδων ἐνίοις, τοῖς ὄρνισι μέχρι τοῦ γεννῆσαι καὶ ἐκθράψαι· διόπερ καὶ μὴ ἐπαύξουσαι ἰθὺλεῖαι ὅταν τέκωσι, διατίθενται χεῖρον ὥσπερ ἐνός τινος στερισκόμεναι τῶν συμφύτων. Here we have the different stages of φιλία clearly traced, and these stages are made to depend upon the degree of φρόνησις, or knowledge of the good for one's own kind, which is present at each. In fact φιλία is, we may say, the altruistic use of φρόνησις, a use which is its 'natural' use in spite of public opinion to the contrary (cf. 1141 b, 29 sqq.). We can see, then, how the treatment of φιλία is quite in its right place here, and we shall see later how it leads us naturally through the stages of love for the good as such, and love for our own 'best self,' to its highest manifestation, the *amor dei intellectualis*. It is, in fact, *ωιλία* and φιλία alone that can bridge the gulf between φρόνησις and σοφία, the practical and the theoretic life.

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαϊότατον εἰς τὴν βίον. ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ὄλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λεπτὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ δυνασταίαι

1155 a. 3. EE. 1234 b, 18 Περὶ φιλίας, τί ἐστὶ καὶ τοῖόν τι καὶ τίς ὁ φίλος, καὶ πότερον ἢ φιλία μισθῶς λέγεται ἢ πλεονηχῶς, αὖ

1. §1. ἔστι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reasons given for discussing φιλία are (1) that it is καλόν, (2) that it is ἀναγκαῖον. This is the literary form of the distinction between τὸ κατ' αὐτὸ ἀρετόν, τὸ οὐ δυνατὸν and the *κατὰ τὴν φύσιν* πῶς, οὐ οἷον ἀνευ τοῦ εἶναι. The distinction between καλὰ and ἀναγκαῖα πράγματα plays a great part in the *Politics*, and is derived from Plato, cf. *Rep.* 493 c τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δικαία καλοῖ καὶ καλὰ, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μὴτε ἑωρακῶς εἶη μὴτε ἄλλῃ δυνατὸν δείξαι. To say φιλία is an ἀρετὴ is equivalent to saying it is καλόν. The two points are then taken in the reverse order: (1) τὸ ἀναγκαῖον §§ 1-4, (2) τὸ καλόν § 5.

ἀρετὴ τις. There is an ἀρετὴ which for want of a better name, we called φιλία, but that is not what we are going to speak of now. It was not based on feeling (πᾶθος or affection (τὸ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ)), and

we are now going to discuss φιλία as a feeling (cf. 1126 b, 19 sq.). In this sense it may or may not be strictly an ἀρετὴ itself; it is certainly μετ' ἀρετῆς, for in the truest form it can exist, we shall see, only between the good.

ἀναγκαϊότατον. The point is φιλία is *ἐκ ὑποθέσεως* ἀναγκαῖον to the good. It may be reduced to three: (1) it is necessary as *εὐπρόχρητος* εἶναι and also as *πονητικὸς* καὶ φιλακτικὸς, (2) it is necessary because it is just, and justice makes nothing of value, (3) it is rather than justice in the best of the state, and the good life is possible only in the state.

ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων κ.τ.λ. It is not the only (the *ἐν οἷς* ἂν ζῶμεν αὐτοὶ).

καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι κ.τ.λ. These are taken as examples because they can choose freely (cf. 1092 b, 21 sq.). If we find, then, that they would not choose to live without friends to benefit, we get a strong *εὐδοκία*.

κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστα εἶναι χρεῖα· τί γὰρ ὕφελος
 τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ὑφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἥ γίνεται
 μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινεταπιότη πρὸς φίλους, ἥ πῶς ἂν τηρηθεῖη
 καὶ σφίξοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσα γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτω ἐπισφα- 10
 2 λαστέρα. ἐν πενία τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην
 οἶονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοῖς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ
 ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρὸς ὑγίαινον πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλ-
 λείπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειας βοηθείας, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ
 πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· "σὺν τε δὴ ἐρχομένοι·" καὶ γὰρ 15
 3 βοηθεῖν καὶ πράξει δυνατότεροι. φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε
 πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γενησάντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γενησάν
 τῷ γενηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνεσι

εἰ πλεοναχῶς, πῶς ἴσθιν, ἐπὶ δὲ πῶς χρηστὸν τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τί τὸ
 δίκαιον τὸ φιλικόν, ἐπισκεπτέον οὐθένος ἦττον τῶν περὶ τὰ ἡθῆ καλῶν
 καὶ αἰρετῶν. τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτείας ἔργον εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ποιῆσαι
 φίλοι, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ τοῦτο φύσιν εἶναι χρησίμουν· οὐ γὰρ
 ἐνδέχεται φίλικα ἰαυτοῖς εἶναι τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἢ ἀλλήλων. ἐπὶ
 τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδικον περὶ τοὺς φίλους εἶναι μάλιστα πάντες φασί,
 καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δοκεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, καὶ φιλία ἡθική τις
 εἶναι ἔξις. καὶ εἰς τὴν βούληται ποιῆσαι ὥστε μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἢ ἄλλ' εἰς
 (ἐλπίς Jackson) φίλους ποιῆσαι· οἱ γὰρ ἀληθινὰ φίλοι οὐκ ἀδικοῦσιν.

εὐετηρίας. Cf. 1098 b, 16 n.

ἥ πῶς ἂν κ.τ.λ. We pass from
 the ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἔστι, ὡς ἔστι ὅτι
 ὅτι ἔστι καὶ ποιητὴς καὶ φιλικὴ.

§ 2. πρὸς θεραπείαν κ.τ.λ. This
 sentence is obscure owing to the fact
 that πρὸς has to do duty twice over
 by a sort of brachylogy. The full
 construction would be πρὸς θεραπείαν
 καὶ πρὸς βοηθείας πρὸς τὸ ἐλλείπον τῆς
 πράξεως. For the plural βοηθεῖν and
 for βοηθεῖν πρὸς τὴν see Bon. loc.
 139 a, 2 149. The old editors took
 βοηθεῖν καὶ πρὸς καὶ, (ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπὸ
 ἀπαιτοῦ Zeller. Bekker reads βοηθεῖ
 on inferior authority, Susemihl and
 Bzowier both restore the reading of
 the best ms. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii, 4, 6

ὁ ἀγαθὸς φίλος εἰσὶν ὅτι πρὸς πᾶν
 τὸ ἀλλοτρίον τῷ φίλῳ.

σὺν τε δὴ ἐρχομένοι. The first
 words of the famous passage. II, x,
 124—

σὺν τε δὴ ἐρχομένοι, καὶ τε πρὸς ὁ τοῦ
 φέρειν.

δοῦναι ἀρέσας ἔργ' αὐτοῖς δ' αὖτε τε
 εὐχῆσθαι.

ἀλλὰ τί οἱ βρῆσαν τι νόον, λεπτὴ δὲ
 το μῆτις.

Plato also refers to this passage by its
 first words only (Symp. 174 d, etc.),
 as it was already proverbial.

§ 3. φύσει κ.τ.λ. If a thing exists
 φύσει, it must be ἐκ οὐδεὶς ἀγα-
 θῶν, for nature aims at the good and
 οὐδὲν μᾶλλον νοεῖ. The fact that the

καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοθυμίᾳ πρὸς ἀλ-
 20 λήλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοῖς φιλικῶν
 ἐταινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάταις ὡς οἰκεῖν
 ὅπας ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλῳ. οἰκεῖ ἕκαστος καὶ τὰς τε-
 λεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία καὶ οἱ νομοθεταὶ μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῶν
 σπουδάζουσιν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἢ γὰρ ὁμίονα ὁμοίον τι τῇ
 25 φιλίᾳ οἰκεῖν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστα ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στε-
 σιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελάνουσι· καὶ φίλων μὲν οὐκ
 οὐδεν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιον δ' ὅστις προσδίδουσι φιλίας,
 καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον
 5 δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους

ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ εἴαν δίκαιον ὦναι, οὐκ ἀδικήσουσιν· ἢ ταῦτόν ἄρα ἡ ἐγγί-
 τι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ φιλία. πρὸς δὲ ταύταις τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν
 τὸν φίλον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνομεν, τὴν δὲ ἀφιλίαν καὶ τὴν ἐρημνίαν
 δεικνύσαντες ὅτι ὁ βίος ὅπας καὶ ἡ ἐκούσιος ὁμιλία μετὰ τοιούτων· μὴ
 οἰκεῖν γὰρ ἢ μετὰ συγγενῶν ἢ μεθ' ἑταίρων συνδιημερινομεν, ἢ τέκνων
 ἢ γονέων ἢ γυναικός. καὶ τὰ ἴδια δίκαια τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐστὶν ἐφ'
 ἡμῶν μόνον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπινοηθέντα, καὶ οἷα ἐφ' ἡμῶν.

hen-bird is uneasy if not allowed to
 sit (cf. Gen. An. quoted on p. 345)
 is already a sign that *philia* is a neces-
 sary condition of the good life.

τοῖς ὁμοθυμίᾳ, 'animals of the
 same race.' Eudemos says *ὁμοθυμίᾳ*
 (p. 380). Cf. Rhet. 13. 1, 21 ἐπεὶ
 τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἦδὲ τὸ συγγενὲς δὲ κατὰ
 φύσιν ἀλλήλους ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς συγγενῶν
 καὶ ὁμοίᾳ ἦδὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὐκ
 ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἴσος ἴσῳ καὶ
 σέος σέῳ. Fritzsche quotes Thucyd.
 1. 21 τέττιξ μὲν τέττιγι φίλος, νόρμας
 δὲ μύρμαξ, ἰ ἰσηεὶ δ' ἰσηεῖ· ἐμὲ δ' Ἀ-
 θῆναι καὶ ὦδα.

ἐν ταῖς πλάταις. This is one of
 the few places in Aristotle where we
 see a sign of the coming cosmopoliti-
 tanism. He was himself an ἀνολίς
 οἰκεῖν, opp. ἀλλότριον. Cf. below
 1171 a, 16 οὐκ ὡς ἀπογχεῖν.

§ 4. οἰκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The good
 life is impossible without the *polis*,

philia is the bond of the *polis*, there-
 fore *philia* is ἀναγκαῖον.

οἱ νομοθέται, cf. 1103 a, 3 n.

ὁμίονα. Cf. below 1157 a, 21 καὶ
 Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 16 ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁμίονα
 γὰρ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν
 εἶναι.

τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα, κ.τ.λ. 'justice
 in the fullest sense.' I do not
 think there is any reference to special
 forms of justice, either τὸ ἐπικτῆ-
 (Zwinger) or τὸ πολιτικὸν δικαίον
 (Aschmann), but simply to the general
 principle ἀρετῆς δὲ τῶν φίλων ὡς τῇ
 φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δικαίον (1150 a, 7).

§ 5. ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν. For the
 opposition between τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ
 ἀναγκαῖον and τὸ καλόν, cf. 1130 b,
 1 n. Friendship is not only a means
 but an end.

τοὺς φιλοφίλους. Cf. Rhet. 1381 b,
 16 φιλοῦσι τοὺς φίλους φιλοφίλοις καὶ
 καὶ ἐγκαταλείποντας

1155^b τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀλλήλοισι φασιν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον. Εὐριπίδης μὲν φίσκειν "ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν" ξηρανθεῖσαν, "ἐρᾶν δὲ σερμνὸν οὐραία πληροῦμενον ὄμβρου πεσείν ἐς γαῖαν," καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὶς "ἀντίξουν" συμφέρον καὶ "ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστηι

τὸ ὅμοιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον, διὸ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπὸ καθήκοντος ἐπὶ τῇ περαιτέρω διὰ τὸ εἶναι πλείονος ἔχουσαν. οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτω το φῖλον λέγουσιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φασὶν εἶναι φῖλον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρώμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν πάντες εἶναι φῖλον, ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ οὐ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῖς ξηροῖς, ἀλλ' ὕγρῳ, ὅθεν εἴρηται

ἐρᾶ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖα

καὶ τὸ

μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.

ἡ δὲ μεταβολὴ εἰς τοῦναντίον. τὸ δ' ὅμοιον ἐχθρὸν τῷ ὁμοίῳ· καὶ γὰρ κεραμεὺς κεραμῇ κοτεῖ,

καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεφύμενα πολέμια ἀλλήλοισι ζῶα. αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἰππολήνεις τοιοῦτον διεσπᾶσιν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον φιλεῖ, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον πολέμειον,

τῷ πλείονι δ' αἰεὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται

τούλασσαν, ἐχθρὰς θ' ἡμέρας κατέρχεται,

ἀνώτερον, sc. "in serie causarum" (Boo. Ind. 68 b, 47), for φυσική is ἡ ἀνω ἐπιστήμη with regard to πολιτική, just as ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία is with regard to φυσική (Met. 1005 a 33) *ἵνατι δὲ τοῦ φυσικοῦ τις ἀνώτερος*. They take φυσικός instead of ἡθικός *προσδοεῖ* (cf. 1147 a, 24 n.). This explains the use of ἀνωθεν above 1144 a, 12.

Εὐριπιδὴν μὲν κ. τ. λ. 16 898 *Νηκε* beginning *Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὁρᾷ δὲ θεὸς*. The lines more immediately referred to here are—

ἐρᾶ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖ', ὅτε ξηρὸν πῖδον ἔκαρπον ἀρχμῷ ποτῖδος ἐδεῖν δ' αὖ· ἐρᾶ δ' ὁ σερμνὸν οὐραίων πληροῦμενος ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν Ἀφροδίτης θεοῦ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος κ. τ. λ. Cf. 'Early Greek Philosophy' pp. 158 sqq. In

the *Lyria* 215 a Plato quotes some sayings which are clearly of Heraclitean origin (*Κρατὺς καὶ ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τοιοῦτου τοῦ ἐναντίου*) *ἔστιται ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦ ὁμοίου*. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν ὕγρῳ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμῷ, τὸ δὲ πλεονὺς γλυκύν, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττω ἀμυγδαλῇ, τὸ δὲ πενὺς πληρώσκει, καὶ τὸ εὐχρηστὸν πενέσκει· *εὐμφορὰ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ* το γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου οὐδὲν ἂν ἀπολοισται

τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον κ. τ. λ. 16 46 *Lyria*. It seems to be fairly well made out Zeller (p. 627 a 1 ed. 3) that the primary reference of this fragment was to pieces of wood used in building and upset by each other heaving in opposite directions. The stability of the building is due to opposite strains or, as Chrysippus

ἁρμονίαν" καὶ "πάντα κατ' ἔρην" γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τοῖς τοῖς ἄλλοις τε καὶ Ἑμπειδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοίον τοῦ ὁμοίου
 7 ἰφίσταται. τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία τῆς παρουσίας σκεψέως)· ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψάμεθα. οἷον 10 πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οὖν τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν

ἔτι δὲ καὶ αἱ τόποι κεχωρισμένοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ δὲ φιλία δοκεῖ συμπέγειν· αἱ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φιλεῖ, καὶ Ἡρακλείτους ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι

ὡς ἔρεξ ἔκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,

οὐ γὰρ ἐν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὅντος ὀξείας καὶ βαρίδος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῶα ἄνευ θήλειας καὶ ἄρρεος ἐναντίων ὄντων.

1155 b, 8. FF. 1235 a, 29 δύο μὲν αἶται δύζαι περὶ φιλίας εἰς, λίαν τε καθόλου <καὶ> κεχωρισμέναι τοσοῦτον· ἄλλαι δὲ ἥδη ἐγγιγνέτω καὶ οἰκείαι τῶν φαινυμένων τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ, τοῖς φιλοῦσι εἶναι φίλους, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· τοῖς δ' ἀποκρίναι εἰ μὴ φιλοῦσιν αἱ μητέρες τὰ τέκνα (φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἰσοῦσα φιλία· προεποθνήσκων γόνυ αἰρούνται τῶν τέκνων)· τοῖς δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον δοκεῖ φίλον εἶναι μόνον. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ διώκουσι ταῦτα πάντες, τὰ δὲ ἄχρηστα καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν ἀποβάλλουσιν· ὡς περ Σωκράτης ὁ γέρον ἔλεγε τὸν πτύλον καὶ τὰς τρίχας καὶ τοὺς οὐχ ἄχρηστος παραβαλλῶν, καὶ τὰ μαρμα ὅτι ρίπτοι μιν τὰ ἄχρηστα, καὶ τέλος

philis in (ap. Aul. Gell. vii. 1. 2) 'opposita inter se et quasi mutuo adverso quaeque folia sunt conuoluit' But in any case the point lies in the fact 'The hostile is good for us' 'what disagrees with us agrees with us.'

ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων κ. γ. λ. This is the explanation given by Aristotle in the text and in the margin (cf. 1155 b, 10) on which see 'Early Greek Philosophy' 139. 158, 115. Cf. fr. 48 ἀρμονία ἀφανής φανερὰ ἐρεσσω.

πάντα κατ' ἔρην. Cf. fr. 44 πόλεμος πάντων μιν τανύρε κ. γ. λ. and especially fr. 43 quoted in E.E. 1235 a, 26 (above) 'Early Greek Philosophy' p. 161.

Ἑμπειδοκλῆς. For the meaning of his doctrine of "like to like," cf. 'Early Greek Philosophy,' p. 243 sqq.

§ 7. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ. γ. λ. These physical propositions are not relevant to the present enquiry, we shall confine ourselves to enquiries raised by ἡθικά προτάσεις.

οἷον πότερον κ. γ. λ. This also comes from Lyais 214 d τούτοις τοῖν αἰσίντωνται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶσιν, ὡς ἔταίροι, οἱ τὸ ὁμοίον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον λέγοντες, ὡς ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μῶντε μῶντε φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὐτ' ἀγαθῷ οὐτε κατ' οὐδένποτε οἷον ἀληθῆ φίλον ἔρχεται.

πότερον ἐν εἶδος κ. γ. λ. We shall

ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν αἰσμένοι, ὅτι ἐπιδίχεται το μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὐχ ἰκανῶς πεπιστεύκασιν σημειῶν· δίδχεται γὰρ

τὸ σῶμα, ὅταν ἀποθάνῃ· ἀχρηστος γὰρ ὁ κερὶς, οἷς δὲ χρῆσται φυλάττονται, ὥσπερ ἐν αἰσμένοι ταῦτα δὴ πάντα δικαί μὲν ὑπερβατα ἀλλήλοις εἶναι. τὸ τε γὰρ κοῦμαιον ἀχρηστον τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ διαι τούτης ὁμοιότητος ἀποχρὶ πλείστον, καὶ το ἐναντίον ἀχρηστότατον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· φθαρτικὴν γὰρ τοῖ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον. ὅτι ἀναί τῆς με ῥήθιαν τὸ κτήσιουθαι φίλον· τοῖς δὲ στανιώτατος γόνων, αἱ οἷς ἐπιδίχεσθαι ἀνευ ἀνυχίας τοῖς γὰρ εὐ πρὸς τῶν βουλῶνται ταῦτα

find that the answer to this παράβλημα will furnish the basis of all the ὅμοια.

ἔτι ἐπιδίχεται κ.τ.λ. The quest on at issue here is whether difference in degree excludes specific difference. According to Plato, *Philob.* 24 c οὐδὲ δὲ ἡμῶν φανερὰ, μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον γυγνόμενα καὶ το σφόδρα καὶ το ἥμεν διαχωρῶνται καὶ τὸ λαν καὶ δὲ τοιαῦτα πάντα εἰς τὸ εὐὶ ἀκρῶν γόνων καὶ εἰς τὸ δὲ, πάντα ταῦτα τῶνται. This doctrine Aristotle fully accepts, and it shows from it that difference in degree can never constitute specific difference, το μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον is not εἰδωμένη, cf. *Pol.* 1279 b 36 οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οἷον τε διαφέρειν 38 το δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οὐδὲν ἔσθ' εἶδει διαφέρειν. But it does not follow from this that difference in degree will exclude generic difference though it may exclude specific difference, cf. *Part An.* 644a, 18 δὲ διαφέρειν καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, ταῦτα ἐξαιρέτως εἰ γόνον. If anything can be more or less' something, it must be that thing, but there is nothing to prevent the 'more' being a different species from the 'less' under certain conditions.

δίδχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. As το μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον cannot be εἰδωμένη it can only be in cases where, as Plato would say, τὸ σφόδρα is 'more' with

τὸ ἥττον, i.e. where there is some λόγος or difference in composition a 'form εἶδος'. The most instructive example of this is furnished by musical 'intervals.' It is true that the *ῥυθμοὶ* φθογγῶν admitted of το μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον and we might conclude from this that it can have no specific difference but this is to leave out of account the fact that *σφόδρα*, the *διπλασι* series, cannot distinguish any interval so than the *διπλασι*. The *μεσότης* of *βῆ* and *παρὰ* may be a little 'more' or 'less', the note may be a little 'flat' or 'sharp', but it remains *σφόδρα* the same note. So too with colours. They are all generic and one and the same genus has the *στανιώτατος* white and black corresponding to *εἶδος* and *παρὰ* in the musical scale. But *σφόδρα* cannot distinguish an interval between of colours between white and black. There are certain definite number of λόγοι or proportions of white to black which might call for *σφόδρα*, and he states a little more or a little less are correct to these λόγοι, *καὶ* there are certain definite numbers which are specifically there if it is greater, in spite of the fact that it is white in *σφόδρα* 446a, 1. As *στανιώτατος* this is the end of the *σφόδρα* interval. We do not hear the *εἶδος* of one grain, nor does it make the sound louder if we add one grain to a bushel.

τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. εἴρηται δ' 15
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐμπροσθεν.

11. Τάχα δ' ἂν γίνετο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος
τοῦ φιλητοῦ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν,
τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον· δόξειε δ' ἂν χρή-
σιμον εἶναι δι' οὐ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ 20
2 ἂν εἴη τὰ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τὰ ἀγαθόν

δοκεῖν φίλοι εἶναι). οἱ δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς συνδιαμικνουσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις
ἀξιοῦσι πιστεῖν, ὡς ἐξηπατώντας καὶ προσποιουμένους, ἵνα κτήσωνται
διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀτυχούντων ὀμιλίας πάλιν εὐτυχούντων φίλων.

1155 b, 17. EE. 1235 b, 13 ληπτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν
ἄμο τὰ τε δοκούντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας
λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἔνν εἰλόγως φαίνεται τὰ
ἐναντία δοκούντα· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμιλογοῦμενε δ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος
τοῖς φαινομένοις. συμβαίνει δὲ μέναι τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, εἰμ ἔστι μὲν
ὡς ἀληθεῖς ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ πότερον
τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν εἶπτι τὸ φιλούμενον· εἰ μὲν γὰρ φιλούμεν οὐ
ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως τοιούτων—οὐθαίε γὰρ

ἐραστῆς ὅστις οὐκ αἰεὶ φιλεῖ—

ἢ δὲ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ταύτῃ μὲν τὸ φιλούμενον τὸ ἡδὺ, εἰ δὲ δ
βουλούμεθα, τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἔστι δ' ἕτερον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

τῷ αἰθε. Things γένει ἕτερα δὲ ποτ.
ἐμπροσθεν. It is vain to ask
whence.

11. § 1. περιεχόντων, quite general.
'The subject may be cleared up'

γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ. So
προσέειπεν was defined after an en-
quiry into τὸ προαιρέτον, βούλησις
and βουλήσις after an enquiry into
τὸ βουλευτόν and τὸ βουλητόν. This
dialectical method is explicit for τῶν
ἐπιδόσεων, and is here applied to
the ἐπὶ τῷ αἰθε, ὡς ἔστιν πολλὰ καὶ ἢ
ποσάων τῷ αἰθε λέγονται; (Top. 106 a,
9, the title being ὅτι αὐτὸ πλεοναχῶς
λέγεται, καὶ ἢ πῶς οἱ ἢ αὐτοῦ
πλεοναχῶς βηθήσεται, καὶ εἰ ἢ πῶς οἱ,
καὶ αὐτὸ (10. b, 38). It is more
obvious that τὸ φιλητόν has different

species than that φίλος has; for τὰ
φιλητὰ have acc. no. 5 different names
(τοῖς ὀνόμασι διαφωνεῖ) and this makes
it clear that φίλος is not specifically
one.

ἀγαθόν . . ἡδὺ . χρήσιμον. Cf.
1104 b, 30 τῶν γὰρ δυνάμεων τῶν εἰς
τὰς αἰρέσεις καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδονῆς
δόξειε δ' ἂν π.τ.λ., for τὸ χρήσιμον
is always ἄλλου χάριν (1096 a, 7).

§ 2. πότερον οὖν π.τ.λ. Cf. the
previous γὰρ μαρτυρεῖται about βουλή-
σιν above 1113 a, 15 sqq. There we saw
that the object of βούλησις was always
τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, but that in the
case of the good man this coincides
with τὸ φέρεται or κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν.
The solution in the present case would
be the same: we always love τὸ φαι-

φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίστη ταῦτα.
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ το ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν
 ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ
 25 τὸ ἐκείστῳ· φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ το δὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ
 τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ το φιλητόν φαι-
 νόμενον. τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀνύ-
 3 χων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀντιφάλλησις, οὐδὲ
 βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθὸν—γελοῦον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βέλτε-

περὶ δὴ ταύτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συγγενῶν τοῖσις τιωστέσι
 διαρίσσει, λαβούσιν ἀρχὴν τήνδε. τὰ γὰρ δριατὸν καὶ βουλήτοι ἢ τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀρεατὸν· φωνομα-
 γαρ τι ἀγαθόν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται αὐτὸ μὴ δοκῇ· π
 γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ φαντασία καὶ ἢ δοξα. ὅτι μιντοὶ φίλιν κα
 τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδέ, δῆλον.

τούτων δὲ διαρισμένου ληπτέον ἐνύθεισι τ-ίμαί. τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν
 τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἔσιν ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ τινί, ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐ. καὶ τὰ αἷτε
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδέα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι φαινομεν σωματι
 συμφέροντα ἀπλῶς εἶναι σώματι ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι οὐ, ὡς
 φαρμακείας καὶ τομάς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδέα ἀπλῶς σώματι τὰ τῷ
 ὑγιαίνοντι καὶ ὀλοκλήρῳ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῇ φωτὶ ὄραν καὶ εἰ τὸ δὲ τῷ σκοτεινῷ
 καὶ τοῖς τῷ ὀφθαλμίωντι ἐναντίως καὶ οἷντος ἡδέον οὐχ ἢ τῷ διεφθαρμένῳ
 τὴν γλυπτὴν ἐντὶ οἰνοφυλγίας, ἐπεὶ αἷτε ὅς τις παρεγχύοντις, ἀλλὰ τῇ
 ἀδιαφθόρῳ αἰσθῆσαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐχ ἢ τοῖς ταῖσις
 καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῖς καθευτώσιν ἀμφοτέρων γούν μεμεσημετα

νόμενον φιλητόν, but this does not
 affect our inference from different
 species of φιλεῖν to different species
 of φιλία. For, if we say φαινόμενον
 φιλητόν instead of φιλητόν, to signify
 (as in cases where το ἀγαθόν or το
 ἡδύ is not the real y good or pleasant),
 we still keep the πῶσις required for
 the argument. Eudemus works this
 out with reference to health as a
 normal state, cf. above 213a, 225qg
 with the notes.

§ 8 ἐπὶ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Three charac-
 teristics of φιλία are inferred from the
 use of this word in current language.
 Though we use the verb φιλεῖν of our

feeling towards inanimate objects (as
 is a φίλησις), yet we do not call this
 feeling φιλία. This is because φιλία
 is (1) βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθόν, (2) ὁ
 ἀντιστοιχούσα, to which we must add
 (3) μὴ λανθάνουσα.

ἀντιφάλλησις, cf. ἐν ἀντιφάλλησι below.

ἐκείνῳ. For the reading cf. Brunsen,
 Contr. p. 89.

τῷ οἴνῳ. The illustration is sug-
 gested by the word φιλοῦσις in Plato,
 Lys. 212d αὐτὸς ἀνα φιλοῦσιν οἶνον οὐ
 δὲ οὐκ ἐπὶ καὶ ἀντιφάλλησις, αὐτὸς
 φιλοῦσιν, οὐδ' αὖ φιλοῦσιν γὰρ καὶ
 φιλοῦσι. The problem here is not to

σθαι τάγαθά, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σφίζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς 30
 ἔχῃ—τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τάγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα.
 τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τάγαθὰ εὖνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ
 ταῦτο καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίνηται· εὖνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι
 4 φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετίον μὴ λαιθάνουσιν; πολλοὶ γάρ
 εἰσιν εὖνοι οἵς οὐχ ἐωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπεικείεις 35
 εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κἀν ἐκείνων τις πάθος 1156
 πρὸς τούτον, εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φί-
 λους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι λαμβάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ
 ἄρα εὖνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τάγαθὰ μὴ λαμβάνοντας
 δι' ἐν τε τῶν εἰρημένων.

S

ταῖς αἰρούμεθα, ὡς δ' ἔχει παιδίον καὶ θηρίον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καθ-
 εστῶτα, οὔτως ἔχει ὁ φεῦλος καὶ ἡ φῶν πρὸς τὸν ἐπικτῆ καὶ φρόνιμον.
 τοῖσι τοῖς δὲ ἡδὴ κατὰ τὰς ἑξέεις· ταῦτα δ' ἔστι τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ

1156 b, 27. FE. 1236 a, 7 sqq. ἐπεὶ οἱ τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεοναχῶς
 (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ τοιοῦτ' εἶναι λέγμεν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἀφελίμῳ καὶ
 χρησίμῳ), ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὴ τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ τινα καὶ
 φρονιμῶς ἀγαθόν· ὡς περ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀφίχων δι' ἡσασιν τοῦτων
 ἐνδίδεται ἡμᾶς αἰρεῖσθαι τε καὶ φιλεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπον. τὸν μὲν
 γὰρ <τῷ> τοιῦδε καὶ δι' ἀρετῆν, τὸν δ' ὅτι ἀφελίμος καὶ χρήσιμος, τὸν
 δ' ὅτι ἡδὺς καὶ δι' ἡδονῆν. φίλος δὲ γίνεσθαι ὅταν φιλοῦμενος ἀντιφίλῃ,
 καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λαιθύνῃ πως αὐτοῖς

olimus to us because we have the
 verb 'to like' for this sort of φίλος.
 Cf. French *aimer le vin*, but not *une*
amitie pour le vin.

εἴπω, 'if at all.'

ἐκείνου ἔνεκα. This is merely a
 popular belief the mention of which
 is suggested by the problem of the
 φίλος. We must not press it or
 make it part of the definition; for, as
 we shall see, it does not strictly hold
 of all or indeed any species of φίλος.
 The truth which underlies this *ἐνδίδει*
 is otherwise expressed by Aristotle

ἐβνοι. On *ἐβνοι* see below
 1166 b, 30. Here it is defined as
κατάλογον ἀγαθοῦ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, but
 something more is required to differ-
 entiate φίλος from it.

ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι, i.e. ἐν ἀντιφι-
 λουσι. Here, as in commercial ex-
 change, supply and demand, action
 and reaction (ἡ ποῦν and τὸ πῶσιν,
 cf. 1133 a, 15 n.) must be equal.

§ 4. μὴ λαμβάνοντας. This is added
 to meet the possibility even of re-
 ciprocated and disinterested well wishing
 which is unknown to both parties. If
 A may entertain such a feeling towards
 B without B's knowledge, it is equally
 possible that B may be entertaining it
 towards A without A's knowledge.
 This may be common enough, for
 instance, between writers of different
 nationalities.

δι' ἐν τε τῶν εἰρημένων, i.e. τὸ
ἀγαθὸν ὃ τὸ ἡδὺ ὃ το χρήσιμον. Cf.
 the definition in *Rhet.* 1380 b, 35

ἔκ. οἱ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς
 ὄν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδέϊ, καὶ ἔξ
 ἧ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστιν. ἀλλ' ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ
 ἱεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταὶ εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἔστιν ὅς-
 ἔστιν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ πορίζουσιν
 ἢ ἀγαθὸν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν. εὐδιόλutoι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί
 μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· εἰάν γάρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς το-
 υτοῖσι μοι ὥσι, παύονται φιλοῦντες. τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ
 ἐναι, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίνεται. ἀπελυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ

αὐτὸν ἄλλας φιλίας εἶναι αἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσὶν·
 ὅταν ἢ πρώτη μὴ ἐφαρμότῃ, ὡς οὖσαν καθόλου αἱ εἰπερ ἦν
 ἢ οὐδ' εἶναι φιλίας τὰς ἄλλας φασίν· ἔστι δὲ πολλὰ εἶδη φιλίας.
 ἂν βιβλίων ἦν ἡδὴ, ἐπειδὴ διωρίζεται τριγῶς λέγεσθαι τὴν φιλίαν.
 γὰρ διωρίζεται δι' αἰσθητήν, ἢ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.
 κίων ἢ μὲν διὰ τὸ χρησιμὸν ἔστιν ἢ [διὰ] τῶν πλείστων φιλία
 γὰρ τὸ χρησιμὸν εἶναι φιλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, καὶ μέχρι τούτου,
 ἢ ἡ ταπεινία

Γλαῦκ', ἐπίκουρος αἰτῇ τόσον φίλος ἔσκε μάχηται,

οὐκέτι γενοῦσθεσσι "Ἀθηναῖσι Μεγαρήσι—

ἢ ἡδονήν τῶν νέων· τοῦτου γὰρ αἰσθησὶν ἔχουσιν· διὸ εὐμετα-
 φιλία ἢ τῶν νέων· μεταβαλλόντων γὰρ τὸ ἦθρ κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας
 ἄλλα καὶ τὸ ἡδέϊ—ἢ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῶν βελτίστων.

ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστιν. Bywater
 p. 301 thinks the article
 is omitted in K¹ "would be
 away" and refers to FF 1237 a,
 361). But that passage simply
 θέλει τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἀρετήν
 πρὸς τὸ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν τὸ
 ποῖ ἔστιν χρῆσθαι ὁ φιλούμενος,
 ὅς φιλοῦσιν τοῖς φίλοις ἢ φίλοις.
 In another point. The reading
 καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν would surely be
 least to ἢ φιλοῦσιν, and we have
 to add that all friends benefit
 τῶν ἢ φιλοῦσιν. The mean-
 at be the same as that of ἢ ἔστιν
 ἔστιν ὁ φιλούμενος just below,

that is, practically equivalent to τῷ
 ποιῶν τῶν εἶναι above. But there is
 no need to read ἔστιν <δοτεῖ ἔστιν>
 here with Bonitz; for ἢ ἔστιν can
 very well mean "on the ground of
 what he is," in accordance with the
 principle of abbreviating subordinate
 relative clauses illustrated in Kühner
 § 557. When φίλος is διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν,
 we owe our friend "for what he is,"
 not for his usefulness or agreeableness
 to ourselves.

§ 2. Σ' δ', i.e. τοῦ δ' ὁ, cf. 1117 b,
 30 u. This abbreviation is really
 similar in principle to that of ἢ ex-
 -plained in the last note.

εἰώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μετα-
 πικτοῦσθαι καὶ τὰ ἰδία γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται
 φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἡμὰ γὰρ τῷ ἡδέϊ ἢ φιλῖα μεταπί- 35
 πτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχέως ἢ μεταβολῇ. καὶ ἔρω- 1156^b
 τικὰ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ
 τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολ-
 λάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ
 συνῆν οὗτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν
 φιλίαν οὕτως.

Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τὰγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ἢ

ἡδονὴν γὰρ ἱππόμενουσιν ἀλλήλοισι βλαπτόμενοι, ὡς ἂν ᾖσιν ἀκρατεῖς·
 οὐ δεῶσαι· ὁ οὐδ' οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλοισι φίλοι εἶναι, ὅταν
 κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ζητῶσιν, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ πρώτη· ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ βίβαιοι, αὕτη
 δὲ ἀβίβαιοι. ἡ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν, ὥσπερ εἰρηται, φιλία, οὐκ ἐκείνη δὲ, ἀλλ'
 ὡς ἐκείνη· τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνως μόνον λέγειν τὴν φιλίαν βιάζεσθαι τὰ
 φανερὰ ἐνταῦθα, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ ἐν δὲ λόγον
 πᾶσας ἀδύνατον. λέγεται ταῦτον οὕτως, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὡς μόνη ἐν-
 πρώτη φιλία, ὅστις δὲ ὡς πᾶσαι, οὕτε ὡς ἑμῶν μοι καὶ ὡς ἐντυχον ἔχουσιν
 πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς, οὕτε καὶ ἐν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἐν.

1156 b, 7. EE. 1236 b, 27 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀπλῶς
 ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἡμῶν, ἂν μὴ τι ἐμποδίζῃ, ὃ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἀπλῶς
 ὁ πρῶτος ἐστίν, ὅστις δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς αἰρετός (ἀνάγκη δ'
 εἶναι τοιοῦτον· ὡς γὰρ βούλεται τις δι' αὐτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθὰ, ἀνάγκη καὶ

§ 6. Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν α.τ.λ. The
 friendship of the good is distinguished
 from the other two by being τέλειον
 etc. We have seen that *philia* exists
φίλοι (1155 a, 16 a.) and is therefore
 capable of growth or evolution. By
 calling the friendship of the good
 τέλειον, Aristotle means to say, in
 accordance with the strict use of the
 word, that the growth is complete
 and that the 'form' (*εἶδος*) of *philia* is
 realised in it so that none of it is left
 out (τὸ τέλειον = οὐ μὴδὲν ἔξω). It is,
 in fact, 'full-grown' *philia*, as a τέλειος
 ἀνὴρ is a 'full-grown' man. We can

now see why the ἀρεταῖς *philia* were
 shown at length to be characteristic
 of youth and age: the one is un-
 developed, the other is past its prime.
 Eudemus has worked out this point
 more fully. Cf. 1236 a, 16 sqq.,
 quoted on p. 356.

καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων. As *philia*
 is *ἐν ἀντιστοιχείᾳ* (1155 b, 33) it is
 necessary to make it clear that the
 τέλειος *philia* implies the goodness of
 both parties. It is on y. then that the
 βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ can be
 reciprocal.

ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτοὺς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τάχα
 10 τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· εἰ αὐτοὺς γὰρ
 οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τοῦτο
 φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ὦσιν, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ μονιμον. καὶ ἔστι
 ἐκάτερος ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

αὐτὸν αἰρεῖσθαι εἶναι), ὁ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἡδὺς ἔστιν ἀπλῶς· δὲ
 δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ ὁπωπιῶν φίλος ἡδὺς· ἐπεὶ δὲ διακρίσιον περὶ τούτου μέλλει·
 ἔχει γὰρ ἐπίστασιν πύτερον τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν φίλον,
 καὶ πύτερον τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν
 ἡδὺ, ἢ οὐ. ἀμφω γὰρ εἰς ταῦτό σινακτεῖν· τὰ γὰρ μὴ ἀπλῶς
 ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ἀπλῶς < ἂν > τύχη φευκτά· καὶ τὸ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν
 οὐδὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ζητεῖται, τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ
 εἶναι ἀγαθόν. ἔστι γὰρ αἰρετῶν μὲν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ
 ἀγαθόν· ἃ δὲ συμφωνεῖται καὶ τοῦτο ἢ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ καὶ ἡ πολιτεία
 ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὥστε οἱ μὴ ποῦ ἔστι γίνεσθαι * * εὐθέως δὲ καὶ πρὸ οὗτοι
 ἀνθρώπου ὢν (φύσει γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 ἐντὶ αὐτῷ γυναικὸς καὶ εὐφυὲς ἀφυσού, διὰ τοῦ ἡδέος δεῖ ἢ οὐδὲν· ἀνάγκη

καθ' αὐτοὺς, 'essential y.' not merely
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός or in so far as they
 may be 'some good' to one another.
 The disinterested character ἐκείνου
 ἔνεκα (1155 b, 31) of true φιλία depends
 upon the φιλεῖν being something
 which belongs to the φιλοῦμενος, not in
 relation to the φίλος (τῷ φιλοῦντι),
 but καθ' αὐτόν, for βούλομαι τάχα
 ἀλλήλους ταύτην ἢ φιλοῦσιν (1156 a, 9).

δεῖ αὐτοὺς, here as often a reflexive
 reflexive pronoun, more emphatic than
 δεῖ ἀλλήλους 'they owe (οὐτως ἔχουσι
 i.e. φιλοῦσι) 'for each others' own
 selves', in other words each loves ἢ ο
 φιλοῦμενος ἔστι, 'for what the object
 of his love is' (1156 a, 16).

διαμένει οὖν κ.τ.λ. A thing cannot
 be 'complete' unless it has sufficient
 time to develop fully (cf. ἐν βίῳ
 τελεῖται τοῦθ' α, 18 n.), for αὐτὸν ἔστι
 in time. We now see why it was
 shown above that the developed φιλία are

εὐδαιμόνεια (1145 a, 19). That what
 is 'real y' τελειον must be τέλειον κατὰ
 τὸν χρόνον (1156 b, 33).

ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον Cf. 1108 b
 11 nq. and continues 1145 a, 31 τὸ δ'
 χρῆσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο
 γίνεται, a, 33 τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἔργα
 καὶ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. This continues
 the proof that such φιλία is 'com-
 plete.' Since τὸ τέλειον is οὐ μόνον
 ἔξω, 'complete' φιλία must include
 the incomplete or undeveloped form
 of φιλία. The good therefore, can
 be (1) good, (2) good for one another
 (3) pleasant, (4) pleasant to one
 another.

καὶ ἀλλήλους ὠφέλιμοι, i.e. (1) good
 for one another. This φιλία therefore
 includes the advantages of φιλία as
 τὸ συμφέρον.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδέος, i.e. both 3
 ἀπλῶς and 4 τῷ φίλῳ.

ἡδεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλους· ἐκάστω 15
 γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκτεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται,
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὅμοιοι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία
 μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα
 τοῖς φίλοις δι' ὑπάρχειν, πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν
 ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά 20

αἰσι τὰ καλὰ ἥνα. ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο διαφωνῇ, οὕτω σπουδαῖον τελείω·
 ἐδέχεται γὰρ ἐργασθῆαι ἀκρᾶσιαν· τῷ γὰρ διαφωνεῖν πύγαθόν τῷ
 ἡδεῖ ἐν τοῖς πάθεισιν ἀκρασία ἐστίν.

1156 b, 17. EE 1237 a, 10 ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ πρώτη φιλία καθ'
 ἀρετὴν, ἐσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοί. τοῦτο δ' οἷχ' ὅτι χρήσιμοι,
 ἀλλ' ἄλλον τρόπον· διχῶς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ τῷ φίλῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν.
 καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἱσίων. ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ
 ὠφλεῖν ὠφελίμον καὶ τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον <οἷον τὸ> γυναιξέσθαι πρὸς
 τὸ φεμμαιεσθαι. ὥστε καὶ ἡ εἴς τε ἡ ἀνθρώποι ἀρετὴ <ἐστίν>. ὅστω
 γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρώπος τῶν φύσει σπουδαίων· ἢ γὰρ τοῦ φύσει σπουδαίου
 ἀρετὴ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐκείνῳ. ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ.
 ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐπιστάσιον καὶ σκεπτέον πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡδονῆς φιλία, καὶ

καθ' ἡδονήν, equivalent to ἡδεῖαι,
 ποιεῖ οἷον εὐδοῖ ἡδονήν.

αἱ οἰκτεῖαι καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, 'his
 own acts, and (therefore) acts like
 them. If a colour's pleasant, it will
 be pleasant when reflected in a mirror.

αἱ οὐτοὶ ἢ ὅμοιοι. The acts of one
 good man are 'the same as or similar
 to' those of another, and therefore
 pleasant to him. This friendship,
 then, includes the advantages of φιλία
 διὰ τὸ ἡδέ.

§ 2. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ κ.τ.λ. If I am
 right in my interpretation of this
 passage, it is not a duplicate of the
 last. It puts the whole matter in a
 more scientific form and shows that
 all four advantages of friendship not
 only belong to the friendship of the
 good, but belong to it καθ' ἀρετὴν,
 and that this is the reason of its
 permanence.

συνάπτει, intrins. 'join,' 'meet,'
 cf. 1137 a, 34.

πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία κ.τ.λ. It is not
 necessary to mention τὸ χρήσιμον, for
 it is not φιλήτων ὡς τέλος. It is
 sufficiently provided for by the quali-
 fication τῷ φιλοῦντι.

ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά
 τινα, 'either for pleasure simply or
 for pleasure to the lover, i.e. pleasure
 depending on a similar y.' I delete
 the comma after φιλοῦντι with Grant,
 though I do not adopt with him the
 interpretation of Anaxagoras. The mean-
 ing, I think, is that friendship is
 either δι' ἡδονὴν ἀπλῶς, as for instance
 the friendship of kings for εὐπρατεῖαν
 (cf. 1156 a, 13 n.), or it may be
 δι' ἡδονὴν τινι, i.e. it may be based on
 the fact that activities 'the same as or
 similar to' our own are pleasant, for
 instance the friendship of laid men
 who 'rejoice in each other's haliness'
 (cf. 1156 b, 20). The first kind is based
 upon pleasure as such, and may exist
 between the most unlike persons, the

τινα· ταύτη δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημεία καθ' αὐτοὺς·
ταύτη γὰρ ὁμοιοι, καὶ τὰ λοιπά—τὸ τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ
ἡδὺν ἀπλῶς—ἔστιν. μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά· καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν
δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τοιτοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. σπανίας δ'

τί διαφέρει, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ποτ' ἔστι τὸ φιλεῖν. [καὶ] πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθόν.
κἀν εἰ μὴ ἡδύς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο, διχῶς δὴ λεγόμενον τρεῖς φιλίαι,
πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τὸ κατ' ἀνέγκειαν οὐκ αἰετὶ ἡδύνης φαίνεται. ὁλοκ
δ' ὅτι ὡς περ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἱ πρὸς φάτοι θεωρίαι καὶ μαθηματικαὶ
αἰσθηταὶ μάλιστα τῷ ἡ' αὐτῶν καὶ αἱ τῶν σινητήτων ἀναγνωρίσεις, καὶ
ὁ λόγος δ' αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν. φύσει γοῦν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς,
καὶ οἷε ἀγαθόν, τοῖσι τοῖς ἡδύ. διὰ εἰθὺς τὰ ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις χαίρει, καὶ
ἀνθρώπῳ ἡδιστον ἀνθρώπος. ὡς' ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ τελειῶν, ὁλοκ ὅτι ἐπὶ
τελειωθέντι· δ' δὲ σπουδαῖος τέλειος. εἰ δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀνέγκειαν φιλεῖν
μετ' ἡδονῆς ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῆς ἀλλήλων γινώσκου, ὁλοκ ὅτι καὶ αἰετὶ

second is based on a pleasure which
can only be felt by a like person on
recognizing acts like his own. As-
sparius, followed by Grenti, takes καθ'
ὁμοίωτα in the sense of 'metaphori-
cally,' 'by analogy' (cf. Ind. a v. ὁμοίω-
ται), but this would imply the doctrine
that friendship δι' ἡδονῆν ἀπλῶς was
true friendship, whereas from 1153 b 6
we see that *all* friendship based on
pleasure is only φιλία καθ' ὁμοίωτα.
On the other hand, to put a comma
after φιλοῦντι with the other editors
would make Aristotle say that *all*
friendship is based on similarity, which
would be to prejudge the λόγος of the
ἀπορία stated 1155 a, 39 sqq., and that
in a manner inconsistent with the
λόγος actually given below.

ταύτη καθ' αὐτοὺς. Strict gram-
mar would require either ταύτη καθ'
αὐτῆς or ταύτοις καθ' αὐτοῦς, but the
change from the abstract to the per-
sonal is in complete accordance with
Greek idiom being in principle the
same as the use of πόλις in reference
to the name of a town. All the four
advantages belong to this φιλία, and

that too essentially and therefore
permanently.

ταύτη γὰρ ὁμοιοι, i.e. ὅτι ἀγαθόν.
Both being good they will be ἀγαθὸν
ἀλλήλοις, as shown above. The read-
ing I have adopted has far the highest
authority (H² I² Asp.), and makes
sense (not sense as we only put a comma
after it). The other reading ταύτη δὲ
ὁμοιοι καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ('and the remaining
εἰδη φιλίας are like it') is mentioned by
Asparius and is plainly untenable
to his erroneous interpretation of καθ'
ὁμοίωτα above. For the same gives
to ταύτη ὁμοιοι, cf. 1157 b. 2 where I
can hardly mean anything else.

καὶ τὰ λοιπά, 'the remaining two
of the four advantages enumerated
above explained by τὸ τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν
καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς. Hitherto καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
has been taken either as an accusative
limiting ὁμοιοι or as the subject of ἔστιν.

ἔστιν. My interpretation of τὸν
makes it necessary to give ἔστιν the
full force of ἔστιν or ὑπάρχει. This
is quite in accordance with Greek
idiom, which repeats a compound
verb by the corresponding simple verb.

εἰκός τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ 15
προσδίδεται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ
οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας σινα-
ναλώσαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι ἐν πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους,
9 πρὶν ἂν ἑκάτερος ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητός καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ
δὲ ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βοῦνται μὲν 30
φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασιν·
βοῦλῃσι μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὐ.

IV. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ
λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτ' αὐτὴ γίνεται καὶ ὁμοία

ἡ φιλία ἢ πρῶτη ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων, ὅτι
ἀγαθὰ ται ἡδῆς. ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ φιλία ἔξτε ἀφ' ἧς ἡ τοιαύτη προαίρεσις.
τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια, αὕτη δ' ἢ ἡκὶ ἐξω ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ τῷ
φιλοῦντι, ἐνείμειναι δὲ πάσης ἔδω· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ <ῆ> ἑτέρῳ. διὸ
τὸ φιλεῖν χαίρειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἐστίν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι
φιλητοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ καὶ φιλίας, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἀμύνῃ, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν
ἀμύνη· φιλεῖται γὰρ καὶ τὴ ἀψυχα· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν
τὸ φιλοῦμενον [εἰ] ἐστὶ χρῆσθαι ἢ φιλοῦμενον, ὁ δὲ φίλος φιλοῦμενον
τῷ φίλῳ ἢ φίλῳ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἢ μουσικὸς ἢ ἰατρικὸς· ἡδονὴν τοίνυν ἢ ἀπ'
ἐντοῦ, ἢ αὐτοῦ, αὕτη φιλία. αὐτὸν γὰρ φιλεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλος. ὥστ'
ἂν μὴ χεῖρη ἢ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡ πρῶτη φιλία. οὐδὲ δὲ ἐμποδίζειν οὐθέν
τῶν συμβιβηκῶτων μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὐφραίνειν. εἰ γὰρ σφόδρα
ἐκπᾶσθαι, λέγεται· ἀγαπᾶται γὰρ τῷ εὐνοεῖν, σελῇ δὲ μὴ.

Cf. Plato, *Phd.* 59 b, where *παρὴν* is
repeated by *ἦν*.

§ 2. ἐν δὲ κ.λ. Another reason
for the rarity of such *philia*. The
verb *προσδίδεται* is properly used of
the *conditio sine qua non* which is
not itself a part of the thing. Cf.
1000 a, 31 n.

τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας FE 1238 a
τὸ δὲ οἱ παροιμίαι ἐληλίσσε δὲ μέδμενοι
τῶν ἅλων. In this precise form the
verb does not seem to occur earlier;
but the phrase *ἅλας καὶ τράπεζα* was
commonly used of 'eating one's salt
and sharing one's board'.

ἀποδέξασθαι, *summare*, cf. 1157b, 18
1065 b, 15. 1169 a, 8.

§ 3. βοῦλῃσι. *φιλίας*, i.e. *ἐθνοια*,
cf. 1155 b, 32.

IV. § 1. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν κ.λ. A
comparison between the *ἀπλῆς φιλίας*
and *ἐκτέλες φιλία* gives the answer to
the question whether there are more
εἰδη φιλίας than one. Strictly
speaking there is only one, the rest
are only *φιλία κατ' ὁμοίωσιν*. But,
as current language calls these *φιλία*
also, it will be best for us to do
so too. There are then three *εἰδη*
φιλίας in the popular sense of the
word.

καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ, the remaining
ἀπαραίτητα, viz. *grief* and *pleasure*
both *ἐννοεῖσιν* and τῷ φιλοῦντι.

35 ἐκατέρῃ παρ' ἐκατέρου, ὑπερ διὰ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν. ἡ δὲ
 1157* διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδέει
 ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιού-
 τοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοὶ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις αἱ φι-
 λίας μένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον
 5 ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὗτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον
 τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὥς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῃ. οὐ γὰρ
 ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονταὶ οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκείνῳ, ὁ
 δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγοῦσιν δὲ τῆς ἡρας
 εἰς ὅτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ἡ
 10 ὀφεί, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία)· πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμε-
 νουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τι ἤθῃ στήρξωσιν, ὁμοφύθι-
 οντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ
 χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἦτιεν φίλοι καὶ δια-
 μένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἴμα τῷ συμ-

καὶ κατὰ πάντα κ.τ.λ., 'and in respect of them all each gets from each the same and similar things.'

ὁμοίωμα ἔχει, but only in the sense of having τινόν τι, the sense in which παιδίον ἐκείδῃ Pol. I 339 b 32 ὁμοίωμα ἔχειν τῷ τέλει, because both imply pleasure. It is not even a ὁμοίωμα like that between things which are εἶδη ἐν, but αἰσιν of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττω (cf. II 54 b, 14 n.), they are not 'like' in the sense that white lead is 'like' snow. For we must not infer from Aristotle's mention of εἶδη which admit of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττω that he meant to apply this to φίλοι. They were only adduced to show that the argument advanced (by Dremeiros?) was sufficient.

καὶ ἐν τοῦτοις, sc. ἐν τοῖς καθ' ὁμοίωματα φίλοις.

μένουσι. I.^a has διαμένουσι, but the compound is referred to by the simple verb, cf. I 150 b, 13 n.

ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται κ.τ.λ. The forms of φίλοι in which the two parties do not get the same thing from one

another are discussed in Book IX and there for the first time get the name of ἀποροῦντες φίλοι (I 163 b, 31 A), the φίλοι discussed in this book are ὁμοειδῆ καὶ αὐτὰς εἰς δύο εἰς διὰ τὸ εἶδος (I 163 b, 31 A) ὁμοειδῆ.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ The ὁμοίωμα to τὴν φιλίαν is πᾶσι κοινόν when there is τινόν τι, not only a pleasure but of the same pleasure.

ληγοῦσιν δὲ κ.τ.λ., interpreted by Plato, Symp. I 193 c ποταμοὶ δ' ἑστὶν εἰς ὅσον ὁ ἐραστὴν ὁ παθόμενος, ὁ καὶ σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκείνου γὰρ οὐδὲ μόνον ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦνον ἐρῶν πρότερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπὸ τοῦ ληγοῦντος, ὡς περὶ τῆς, ἀφεται ἀποσπόμενος, πολλὰν λέγει καὶ ὑποσχέσθαι ἀποσπόμενος. αὐτὸν ἔχοντος χρῆσται βέβαιον ἐραστῇ δὲ βῶ μιν αὐτὸ μόνον σπασσέναι.

§ 2. ἦτιεν φίλοι less even so those who exchange different pleasures. Of course ἦτιεν goes with διαμένοντες as well as φίλοι.

φέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ 15
 τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ δια τὸ χρησιμον καὶ
 φαῦλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐπικεικίς
 φαῦλοις καὶ μηδετέρον ὁποιποῦν. δι' αὐτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι
 3 μὴ τις ὠφέλεια γίνοιτο. καὶ μόνῃ δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φι- 20
 λία ἀδιαβλήτος ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ῥηδίων οὐδενὶ πιστεῖσαι περὶ
 τοῦ ἐν πολλῇ χρόνῳ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ δεδοκιμασμένου· καὶ τὸ "πι-
 στεῖναι" ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ "μηδεποτ' ἐν ἀδικήσαι," καὶ ὅσα
 ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ ὥς ἀληθῶς φιλέει ἐξισχύται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἑτέραις
 4 οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι 25

1157 a. 16. FE. 1237 b, 8 αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἣν
 πάντες ὁμολογοῦνται· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δι' αὐτὴν καὶ ἡκοῖσι καὶ ἀμφισβη-
 τοῦνται. βίβλαν γὰρ τι δευτέ· ἡ φιλία· μόνῃ δ' αὕτη βεβαίως. τὸ γὰρ
 κεκριμένον βέβαιον, τὰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ γινόμενα μὴδὲ βραδίως [οὐ] ποιεῖ τὴν

μηδετέρον ὁποιποῦν, 'one who is
 neither good nor bad to a person of
 any character you please.'

τοῖσι, the reciprocal reflexive, an
 emphatic ἀλλήλοις. Cf. 1155 b, 10 n.

ἀδιαβλήτος. The proper meaning
 of διαβállειν is 'to set at variance,'
 'to estrange.' The meaning 'to mis-
 represent,' 'slander' is secondary.

τὸ πιστεῖναι κ.τ.λ., 'the sayings
 πιστεῖναι ("I trust him") and οὐδέποτ'
 ἐν ἀδικήσαι ("He would never do me
 wrong").

ἐν τούτοις, sc. ἐν ταῖς ἀγαθοῖς.

§ 4. ἐπεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'I say ἐν
 ταῖς ἑτέραις (sc. φιλίαις); for, since
 people call them φίλοι, we may do
 so too, though strictly speaking only
 the friendship of the good, as τελεία
 φιλία, deserves the name. But, if we
 use the word in the comprehensive
 way, we must allow more εἰδὴ φιλιῶν
 than one. Eudemus is at pains to
 point out exactly where the unity of
 these different φιλιῶν lies. They are
 not καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα οὐ συνώνυμα

as the εἶδη of one γένος, since the
 γένος is only predicated of one of
 them καθ' αὐτό. Nor are they mere
 chance ὁμώνυμα (cf. 1019^b b, 17 n.);
 for they are all called φίλοι in
 virtue of a common element. They
 are πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα, just as the
 ἀρετὴ of a pair is so called πρὸς τὸ
 τέλος (Pol. 1260 a. 35), i.e. in the
 light of what it will be when fully
 developed. Now this relation between
 the ἀτελής and the τελείος is just τὸ
 ἀνάλογον. For instance the less
 highly developed animals have not
 blood but something 'analogous.' Hiat.
 Αἱ 489 n. 28 ὅτι δὲ τούτοις τοῖς μὲν
 εἶμα καὶ φλέψ, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον
 τούτων· ὅτι δ' ἀτελὴ τὰ τούτα, οὐκ ἐν
 μὲν ἐν τὸ δὲ ἴσχυρ (for the biological
 theory see Zeller, *Aristot. c. Eng. Trans.*
 v, 2, 274). The different φιλιῶν are
 therefore τῷ ἀνάλογον ἐν or καθ'
 ὁμοίωσιν, for this is the only kind of
 unity that can exist between the
 undeveloped and the developed, just
 as it is the only kind that can exist

λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἔνκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἵσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, εἶδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθῶν, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὁμοῖόν τι, ταύτῃ φίλοι·

εἰσὶν ὁρθήν. οὐκ ἴσται δ' ἄντι πάντως φιλία βίβλιος ἡ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἄντι χρόνου. δεῖ γὰρ πῦρην λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ λέγει καὶ Εὐέργης·

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἄνδρὸς νόον οἷδ' ἔχοντος,
πρὶν περᾶν αὐτῆς ὥσπερ ὑπερλινγίου.

οὐδ' ἄντι χρόνον φίλος, ἀλλὰ βυβίλοντας φίλοι, καὶ μάλιστα λαμβάνει ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ὡς φιλία. ὅταν γὰρ προθύμως ἔχουσι φίλοι εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὑπηρετεῖν τὰ φιλικὰ ἀλλήλους, οἰοῦνται οὐ βουλεσθαι φίλοι, ἀλλ' εἶναι φίλοι. τὸ δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας.

between different *γένη*. We see then that Aristotle does not adopt the suggestion he made that the difference is one of *μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον*, for that difference is expressly contrasted with τὸ ἀνάλογον. Cf. Hist. An. 368 a, 23 τὰ μὲν γὰρ (sc. ζῷα) τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν διόρθωσιν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀνάλογον διαφέρει. The true doctrine is that the other *φιλίας* are so called because they show in a rudimentary and undeveloped way the characteristics of true *φιλία*, and it is only to avoid unnecessary conflict with current language that we speak of them as *εἶδη φιλίας* at all.

ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις. ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες. People talk of 'friendship states' and of children 'playing with their friends,' and we must respect the *usus loquendi* if possible. Strict grammar would require ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες (it is quite wrong to supply λέγουσι or ἀναμύθουσι); but Greek idiom can use the nominative after ὥσπερ without regard to the structure of the sentence.

πρώτως καὶ κυρίως. *εἰρη.* *κενέρον* καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. *κατὰ μεταφοράν* Cf. Bonitz on *Μοί.* 1012 b, 11

ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι, sc. *φιλίαν*, to be separated from φίλοι. Το ὅλο ὡς καὶ φαινόμενος ἀγαθόν, and therefore built up an 'analogous' position in their minds to that of τὸ ἀγαθόν in true *φιλία*.

καὶ ὁμοῖον τι, sc. *φίλον*. This is another point of 'analogy.' Their *φίλοι* is based, like that of the good, on the fact that *εὐδαιμονία καθ' ἡδονὴν αἰσθητὰ πράξει καὶ αἰ τολύται*. The acts of (e.g. the *εὐδαιμόνων*) are pleasant to the *εὐδαιμόνων*, just as the acts of the good man are pleasant to the good man. Again, however, we have a variety of interpretations due, as I have 1126 b, 20 to the two senses in which τὰ ὁμοῖον and ὁμοιότης are used throughout this passage. In L¹ n after *ὁμοῖον* is omitted, and this shows that the passage was understood to mean 'in so far as it is something good and *like the good*.' But the locus sight of one point in the analogy.

5 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάντῳ δ' αὐταὶ
 συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον
 καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμ- 35
 βεβηκός.

6 Ἐς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας νυνεμημένης οἱ μὲν 1157^b
 φαῦλοι ἴσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον. ταύτῃ
 ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοί.
 οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ τῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
 καὶ τῷ ὁμοιωσθαι τούτοις. V. ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν 3
 οἱ μὲν καθ' ἕξιν οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω

οὐ γὰρ εἰ βούλονται ἡγιοῖναι, ἡγιόνουσιν, ὥστ' οὐδ' εἰ φίλοι βούλονται,
 ἡδὴ καὶ φίλοι εἰσὶν. σημεῖον δὲ· εὐδαίμωνος γὰρ οἱ διακείμενοι ἀνευ
 πειρας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πείραν δεδῶκασιν ἄλλήλοισι,
 οὐκ εὐδαίμωνος περὶ ὧν δὲ μὴ, πεισθῆναι ἂν ὅταν σύμβολα λέγωσιν εἰ
 διαβέβηκότες. ὅμοι δὲ φανερόν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις αἴτιη ἢ φιλία·
 ἐπιτωτικὴ γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος καὶ κακῆς πρὸς πάντας· αὐτῷ γὰρ μετρεῖ τοὺς
 ἄλλους. διὸ εὐξέπαπτότεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί, ἂν μὴ διὰ πείραν
 ἀπιστώσιν· οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι αἰροῦνται τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ὥτι τοῖς φίλοις,
 καὶ αἷε εἰ φιλεῖ μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ πράγματα· ὥστ' οὐ φίλοι· οὐ
 γὰρ γίνεται οὕτω κοινὰ τὰ φίλων· προκινέμεται γὰρ ὁ φίλος τοῖς

§ 6. οὐ πάντῳ συνάπτουσιν, 'are not
 very apt to coincide.' It is a mistake
 to suppose that οὐ πάντῳ means 'not at
 all' in classical Greek, in spite of
 Cobet's contention to that effect.
 Where it seems to mean 'not at all,'
 it is only by a litotes; just as οὐχ
 φανερόν may seem to mean μάλιστα.
 The friendship of the good is neces-
 sarily both pleasant and useful (1156 b,
 18), but a friendship for pleasure is
 not very likely to be useful, nor a
 friendship for use very likely to be
 pleasant.

οὐ πάντῳ συνδυάζονται, cf. 1101 a,
 16. Pleasure and profit belong to
 the friendship of the good essentially,
 but there is nothing to bind pleasure
 to profit nor profit to pleasure. As
 'accidents' they are 'not much found

in combination.' Cf. Met. 1027 a, 11
 οὐκ οὐδ' αἰεὶ οὐθ' ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ πάλυ ὁ
 λευκὸς μοιραῖος ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ δε γίνεται
 ποτε, κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν. The
 phrase, then, excludes the συνδυασμός
 of pleasure and profit from τὰ ὅτι ἐπὶ
 τὸ πάλυ.

§ 6. ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, cf. 1156 b,
 20 ff., and 1157 a, 31 §... ὁμοίως τι, cc.
 φιλοῦσι.

δι' αὐτοὺς, i.e. δι' ἄλλήλους, cf.
 1136 b, 10 n.

τῷ ὁμοιωσθαι, i.e. καθ' ὁμοίωσιν.

V. § 1. ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν
 κ.λ. Cf. 1098 b, 33 τῆς μὲν γὰρ
 ἡμετέρας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς
 ὑπάρχουσιν, οἷον τῷ ἀσθενοῦσι ἢ καὶ
 ἄλλοις πως ἐξηγητόν, τῆς δ' ἐνέργειας
 οὐκ οἶόν τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ
 οὐ πράξει.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σιζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἄλλο-
 λοις καὶ πορίζουσι τὰγαθὰ, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κερωρι-
 μένοι τοῖς τύποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὗτοι δ' ἔχουσιν ἄστ'
 10 ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τύποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν
 ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπειροσία
 γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην παιεῖν· ὅθεν εἶπται,
 "πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν." οὐ φαίνονται·
 15 οὐθ' οἱ πρεσβύτεροι οὐθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχυ-
 γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συντημεσθῆναι
 τῷ λυπηρῷ οὔτε τῷ μὴ ἡδέϊ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαί-
 νεται τὸ λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ]

πράγμασιν, οὐ τὰ πράγματα τοῖς φίλοις οὐ γίνεσθαι ἀρ' ἡ φίλ' α' ἢ
 πρώτη ἐν πολλοῖς ὅτι χαλεπὸν πολλῶν πείραν λαβεῖν· ἐκείνη γὰρ ἐπὶ
 ἔδει συζῆσαι. αὐτοὶ δὲ αἰρετέον ὁμοίως περὶ ἱματίων καὶ φίλου· κατα-
 ἐν πῶσι δοκεῖ τοῖς νοῦν ἔχοντος δυοῖν τὸ βέλτιον αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ μὲν
 τῷ χείρονι πάλαι ἐχρήσατο, τῷ βελτίονι δὲ μηδέπω, τοῖς αἰρετέον, ἀλλ'
 οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ πάλαι φίλου τὸν ἀγαπᾶ εἰ βελτίον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτῷ
 πάλαι οἰδᾷ μῦθε ἡμέρας ὁ φίλος, ἀλλὰ χρόνου διᾷ. ὅτ' εἰς παροιμίαν
 ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν αἰῶν· ἅμα δὲ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοί, εἰ δὲ φίλος ἴσται σοὶ φίλος. ἀγαθὸς μὲν γὰρ
 ἀπλῶς ἴσται τῷ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, φίλος δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθός, ἀπλῶς ὅδ'
 ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, ὅταν συμφωνήσῃ ταῦτ' ἑμφω, ὥστε ὁ ἴσται ἀπλῶς
 ἀγαθόν, τὸ τοῦτου ἄλλω, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς μὲν σπουδαίῳ, ἄλλω δ'
 ἀγαθός, ὅτι χρήσιμος. τὸ δὲ πολλοῖς ἅμα εἶναι φίλον καὶ τὸ φίλου
 κωλύει· οὐ γὰρ οἷον τε ἅμα πρὸς πολλοῖς ἐνεργεῖν

ἔστ' ἐνεργεῖν. It is not necessary
 to insert ἐν with Kamauier and
 Susemihl. Their εἴη is such as to
 become active at once when brought
 into contact with the object.

τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, καὶ τὴν ἔξω.

πολλὰς δὴ κτλ. We do not know
 the author of this version of "out of
 sight, out of mind." The word
 ἀπροσηγορία occurs nowhere else in
 classical literature. We expect it to
 mean want of 'affinity', but Aristotle
 seems to take it as simply "lack of

converse" (Peterson).

§ 2. οἱ στρυφνοί, 'sour.' The
 εἰδῶ των χυμῶν are given in Ar. 492 b, 11. They form a series between
 the opposite sweet and bitter, differing
 τῷ πολλῶν καὶ ὀλίγων ἀπὸ τοῦτο καὶ
 colours (i. 1145 b, 15 a). In the
 series το στρυφνὰ comes between
 ἀσπέρους, 'dry' (as we say of
 sherry) and τὸ ἔξω, 'acid.' It is the
 taste of unripe fruit. In its met-
 aphorical use as applied to ἔξω we
 have it in Ar. Wasps 877.

δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ σιζῶντες δέ. εὖνοις τοῖσιν
μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὥς τὸ συζῆν
—ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημριεῖν δὲ 20
καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις γὰρ εἶναι τοῖσιν ἥκιστα προσ-
ῆκει—συνδιαίγειν δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἐστὶ μὴ ἡδέως
ὄντας μὴδε χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρική δοκεῖ
ἔχειν.

4 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φίλια ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ 25

1157 b, 25. EE. 1238 a, 11 ἐὰν δὲ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι ὁρθῶς
λέγεται ὅτι ἡ φίλια τῶν βέλων, ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν αἰτίων,
καὶ ὁρθῶς εἴρηται

ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέλων, οὐ τὰ χρήματα.

καὶ δὲ ἄλλιον εἶπεν ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὅτι χρόνος λέγεται
δικαίως τὸν φιλομενον, καὶ αἱ ἀτυχίαι μᾶλλον τῶν εὐτυχιῶν· τότε
γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι κινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων (οὗτοι γὰρ μόνον ἀντὶ τῶν φύσει
ἀγαθῶν καὶ φύσει κακῶν, περὶ δ' αἱ εὐτυχίαι καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι, αἰροῦνται
μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπων ἢ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι)· ἡ δὲ ἀτυχία
δηλοῖ τοῖς μὴ ὄντως ὄντας φίλους, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τυγχόντας. ὁ
ἐκ χρόνος δηλοῖ ἀμφοτέρους· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρήσιμος ταχὺ δῆλος, ἀλλ' ὁ
ἡδὺς μᾶλλον· πλὴν οὐδ' ὁ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺς ταχύ. ὅμοιοι γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι
τοῖς οὐοῖς καὶ τοῖς σμασίν· ἐκείνων τε γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἡδὺ ταχὺ δηλοῖ, πλείω
δὲ χρόνον γινόμενον ἡδὺς καὶ οὐ γλυκύ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοίως.
ὥστε γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἡδὺ τῷ τέλει ὁμοίον καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ. ὁμολο-
γήσαινεν δ' αἱ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλ'
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς πάσι καλοῦσι γλῦκιν· τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀποβαίνειν
οἱ χ' ἡδὺ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνεχές, ἀλλὰ ἐκ πρώτων ἐξαπατᾷ.

§ 3. ἀποδεχόμενοι, *prodeunt*, cf
above 1246 b, 28

οἱ μακάριοι, *beati*, as opposed to
οἱ ἐνδεεῖς, those who are in need of
nothing. It is not necessary, however,
to limit the meaning so far as to
make it merely equivalent to οἱ
πλούσιοι.

μονώταις, cf 1057 b, 5 n.

ἡ ἐταιρική, i.e. φίλια.

§ 4. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν κ. τ. λ. The
emphasis of thought here seems to
be 17a. The distinction just drawn
between the *ἐξαι* and the *ἐνέργεια* of

φίλια suggests another important dis-
tinction which still further brings out
the nature of the *τελέα φίλια*. Al-
though it is true that something more
than the *ἐξαι* is necessary for it, we
must distinguish the *ἐνέργεια* which
comes from the formed *ἐξαι* and the
mere *ἐξαι* of *φίλων* which is the
material out of which the *ἐξαι* is
formed. The *ἐνέργεια* of true *φίλια*
is not a *τελέα*, but an *ἐνέργεια* which
is ἀπὸ τῆς *ἐξαι* and implies *προσμε-
ναι*. The distinction is just like that
between the *κινήσεις* which make up

πολλάκις εἰρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ αἰρετὸν το
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἐκάστη δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὃ δ'
 ἀγαθὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἑαυτοῦ ταῦτα. ἔσκε δ' ἡ μὲν φί-
 λησις παθεῖ, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἔξει· ἡ γὰρ φιλησις οὐχ ἡτοῦ
 30 πρὸς τὰ ἀψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφίλοισι δὲ μετὰ προαίρεσιν,
 ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἑξέως· καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς
 φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, οὐ κατὰ παθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑξιν
 καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· οὗ γὰρ
 ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ὃ φίλος. ἐκότερῃ
 35 οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι
 τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ εἶδει· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης, μά-

desires and the good activities which
 arise when the *θέλημα* is concerned.

τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον, i.e. ἀγαθὸν ἢ
 ἡδύ.

δι' ἑαυτοῦ ταῦτα, (1) διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς,
 (2) διὰ τὸ αὐτῷ

§ 5. *δοκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Three *σημεῖα*
 are given which show that true *φιλία*
 is a *ἔξις* (1) *ἀντιφίλησις* implies
προαίρεσις, (2) the *βούλησις* ἀγαθοῦ is
ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, (3) the *φιλοῦν* is το
ἀγαθόν. Ultimately this means that
φιλία is not an *ἀλλοιωσις* but a *τελεί-
 ωσις* of the soul. Cf. 1103 a, 23 ff.

ἡ γὰρ φιλησις κ.τ.λ. We can now
 explain why the word *φιλία* has a more
 restricted application than *φίλησις* (i.e.
 the verb *φιλῶν*, cf. above 1155 b, 29 ff.).
 It is just because *ἀντιφίλησις* implies
προαίρεσις and *προαίρεσις* implies a
ἔξις. For the presence of *προαίρεσις*
 as a means of distinguishing *ἔξις* from
πάθος cf. 1106 a, 3, where it is given
 as one of the arguments to show that
ἀρετή is not a *πάθος* but a *ἔξις*, that
 the *ἀρεταὶ* are *προαίρεσις* τινὲς ἢ οὐκ
 ἀπὸν *προαίρεσις*. Now it is clear
 that the reciprocal *οὐκ ἀφίλησις* must
 be 'deliberate' or *μετὰ λόγον*—no
 mere *ἀλλοιωσις* of το *δραστήον* could
 amount to reciprocity—and it there-
 fore implies the union of the intellectual
 with the appetitive, i.e. *προαίρεσις*,

and that implies a *ἔξις*.

καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται κ.τ.λ. The
 fact that the *βούλησις* is *ἐκείνων ἕνεκα*
 (ἐκείνων ἕνεκα) also shows that it can
 be no mere *πάθος*.

καὶ φιλοῦντες κ.τ.λ. The fact that
 the *βούλησις* is το *ἀγαθόν* as it is το *ἀγαθόν*
 it is no mere *πάθος*. It always re-
 quires a determinate *ἔξις* to make τι
φειδόμενον ἀγαθόν, the object of a
βούλησις, coincide with το *ἀγαθόν*
ἀγαθόν.

τῇ βουλήσει, the *βούλησις* ἀγαθόν
 is reciprocal (*ἀνταποδίδωσι*, cf. *ἀντι-
 φίλησις*, *ἐν ἀντιστοιχείᾳ*, 1106 a).

καὶ τῷ εἶδει. The *φιλία* is (1) *ἐν
 ἰσότητι*, cf. το *ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι*, and
 also (2) *ὁμοῦ* as expressed below
 1158 b, 1: τὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν οἱ
αἰσθητὰ (cf. 1107 a, 4 ff.) καὶ *βούλησις*
ἀλλήλοις as contrasted with the *οὐ
 μαινεῖται φιλία* in which *ἑτέρου* or
ἑτέρου κατὰ δόξαν, *ἐκείνων ἕνεκα*
ἀπ' ὁφείας (1158 b, 2). This part
 is as important as the other and should
 hardly be omitted here. The E
 reading καὶ τῷ ἡδύι seems to be to
 spoil the argument, though it would
 show that they give each other
 equal pleasure.

φιλότης ἰσότης. This is said to be
 a Pythagorean formula.

- λιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύθ' ὑπάρχει. VI. ἐν δὲ τοῖς 1158^a
στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἦττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, ὅσοι
δυσκολωτέροι εἰσι καὶ ἦττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα
γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλία. διὸ
νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὐ· οὐ γὰρ γί- 5
νονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυ-
φνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἶναι μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοισ'· βούλονται
γὰρ τάγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαιτῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ
πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοισ,
2 α' δὲ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικὰ. πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον 10
κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἔνδεχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐράν
πολλῶν ἅμα (ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα
πίφθηκε γίνεσθαι)· πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν
3 σφόδρα οὐ βράδυν, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμ-
πειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχαλεπόν. 15
διὰ τὸ χρησίμους δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχε-
ται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπη-
4 ρεσίαι. τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλία ἢ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν

1158 a, l. EE 1238 a, 30 ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη φιλία, καὶ δι' ἣν αἱ
ἄλλαι λέγονται, ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐστὶ, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ

VI. § 1. ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς
π.τ.λ. This is not a duplicate of
1157 b, 13-14. It is true that the
same facts are referred to, but it is
for a different purpose. In the first
passage it is stated that the "sour and
elderly" do not produce the *ἐνέργεια*
of *φιλία*, which is one sign among
others that true *φιλία* is a *τελειωσις*
and, therefore, though it cannot suffer
ἀλλοιωσις, it may be lost *ἀλλοιούμενων*
τούτων (cf. 1103 a, 15 n). Here we are
speaking of the *εὐρήσεις* (*ἀλλοιωσις*,
σέβη) called *φίλῃσι* which are the
ποιητικὰ φιλίας, and it is pointed out
that they too are absent from nature's
past their prime.

§ 2. ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ. This is

really another σημῆσις that true *φιλία*
is *τελής*. Like love, it cannot have
many objects, and the reason is that,
like it, it is an *ὑπερβολή*. Now one
of the definitions of τὸ εἶλεον is τὸ
κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ οὐ μὴ ἔχειν ὑπερ-
βολὴν πρὸς τὸ γένος (Met. 1024 b, 15).
οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, sc πολλοὺς
βράδιον

§ 3. πολλοὶ γὰρ π.τ.λ. The two
things which make *τελής φιλία* rare
are (1) the small number of the good,
(2) the time it takes to form.

§ 4. τούτων δὲ π.τ.λ. The two
ἀρετῆς φιλίας are now contrasted with
each other.

ὅταν ταῦτά κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1157 a,
4-14.

ταῦτά ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ χαίρωσι ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς
 20 αὐτοῖς, οἵαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μάλλον γὰρ ἐν
 ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρησίμων ἀγοραῖον
 καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δύνανται, ἡδέων δὲ
 συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονταί τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλέγον μὲν
 χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οἷδ' αὐτο
 25 τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ἔχ-
 τοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιοῦτους ὄντας, καὶ ἐτι αἰετοῖς
 οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς 5
 ἐξουσίαις διηρημένοι φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις· ἀλλὰ
 γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσι χρήσιμοι καὶ ἑτεροὶ ἡδεῖς, ἄμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ

εἴρηται πρότερον· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἐγγίονται φιλίαι καὶ ἐν ταισὶ καὶ θηρίοις
 καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις. ὅθεν λέγεται, "ἥλιξ ἦλικα τέρπει" καὶ

σακὸς παῖψ <ὁ> συνιτέηκεν ἥδονῃ.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλους εἶναι. τοὺς φαίλονε, οἷχ ὃ φαῖλον ἢ
 30 μῆτ' ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' οἷον ᾤκηκαί ἄμφω, ἢ ἢ μὲν φιληθὲς ὁ δ' ᾤδιος ἐστιν.
 καὶ ἢ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἀγαθόν καὶ ταύτῃ συναρμύττουσιν ἀλλήλους· ἐν
 χρήσιμοι ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ὠφελιμοί, οἷχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν
 προαίρεσιν, ἢ - ἢ - οὐδέτεροι. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν φαῖλεν αὐτοῖς
 φίλον. καὶ γὰρ χρησίμος ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὁ μὲν φαῖλος
 πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ σπουδαίῳ, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ πρὸς τὴν
 ὑπάρχουσαν, τῷ δὲ φαῖλεν πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ
 ἀγαθὰ, ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς, τὰ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ὃ τῷ

ἐλευθέριον· ἀγοραῖον. These words
 are properly contrasted, cf. below
 1161 b, 26.

καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ, opp. οἱ ἐνδεεῖς
 1137 b, 30.

οἷδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν. I do not
 know why Grant should doubt that
 Aristotle was capable of meaning this
 as a joke. It may be true that he
 jokes with difficulty, but he was
 certainly not above a little banter of
 the *Academici*.

τοιοῦτοι ὄντας, sc. ἡδεῖς, καὶ ἐτι
 αὐτοῖς sc. ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἡδεῖς. This
 gives all four *ἐνδεχόμενα*.

38. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις. *Αἱ*
λέγει τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐξουσίαις, cf. 1095 b, 112.
 The obvious fact that princes and
 potentates have two sets of friends
 confirms our doctrine. They wish to
 have all the advantages that can be
 derived from friendship; but, as it
 were, *συνδίδουσι τὰ κατὰ συνθήκην*
 (1137a, 31 n.), they cannot also reward
 pleasant needs who are also useful.
 So they have both 'agreeable *ἡδεῖς*'
 (*suavia*, *philosophici*, *amicus*), and
 also 'able henchmen' (*mei*, for
 instance, who can poison a *friend*
 some brother) at their courts. *Amicus*

οὐ πᾶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους 30
εἰς τὰ καλὰ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφίεμενοι,
τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθεῖν, ταῦτα δ' οὐ πᾶν γίνεται
6 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπου-
δαῖον· ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, εἰ μὴ
καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἐσάξει ἀναλογον 35
ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πᾶν δ' εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.

συμφέρι ἢ νόσου, <καὶ> ταῦτα τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν ἕνεκα, ὥσπερ καὶ
αὐτὸ τὸ φάρμακον πιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ βούλεται * *. ἀλλὰ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα
βούλεται. ἐτι καθ' οἷς τρόπους καὶ ἀλλήλοις οἱ μὴ σπουδαῖοι εἶναι
φίλοι· εἴη γὰρ αἱ ἡδὺς οἷς ἢ φίλος, ἢ ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν ἀσυνῶν τινος μετέχει,
οἷον εἰ μυκητικός· ἐτι ἢ ἐνι τι πᾶσιν ἐπικαίς· διὸ εἰς αἱ ἀμνηστικὰ εἶναι
ἂν καὶ σπουδαῖον. ἢ ἢ προσημνύονται ἐκάστῳ· ἔχουσι γὰρ τι πᾶντες
τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

know all about this from personal
experience in Macedonia. We may
see the same thing in the case of
Frederica the Great.

τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοὺς δὲ 30
For the "twofold use of the article"
cf. 1157 a 19 n. We must take
δεινοῦς as a secondary predicative
object after ζητοῦσιν. 'They seek
others who shall be skilful at executing
orders.' For the predicative object
after ζητοῦσιν cf. 1137 a, 22 n.

§ 6. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ α.τ.λ. This
section answers the question 'why do
tyrants not avoid the necessity of
having two sets of friends by taking
good men as their friends?'

ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι α.τ.λ. * But such
a man (τοιοῦτος = ὁ τοιοῦτος) does
not become a friend to one who
exceeds him (in power, i.e. τῷ τυ-
ραννί), unless he (the good man) is
exceeded (by the tyrant) in goodness
as well as (καὶ) in power. Unless
this is so, the good man is not
equivalent to the tyrant by being
exceeded in power (οὐκ) in propor-
tion to the amount by which he is
exceeded in goodness. Such tyrants

are not found every day' (on ὁ πάντων
see Ind. a. 9.). This is how recent
editors (Grant Stewart) take the
passage. The old view according to
which ὁ ὑπερέχων and οὐκ ὁ σπουδαῖος
is the subject of ὑπερέχεται is gram-
matically improbable and morally
absurd. It would make Aristotle
say that the good man would find
it easier to be the friend of a tyrant
the worse the tyrant was! This
sentence is really the close of a long
debate Plato had suggested in the
'Laws' that, even if philosophers
could not be kings, a philosopher
might do something as the friend of
a young tyrant. Aristotle, who knew
what court life was, renounces the
idea. It is better to lecture on *politikḗ*
with the hopes of training a *νομοθέτης*.

οὐκ ἐσάξει. For *ἐσάξει* intransitive
cf. 1154 b, 24, 1167 b, 2. Aristotle
has not yet explained what he meant
by ἀναλογον ὑπερεχόμενος and he
has only been led into mentioning it
here by the case of the tyrant. We
shall see from the next section that
the principle is the same as that of
Distributive Justice. If the tyrant is

1158^b Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ αἰτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βοῦλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας· ὅτε δ' ἡττόν εἰσιν αὐταὶ φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται. 5 δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταύταις εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίας· καθ' ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τίς κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἰδὺ ἔχει ἢ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κικεύη), τὰ δὲ τῆς μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως

1158 b. 1. EE. 1238 b, 15 τρία μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα φιλίας ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τοῖσι κατ' ἰσότητά πως λεγεται ἡ φιλία καὶ γὰρ οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ἐν ἰσότητι πως εἰσιν ἀρετῆς φίλοι ἀλλήλοις ἄλλη δὲ διαφορὰ ταύτων ἢ κατ' ὑπερβολήν, ὡς περ θεοῦ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον εἶδος φιλίας, καὶ ὅπως ἀρχαῖοι καὶ ἀρχομέναι καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἕτερον· κατ' ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἴσον, κατ' ἀρχαίαν δ' οὐκ ἴσον ἐν ταύτῃ τῷ γένει πατὴρ πρὸς υἱόν καὶ ὁ εὐεργέτης πρὸς τὸν εὐεργετηθέντα, αἰτῶν δὲ ταύτων διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἄλλη πατὴρ πρὸς υἱόν καὶ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς γυναῖκα, αἴτη μὲν ὡς ἀρχιστος καὶ ἀρχομενοί, ἡ δὲ εὐεργέτης πρὸς εὐεργετηθέντα ἐν ταύταις δὲ ἡ οἷα ἐνίστοι ἢ εἰς ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι γαλοῖον γὰρ εἰ τις ἰσχυρὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὅτι καὶ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλεῖται, ἢ τῷ ἀρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομενῷ φιλεῖσθαι γάρ, οἱ φιλεῖν τοῦ ἀρχοντος, ἢ φιλεῖν ἄλλον τρόπον, οὐ ἡδοτὴ διαφέρει, οὐδὲν ἢ τε τοῦ αὐτάρκους ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῖ ἀντήματι ἢ πατρὶ καὶ τοῖ διδούσι ἐπὶ τῷ γινυμένῳ οἷα δ' αὐτως καὶ ἐστὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δι' ἡδονὴν οἱ μὲν κατ' ἰσότητά εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ κατ' ὑπεροχὴν. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἐκείνους οἰόμενοι ἐγκαλεῖσιν, εἰ μὴ ὁμοίως χρήσιμοι καὶ εὐ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁῖον δ' ἐν ταῖς

as much better than the philosopher as he is more powerful, there will be a proportionate equality between them, and therefore the possibility of *philia*, though not *philia* of the kind we have been discussing in heretofore, but a *φιλότης* κατ' ἄλλαν ἣν ἡ γίνεται πως ἰσότητι (1158 b, 27).

§ 7. Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. We now pass from *philia* to *ισότητι*, which is to ἀντιστοιχεῖν and resembles to

διορθωτικῶν διαισιν, το φιλία κατ' ὑπεροχῆς, which is κατ' ἄλλαν καὶ resembles to ἀντιστοιχεῖν διαισιν. It is of great help in the interpretation of this Book to keep this analogy in view.

οὐ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται, καὶ οὐ καὶ ὁμοιότης, ἢ καταλλάττονται κ. ὅ ταῖς ἀνομοιότησιν.

αὐτῶν, 'the latter,' καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτῶν.

μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φι- 10
λίας δὲ ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης. VII. ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας
εἶδος το καὶ ὑπεροχήν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅπως πρεσ-
βυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρὶ τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρ-
χοιτι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ ἀλλήλων·
οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ὑπ- 15
χομένους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα,
οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα
γὰρ ἐκάστω τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι'
ἡ φιλοῦσιν. ἕτεροι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.
2 ταῦτά μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θιτέρου οὔτε δεῖ 20
ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπαρέμῃ ἢ δεῖ τοῖς
γεννησάσι, γονεῖς δὲ υἱέσιν ἢ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος
ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπεικῆς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν

ἐρωτικαῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ αἷτιον τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἀλλήλοις παλλακίς. ἀγνοεῖ
γὰρ ἡ ἐρῶν ὅτι πῶς ἡ αἰτὶς λόγος αὐτῆς ἐπὶ τὴν προθεμίαν διὰ
εἰρηκαίης εὐκείης ὅ (εἴμελεν Εὐνικὸς Jacks^{on}) "ἐρώμενος τιατ' ἂν οὐκ
ἐρῶν λέγοι." οἱ δὲ νομίζουσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον.

b, 20. El. 1339 a, 1 ὥσπερ οἷν εἰρηται, τρων ὄντων εἰδὼν φιλίας,
κατ' ἀρετὴν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, αὐταὶ παλιν διήρηται
εἰς δύο· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον αἱ δὲ κατ' ὑπεροχὴν εἰσιν. φιλίᾳ μὲν
οὖν ἀμφοτέρω, φίλοι δ' οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ἀποπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ
ἐνὴν ποιεῖν φίλος, φίλοι δὲ γε καὶ φιλεῖται. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι μὲν
δεῖ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα, εἴην δὲ φιλεῖ, ὀνειδίζεται ὡς ἀντίειν φιλοῦν· τῇ γὰρ
αἰετῇ τῶν φίλων μετρεῖται καὶ τὰ ἴση. τὰ μὲν οὖν δι' ἡλικίας ὑπερῶν
αἰετῇ ὁμοίως φιλεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ γένος ἢ κατὰ ἄλλην
τοιότην ὑπεροχὴν. δεῖ δὲ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα ἢ ἦττον ἢ μὴ φιλεῖν ἀξιοῦν,
καὶ ἂν ἐφ' χρησίμῳ καὶ ἂν ἐφ' ἡδὲ καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς
μικραῖς ὑπεροχαῖς εὐκταὶ γίνονται ἀμφιβλητήσεις (τὸ γὰρ μικρὸν
ἐνιαχοῦ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, ὥσπερ ἐν ζυλοῦ σταθμῷ, ἀλλ' ἐν χροναῖ· ἀλλὰ

VII. § 1. κατ' ὑπεροχὴν, in the
mathematical sense of the word,
cf [31] v.

καὶ ἀλλήλων, as well as from the
φιλίας ἐν ἰσότητι.

§ 2 ταῦτά μὲν δεῖ καὶ λ. Friend
ship is ἐνδεῖται may or may not be

ὁμοιοῦς, friendship κατ' ὑπεροχὴν is
always ἀνομοιότης.

ἀνάλογον καὶ τὴν φιλήσιν δεῖ
γίνεσθαι. I do not think we should
press the meaning of καὶ, as if there
were anything other than the φιλία
which is 'in proportion.' Rather

πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὖσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φιλοσιν
25 δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τον ἡμῶν μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φίλῳ,
καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως·
ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἢ φιλήσει γίνηται, τότε γίνεταί πως
ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τοῖς δικαίαις καὶ ἐν τῇ 3
30 φιλίᾳ φαίνεται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον
πρῶτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ
τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρῶτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν
δευτέρως. δῆλον ὅ, ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γίνηται ἀρετῆς 4
ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἢ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσιν
35 ἀλλ' οἱδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανεστάτου δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν·
πλείστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον ὅτι
1159· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βυσσίδων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῖτοις ἡξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι
οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις εἰ
μηδεὶς ἀξιοί. ἀκριβὲς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις οὐκ ἔστιν 5

τὸ μικρὸν ὥς ἀκρίβως· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν οὐκ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν δὲ τὸ
ἐγγὺς μέγα, τὸ δ' ἄλλότριον διὰ τὸ πόρρω μικρόν· ὅταν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ
οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐπλητοῦσιν ὥς δεῖ ἢ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι
οἷον εἰ τις ἀξιοί τὸν θεόν. φανερόν δὲ ὅτι φίλοι μὲν, ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ
τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν ὃ ἔστιν αὐτῷ τοῦ φίλου εἶναι.

Aristotle has in his mind two forms of statement (1) καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν φιλοσιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, (2) ἀνάλογον τὴν φιλοσιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι. Even an English writer might say loosely 'if there is excess on either side, the affection must be in proportion as well'.

τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, e.g. τὸν ἡδίστον.

κατ' ἀξίαν, cf. 1131 a, 29 n.

πως ἰσότης, for τὸ ἀνάλογον in ἰσότητι λόγων, cf. 1131 a, 31 n.

§ 2. Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. In spite of the parallelism between ἢ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φίλοι and τὸ διαμενηνίου δίκαιον, there is really a great difference. In the latter the *proportion* is everything and it does not matter how great the excess may be.

In the former *aristocracy* in the word arithmetical sense is the *limit*, and if the excess goes beyond a certain limit *friendship* ceases altogether. The *division* of a democratic state is one form of justice among others. The friendship of equals is the typical friendship from which all others are variations. *Kathistos* (1131) goes so far as to say that, though they are φίλοι you cannot call the parties φίλοι.

§ 4. ἢ τινος ἄλλου, e.g. τοῦ γένους.

§ 5. ὥς τινος οἱ φίλοι, i.e. φίλοι, 'up to what point friends are not friends.' This is a 'brachylogy' of the type illustrated in Kühner § 591 Cf. especially Plato, *Menon* 89 a on

ῥιςμός, ὥς τίς οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ αφαιρουμένων ἐτι
 6 μένει, πολὺ δὲ χαρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκ ἐτι. ὅθεν καὶ 5
 ἀπορεῖται μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ
 μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐτι φίλοι
 ἴσονται αὐτοῖς, οἷδὲ δὴ ἀγαθὰ· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθὰ εἰ
 δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ
 ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δισι οὗτος ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκείνον· ἀνθρώπῳ 10
 δὴ ὅτε βουλησεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ. ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα·
 αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ. VIII. οἱ πολ-
 λοι δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
 φιλεῖν· διὸ φιλοκάλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ
 φίλος ὁ κύλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος καὶ μᾶλλον 15
 φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ

1159 a, 12. EE. 1239 a, 21 διήλον δὲ καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦσι μᾶλλον
 εἰ ἀνθρώποι τὴν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαν τῆς καθ' ἰσότητά· ἅμα γὰρ
 ὑπάρχει οὕτως αὐτοῖς τὸ τε φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχή. διὸ ὁ κύλαξ παρ'
 ἐκείνους ἐντιμότερος τοῦ φίλου· ἅμφω γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ
 ἀλλοτρίω. μάλιστα δ' οἱ φιλότιμοι τοιοῦτοι· τὸ γὰρ θαναμάζεσθαι

ἀν εἶναι φέρεται εἰς ἀγαθὰ, ὡς ἀγαθὰ.
 I do not therefore think it necessary
 to read *ἡ φιλία* as Bywater proposes
 (Conte, p. 60). Nor is there any
 difficulty in the singular *μένει* which
 follows.

ἀφαιρουμένων, 'subtracted' from
 the one party. *Αὐτῷ* he might
 equally well have said *προσθεμένων*,
 'added' to the other, for *ὑπεροχὴ*
 arises from *ἀφαιρέσις* and *προσθεσις*.

§ 8. ἀπορεῖται μή ποτ' οὐ, 'there
 is a difficulty as to whether perhaps...'

οὐ γὰρ ἐτι κ.τ.λ. The point is
 that in wishing a friend to become a
 god, you are wishing to deprive him
 of something good, namely your own
 friendship.

οὐτῷ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We shall come
 to the question of *φιλαντία* presently.

VIII. § 2. οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. We
 have said that *φιλία* in the
 primary sense is *ἐν ἰσότητι*, but we

have to account for the fact that the
 mass of men prefer *φιλία καθ' ὑπερο-
 χήν*. It is because they prefer to be
 loved rather than to love, and this is
 due to their love of esteem. It is
 easy to account for the love of flattery;
 the common run of men like to feel
 their superiority. It may seem more
 strange to say that men seek friend-
 ships in which the other party exceeds
 them, but this also is true. They love
 the friendship of the great because of
 the expectation of favours to come,
 and the friendship of the wise and
 good as a testimony to their own
 worth. In all these cases, however,
 the *φιλία* is only *ἀπὸ τοῦ καθ' ὑπερο-
 χήν* and not *καθ' αὐτό*, whereas the
 friendship of equals is *ἀπὸ τοῦ καθ'
 αὐτό* and therefore better.

προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος. Cf. Dem.
 de Cor. § 128 ὅρα μή τοῖσιν μὲν
 ἐχθρὸς ᾖ, ἐμὲ δὲ φρασεῖν.

τιμᾶσθαι, οὐ δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίεσθαι. οὐ δὲ αὐτὸ δ' εἰσάσσει
 αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι
 γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμᾶσθαι
 20 διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα (οἰοῦνται γὰρ τειχεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν ἂν τοι
 δέωνται· ὥς δὴ σημείω τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τ.μῇ·
 οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπισεικῶν καὶ εἰδότην ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βε-
 βαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκίαν δοξᾶν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι
 25 τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δε καθ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖτ-
 τον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ
 εἶναι. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι
 εἶναι. σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἐναι
 γὰρ διδάσκει τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδέναι,
 30 ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφοτερά μὴ ἐνδέχεται,
 ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς εἰσικεῖν εἶναι ἐὰν ὀρώσιν εὖ πρὶν τῶνται
 καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς κἂν ἐκείνοι μηδὲν ὦν μητρὶ προσ-

ἐν ὑπεροχῇ. φησὶ δὲ γίνονται οἱ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἱ δὲ φιλόμοι
 φιλητικοὶ δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἐκείνους δὲ
 φιλόμοις μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖσθαι
 τῆς ὑπεροχῆς φίλος· ὁ δὲ τῇ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ἡδονῇ ὁ φιλητικός· ἐστὶ
 γὰρ ἡ ἀναγκὴ ἐνεργεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός· ἐστὶ γὰρ
 ληϊθάνειν φιλοῦμενον, φιλοῦντα δ' αἶ· ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὸ
 φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν·
 σημείον δὲ ἔστι· ἐν ὁ φίλος μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται· ἀμφω γινώ-
 σκειν ἢ γινώσκεισθαι, οἷον ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς αἱ γυναῖκες ποιοῦσι, καὶ
 ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἢ Ἀντιφῶντος· καὶ γὰρ εἰκε τὸ μὲν ἐθέλειν γινώσκεισθαι
 αὐτοῦ ἐνείκα, καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν
 τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἐνεκα, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τῷ φιλεῖν
 πρὸς τοὺς τεθεωτάς ἐπαινοῦμεν· γινώσκουσι γὰρ, ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκονται

§ 2. ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις. Cf. 1095 b, 21 ff.

βεβαιῶσαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1095 b, 28 sqq.

§ 3. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν κ.τ.λ. Another reason why φιλία καθ' ὑπεροχῆς is not φιλία in the true sense. Whether we regard the ὑπερέχων or the ὑπερέχόμενος

μερος such φιλία is always διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, cf. 1099 a, 22 ff.

σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες κ.τ.λ. The σημείον derives its force from the fact that φιλία is φρεσι. We shall expect to find the characteristics of true φιλία in a rudimentary form (ἐν) even in purely instinctive feelings.

- 4 ἔχει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἀγνοίαν. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας
 εἴσης ἐν τῇ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων
 ὁρίτῃ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, 35
 5 οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ ταύτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ 1159^b
 ἄνισοι μάλιστα εἰεν φίλοι· ἰσάζονται γὰρ ἂν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης
 καὶ ὁμοιοτης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ὁμοιότης· μονιμοὶ γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους
 μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὐθ' ὑπηρετοῖσι τοιαῦτα, 5
 ἀλλ' ὥς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μήτ'
 αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μο-
 χθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς διαμέ-
 νουσιν ὁμοιοὶ ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι,
 6 χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδείς 10

1159 a. 33. EE. 1233 b, 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείονες τροποὶ φιλίας, καὶ πόσοι τροποὶ, ὅτι τρεῖς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι καὶ οἱ φίλοι ἀαφαιρῶσιν, οἱ τε κατ' ἰσότητα καὶ οἱ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, εἴρηται· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν λεγεται καὶ καθύλου μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐλέγχθη, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξωθεν συμπεριλαμβανόντων (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁμοίον φασιν εἶναι φίλον, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἰσακτῖον), λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τούτων πῶς εἰσι πρὸς τὰς εἰρημένους φιλίας. ἀναγεναὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ὁμοίον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν. τὸ τε γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἀπληθὺς, τὸ δὲ κακὸν πολέμορφον· καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ὁμοῖος αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται τὸ ἡδὺς, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ὁ ἀφῆκον υἱθὶς ἔοικεν ἑωθεν καὶ ἐσπέρας. διὸ εἰ μὴ συμβάλλωσιν οἱ φίλοι, οὐ φίλοι ἐαυτοῖς ἀλλὰ διόστανται· ἡ δ' οὐ βέβαιος φιλία οὐ φαλ' α. ὥστε οὕτως μὲν τὸ ὁμοῖον φίλον, ὅτι <τὸ> ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν, ὅστι δὲ ὡς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδὺ· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις ταῦθ' ἡδείς, καὶ ἕκαστον δὲ

§ 4. τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων (cf. above 1153 a. 29). Thus is another example. No one is praised for being loved.

§ 5. οὕτω δ' ἂν, sc. τῇ φιλεῖν (not precisely τῇ φιλεῖσθαι) κατ' ἀξίαν or ἀνάλογον. The συμπεριλαμβάνει may make up for his inferiority by the strength of his affection.

τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν, sc. ἀρίστων.

μόνιμοι καὶ αὐτοῖς, virtually

διαμένοντες ἀγαθοῖ ὅσους καὶ αὐτοῖς, from which it follows that they are permanently ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, their activities being 'the same or similar' 1155 b, 17.

οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς, much less ἀλλήλοις. We cannot be sure that the activities of one bad man will be the same or similar to those of another, as we can in the case of the good. See the fuller account in EE loc. cit. above.

ἐπὶ πλείον διαμίνουσιν· τὰς γὰρ ἂν πορίζουσιν ἡδέως ἢ
ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ
τὸ χρησίμων γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὲς
εἰδότε· οὐ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς αὐτῷ, τοῦτο ἐφείμενος ἂν
15 τιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ' αὖν τις ἔλκει καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ
ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν. δια φαίνονται καὶ οἱ
ἐρασταὶ γελοίοι ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν
ὁμοίως δη φιλητοῦς οὕτως ἴσως ἀξιώσκειν, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον
ἔχοντας γελοῖον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται το ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐπ' 1
20 αντίου καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἡ δ' ὀρεγίς τοῖ
μέσῳ ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ
γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖ
ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γὰρ ἴσως
ἄλλοτριώτερα.

φύσει αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡδύ. διὸ καὶ φωναὶ καὶ αἱ ἐξαι καὶ σπημερεῖς τις
δημογενεῖν ἡδίσται ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴσι· καὶ ταῖσι ἰσχυροῖς
καὶ τοῖς φαίλοις ἀλλήλους φιλεῖν.

κακός κακῷ δὲ συντέτρεται ἡδονῇ.

τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φίλον ὡς τὸ χρησίμων· αὐτὸ γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ
ὁμοίον ἀχρηστον. διὸ δεσπότης δούλου δαίται καὶ δούλος δεσποτα
καὶ γυνὴ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἐπιθυμητόν τὸ ἐναντίον κα
χρησίμων, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τελείῳ ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ὅταν γὰρ τιχῇ
οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἐν τῷ τέλει μὲν ἴσται, οὐκ ὀρέγεται δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τὸ
θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ. ἴσται δὲ πῶς καὶ ἡ τοῦ
ἐναντίου φιλία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὀρέγεται γὰρ ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ μετὸν· οἱ
σύμβολα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ σίσις γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μεσῷ
ἔτι κατὰ συμβεβηκεν οὕτε τοῦ ἐναντίου, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος
ὀρέγονται γὰρ οὐκ ἀλλήλων τἀναντία, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μεσσοῦ. ὑπερένυχθοντες
γὰρ, ἂν θερμανθῶσιν εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστανται, καὶ ὑπερψυχθόντες,
ἂν ψυχθῶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ μή, αἶν ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ,
οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέσοις. ἀλλὰ χαίρει ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμίας τῆς
φύσει ἡδίσται, οἱ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξισταῖσι τῆς φύσει ἴσται. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν
τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἐστίν· τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ᾖ ἐπὶ τῶν

§ 6. οἷον πένης, cf. 1147 b, 31 n.

ἄλλοτριώτερα, i. e. φουσιώτερα

§ 7. οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ κ.τ.λ. Cf. the
quotation from Euripides 1155 b, 3.

1155 b, 2.

IX. Ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ 25 ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἢ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐν ὑπόθεσιν γὰρ κοινωνία δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δέ· προσ- αγορεύουσαι γούν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρα- τιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις. καθ' ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ 30 δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία "κοινὰ τὰ φίλων," ὁρθῶς· ἐν κοι- νωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἐστὶ δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἑταίροις πάντα κοινὰ, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλ- λον αἱ δ' ἥττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ 35 ταῦτά γινώσκει πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, 1180^a οὐδ' ἑταίρους καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἐκάστους τούτων, καὶ αὐξήσιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρή- ματα ἀποστερησάι ἑταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ 5

ἐμφύχων. διὸ ἐνίοτε ἀναμνηστικῶς χαίρουσιν, οἷον αὐστηροὶ τέτραπέλοις καὶ ὀξεῖς ῥαθύμοις. εἰς τὸ μέσον γὰρ καθίσταται, ἐπ' ἀλλήλων. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλήχθη τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ δ' ἂν τὸ ἀγαθόν

1159 b, 25. EE. 1241 h, 11 δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ τε δίκαιον εἶναι ἴσον τε καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν ἰσοτηρίᾳ, εἰ μὴ μάτην λέγεται ἰσότης [ἡ] φιλότης. αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δικαίον τι εἶδος· κοινωνία γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ τοῦ δικαίου συνίστηκεν, ὥσπερ οὕτω εἶδη φιλίας, καὶ δικαίον καὶ κοινωνίης, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα σύνορα ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐγγὺν ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν.

IX. § 1. Ἔοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ. We pass now to the discussion of φιλία in particular, especially in the state. It is here that the parallelism of φιλία and δικαιοσύνη comes out most clearly. ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1155 a, 23 sqq.

περὶ ταῦτα, the things which are its matter, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, the persons who are its object. Cf. 1111 a, 1 n. π. δίκαιον. Cf. Plato Rep. 352 b, 21 sqq.

προσαγορεύουσαι γούν κ.τ.λ. The usual confirmation from current language necessary to set up an *ἐνδοξος*

πρόθεσις. So in English, 'My learned friend.' 'My Right Hon. friend.'

κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, often quoted by Plato. It is said to be a Pythagorean maxim. Cf. especially Usser, 307 a 25 sq. δὲ μὴ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ, φιλία οὐκ ἐν εἴῃ.

§ 2. Ἐστὶ δ' ἀδελφοῖς κ.τ.λ. This is an implied criticism of Plato's Republic.

§ 3. αὐξήσιν λαμβάνει, virtual praise of αὐξήσιν. Britanno com- munes ἐπίδωκεν λαμβάνει Soph. El. 153 b, 21.

- βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῶ ἢ ὀφειλῶ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ἐτιμούν
 ἄλλον. αἰξισθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ὅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ ἐ-
 καιον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα. αἱ
 δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίσις ὁίκασι τῆς πολιτικῆς· συμπο-
 10 ρεύονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζέμεναι τι τῶν
 εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφεροντος
 χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου
 γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθῆται στοχαζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι
 τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μερὲς
 15 τοῦ συμφεροντος ἐφικνται, ὅσον πλωτῆρες μετ' τοῦ κατὰ τὸν
 πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιοῦτου, συστρατιῶται
 δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε εἰρήνης ἢ πό-
 λεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται
 ἔναι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίνεσθαι, θιασμο-
 20 τῶν καὶ ἐρασιστῶν· αἷται γὰρ θυσίας ἔρεκα καὶ σινουσίας
 [πᾶσαι δ' αἷται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν ὁίκασιν εἶναι· αἱ γὰρ
 τοῦ παρόντος συμφεροντος ἢ πολιτικῇ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς

1160 a, 14. EE. 1241 b, 24 αἱ δ' ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι εἰσὶν [?]
 μόριον τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, ὅσον ἢ τῶν φρασεῶν ἢ τῶν ἡρώων, ἢ
 αἱ χρηματιστικαὶ ἐν πολιτείαις.

ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, masc. of the persons,
 ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα = περί ταῦτά 1159 b,
 29.

§ 4. τῆς πολιτικῆς, sc. κοινωνίας.
 συμπορεύονται, sc. of κοινωνοί, cf.
 below a, 25, especially of σύντροφοι and
 the like.

ὅτι τινι συμφέροντι, 'the condition
 upon which they make a journey in
 common in profit of some kind.' For
 the sense of *ἐπὶ* cf. 1150 a, 23.

τοῦ συμφεροντος χάριν. Pol.
 1278 b, 23 καὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συν-
 ἔχει, καὶ δὲ τὸν ἐπιβάλλει μὲν ἐκείνῳ
 τοῦ εἶναι καλῶς. We see from this
 that τὸ συμφέρον includes τὸ εἶναι καλῶς
 as well as τὸ εἶναι.

φασιν. For the *ἐκείνους* cf. Plato,

Rep. 389 c At. Pol. 1279 a, 11
 1281 b, 17.

§ 5. ἡ πόλις, Ratinieres takes
 stands this as referring either to cities
 trying to recover their cities or cities
 seeking for a new one. But the latter
 is more natural to think of a *πόλις*.
 For *εἶναι* cf. 1112 a, 24.

εἶναι δὲ σινουσίας. It is not
 that Hywater is right in holding that
 b, 23 *θυσίας* τε *σινουσίας* is a tautology
 continuous with this. I think it is
 however to assume an interpretation
 than a dislocation, and b 21 *σινου-
 δὲ* 23 *βίον* is not wanted here. It is
 repeated in substance at the end of
 the chapter.

τοὺς βίον] θυσίας τε ποιῶντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας
 ; τιμὰς <τε> ἀποκείμενους τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀνα-
 πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ 25
 φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκο-
 ῖον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχολάζον-
 ροῖς. πᾶσαι δὲ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς
 κ εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τριπλῆται φιλίας ταῖς
 ε κοινωνίαις.

Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβά-
 ν φθορὰι τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασι-

25, agreeing with κοινωνοὶ
 κοινωνίαι. Cardwell comp-
 ar. iii. 79. EHF. Or. 33.
 151, γ. Cf. also above

κατ'λ. They combine the
 the gods the θυσίαι) with
 relaxation (the εὐνοῖαι)
 τὰς πορίζοντες. This is
 last part, for it shows how
 nias are not merely for the
 leisure but for the sake of
 life. That they are for the
 vacation is proved by the
 the original festivals were
 e time of εὐχολή after the
 ck of the harvest. On
 acc. 112) b 33 n. Lambinus
 Hor. Epist. ii. 1, 139.

μεγίστην, i.e. in Aristotle's
 Cf. the argument in AN
 where the relative antiquity
 xortes is proved from the
 the festivals they managed.
 must be more recent than
 laws and the πολιμαρχοί
 e only manages τὰ ἐπιθετα.
 ἀρχαῖαι does not mean 'in
 the (valuable), but 'coming
 in ancient times,' 'original'
 d to ἐπίθετα.

ἀκολουθήσουσι, cf. above
 25 n.

Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.
 fications of constitutions, cf.

Plato Rep. 381 a, 399. 344 c, 399.
 Ac. Pol. 1279 b, 31 399. Rhe-
 1365 b, 39.

παρεκβάσις, 'deflections.' The
 name is taken from music where
 certain scales were called 'deflected.'
 Cf. b.E. 100. cit. p. 386. The fullest
 explanation of the meaning is given in
 Pol. 1290 a. 13 399., where we are told
 that oligarchy and democracy are
 commonly regarded as the typical
 constitutions, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευ-
 μάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ
 νότια, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις.
 People make aristocracy a kind of
 oligarchy and the πολιτεία a kind of
 democracy just as they make the west
 wind a deflection of the north and the
 east wind of the south. He goes on
 ἁμῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρμονίας,
 ὡς παρὰ τινες· καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεται
 εἰς ἓξ, τὴν ὀκτωῖ καὶ τὴν φθονῆν,
 τὰ δ' ἄλλα συντάγματα τὰ μὲν ὀκτώ-
 ρα δὲ φθονῆα καλοῦσιν. But the true
 constitution is οὐκ ἢ μὲν οὐστὶ τῇ
 καλῶς συνστήκῃ τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι
 παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῇ εὐ κεκραμένῃ
 ἀρμονίᾳ (the well tempered scale) τὰς
 δὲ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχίας
 μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δημοκρα-
 τίας, τὰς δ' ἀνωμόταται καὶ μακρὰς
 δημοκρατίας. We shall therefore best
 explain Aristotle's meaning if we think
 of the παρεκβάσεις as 'out of tune,'
 remembering at the same time that

λεία τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. ἐν
 τιμοκρατικῇν λέγειν οἰκείον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αἴτιον
 35 εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι καλεῖν. ταύτων δὲ βελτίστη μετ' οἱ
 βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρεκβάσεις δὲ βασι-
 1180^b λείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, ἐκφέρειν οὖν
 πλείστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ
 ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ὑρχομένων. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς
 ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δ'
 5 τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδίδεται· τὰ ὀφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μετ' οὐκ

vulgar people at Athens preferred
 scales which were not natural, cf.
 Pol. 1347 a, 22 τίσι δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ
 ψυχὰς παριστραμμένας τῆς κατὰ φύσιν
 ὄψεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἀριστοῦς παρι-
 βάσκειν εἶσι, καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ εὐτότερα
 καὶ παρεκχρωσμένα (see Swinburn
 and Hicks p. 636). The ὁρμαὶ πολι-
 τείας are based on the natural notes of
 the scale.

Βασιλεία ἀριστοκρατία. Pol.
 1379 a, 33 καλεῖται δ' εἰσάμεν τῶν
 μέν μοναρχίαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν
 ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν,
 τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μεν, πλείων δ'
 ἑνὸς, ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἣ δὲ διὰ τὸ τοῦ
 ἀριστοῦς ἄρχειν· ἣ δὲ τὰ πρῶτ' ἐν
 ἀριστοῦς τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν
 αὐτῇ.

ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. Plato calls this
 ὀλιγαρχία. Rep. 550 c Ἀρχεῖ δέ, ἣ
 δ' ἐκ, τῆς πόλεως καταστάσεως ὀλιγαρ-
 χίας.—Τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣ δὲ ὀλιγὴ,
 πολιτείαν. Iohannes, who on y allows
 this constitution, speaks Panath.
 § 151) of δημοκρατίαν ἀριστοκρατίαν
 χρωμένην, ἐν αἷ μὲν πολλοὶ χρησιμω-
 τάτης ὁδὸν ὥσπερ τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων
 ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀριθμοῦσιν.

τιμοκρατικῇ. Plato uses the word
 in a very different sense (see Rep.
 545 b, 277). He dissociates it from
 the natural conception with τιμήματα
 and uses it of states like Sparta whose
 ruling principle is honour.

πολιτείαν. This refers to the πόλι-

ται πολιτεία which the moderate party
 took to receive after the Pechonossian
 War. Its ideal was that political
 power should be confined to a re-
 stricted number of persons, and that is why it is
 here called τιμοκρατικῇ. In the Po-
 litics Aristotle calls it πολιτεία ἡμετέρα
 and says (1379 a, 37) ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον
 πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύεται συμφέρον,
 καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὅραμα τῶν αὐτῶν πολι-
 τειῶν, πολιτεία. But he means exactly
 the same thing as he does here. That
 he is not thinking of a "timocratic"
 state, in which there are several classes
 based upon a property qualification, is
 shown by b, 18 ὅτι αὐτοῦ αἱ ἐν τῇ
 πόλει μετέχουσιν.

§ 3. βελτίστη βασιλεία. This is
 only to be understood, however, of
 the ideal rules in the συμβουλία, the
 man of honour and benevolence. The
 whole question is thoroughly discussed
 in the Third Book of the Politics.

χειρίστη τιμοκρατία. The reason
 is given Pol. 1379 a, 37 ἐκείνη μετ' ὁ
 φέρει κατ' ἀμφοτέρω ὁδῶν ὁ δὲ ὀλιγὴς
 πλείων δ' ἐστὶν ἡλιθίων τετρακτὶς
 πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρετὰς.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος α.τ.λ. Pol.
 1379 b, 6 ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἐστὶ
 μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τοῦ τοῦ
 μοναρχοῦντος. 1311 a, 2 ἣ δὲ τυραννὶς
 πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποβλέπει. οὐκ οὐκ· μὴ ἐπὶ
 ἰδίᾳ ὀφείλειαι χάρις. ἐπεὶ δὲ φέρει
 μέν τετρακτὶς τὸ πλεόν, βασιλεὺς δὲ τὸ
 καλόν.

δὲ σκοποῖν, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρω-
τὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεὺς. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτης·
τὸ γὰρ ταυτὶ ἀγαθὸν δίδωκε. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύ-
της ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτιστῷ.
3 μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φανλοῦται γὰρ 10
ἔστι μοναρχίας ἢ τυραννίς, ὃ δὲ μοχθηροὺς βασιλεὺς τύραν-
νος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακίαι τῶν
ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμονται τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ
πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς
αἰεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστον ποιοῦμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι 15
δὲ ἀρχοῦσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπεικιστάτων, ἐκ δὲ
τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γὰρ εἰσιν αὗται·

1160 b. 12. EE. 1241 b, 33 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν
τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἶδη ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς
κοινωνίας. αὐτ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡ «δημοκρατικὴ» κοινωνία καὶ ἡ
ἐταίρια φιλία, τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὅρῳ μετρίεται· κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἡ
ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἡρώτη καὶ βασιλική· οἱ γὰρ αὐτοὺς δίκαιον τῷ
ὑπερέχοντι καὶ ὑπερεχόμενῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. αὐτὴ ἡ φιλία δὲ
ὁμοῦ πατρὸς καὶ παιδὸς, καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ὁ αὐτοῦ τρόπος.

κληρωτὸς βασιλεὺς Kaimauer
refers to Plato, Pol. 190 c seq., τοὶ
δὲ καὶ τὰς ἑμῶν. τῷ λαβόντι βασιλεί-
φωσι ἴσως τὰ σημεῖα καὶ μάλιστα
ἐστὶν τῶν ἀρχαίων θεοῦ ἀποδο-
δοῦναι. 19: αὐτοῖς τε τοῖς τοῖς
κληρωτὸς βασιλεὺς ἀρ. καὶ ἱερὰς.
The reference, then, is primarily to
the βασιλεὺς at Athens and, as Mr. J.
Solomon has shown C. Rev. 11,
296, the meaning is practically 'a
monarchy or king' Mr. Solomon
quotes two further passages in illus-
tration (1) At Pol. 1315 a. 2 περι-
αίρειται τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξ
αὐτῆς κληρωτὸς ποιεῖ (as a means
of reducing a magistracy to insignifi-
cance) and (2) Plato, Laws 693 a
ὅταν ψάλλον ἀνέλεον αὐτῷ (i.e. the
ἀρχὴ of the Spartan king) τὴν τῶν
ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς

ἀρχῆς δύναμιν, which, as he rightly
says, must practically mean 'reducing
it to an almost nominal kingship.'

φανερώτερον. sc. ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς τιμο-
κρατίας (a. 26).

ἐκκινῶν δὲ κτλ. For the τόπος
see Top. 117 b, 9. Cf Pol. 1289 a,
39 ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ
θεοφάνους πολιτείας ἀντιτάξαι εἰς
χειρίστην

§ 2. μεταβαίνει, impersonal, 'the
transition is from—'

εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. Pol. 1306 b, 23
ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἀρχόντες,
οἱ μὲντοι διὰ τοῦτον ὀλίγοι. 1290 b,
19 ὀλιγαρχία δ' (ἐστὶν) ὅταν οἱ πλοῦστοι
καὶ ἐβουλόσθησιν (ἐννοεῖται τῆς ἀρχῆς ὡς οὐκ),
ὀλίγοι δυνεῖν. 1279 b, 7 ὀλιγαρχία
ἐστὶν τὸ τῶν πτωχῶν (συμφορὰς ἐστὶν)
(Fritzsche).

εἰς δημοκρατίαν. Pol. 1290 b, 17

πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσα
 πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ τιμῇ. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ
 20 δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας
 εἶδος. μεταβιλλοῦσι μὲν οὖν μάλιστα οὕτως αἱ πολιτείαι·
 ελάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾶστα μεταβαίνουντι. ὁμοιωμάτων
 δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον περιδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν
 ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὸς κοινωνία βασι-
 25 λείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῇ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐν
 ταῖς δὲ καὶ Ὀμηρὸς τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πα-
 τρική γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαι
 δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική· χρώνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς
 υἱέσιν. τυραννική δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότης πρὸς δοῦλους· το γὰρ
 30 τοῦ δεσπότητος συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πρᾶττεται· αὕτη μὲν οἷον
 ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφορῶν
 των γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διώφοροι. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀρ-
 στοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀρχεῖ, καὶ

1160 b, 32. EE. 1241 b, 27 αἱ δὲ πολιτείαι εἶναι ἐν οἰκίαις
 συνπαρχούσαι, καὶ αἱ ὀρθαὶ καὶ αἱ παραβύουσαι (οὕτω γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὥστε

δὲν δημοκρατία δὲν οἱ ελευθεροὶ καὶ
 ἄστοροι, πλείους ὄντες, αὐτοὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς
 ὦσαι. 1170 b, 8 ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία (ενν.)
 πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ των ἀπόρων.

σύνοροι. "contiguous"

πλήθους βούλεται εἶναι Cf.
 1130 a, 21 f. "The ideal of timocracy
 too is to be the rule of the many."
 If the τιμή was so high as to
 exclude the masses, we should have
 an oligarchy

οἱ ἐν τῇ τιμῇ, i.e. the 5000 at
 Athens, οἱ τα τιμήματα παρεχόμενοι.

ἥκιστα μοχθηρόν. Cf. Pol. 1289 b,
 2 ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρώσθην οἷσαν
 πλείστον ἀπέχει πολιτείας, δεύτερον
 δὲ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν, ὑπερτάτην δὲ
 τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

τῆς πολιτείας, i.e. τῆς τιμοκρατικῆς.

§ 2. τῇ πατρὶ μέλει, so that his
 share is τὸ των ἀπορῶν συμφέρον.
 Cf. Pol. 1250 b, 10 ἡ δὲ των τέκνων

ἀρχὴ βασιλική Here too Ηρακλῆς
 Ζεὺς πατὴρ is referred to.

βούλεται εἶναι. Cf. 1134 a, 11 c.

ἐν Πέρσαις τ. λ. This is an unhappy
 contrast to Xenophon's ideal of a
 ὁρθεῖα μὲν οἷον, i.e. the "symmetrical"
 relation between master and slave as
 opposed to that between man and
 nature.

τῶν διαφορῶντων How they differ
 we learn from Pol. 1250 a, 9 ἄλλω
 γὰρ ἔχουσιν τὰ εὐαίερα τῶν ἀρχῶν
 ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ
 παιδοὶ· καὶ τὰς οὐδὲν ἀρχαί μὲν τὰ
 μόρια τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλ' ἐννοεῖται. διαφε-
 ρόντων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ἀλλοτρίως ἐστὶ
 τὰ βασιλευσίν, ἐπὶ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει καὶ αὐτὸς
 αἰετοῦ, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἐστὶ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰε-
 τῶν.

§ 3. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς κοινω-
 νία. In Pol. 1249 b, 1 we have
 γυναικὸς μὲν καὶ ἀρχαίς πολιτείας,
 τέκνων δὲ βασιλευσίν

περί ταῦτα ἂ δαί τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικί ἀρμόζει,
ἐκείνη ἀποδίδωσιν. ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὅλη· 35
γαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ
οὐχ ἢ ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπικληροὶ 1161^a
οἶσαι· οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλου-
6 τον καὶ δύναμιν, καθύπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. τιμοκρα-
τικῇ δ' ὁμοῖεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι γάρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον
ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις 5
διαφύρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. δημοκρατία
δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῖθα

καὶ ἐν τῶν ἁρμονίων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιταίαις)· βασιλικὴ μὲν ἡ τοῦ
γεννητοῦτος. ἀριστοκρατικὴ δ' ἡ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, πολιτεία δ' ἡ τῶν
ἀδελφῶν· τυραννῆσιν δὲ τοῦτων τυραννὲς ὀλιγαρχία δῆμος. καὶ τὰ
δίκαια ἐν ταῖς πολιταίαις.

Ε.Ε. 1242 a, 1 λέγοντα, διὰ φιλίας συγγενικῆς ἑταιρικῆς κοινωνικῆς ἢ
λεγομένης πολιτικῆς· ἴσιν μὲν συγγενικῇ πολλὰ ἔχονσα εἶδη, ἡ μὲν ὡς
ἀδελφῶν, ἡ δ' ὡς πατρὸς καὶ υἱῶν (καὶ γὰρ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ἡ
πατριεὴ, καὶ κατ' ἀφαιρέσειν οἷον ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἔγγιν γὰρ αὕτη τῆς
ἑταιρικῆς· ἐκταραχθέντος γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρίττειν)· ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ
συνεστήκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρῆσμον καὶ μάλιστα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ αὐταρκεῖν
δοκοῦσι συνελθόν, ἐπεὶ συνήλθον γ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ σιζην χάριν. μόνῃ δ'
ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ παρ' αὐτὴν παρέλβουσι οὐ μόνον φιλία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς
φιλοὶ κοινωνεῖσιν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι κατ' ὑπεροχὴν. μάλιστα δὲ δίκαιον τὸ
ἐν τῇ τῶν χρησίων φιλίᾳ, διὰ τὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.
ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον συνήλθον πρίων καὶ τέχνη, οὐχ ἕτερον κοινὸν εἶνος
(οἷον γὰρ ἄρτανον καὶ ψυχὴν) ἀλλὰ τοῦ χρησμένου ἕνεκεν. συμβαίνει δὲ
καὶ ταῖς ὀργανοῖς ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνειν, ἧς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον·
ἐκείνου γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἔστιν. καὶ τὸ τυτπάζειν εἶναι διττόν, ὥν τὸ κυριώτερον
ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἡ τριτοῦτος. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ εἶδει σῶμα καὶ δούλος, ὥσπερ
εἴρηται πρότερον.

μεθίστησιν, i.e. τὴν κοινωνίαν, i.e.
εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν.

ἐπικληροὶ οἶσαι. Cf. the well
known lines of Menander—

“ὅστις γυναικὶ ἐπικληρὸν ἐπιβόμει λα-
βεῖν”

πλευροῦσας, ἧται μῆτρ' ἐκτικεῖ θεων,
ἡ βοδὴν' ἀντυχῶν, μακάριος καλούμενος,

§8. τῶν οἰκήσεων, 'habitations.' As
Stewart points out, the word is often
used of the habitations of wild beasts.
“Dicuntur autem homines male oikētes
quae non sunt οικιαί, sed οἰκοί.”
Kantanker. The word οἶκος implies
an organised family, οἰκῆται is a more
place to live in.

γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενῆς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ ἐκάστη ἐξουσία.

- 10 XI. Καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται ἰσὺς
ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους
ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους
εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς αὐν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἢν εὐ πράττῃ
ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὀμηρὸς τὸν Ἰλαμον
15 μνοντα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατριή·
διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγεθὶ τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ τῇ
εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας. καὶ
τοῖς προγόνους δὲ ταῦτα προσνίμεται· φύσει τε ἄρχων
πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλευ-
20 μίνων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται·
οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλὰ τὸ
κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ τῆς
γυναικᾶς ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρασίᾳ κατ' ἀρίτητα
γὰρ, καὶ τῇ ἀμείνουσι πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμάζον ἐσθ-
25 στερ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἑταί-
ρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιώται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὁμοπα-
θεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ
κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικὴν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται, καὶ
ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μίρῃ δὲ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὲ
30 καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δ-
καιον ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἔστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἔκιστα ἐν

1161 a, 30. EE. 1241 b, 17 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμοίως ἔχει ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα
καὶ τεχνίτης πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ δισπύτης πρὸς δοῦλον, ταῦτα μὲν οἷα

XI. § 2. Καθ' ἐκάστην κ.τ.λ. We may compare the modern ideas of (1) Loyalty, (2) *Asiatic* *obligation*, (3) Fraternity.

ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. How far that is is explained above, 1134 a, 16-33q.

ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων. Here again Aristotle is thinking of Plato's *Poistikos*.

§ 2. ἡ πατριή καὶ φιλία διαφέρει, κ.τ.λ.

§ 3 οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. The sense of the subject is that the *citizens* *are* *equal* and *good*.

§ 5. βούλονται εἶναι. The sense of the sentence is that the *citizens* *should be* equal and good. Here *ἐπιεικεῖς* = ἀγαθοί, cf. 1135 a, 33 a.

τῇ χειρίσθη· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς
 γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οἷδὲ
 φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· οἷον τεχνίτῃ πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ
 ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δοῦλον· ὠφελείται 35
 μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ 1161 b
 ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψιχα οἷδε δίκαιον. ἄλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ
 βοῦν οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δοῦλος. οἷδιν γὰρ καινόν ἐστιν·
 ὃ γὰρ δοῦλος ἄψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦ-
 7 λος ἢ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἐστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' 5
 ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς
 πάντα τον δυναμένον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ
 8 φιλία δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς
 τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρα-
 τίαις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσους οὖσιν. 10

XII. Ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ
 εἴρηται. ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις τὴν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν
 ἑταιρικὴν αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοικαί,
 καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς εἰκόασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ

ἐστὶ κοινωνία. οὐ γὰρ δι' ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός [οἷδὲ].
 οὐδὲ διαίρετον τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκατέρω, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρω τοῖ ἐνός οὐ ἰσικά
 ἴσταν. τὸ τε γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν ὄργανον σῶμα, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότης δ
 δοῦλος ὡς περ μύριον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ὡς περ
 δοῦλος ἄψυχον.

§ 8. δοῦλος ἄψυχον ὄργανον. Cf.
 Γλ. 1153 b, 27 τῶν δ' ὄργανων τὰ μὲν
 ἄνθρωποι τὰ δὲ ἄψυχοι (οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ
 ὁ μὲν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ὁ δὲ σκλάβος ἄψυ-
 χος· ὁ γὰρ ὑπερέπε ἐν ὄργανοις εἶδει
 ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οἷον καὶ τὸ πᾶν
 ὄργανον ὡς ἐν ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ πᾶσι
 πᾶσι ὄργανον ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος
 πᾶσι τῷ ἄψυχον.

§ 7. § 8. ἄνθρωπος. Cf. Ulpian
 'Quod attinet ad iura civile pertinet
 pro nullis habentur, non tamen iure
 naturali, quia, quod ad ius naturale
 pertinet, omnes homines sunt aequa-
 les.' Col. 1193 b, 12 διὸ καὶ ἀμφοτέρω

ἐστὶ τι καὶ φιλία δοῦλος καὶ δεσπότης
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς φύσει τοῦτον ἔχει-
 μένοι.

— XII. § 1. ἀφορίσειε B' ἐν τῇ
 π. τ. λ. 'We might make συγγενική
 and ἑταιρική φίλια into separate
 species' from κοινωνική φίλια in the
 strict sense. Eudemica (loc. cit. p.
 387) actually does so.

πολιτικά, 1161 a, 10 κη. φυλε-
 τικά 1160 a, 18.

συμπλοικά, 1159 b, 18. 1160 a, 13.
 καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, c. 2 τῶν συστρα-
 τιστῶν.

- 15 καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνεται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τὰ
 ξενικὴν καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν καὶ ἡ συγγενική δὲ φαίνεται
 πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς
 οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτὰν τι ζῆτα.
 20 τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ζῆτα. μᾶλλον
 οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὶ ἐξ αἰτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ
 τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συγκαίεται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ γεννηθῆναι ἢ
 τὸ γεννόμενον τῷ ποιήσασθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αἰτοῦ οἰκείον τὸ
 ἀφ' οὗ, οὐκ οὐδ' αὖτε θρῖξ ὅτι οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ
 25 γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντος χρόνου
 τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων ἐκ
 δὴλον καὶ δι' αὐτὸ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. γονεῖς μὲν οὖν
 30 τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τα γὰρ ἐξ αἰτῶν οὐκ ἔστιν
 αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρισθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς αὐτ' ἐκείνων τι
 35 φυκότα ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφαι-
 ναι· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταῖτοποιεῖ
 ὅθεν φασὶ ταύτων αἷμα καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οἷσι
 δὴ ταῦτά πως καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλάσας
 καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἡλιξ γὰρ ἡλικία.

τὴν ξενικὴν 1156 a, 31

§ 2 μᾶλλον συγκαίεται κτλ.,
 i.e. οἰκειότερον ἔχει, 'feels it more its
 own.'

φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. Μυτε-
 τικη ἡμισυ Εἰσιπ. frag. incert.—

μητέρα φιλοτακτοὺς μᾶλλον ἔστι τοῦ
 πατρὸς.

ἢ μὴ γὰρ αὐτῆς οἶδεν ὅτι δ' αὖτε.

Μεταίει Κερκ 2—

αὐτὴν γὰρ οὐδ' αἶδε τοῦ ποτ' ἔγενετο,
 ἀλλ' ὁπποῦσιν πάντες, ἢ πιστεύομεν

Hom., Od. i, 215—

μητέρα μὲν τ' ἐμὲ φησι τοῦ ἐμμεναί,
 αὐτὰρ ἐγώ γε

οὐκ οἶδ'· οὐ γὰρ πῶ τις ἐδὼν γόνον αὐτῆς
 ἀνέγνω.

§ 2. τῷ κεχωρισθαι i.e. they are
 estranged in virtue of their separation, just
 as they are of αὐτοὶ τῷ αὐτῶν το εἶναι.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. The following passage
 shows that this is neuter

ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνα κτλ., 'for
 identity with them parents identify
 them with one another' (cf. καὶ
 1018 a 7 ὡς οὐ φανερόν ὅτι ἡ ἐκείνων
 ἐκείνη τίς ἐστιν ἡ κλειόμενος τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ
 ὅταν χρεῖται ὡς πληθυντῶν, ὡς διακρίνει
 αὐτὸ αὐτῷ τῷ ὅτι οὐ γὰρ χρεῖται
 αὐτῷ).

ταύτων αἷμα. This passage is interpreted
 by the word ὁμοῦς (cf. Ἀνθ.
 Εὐμ. 89 ἀνελήφθαι οἷον)

ρίζαν, i.e. τὴν αἵτην. Cf. Εὐμ. 10
 αἵτ' αἰσθὲν γενόμενα ἐόσασιν ῥίζῃ
 μίαν

καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις, i.e. συχωρε-
 μένοις (cf. 1156 a, 35 βούλομαι
 ὡς περ αὐτὸς διαμετρεῖται ὁ φίλος)

§ 2. τὸ σύντροφον 'because brought

καὶ οἱ σιτηθῆναι ἑταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἑταιρικῇ 35
ὁμοιοῦται. ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων 1162^a
συνυφικεῖνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτῶν εἶναι. γίνονται δ'
οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἱ δ' ἄλλοτριώτεροι τῷ συνεγγυεῖ ἢ πόρρω
5 τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις,
καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεοὺς, ὡς πρὸς ὠγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον· 3
εὖ γὰρ πεπυηέκασε τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆ-
6 ναι αἰτίαι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ
ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν ὁμιλείων,
ὅσῃ καὶ κοινώτερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. ἔστι ἐκ καὶ ἐν τῇ
ἀδελφικῇ ἄπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς 10
ἐπικαίεσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῃ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ
γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῃ ἀμαθητί-
στεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αἰτῶν καὶ σὺντροφοὶ καὶ παιδευθίντες
ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ
7 βεβαιωτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγε- 15
νῶν τὰ φιλικὰ. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ
φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἀνθρώπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν
μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσῃ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαϊότερον οἰκία
πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινώτερον τοῖς ξείοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν
ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσούτου ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἀνθρώποι οἱ μόνον 20

up together, τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν, sc. εἶναι, their 'being of an age'.

ἡδὺ γὰρ ἡλικία. Cf. E.E. 1258 a, 23, Bhet 137; B, 13. The proverb is quoted by Plato, Phdr. 140 c φιλία γὰρ καὶ ὁ φιλοῦς λόγος τέρπει τὸν φίλον.

ἐν τοῖσιν, sc. ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν.

§ 6. τὸν ὀδυνῶν, i.e. τῇ τῶν ὀδυνῶν.

§ 7. ἀνάλογον, 'in proportion' (to the closeness of their relationship).

τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικόν. Cf. Pol. 1253 a, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ πρότερον συνδέει τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ ἀντιπληθύνειν καὶ δυναμῶντος εἶναι, οἷον θηλυ μὲν καὶ ἀρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἵκεται, (καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐκ κοινοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοῖς ζῴων καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἰσχυρῆναι οἷον αὐτὸ τοσούτου καταλείπειν

δεσφιν).

πρότερον (sc. χρόνῳ) καὶ ἀναγκαϊότερον (sc. ἐξ υποθέσεως). But in another sense the state is πρότερον καὶ καλλίων. Cf. Pol. 1253 a, 19. The addition of καὶ ἀναγκαϊότερον shows what kind of priority is meant.

κοινώτερον τοῖς ξείοις, a sure sign that a thing is φυσικόν, in the sense of ἀναγκαῖον. Cf. Introductory Note.

ἐπὶ τοσούτου, i.e. ἐφ' ὅσῃ ἡ κοινωνία. Cf. Gen. An 733 a, 7 quoted in the Introductory Note. See also Oecum. 1243 b, 13 ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀλλοῖς ζώων ἀλόγως τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ ἐφ' ὅσῃ μετέχουσι τῆς φύσεως (κατεῖναι φρονήσεως), καὶ τοσούτου. καὶ τεκνοποιίας μόνον χάριν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἡμέτεροις καὶ φρονεμασίαις διήθησται μᾶλλον

τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· εἴθις γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνέρος καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια, διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ·
 25 καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι' αὐτὴν εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἴεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐκατέρου ἀρετὴ καὶ χαίρειναι ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, σύνδεσμον δὲ τὸ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θῆτον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρῶν, συνεχέει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὰ δὲ πῶς βιωτικόν ἀνδρὶ
 30 πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅπως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλῳ, οἷόν ἐστιν φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτον φαίνεται

1162 a. 29. EE. 1242 a. 14 τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῇ φιλοφιλίᾳ, τὸ ζητεῖν δίκαιόν τι ἔστιν. καὶ γὰρ ὅλος τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι τῇ φιλον. τὸ τε γὰρ δίκαιόν τι καὶ κοινωνικόν, καὶ ὁ φίλος κοινωνικὸς ὁ μὲν γένους, ὁ δὲ βίου. ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρώπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκονομικὸν ζῶν, καὶ οἷον ὡς περὶ τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς τὸν κοινόν καὶ τὴν τοιούτῃ [καὶ] ὁφείλει καὶ ἀρρετὴ ἢ ἀλλ' αἰ διὰ δίκαιον αἰλικόν ἢ ἰσὺν δὲ δὴ μοιτικόν, ἀλλὰ κοινωνικόν ἀνθρώπου ζῶν πρὸς οἷον φιλίᾳ συγγενείᾳ ἔστιν· καὶ κοινωνία τοίνυν καὶ δίκαιόν τι, καὶ εἰ μὴ πᾶσι εἴη· οἷον δ' ἔστι τις φιλία. δισπύτιον μὲν οἷον καὶ δούλον ἤπερ καὶ τέχνη καὶ ὑπάκουον καὶ ψυχῆ καὶ σώματος, αἱ δὲ τοιαῦτα, οὔτε φιλία οὔτε δίκαιον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀναλογον, ὡς περὶ καὶ τὸ ὑγεινὸν οἱ δίκαιον, αἱ ἀναλογον· γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς φιλία ὡς χρήσιμον καὶ κοινωνία πρὸς καὶ υἱοῖ ἢ αὐτῇ ἤπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ πρὸς ποιήσαντος πρὸς τὸν παθόντα καὶ ὅπως τοῦ φύσει ἀρχόντος πρὸς τὸν φύσει ἀρχόμενον· ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἱεραρχικὴ μάχιστος ἢ κατ' ἰσότητα

οὐ γὰρ τι νοῦτος τῷ ἀπεδείχθη.

ἀμφότεν δὲ πατὴρ αὐτὸς ἐληθῆ

Ζεὺς ἐμὸς ἀρχων.

ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς τὸ ἴσον ζητούντων λέγεται. διὸ ἐν οἷσιν πρῶτον εἶχαι καὶ πηγαί φιλίας καὶ πολιτείας καὶ δίκαιον.

(φαίνεται γὰρ πολλὸν βοηθεῖν γυναικαὶ καὶ υἱοῖ καὶ συνεργαῖς ἀλλήλοις, ἐν ἀνθρώποις δὲ μάλιστα, ὅτι οὐ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι συνεργῶν ἀλλήλοις τὸ θῆλον καὶ τὸ ἀρετὴν ἔχει.

διήρηται τὰ ἔργα. Fritzsche ἡρώδης

Περὶ 1343 b. 25 οὕτω τὸ φιλίᾳ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκπύρεται ἢ φιλίᾳ, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ γυναικί, πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν, κ. τ. λ.

§ 8. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν φαίνεται, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.

τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ὀφειλὸν καὶ τὸν ἑταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.

XIII. Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὕπνου τῶν δὲ 35 καθ' ὑπεροχὴν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χείρονα ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσι- 1162^b μον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὀφειλαῖς καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητά δι' τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. 2 γίνεται δι' τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μεμψις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μωρῇ ἢ μάστιχα, εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὐ δρῶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἀμιλλωμένων οἷα ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα αἰδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εἰ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς ἐυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἂν ἢ χαρίεις, ἀμύ- 10 νεται εὐ δρῶν. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, τυγχάνων οὐ ἐφίσταται, οἷα ἂν ἐγκαλοῖν τῷ φίλῳ· θεαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγε- 3 ται. οὐ πᾶν δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονὴν ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οἷ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιαγεῖν χαίρουσιν· γελοῖος δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντα, ἔξου μὴ 15 4 συνημερεύειν. ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματικῇ ἐπ'

συμφοιτητήν, 'schoolfellow' Plato, Euthyd. 273 c οἱ συμφοιτῶνται μόν, Philo. 145 a

XIII. § 1. Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν κτλ. We come now to certain practical rules about φιλία. We always make a point of drawing practical conclusions from our theories, even if they interpret the main argument. They serve also, however, to bring out the true nature of Friendship p.

ὁμοίως δι καὶ ἡδεῖς, κ.τ.λ., i.e. they may be equally pleasant or useful, or one more pleasant or useful than the other (ἰσάζοντες ἢ διαφέροντες).

κατ' ἰσότητά εὐσχεῖν with ἰσάζειν.

καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς, sc. τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τῷ ἡδέϊ or τῷ χρήσιμῳ.

τῷ ἀποδιδόναι sc. δι' ἰσότητος. The reading τῷ is probably a conjecture by the corrector of cod. Vat. 1417 (c^o K^o L^o), but it seems necessary to make a proper antithesis to κατ' ἰσότητά.

§ 2. ἀμύνεται, Spengel quotes Rhet. 1398 a, 24 διὰ Σωκράτη οὐκ ἐση βαλίσκῳ δι' Ἀρχέλαον· θῆρε γὰρ ἴση εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνεσθαι ὁμῶς εὐ καθεύδει. Cardwel. refers to Isocr. 86 d χαμῖνται οἱ τοῦ ἡμιάνθρωπου. Thuc. iv, 63 τὸν εὐ καὶ οὐκ ὡς δρῶντα δὲ ἴσου ἀρετῇ ἀμυνόμενα.

§ 3. οὐ πᾶν δι, sc. ἐγκλήματα γίνεται. Ind. c. v. οὐ πᾶν.

ὠφέλειά γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις αἰετοῦ πλείονος δέονται καὶ ἱλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μίμφονται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τασούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἀξιοὶ ὄντες· ο
 20 δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ πάσχοντες δέονται. ζοικε δὲ καθ' ἑπὶ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι ἐπιτέας, τὸ μὲν ἀγρηφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ το
 χρήσιμον φιλίας ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλιστα ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συνι
 25 ἀλλάξωσι καὶ διαλυῶνται. ἔστι δ' ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπι
 ῥητοῖς, ἡ μὲν πάνπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἡ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀπὶ
 τίνος. δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοῖα ἀμφίλογον

1162 b, 21 EE. 1242 b, 22 ἡ δὲ κατ' ἴσα φιλία ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ· ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐστὶ μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ὥσπερ αἱ πολλαὶ ἀλλήλαις φίλαι, οὔτω αὖ οἱ πολῖται, καὶ ὁμοῖως

οὐκέτι γεννώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαροῖς,

καὶ οἱ πολῖται, ὅταν μὴ χρήσιμοι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα ἡ φιλία· ἔστι δὲ ἀταίθα καὶ ἄρχοι καὶ ἀρχόμενοι οἷτε τὸ φυσικῶν οἷτε τὸ βασιλικῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει, οὐδὲ τοῦτου ἕνεκα ὅπως εὖ το ἢ ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἴσων ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς λειτουργίας· κατ' ἰσότητά ἐν βούλῃ εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρησίμου φιλίας εἰς δύο, ἡ μὲν νομικὴ ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ. βλέπει δ' ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ὡς καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥσπερ οἱ πωλοῦντες καὶ οἱ ὠνομενοί. διὸ εἰρηται

μισθὸς αἰδὲρὶ φύλα.

ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθ' ὁμολογίαν <ἢ> ἡ πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία, [σοὶ] νομικὴ·

§ 8 κατὰ νόμον. The opposition is not quite correctly stated, for a *νομικὴν δίκαιον* may quite well be unwritten, nor is an ἀγρηφον δίκαιον necessarily φύσει δίκαιον. But the expression is natural, for τὰ γεγραμμένα δίκαια are περὶ ὧν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀγορεύουσιν (Rhet. 1374 a, 19).

φίλας. So K^b and Asp. This reading is guaranteed by Eusebios (loc. cit.), otherwise we might be

tempted to adopt the reading of L^a αἰφελείας.

ἠθικῇ. We still speak of a 'moral' as distinct from a 'legal' obligation, though the associations are different.

ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν, i.e. φίλας, συναλλάξωσι διαλύονται, 'when they contract and dissolve the friendship'.

§ 6. ἡ μὲν ἡ δὲ. A further subdivision of ὁ νόμος.

οὐ δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων
 , ἀλλ' οἰοῦνται δεῖν στεργεῖν τοὺς κατα πίστιν συναλλά- 30
 κς. ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥήτοισι, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται
 δῖπποτε ἄλλο· κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῦ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλεόν.
 ὃ δεδοκώς ἀλλὰ χρήσας· οἷχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλ-
 κει καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. ταῦτα δὲ συμβαίνει
 ὃ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείους τὰ καλὰ, 35
 ἱρησθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα· καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ
 ἐντιπιάθῃ, ὠφελιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετῆσθαι δυναμένῳ 1163^a

Ἔπιτροπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἠθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἑταιρική.
 ἕλιστα ἐγκλήμα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν.
 γὰρ φιλεῖ ἢ κατὰ τὸ χρησιμὸν καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν· αἱ δ'
 παρὰ βούλονται ἅμα ἔχειν, καὶ ὁμοίῳσι μὲν τοῦ χρησιμίου ἕνεκα,
 ἢ δὲ ποιῶσιν ὡς ἐπιεικέως, διὰ ὡς πιστεύοντες οὐ νομικὴν ποιῶσιν.
 ἐν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ τῶν τριῶν πλεῖστα ἐγκλήματα (ἢ μὲν γὰρ
 ἀνέγκλητον, οἱ δ' ἠδέως ἔχουσιν καὶ ἴσους ἀπαλλάττονται· οἱ δὲ
 καὶ οὐκ εὖθις διαλύονται, εἰ μὴ νομικῶς καὶ διαιτητικῶς προ-
 ςαί·) ὁμοίως δὲ τῇ χρησίμῃ ἢ νομικῇ ἀνεγκλήτως. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν
 | διαλυσις πρὸς νόμισμα (μετρεῖται γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἴσον), ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ
 σε. διὸ ἐναχοῦ νόμος ἔστι τοῖς οὕτοις ὁμοίῳσι φιλικῶς μὴ εἶναι
 τῶν ἱκανῶν ἀνταλλάγματων, ὁρθῶς· τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ
 εἰ δίκαιον εἶναι οἱ δ' ὡς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ συναλλάττονται, ἔστι
 ταυτὴ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἀμφιβαλλόμενα αὐτοῖς ἀμφοτέρω,
 ἡμετέρας ἐγκαλεῖ, ὅταν ἠθικῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ νομικῶς πιστεύουσιν

κὼν ἔχει. 'the postpronomen
 friendly element in it.'

παρ' ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ. *Sic* *patet*
Theophrastus *Περὶ συμβολαίων*
κεῖται *Χορὴν* *καὶ* *Πάτων*
χρησιμὰ *καλοῦσιν* *δίδωσι*, *καὶ*
εἰς *ταῦτα* *δε* *τις* *πιστεύει*, *μὴ*
λαβὼν, *αὐτὸν* *γὰρ* *οἶμαι* *εἶναι* *τῇ*

διωδότητι ἄλλο, κ.τ.λ. ὠφέλει
 means the only verb we can

οἷχ ὁμοίως, 'not so well.'
 does not come out of the
 on as good terms as he went

in.' The phrase cannot be equivalent
 to *μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετήν*, for it
 refers exclusively to *ἠθικὴ φιλία*.

βούλεσθαι προαίρεσθαι. The
 appetitive element is sound, but the
 intellectual and deliberative is not.

§ 8. *δυναμένῳ* δὴ κ.τ.λ. The
 words *καὶ* *ἐκόντι* can hardly be
 translated 'willingly' (i.e. without
 wishing to be asked) ('Sic' *patet*, for
ἐκόν means 'voluntarily' (i.e. without
 being forced). Nor can *ἀναποδοτῶν*
 naturally mean anything
 else than 'one must give back to the
 man who is willing to take it.' I

δὴ ἀνταποδοτίου τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν ἔπαθεν [καὶ ἰκόντι] (ἀκούσα
 γὰρ φίλον εἰ ποιητῶν· ὡς δὲ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ
 καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει—οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ φίλου, οὔτε δι-
 5 αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρώντος· καθάπερ οἶν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα
 διαλυτέον). καὶ δ' ὁμολόγησεν ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδοῦναι· ἀ-
 δυνατούντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ διδοὺς ἤξιωσεν ἂν. ὥστ' εἰ δικαίως
 ἀποδοτίου. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτόν ὑφ' οὗ εὐεργετῆται καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῷ, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομῆνῃ ἢ μὴ. ἀμφισβήτησαν
 10 δ' ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ

καὶ ἔχει ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ποτέρου δεῖ κρίνειν τὸ δίκαιον, πότερα πρὸς τὸ
 πρῶγμα βλέποντα τὸ ὑπηρετηθῆναι, πόσον, ἢ πῶς ἔν τῷ πεποιθεῖ
 ἐνδέχεται, γὰρ ὅπερ λίγει θίγγειν·

σοὶ μὲν τοῦτο, θεῷ, μικρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγα.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τοῦναντίον γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, οὐκ ἀν-
 παθεῖν τοῖς· εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ θάνατον. ἐνταῦθεν δ' εἰρηται τὰ ἐν
 κλήματα· δ μὲν γὰρ ἀξίῳ ἀνταθεῖν ὡς μέγα ὑπηρετήσας ἐπὶ
 δεομένη ἐποίησεν, ἢ τε ἄλλα τοιοῦτα, λίγων πρὸς τῇ ἐκείνου ὠφελείᾳ
 πόσον ἡδύνατο, ἀλλ' οὐ τί ἦν αὐτῷ· δ δὲ τοῦναντίον ὥς οὐκ ἐπὶ ὠ-
 οὐχ ὅσον αὐτῷ· ὅτι δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀμφιβαλλεῖν· ὁ πρὸς γὰρ
 ὅσον αὐτῷ μικρόν ἀπέβη, ὁ δ' ὅσον αὐτῷ μέγα εἰδέναι, ὡς εἰ ἐκείνου πρὸς
 δραχμῆς ἀξίαν ὠφέλησεν, ὁ μὲν τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μεγάλῃς ὁ δὲ τὸ τοῦ
 ἀργυρίου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τῶν νομισμάτων ἀποδοῦσαι, καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα

suspect the interpolator meant it so,
 not seeing the drift of the next clause
 Ἀρκαίος, as well as K², omits the
 words.

ἀκούσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. A long 'd goes
 are parentheticus' (Bywater.. We
 must not assume that our benefactor
 meant to be a friend to us.

ὡς δὲ διαμαρτόντα κ.τ.λ. There
 is an anacolouthon here caused by
 the parenthesis within a parenthesis
 οὐ γὰρ.. δρώντος. We expect ἀποδο-
 τέον, but the sentence is resumed by
 καθάπερ οἶν κ.τ.λ.

καὶ δ' ὁμολόγησεν ἂν, κ.τ.λ. ἀναπο-
 δότεον. I have accepted Bywater's
 conjecture here. We must join closely
 τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν ἔπαθεν καὶ δ' ὁμολόγησεν

δ. 'He must repay the equivalent
 of the benefit received and what he
 would have agreed to repay if he
 could' (but for the anacolouthon
 ing).

οὐδ' ἤξιωσεν ἂν. He is not
 to assume that it is not a mere
 comment on satisfaction and that the
 giver is so much his friend that he
 would not have asked him to pay if
 he were unable.

ἐπὶ τίνι, 'on what terms' ὁποῖον
 sc. εὐνοηταίαν.

§ 10 ἀμφισβήτησαν δ' ἔχει, 'there
 is room for difference of opinion and
 therefore arguments may arise' (cf.
 n.v. § 41).

τὸς ταύτην ποιῆσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δρῦσαν-
τος εὐεργεσίᾳ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν
παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἢ μικρὰ ἢν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ'
ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνύπαλιν τὰ μέ-
γιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἂ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν 15
11: κινδύνους ἢ τοιαύταις χρεΐαις. ἄρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρήσιμον
τῇ φιλίας εὐσυχῇ ἢ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφίλεια μέτρον ἔστιν; οὗτος
γὰρ ὁ διόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὥς κομισόμενος τὴν
ἴσῃν· τοσαύτη οἶν γινύηται ἡ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέλῃ-
ται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἰπηύρετο, ἢ καὶ πλεόν· 20
κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ
ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ' ὅμοιος ἢ τοῦ δρῦσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς
ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἥθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κέρριον.

καὶ τούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ πῶς τότε ἦν, ὁ δὲ πῶς
νῦν, ἀι μὴ διαιπώται· ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν
καὶ εἰς τὸ πρῶγμα, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν. ὥστε καὶ δίκαιον
τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἔστι, καὶ δικαιοσύνη φιλική. αἰτίον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι,
διότι καλλίων μὲν ἢ ἠθικὴ φίλος, ἀταγκασιόεκα δὲ ἡ χρησιμότης. οἱ δ'
ἀρχονται μὲν ὡς οἱ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι καὶ δι' ἀρετῆς ὄντες ὅταν δ' ἀντικρὺς
ἢ τι τῶν ἰδίων, δῆλοι γίνονται ὅτι ἕτεροι ἦσαν. ἐκ περιουσίας γὰρ
διώκονται οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ καλόν· διὰ καὶ τὴν καλλίως φιλίαν. ὥστε
φανερὸν πῶς διαμετρίον περὶ τούτων. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι εἰς τὴν
προαίρεσιν βλέπτουσιν εἰ ἴση, καὶ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀξιωτέον θατέρῳ παρὰ
θατέρου· εἰ δ' ὡς χρήσιμοι καὶ πολιτικοί, ὡς ἂν ἐλυσिताὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν·
ἂν δ' ὁ μὲν φῇ ὡς ὁ δὲ ἐκείνως, οὐ καλὸν μὲν ἀντιπολεῖσαι, δέον τοὺς
καλὸν λεγέειν λόγους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ θατέρου, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ διαι-
ποῖτο ὡς ἠθικός, δεῖ κρίνειν τίνα, μὴδ' ὑποκρινόμενον μὴδετέρου αὐτῶν
ἐξατατάειν. ὥστε δεῖ στέμγειν αὐτὸν τὴν τύχην. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ
κατὰ προαίρεσιν, δῆλον, ἐπεὶ κἂν εἰ μεγάλα παθὼν μὴ ἀποδῶ ὁ
ἐδυσχερῆς. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἠδ' ἄλλα, καλῶς· καὶ ὁ θεὸς πείσεται κατὰ δύναμιν
λαμβάνων τὰς θουσίας. ἀλλὰ τῷ πωλοῦντι οὐκ ἰσχυρῶς ἔξει, ἂν μὴ
φύσῃ δύνασθαι πλέον δουλεῖν, οὐδὲ τῷ δαιεῖσθαι.

οὐκ ἦν, sc. λαβεῖν.
§ 31. ἄρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. The regular
formula in a tentative answer.
ἐπαρκεῖ, sc. ὁ εὖ ποιεῖν.
ἢ καὶ πλεόν. Epitaphic quotes

Hes. *Kory 349 hē mēn metasthai parā
γαιτόρος, id. δ' ἀποδοῦναι, 1 αὐτῷ τῷ
μέτρῳ, καὶ λῶτον, αἰ sc. διστοῖαι. This
is the rule of the ἐπιμετρον.

XIV. Διαφέρονται δε καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις·
 25 ἀξιοὶ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλείον ἔχειν, ὅταν ἐκ ταύτης γίνηται,
 διαλέτται ἡ φιλία. οἶται γὰρ ὁ τε βελτίων προσήκει
 αὐτῷ πλείον ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλεον· ὅμοιος
 δὲ καὶ ὁ ὑφελεμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὐ φασὶ δεῖν ἴσας
 ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οἱ φιλίαν, εἰ καὶ
 30 κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας· οἷοιται
 γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλείον λαμβάνουσιν
 οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλείον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ
 δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνίπαλες· φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι
 τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς εἰδέσιν· τί γὰρ, φασίν, ὕψελος σκοπιάφ
 35 ἢ δυναστη φίλου εἶναι, μηδὲν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν·
 1163^b τοῖκε δ' οὖν ἑκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῖν, καὶ δεῖν ἐκαστέρῳ πλεον
 νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερ-
 ἔχοντι τιμῆς τῷ δ' εἰδέει κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς

1163 a, 24. F. 1242 b, 2 ἐπεὶ δὲ φιλία τρεῖς, κατ' ἀρετήν,
 κατὰ τὸ χρησιμὸν, κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ταύτων δι' ἑκάστης διὸ διαφέρει (ἢ καὶ
 γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἢ δὲ κατ' ἰσότητά ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ ἅλως
 τὸ περὶ αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀμφισβητησάτων δ' ἔστιν), ἐν μὲν τῇ καθ' ὑπερ-
 οχὴν ἀξιοῦται τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὅλλ' οὐχ ὡσπύτως, ἀλλ' ἐ μὲν ὑπερέχων
 ἀνιστραμμένως τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλαττω οὕτω τὸ παρὰ
 τοῦ ἐλαττωτος μύμνει οἱ πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ, διαλείμενος ὡστὲρ ἄλλως
 πρὸς ἀρχόμενον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσον κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀξιοῖ
 καὶ γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινωνιῶν οὕτω συμβαίνει, ὅτε μὲν γὰρ
 ἀριθμῷ τοῦ ἴσου μετέχουσιν, ὅτε δὲ λίγῃ· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ἀριθμῷ
 εἰσπνεύγον ἀργύριον, ἴσον καὶ τῷ ὡς ἀριθμῷ διαλαμβάνουσιν, εἰ δὲ καὶ
 ἴσον, ἀνάλογον, ὁ δ' ὑπερέχόμενος τοῦναντίον στρεφεί τὸ ἀνάλογον,
 καὶ κατὰ διμέτρων σπινεύοντιν, ὁ δὲ καὶ δ' ἂν οὕτως ἐλαττωσθαι ὁ
 ὑπερέχων καὶ λειτουργία ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ κοινωνία· δεῖ ἄρα ταῖς ἐταφ

XIV. § 1 Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ
 α. π. λ., i. q. ἐγκαλοῦνται ἀλλήλοις
 ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, and there-
 fore in the Family and the State,
 νέμεσθαι, sc. προσήκει.

οἶονται γὰρ α. π. λ. The ὑπερέχων
 wishes to regulate the friendship on
 the principles of Distributive Justice,
 while the ὑπερεχόμενος wishes to be
 failing under the head of an exchange

of services for services, and there-
 fore in the Family and the State,
 διμετρων. (1 adnote 1155 a, 6 m.)

§ 2 τοῖκε δ' οὖν α. π. λ. Aristotle
 makes the difficulty by saying so
 διμετρων διμετρων. We must find
 the κατ' ἀνάλογον law and apply the
 rule of τὸ ἀντιστοιχεῖν. Then only
 will the argumentation be clear.

- καὶ τῆς εὐεργασίας ἢ τιμῇ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδεΐας ἐπικουρία
 3 τὸ κέρδος. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαί- 5
 νεται· οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ περιζών·
 τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδεται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἢ τιμῇ δε
 κοινῷ. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἕμια χρηματίζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν
 καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει·
 τῷ δὲ περὶ χρήματα ἔλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ 10
 τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ
 σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀνί-
 σοις ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς
 ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτεόν, ἀποδιδόντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα.
 4 τὸ δυνατόν γὰρ ἢ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ 15
 γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθίπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς
 καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοίη, εἰς
 δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ κἂν δό-
 ξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι εἰς πατέρα ἀπειπάσθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν·
 ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν 20
 ὑπεργγμένων δεδρακεν, ὥστ' αἰεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται,
 ἐξουσία ἀφείναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δὲ, ἥμιν δ' ἴσως οὐδεὶς ποτ'
 ἂν ἰσχυρὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβαλλόντος μοχθηρίῳ· χωρὶς
 γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὴν μὴ
 διαθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὴν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, 25
 μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὐ πᾶσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ
 δε ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελέες. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων
 ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

ἀνιστάσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀναλόγον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τιμή, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ
 ἀρχοντι φησὶ καὶ θεῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχόμενον. δεῖ δὲ ἰσασθῆναι τὸ κέρδος
 πρὸς τὴν τιμὴν.

§ 4. τὸ δυνατόν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. in
 this place I need fit in διαιουμένη.

ἔστιν, κ. τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν.

δε δύναμιν κ.τ.λ. Cf. for the
 ἐνδεΐαν Xen. Mem. I, 3, 3 ἀναστέγει
 ἡσ παρὰ τοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦδε (Hec. Έργ. 336,
 Εἰδὲ θέομαι δ' ἔρδων ἐμ' ἀνιμάνεσσι
 ἐνὶ ὧσιν.

ἀποτίσθαι. Cf. Plato Laws 928 e

for the ἀποκρημία of a son. Dem.
 Panth. § 39 ὁ νόμος τοὺς γονεῖς ποιεῖ
 κυρίους πρὸ μόνων θέντας τοῦτον, ἀλλ'
 ἀρχη, ἀλλὰ οὐ πόλλιν ἀτακτοῦσαι ἐκ
 βουλῶνται καὶ ἀποκρημίζαι.

τῶν ὑπεργγμένων, κ. τῷ νικῇ παρὰ
 τὸν ποτρός.

τὴν ἐπικουρίαν, κ. τῇ γυροτρο-
 φίαν.

Ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοειδεῖσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνύλογον
 ἰσάζει καὶ σφίζει τὴν φιλίαν καθὼπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ
 ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποετημάτων ἄμω-
 35 βῆ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ἰφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λειπεῖσι.
 1164^a ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπύρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ 2

1163 b, 32. EE. 1243 b, 15 πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς
 φιλίαις ταῖς μὴ κατ' εὐθυρίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδεῖν οἱ ῥαδίον. χαλεπὸν
 γὰρ μετρηῆσαι ἐν τῷδε τὸ μὴ κατ' εὐθυρίαν, οἷον συμβαίνει ἐν ταῖς
 ἀνωτικῶν ὁ μὲν γὰρ δικάζει ὡς [τῶν] ἦδον ἐπὶ τὸ σιζῆν, ὁ δ' ἐπεισὶν
 ἐνίοτε ὡς χρήσιμον· ὅταν δὲ πειύσῃται τοῦ ἱρᾶν, ἄλλοι γινώσκοντες ἄλλα
 γίνεσθαι, καὶ τότε λογιζόνται παντὶ τινοσ, καὶ ὡς II. θων καὶ Παμμαστῇ

I § 1. Ἐν ταῖς ἀνομοειδεῖσι φι-
 λίαις, i.e. ὡς μὴ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. The
 reading of L¹ ἀνομοειδεῖσι deserves the
 preference over the ἀνομοειδεῖσι of K¹
 (cf. Bon. Ind. x v—ἀμοιόδη); for what
 is meant is friendships in which the
 φίληται of the one party (ἀγαθὸν, ἡδὴ
 or χρήσιμον) is τῷ εἶδει ἕτερον, not
 merely ἀνομοιον, from that of the
 other. In other words, they are
 friendships in which ἕτερον ἀνδ' ἑτέρου
 ἀντιστάλλονται οἷον ἡδωὴν ἀντ' αἰ-
 φελείας. They must not be con-
 fused with αἱ κατ' ἀντιροχὴν φιλίαι.
 Eudemus (loc. cit.) describes friend-
 ships of this kind as μὴ κατ' εὐθυρίαν,
 by which he means apparently friend-
 ships in which the φίληται differ not
 merely by attaining a higher or lower

degree along the same line but in
 which they are wholly disparate. S.
 in Met. 994 a, 2 the αἰτία τῶν ἑσπε-
 ρων said to be ἀνομοιον neither αἰ-
 εὐθυρίαν, as an unending series nor
 κατ' εἶδος.

εἴρηται. The tolerance, it seems, re-
 must be to 1132 b, 31 sqq., the account
 of justice ἐν ταῖς ἀνομοιῖσι ἀνισότη-
 τας.

καθὼπερ εἴρηται. It has not been
 said, though it has been interpreted as
 1163 b, 1 sqq.

ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ, αἱ κοινωνίαι, as we
 see from Eudemus loc. cit. The
 point of the illustration is that betwe-
 en the parties are ἀνομοειδεῖσι.

§ 2. ἐνταῦθα, αἱ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ
 κοινωνίαι. Cf. 1133 a 19 sqq.

πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐλύσε μὲν ὁ ἐραστής ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλῆς δ' ὁ ἐριώμενος ὅτι πρῶτον ἐπαγγελλόμενος 3 πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ, συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδοῆν τὸν ἐρωμένου φιλῇ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρησίμον τον ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλείας οὕσης ἐκλύσεις γίνεται, ἐπειδὴν μὴ γίνηται ὡς ἔνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἑσπεργον ἀλλὰ 10 τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα διὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ αἱ φι-

διαφέρονται καὶ ἄλλως διὰ τὸ καλὸς καὶ μαθητὴς (ἐπιστήμη γὰρ καὶ χρήματα οὐκ εἰς μετρεῖται), καὶ ὡς Προδικος (Prodicus Sprengel) ὁ ἱατρὸς πρὸς τὸν ἀποδόοντα μικρὸν τὸν μισθόν, καὶ ὡς ὁ καθαρχὸς καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδὴ ὁ δ' ὡς χρησίμῳ ὠμίλει· ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ εἶδει ἀποδόοντα, αἰτῶν αὐτὸν ὡς ἡδὴν ἐπαύτηεν, καὶ ἔφη, ὡς περ ἐκείνον ῥησιντα εὐφραναι, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸν ἵπσου χίματος ἐκείνῳ. ὅμως δὲ φαιερὸν καὶ ἐνταῦθα πῶς γνωριστόν· ἐνὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρητέον καὶ ἐνταῦθ', ἀλλ' οὐκ ὅρῳ ἀλλὰ λόγῳ· τῷ ἀναλογον γὰρ μετρητέον, ὡς περ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ μετρεῖται κοινωσίᾳ· πῶς γὰρ κοινωγήσει γεωργῷ σκυτοτόμος εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀναλογον ἰσασθήσεται τὰ ἔργα; τοῦτο δὲ μὴ κατ' εὐθυνορίαν τὴν ἀνάλογον μέτρησιν, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν συμφίαν δοῦναι ἐγκαλεῖ, ὁ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἀργύριον, τῇ σοφίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πλουσιῶν, εἴτα εἰ δοθῇ πρὸς ἐπείτερον, εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἤμισιν ἔδωκεν, ὁ δὲ τοῦ μείζονος μὴ πολλοσπὸν μέρος, ὅθλον ὅτι οὕτως ἀδικεῖ· ἔστι δὲ πάντα ὅσα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμφισβήτησις ἂν φῇ ὁ μὲν ὡς χρησίμους συνελθὼν αὐτοῖς, ὁ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ὡς κατ' ἄλλην τιὰ φιλείαν.

ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ, so κοινωσίᾳ where φιλοία is exchanged for θρασύνη. Cf. 1155 a, 7 24, 9.

ἐλύσε μὲν κ. τ. λ. 1159 b, 16 2413
αἱ οὕτως ἔτυχεν. Cf. 1113 a 19, 22 1114 a, 15 1143 b, 15.

§ 3 ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, 'and they have not by h these attributes.' So a, 11 τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, 'their attributes.' The case supposed is that described above (ληγρόση the wife, when the θρασύνη ceases).

αὐτοῖς, i.e. ἀλλήλοισι καθ' αὐτοῖς, cf. above 1156 b, 19 n. Contrast the

good, who do' αὐτοῖς αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοῖς καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός 1156 b, 101. The MSS., however, have αὐτοῖς.

ἡ τῶν ἡθῶν. Victoria has seen a clearly right in referring to 1147 a, so πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμνησκόμενοι, ἐν δὲ τῇ σωφροσίᾳ τὰ ἡθῶν στρέψωσι, ἀμοιβαίως ὄντες. It is not necessary to suppose with most editors that ἡ διὰ τὰ ἀγαθὰ φίλια is meant. Affection founded on character is καθ' αὐτήν, even if the character is not an ideally good one; for the friend is loved καθ' αὐτόν, not merely for his ὑπάρχοντα.

λίσαι. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν καθ' αὐτὴν οὐσα μένει, καθυπερ-
 εἶρηται. διαφέροισι δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ 4
 μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται. ὁμοιον γὰρ τῷ μῆεν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν
 15 οὐ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνει, οἷον καὶ τῷ καθαριζέει ὁ ἐπαγ-
 γελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄρμιον ᾔσειεν, τοσοῦτον πλεονεξίᾳ
 εἰς δ' ἀπαιτοῦνται τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονῇ ἀπο-
 διδόναι ἐφθ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκότερος τοῦτο ἐβουλεύετο, ἰκανῶς
 ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει
 20 ὁ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὅν
 γὰρ δίδυμοι τυγχάνει. τοῦτοις καὶ προσέχει, πλείονον
 γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσειν. τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτίου τίξαι ἰστί 5
 τοῦ προειμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προειμένος ἔσθ'
 ἐπ'τρέπει ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιῶν
 25 ὅτε γὰρ διδάξκειν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκείνου
 ὅσον δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ λαμβάνει τοσοῦτον. εἰ
 τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ 'μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρεί.' εἰ δὲ

καθ' αὐτὴν i.e. in it καθ' αὐτὴν
 φιλοδοξία. This is a striking example
 of the way in which καθ' αὐτὴν has
 come to be treated as a simple ad-
 jective without regard to its literal
 meaning.

§ 4. ἐφίεται Cf 2110 a, 12 b
 οἷον καὶ τῷ καθαριζέει τ λ. Cf EP
 loc. cit. p. 401 ὅθεν αὐτὸν με ἡδονῇ
 ἐποίησαι means 'adopted the rôle of a
 friend διὰ τὸ ἡδονῇ, and Πρωταγ.
 τῆς Αλεξανδρου τυχῆ 335 f. Διονύσιος
 γοῦν ὁ τυραννὸς, ὡς φασὶ καθαριζοῦντο
 ἐνδοκίμοις διότιον ἐπ'γγεῖλτο δω-
 ρίον αὐτῷ ταλασσοῦ. νη δὲ ὑπερβαίῃ
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀπαιτοῦν-
 ται. Χρὲν, εἴτε, εὐφραίνονται ὑπὸ σοῦ
 παρ' ὅν χρόνον, εὐφρανα ἀγῶν σὲ
 ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ὥστε τὸν μισθὸν ὡς ἐ-
 τέρπει ἀπελάτταντες οὐδὲς ἀντιτερό-
 μενοι. Note the ironic, conventionalized
 way in which Aristotle alludes to the
 story.

πλείονον γε χάριν, i.e. οὐ δέοντες
 τυγχάνει ταῦτα, καὶ ἂν εἴχαι. Must be
 conjectured ἐκ αὐτοῦ.

§ 5. τοῦ προλαβόντος, i.e. πρὸς
 τοῦ προτέρου λαμβάνει, as he says
 καὶ, but as of ἐπ' he says ἀπὸ τοῦ
 got the start 'the advantage'. It
 is called ὁ προδῶν below 1162, 3, 4
 The rendering makes the action seem
 (surprised by Bywaters) natural and
 right. The second alternative is in-
 duced by the prefixed αὐτῷ as in
 the following clause with γὰρ Cf
 1156 b 34

ὅπερ φασὶ ε τ λ Cf 1150, 100
 1180 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὸ πᾶν ἐμμενέει
 εἰς μετὰ βούληται, ἀποδίδεται δ' ἐν
 πράττειν ἀγῶνισιν. εἰς δὲ μὴ εἰς
 εἰς ἱερὸν δέκεται, ὅσον ἐκ φύσεως εἶναι
 τὰ καθήματα τοσοῦτον κατεργασ-
 ποιῶν, 1114 c 1 f. αὐτῷ ε τ λ.

τὸ μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρεί. Hecate
 'Erg 3⁶—

μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρεί φάσι εἰρησύναι ἀνδρῶν
 δέον.

οἱ τε αὐτοὶ γὰρ γελῶσι καὶ μάλιστα
 ἀνδρῶν
 πιστεύει δ' ἄρα ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ ἐπιστάς, ἀνδρῶν
 ἀνδρῶν,

προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον, οἷτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ἂν ἴφα-
σαν διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγ-
7 κλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἢ ὁμολόγησαν τοῦτο 30
δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οὐ σοφιστὰι ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδὲνα ἂν
δοῦναι ἀργύριον οὐκ ἐπίστανται. αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔλαβον τὸν
μισθὸν μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν εἰσιν ἐν οἷς
δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δὲ αὐτοὺς
προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι τοιαύτη γὰρ ἢ κατ' 35
ἀρετὴν φιλία—τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαί- 1164^a
ρεσιν—αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς—οὕτω δ' ἔοικε
καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ'
ἢ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμὴ τ' ἰσόρροπος οἷκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ'
ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ 5
8 ἐνδεχόμενον. μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὕσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δο-
κούσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει,
οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τέττειν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελίθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσων 10
τὴν ἡδονὴν εἴλετ' ἂν, τοσούτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἔξει τὴν παρὰ
τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμε-

Even among friends things should be done on a business footing.

§ 7. τοῦτο, i.e. to have a fixed charge payable in advance

δὲ αἰνείας, 'for the sake of their friends themselves,' not for what they hope to get out of them. ἔρηται, 1164 b. 6 sqq

κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. It is not a case for 'payment by results.' It is the w^l (προαίρεσις) rather than the power (δύναμις) that is essential.

καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς κ.τ.λ. Cf. above 1164 b. 4

§ 8. ἐπὶ τινι, 'for some return,' 'on the understanding that a return has to be made.' The context shows that we are dealing with 'understandings,' not with 'agreements.' So ἐπὶ τινι is not equivalent to ἐπὶ ῥητοῖ.

τὸν προέχοντα, 'the one who has the start.' Cf. the note on τοῦ προελόντος 1164 a. 23. The editors appear to think that ὁ προέχων can mean ὁ πρότερον εἶχων. Even Zell says "is qui prius habet, id est, qui prior accepit."

οὗτος sc. ὁ προέχων.
ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσων κ.τ.λ. The pleasure has to be calculated in terms of τὸ ὠφελίμων.

Ξει, sc. ὁ προέχων, τὴν παρὰ τούτου, sc. τοῦ προέχοντος.

ἐν τοῖς ἀνίοις, 'in the case of things offered for sale.' The seller will take as much as he can get, but the just price is the value of the article to the buyer. Aristotle is still thinking of *χρεία* as the only standard of value. He forgets that there is a Normal Value determined by Cost of Pro-

νοι, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἰκουσίων συμβολαίων δικαιο
 μὴ εἶναι, ὥς δέον ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον
 15 καθάπερ ἰκοινώησεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐτετριφθῇ, τοῦτον οἶεται δι-
 καιώτερον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἐπιτρεψαντος τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ
 τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τί
 γὰρ οἰκεία καὶ ᾧ διδοῦσιν ἐκύσταις φαίνεται πολλοὶ ἔξαι-
 ἄλλ' ὁμοίως ἢ ἁμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν το-
 20 τῶσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσοῦτον τιμᾶν ὅσοι
 ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον ἄλλ' ὅσον πρὶν ἔχειν εἶμα.

11. Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ ταιαῦτα οἷον πότερον οἱ
 πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πειθεσθαι, ἢ κύμματα
 μὲν ἱατρῷ πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροπονητέον τὸν τελα-
 25 μίκον· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον,
 καὶ εὐεργετῇ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ προσέειν.
 εἰν ἁμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδιχῆται. ἄρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ ταιαῦτα ἀερ-
 βῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥάδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας

1164 b. 22. EE. 1244 a, 1. περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ αἰ-
 ἀρετῇ φίλον σκεπτόν πότερον δεῖ ἐκείνῳ τὸ χρῆμα ὑποσχεῖν κα-
 βοηθεῖν ἢ τῷ αὐτιςκουμένῳ καὶ δυναμένῳ. ταῦτα δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ προβλεπόμε-
 ἔστι, πότερον τὸν φίλον ἢ τὸν σπουδαῖον εὐ ποιητέον μᾶλλον. ὅτι μοι
 γὰρ «ὁ» φίλος καὶ σπουδαῖος, ἴσως οὐ λίαν χαλεπὸν, ἂν μὴ τις το μὲ
 αἰξήσῃ τὸ δὲ ταπεινώσει, φίλον μὲν σφόδρα ποῖον, ἑταεική δὲ ἥτορα
 εἰ δὲ μή, πολλὰ προβλήματα γίνεται, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν ἦν, οὐκ ἔσται ἡ, ἢ
 ἢ ἔσται, οὐπω δέ, ἢ ὁ μὲν ἐγένετο, ἔστι δ' οἱ, ὁ εἰ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔν ὁ

duction. If the seller does not get
 this, he will withdraw his wares from
 the market, unless indeed they are
 perishable.

§ 9. ἐνιαχοῦ τε κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1162 b,
 29.

τῶν ἰκουσίων συμβολαίων. Cf.
 above 1131 a, 2 sqq. and the notes.

οἶεται. There is no difficulty in
 the third person singular which Aris-
 totle uses very freely without a definite
 subject (cf. 1110 a, 14 n). Here we
 may supply ὁ νομοθέτης from ὁ νόμος
 if we like.

ἀλλ' ὁμοίως κ.τ.λ. However big
 the seller's estimate may be, it is the
 buyer's estimate that is decisive.

δεῖ δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. A somewhat dis-
 favour of the seller. When the seller
 has been bought in at market value
 the purchaser is bound for he is no
 longer conscious how much he paid
 it. Of course, if he wishes to withdraw
 again, its apparent value to him may
 again.

11 11. Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ.
 These aporiae concern a matter of common
 of Friendship. For ἔχει cf. 1162 b.

ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἔδη- 10 λον· καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις, ὥσπερ καὶ δανείου ᾧ ὀφείλει ἀποδοτεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ ταῦτ' αἰεὶ, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ ληστῶν πότερα τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὅστισιν ἦ, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἐλαφρότε 35 ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε 1165² γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. ὅπερ οὖν εἰρηται, καθύλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἢ δόσει τῷ κυλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον· τοῖοιτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προῖταρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, 5 ἔπειτα δὲ ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὐ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἢ ἀντ-

νὴδ' ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο ἐργωδέστερον. μὴ γὰρ τι λέγει Εὐριπίδης, τοιήσας

λόγων δίκαιον μισθὸν ἂν λόγους φέροις,
ἔργον δ' ἐοικὼς ἔργον <δ>ε< >παρέσχεται.

καὶ οὐ πάντα δεῖ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἄλλ' ἃ δεῖ τῇ μητρί· καίτοι βολέων δ πατήρ. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ Δεῖ πάντα δοῦναι, οὐδ' ἔχει πᾶσας τὰς τιμὰς ἀλλὰ τινὰς. ἴσως οὖν ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ἄλλα δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. αὐτὸν οὐκ εἰ σίτην δίδωσι καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, καὶ συζῆν τοῦτ' εἰς· εἰδ' ὅτ' τοῦτον τὸ συζῆν, τοῦτ' εἰ μὴ οὗτος δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ χρησίμως. ἀλλ' οἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες τοῦτ' πάντα τῷ ἀρωμένῳ δίδωσιν οὐ δέον, ὁδωδὸς εἰσιν ἄξιοι.

καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅροι τῆς φιλίας πάντες μὲν πῶς εἰσι φιλίας, ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς. τῷ μὲν γὰρ χρησίμῳ τὸ βουλευσθαι τὰ καὶ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τῷ εὐ ποιήσαντι καὶ τῷ ὁποῖος δεῖ (οἱ γὰρ ἐπισημαίνει αὐτός ὁ ἀριστὸς τῆς φιλίας), ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ συζῆν, τῷ δὲ καθ' ἡούση τὸ συναγαγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν· πάντες δ' οὗτοι οἱ ὅροι αὐτὰ

§ 4. μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα, sc. δεῖν λαμβάνειν. The point is that, as it is right to ransom your father rather than yourself, it will be right to ransom him rather than the man who has ransomed you, and still more if the man who ransomed you is not himself a

captive but is merely claiming repayment of the money he spent.

§ 5. τὴν προῖταρχήν, 'the original benefit.' The word comes from ἀρχαίως as signified in ἀμείψασθαι. Cf. 1124 b, 19 n.

ἀπόδοσις γίνηται ὃν οἶεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οἷδε γὰρ τῷ
 δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αἰόμενος κομ-
 εῖσθαι ἰδάνεισεν ἐπικικέοντι, ὁ δ' οἷα ἐλπίζει κομίσθαι
 10 παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσται
 τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἰόνται ἔτι, οὐκ ἂν ἐ-
 ξαιεν ἄτυπα ποιεῖν. ὕπερ οὖν πολλοὶ κίς ἐρήται, οἱ περὶ τὰ
 πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγους ὁμοίων ἔχουσι τὸ ἁρισμῶν
 τοῖς περὶ ἃ εἰσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὐτὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πᾶσι ἀποδοτέον,
 15 οἷδε τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οἷδε τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οἷ
 ἀδελφῶν· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταίροις·
 καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεία καὶ τὰ ἁρμοττοῦ
 ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γνημοὶ
 μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γινῆ-
 20 καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κηδὴ δὲ μάλιστα
 οἰόνται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ τούτου. δεξίαι δ' ἔτι
 ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστα ἑπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὁφείλου-
 τας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κήλλιον ὃν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς
 ταῦτ' ἑπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οἱ

φίλιον μὲν λέγονται τινά, οὐ πρὸς μίαν δ' οἰδεῖ. διὰ πολλὰ εἰς αὐτὸν
 ἑκάστος μῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ φίλος, οὐκ ὡν, οἷον ἢ τοῦ εἶναι προαιεῖ
 καὶ γὰρ ὁ καθ' ὑπεραχὴν καὶ ποῦ ἦτας εἶ * * βολεται τῷ ἐργῇ τῷ
 αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχει, καὶ τῷ δόντι τὸ εἶναι διὰ καὶ ἀταποδοῦνται, ἀλλὰ
 συζῆν οὐ τούτω, ἄλλο τῷ ἡδεῖ.

ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ φίλοι ἀλλήλους ἐνίοι· τὰ γὰρ πρᾶγματα μάλιστα, ἀλλ'
 οὐ φιλοῦσι τὸν ἔχοντα· διὰ φιλεῖ κακείνους οἷον ἵπτοι ἡδὲ τὸν αἷον
 εἴλετο, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλούτου εἴλετο· χρησιμώτερος γάρ· ὅτι
 <οὐ> δεῖ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὡς περ ἂν εἰ μᾶλλον εἴλετο εἰς ἡττοκα. οἱ δ'
 ἐγκαλοῦσιν· ἐκείνους γὰρ νῦν ζητοῦσι τον ἀγαθοῖς, πρῶτερον ζητήσαντες
 τὸν ἡδὲν ἢ τὸν χρήσιμον

τὸ ἀξίωμα, 'the claim.'

οἰόνται δέ, 'but they think (or
 rather 'he thinks') it is so. The
 number changes, but it is still the
 good man who does not wish to lend
 his money. It is quite natural that
 he should not lend to a man who he
 thinks (rightly or wrongly) will not

pay back

§ 6. ἀρήται. Cf. 1104 a. 1. αὐτῷ
 θύεται, αἱ. εἴλετο.

§ 7. κηδὴ, (uncertain).

§ 8. τροφῆς, παρὰ τὸν τροφῆς
 The alms are to the Helianthus
 of τροφῆς.

πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί, οὐδ' αὖ 15
τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικὴν,
9 ὁμοίως δε καὶ τὴν μητρικὴν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ
τιμὴν τὴν καθ' ἑλικίαν, ὑπαναστασεί καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς
τοιούτοις· πρὸς ἑταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν
καὶ ἀπάντων κοινοτητα, καὶ συγγενέσι ξὶ καὶ φιλιταις καὶ 30
πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἀπασιν αἰεὶ πειρατῶν τὸ οἰκεῖον
ἀποκρίνειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἐκαστοῖς ὑπάρχοντα κατ'
10 οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥῶν
ἢ κρίσει τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διί
γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν ἐνδέχεται οὕτω διοριστέον. 35

III Ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς
φιλίας ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν ταῦν, διὰ 1165^b
τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μῆκτι ταῦτ' ἔχω-
σιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι· ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὡν
ὑπολαμβάνων εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσει δ' αὖ τις,
εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ 3
τὸ ἡθος· δὲ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλείους διαφυραὶ
γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως ὄνται καὶ ὡς
2 φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολαβῇ φιλεῖ-
σθαι διὰ τὸ ἡθος, μηδὲν τοιούτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἐαυτὸν
αἰτιώτ' αὖ· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ 10
δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ
νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσην περὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ κακουργία.

§ 8. ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει,
'rising and giving them a seat.' Cf
Matth. Rep. 235 α σιγάτε νῦν αὐτῶν
καθὲ πρεσβυτέρους, ὡς πρέπει, καὶ
κατακλίσαι καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις.

καὶ συγκρίνειν &c. h., 'and com-
pare the claims of each in respect of
closeness, goodness and usefulness.'
I cannot feel convinced of Professor
Bywater's view (Cont. p. 62, that
συγγενέων is here used in the sense of
συνείδειν (or συνόχεω) and that the
reference is to 'combining the persons
and their respective dues'. These, I

take it, would be προσήκοντα, ποὶ
ὑπάρχοντα.

§ 30. ἢ κρίσει i.e. ἢ σύγκρισιν
according to the usual practice of
repeating a compound by the simple
word (1136 b, 13 a.). Kuehle's σύγ-
κρισις is therefore unnecessary.

III. § 1. ἐν ἀρχῇ, probably 1163 b,
23.

§ 2. ἢ τοῖς...κιβδηλεύουσιν.
Zwinger quotes Theophrastus, v. 200—
Χρυσὸν κιβδηλοῖ καὶ ἀργύρου ἀσχετοὶ
ἀνδρ.

Κόρος, καὶ ἐξουρεῖ ῥέδιον ἐνδὲρ σφῶ·

εἶν δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ὠγαθόν, γένεται δὲ *μοχθηρὸς καὶ* 3
δοκῇ, ἄρ' ἔτε φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατον, εἴτερ μὴ πᾶν φιλη-
 15 τὸν ἀλλὰ τᾶγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ ⁺φιλητέον⁺ πονηρόν οὔτε εἰ-
 φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρή εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρη-
 ται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἄρ' οἷν εὐθὺς διαλυ-
 τέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν *μοχθηρὰς*;
 ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἡθος ἢ τὴν
 30 οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βίβλιν καὶ τῆς φιλικῆς οὐκαιότερον. δοξεῖ δ'
 ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ
 φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οἷν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφιστάται.
 εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμῖνοι ὁ δ' ἐπιμικιστερος γινώσκει καὶ πολὺ
 διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἄρα χρηστὸς φίλος; ἢ οἶκ' ἐνδεχεται.
 25 ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μαλιστα ὄηλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν
 ταῖς παιδείαις φιλαίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμῖνοι τὴν δό-
 νοίαν παῖς ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος εἴη υἱὸς ἀκρατιστοῦ, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι
 μὴτ' ἀρεσκύμενοι τοῦ αἰτίοις μὴτε χάροντες καὶ λυτὸν-
 30 μενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπέβηκε αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ
 δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι φίλους εἶναι· συμβαίνει γὰρ οὐχ οἷον
 τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων, ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲν ἀλλοιοτερον πρὸς
 αὐτὸν ἔκτειν ἢ εἰ μὴ γεγρονεὶ φίλος μεδίποτε; ἢ εἰ
 μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις
 μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὐκ καὶ τοῖς

εἰ δὲ φίλοι νῦν ἄνθρωποι εἰσι στηθεύει
 λήληθε

ψυχρὸς εἶναι, δόλιον δ' ἐν φρεσὶν ἦτορ
 ἔχει.

τούτω θίσις κερδελότατον ποιήσει με-
 τοῖς,

καὶ γυνῶνι πᾶσι καὶ εὐδὲ ἀνθρώποις.

Cambridge edition 1891 1892 1893
 θαυμάζω δ' ἐγὼ εἰ τοῖς μὲν τὸ νόημα
 διαφθαίρουσι, θάνατος παρ' ἡμῶν εἶναι ἢ
 ζημία, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις τὴν πᾶν κερδελόν
 καὶ ἀτίστον ποιοῦσι λόγον δοῦναι.

§ 3 οὐτε δὲ φιλητέον α. γ. λ. There
 is clearly something wrong here
 even so the φιλητέον = τὸ = νοσηρόν,
 and so Hywatson. Stewart supposes
 the original text to have been ἢ οὐ

δυνατόν, εἴτερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητέον ἀλλὰ
 τᾶγαθόν, οὐδὲ δὲ φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ
 α. γ. λ., ἢ εἰ καὶ οὕτω οὐτὸ φιλητέον
 πονηρὸν ἐστὶν ὅτι οὐτὸ ἀντιπαρὸν
 οὐδὲ δὲ φιλοπόνηρον.

φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ α. γ. λ. ἢ εἰ καὶ
 μετὰ τὴν αἰτίαν αἰτίαν καὶ ἡμε-
 ρήματα. Cambridge edition 1891
 καὶ τὸ ἄλλο φιλοπόνηρον οὐδὲ γὰρ
 τῆς πονηρίας καὶ αἰτίας ἐστὶν, εἰ ἐπ'
 παραίτησιν τὸ δόλιον πρὸς τὸ δόλιον
 ποιεῖσθαι.

ἐπανόρθωσις δ' ἔχουσι, 'καταβίβας α
 reform.' 1891 edition 1892, α. γ.

§ 4 ἢ μὴ 1891 edition 1892, α. γ.

συμβιβάζει. Cambridge edition 1891

γενομένους ἀπονεμητέου τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν, 35
δ' αὖν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διαλυσεὶς γένηται.

IV. Τὰ φιλικὰ δε τα πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίας 1166^a
ὀρίζονται, ὅσκειν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τι-
θείασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πραττοντα τάγαθῶ
ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ
ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὴ τέκ-
να πεπονθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκροικοτες. οἱ δὲ
τὸν συνδιάγουτα καὶ ταῦτ' αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγούντα

1166 a, l. FF. 1240 a, 5 πῶσα μὲν οὖν εἶδη φιλίας, καὶ τίνας
διαφοραὶ καθ' ἃς λέγονται οἱ τε φίλοι καὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες καὶ οἱ φιλούμε-
νοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥστε φίλοι εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ εὐτύτου, εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ αὐτῶν
οἷτ' φίλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ, πολλὴν ἔχει ἐπισκεψιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις
μάλιστα ἱκανοὺς αὐτοὺς αὐτῷ φίλος εἶναι, καὶ τοιούτῳ χροῖσμενοι παρόντι
κρίνουσι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους φιλίαν· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους καὶ
τὰ δοκοῦντ' ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μὲν ὑπεραντιπῶνται, τὰ δ' ὅμοια
φαίνονται οὕτως. ὅστις γὰρ πῶς κατὰ ἀναλογίαν αὐτῇ ἢ φιλῷ, ἀπλῶς δ'
οὐ. ἐν δυοῖ γὰρ διηρημένους τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν· δι' αὐτὸ μᾶλλον
οὕτως αὐτοὺς αὐτῷ φίλος, «ὥς» ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκραιοῦ καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς εἴρηται
πῶς ἐλὼν ἢ ἀλὼν, τῷ τὰ μέρος ἔχει πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς,
καὶ ὅμοιον τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰ φίλος αὐτοὺς αὐτῷ καὶ ἐχθρὸς, καὶ εἰ
ἀλλήτ' εἰς αὐτοὺς αὐτοῦ πάντα γὰρ ἐν δυοῖ ταῦτα καὶ διηρημένους· ἢ δὴ

IV. § 2. Τὰ φιλικὰ θ' κ.τ.λ.
We now come to what is really the
important part of the discussion of
φιλία so far as regards the main argu-
ment. It is φιλία alone, in the sense
of the higher self-love, that can lead us
from the practical to the theoretic life.
(cf. Introductory Note p. 315)

πρὸς τοὺς πέλας (so $\kappa\lambda$ for vulg
πρὸς τοὺς φίλους). Friendship as a
feeling πρὸς ἑαυτὸν is, in its highest
form, an auto-satisfaction and trans-
ference to others of the good man's
relation to himself.

ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν. We must not
supply φιλεῖν, for Aristotle does not
intend to assume yet that there is such

a thing as self-love. That question is
raised only to be dismissed below
(a, 33). There is no definite φίλος.
Eudemus says more clearly ἀπὸ τῆς
ἐκείνου αὐτοῦ εἴσεως (loc. cit. p. 410).

τιθείασι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Five φιλικὰ are
enumerated and shown to be charac-
teristic of self-love, viz (1) φιλοπονεῖν
ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα (2) βουλομένη του
εἶναι τον φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν, (3) τὸ
συνδιατεῖν (= τὸ συζητεῖν), (4) τὸ ταῦτ' αὐτὸ
αἰρεῖσθαι (τὸ ἀπογνωμνῶναι), (5) τὸ
συναλγεῖν καὶ συχαρίζειν.

οἱ προσκεκροικοτες, 'who have
quarrelled' (perhaps about a trifle)
and 'never see each other now,' so
that their friendship is clearly du-

καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ
 τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δὲ τινι καὶ τὴν φίλῳ
 10 ὀρίζονται. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπεικεῖ ὑπ. ρ. 2
 χεῖ—τοῖς δι' λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι
 (δοκεῖ δέ, καθυπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἐκείστων ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ
 ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)—οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογενομενὲς αὐτῷ, καὶ τῶν 3
 αὐτῶν ὀρεγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν· καὶ βεβηλωται
 15 δὴ αὐτῷ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρᾶττε—ταῖ

αὐτοῦ πως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὑπαρχει πως ταῦτα, ἢ ὁ οὐ διηρημένα, οὐκ
 ἐπύρχει.

ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔξεως [ὥς] οἱ λοιποὶ τροποὶ τοῦ φίλου
 διορισμένοι, καθ' οὓς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιστοπεῖν εἰσπαμὲν. δοκεῖ γὰρ
 φίλος εἶναι ὁ βουλευόμενος τινι τὰγαθὰ ἢ οὐα οἶατα. ἀγαθὰ, μὴ δὲ αἴτιον
 ἀλλ' ἐκείνου εἶναι· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ τὸ εἶναι βουλευται δὲ ἐκείνου ἀε-
 μὴ δὲ αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰ μὴ διακρίνωμεν τὰγαθὰ, μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ἂν δοκεῖ
 μάλιστα φιλεῖν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ σιζῇν αἰρείται δι' αἴτιον τῇ
 ἐμφιλίᾳ καὶ μὴ δὲ ἑτερόν τι, οἷον οἱ πατέρες τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις
 συζῶσι δ' ἑτέροις. μέγεται δὴ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ἀλλήλα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
 ἂν μὴ τὸ αὐτοῖς, οἱ δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ τὸ σιζῇν, οὓς οἶοιται
 φιλεῖσθαι· ἐπὶ τὸ ἀλογεῖντι συνελγὼν μὴ δὲ ἑτέρον τι ἀγαθὸν
 θησομεν], οἷον οὐ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότης, ὅτι χαλεπὰ ἀλογεῖντες

interested (αὐτοῦ χάριν). Cf. Pol.
 1263 a, 18 οἱ πλείστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ
 των ἐν τοῖς καὶ ἐκ μετῶν προσαρμόντες
 ἀλλήλοις.

φρίζονται. They are not, of course,
 poetic ὄνειδος, but only dialectical
 ὀνειδος (Tpm. 102 a, 9 sqq.) ἡ φίλος.

§ 8. τῷ ἐπεικεῖ, i. q. τῷ ἀγαθῷ.
 and ὁ σπουδαῖος below i. q. ὁ ἀγαθός.
 ἢ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, 'in so far as
 they fancy themselves good.' The
 point is more fully expressed below
 1166 b, 2. Here the remark is quite
 parenthetical.

καθυπερ εἴρηται. Cf. 1113 a,
 21 sqq.

§ 8. οὗτος γάρ, sc. ὁ ἐπεικεῖ (a,
 10). 'The *friend* φιλεῖν αὐτοῦ is to be
 true of the good man's relation to him-
 self. Cf. 1167 b, 4.

κατὰ πάναν τὴν ψυχὴν. — c. 1166
 is no variance between the two, but
 ἐπὶ αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι the same
 objects as διὰ βούλησιν. It is the
 issue of him that τὰ πάντα μέγεται.
 (1099 a, 12), πᾶσα γὰρ ἀμείνωσι τὸ
 λόγῳ (1102 b, 10). We must attend
 the Paraphrast's error of saying τὸ
 αὐτῶν ἀρέσκει κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ
 καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. The λόγῳ ἐκ
 ἡμῶν ὁμοῦ.

καὶ βουλευται δὴ αὐτῷ. The ἀρε-
 φίλος, viz. βούληται ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ
 εἶναι.

καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα. Of course the
 the good man there are ἀρετῶν καὶ
 τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὰ, but ἡ ἀρετὴ
 ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμῶν καὶ
 that ἀρετὴ is one ἀρετὴ καὶ

γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τῶγαθον διαπονεῖν—καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα—τοῦ
 γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἑκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ.—καὶ ἤν
 δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτον καὶ σφίζεσθαι, καὶ μέγιστα τοῦτο φ
 4 φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαιεῖ τὸ εἶναι. ἑκαστος δ'
 ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τῶγαθον, γενομένος δ' ἄλλος αἰρεῖται οὐ- 20
 δεῖς πάντ' ἔχειν ἐκείνο τὸ γενομένον—ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ

ἀλλ' οἱ δὲ αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ αἱ μητρες τοῖς τέκνοις καὶ οἱ συνωδόνοντες
 ὀρνίθες βιάσεται, γὰρ μαλιστα γὰρ οὐ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ
 φίλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην, οἷον διαψῶντι συνδιψῆν, εἰ ἐνεδέχεται,
 ὅτι [μὴ] ἴγνωται. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαίρειν. «τὸ γὰρ
 χαίρειν μὴ δι' ἑτέρον τι, ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτὸν, ὅτι χαίρει, φιλοῦν. ἔτι τὰ
 τοιαῦτα λέγεται περὶ τῆς φιλίας, εἰς ἰσότητος φιλοῦντος, καὶ [μὴ] μίαν ψυχὴν
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀληθῶς φίλους. ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἱκαναφέρεται πρὸς τὸν εἶνα.
 καὶ γὰρ βούλεται τῶγαθὰ αὐτῷ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, οὐθεὶς γὰρ αὐτὸς
 αὐτὸν εἰ ποιεῖ διὰ τι ἑτέρον, οὐδὲ χάριτος. οἱ δὲ λέγει ὅτι ἵπποισεν ἢ εἰς.
 δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι βιασέσθαι ὁ ὅλῃον ποιῶν ὅτι φιλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλεῖν

1166 a, 20. EE. 1240 b, 3 καὶ τὸ εἶναι μέγιστα καὶ τὸ συζῆν

ὅπερ ἑκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ, 'which
 each of us is believed to be.' We
 need not seek far for the author of
 this *doxos*. Plato in Rep. ix. had
 already represented τὸ φιλόσοφος in
 the *iknema* as a man, with *e thymos* and
epithymia as in the image of a lion
 and a many-headed monster. We
 need not yet consider whether or in
 what sense, Aristotle himself could
 accept the formula Cf. 1166 b, 30
 1173 a, 1 1174 q.

καὶ ἤν *h* κ.τ.λ. The *monos*
philos.

τοῦτο δ' φρονεῖ, in the Platonic
 sense of the word *phronesis*. Cf. above
 1140 a, 24 n.

§ 4. γενομένος δ' ἄλλος κ.τ.λ.
h *h* *h* is evidently right in trying
 to explain this sentence by the light
 of the *epithymia* which βούλεται ἀγαθὸν
 raised above (1140 a, 3 1174 j). There
 we saw that a man will not wish his
 friend to be a god, here we see that

he will not wish to be a god himself.
 We are coming closer to the idea of
 Self.

γενομένος δ' ἄλλος, 'by becoming
 another.' The sentence "No one
 chooses by becoming another that the
 thing he has become should have all
 good things" is not logical; but the
 thought does not lend itself to clear
 expression. If we bracket *ἀεὶ* τὸ
γενομένου with *Vermeiden*, the sen-
 tence is smoother; but I am inclined
 to think the confusion of two in-
 consistent thoughts is intentional.

καὶ νῦν, 'as it is,' so he would be
 wishing for something which already
 exists. Cf. Leibniz: "A quoy vous
 serviroit-il de devenir Roy de la
 Chine à condition d'oublier ce que
 vous avez esté? Ne seroit-ce pas la
 même chose que si Dieu en même
 temps qu'il vous détruisoit, créoit un
 Roy dans la Chine?"

θεὸς τάγαθόν—ἀλλ' ὥν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν· διῆκει δ' ἂν τὸ νοεῖν
 ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιώγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰσαυτῷ
 25 βουλεται· ἡδὲ καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμέ-
 νων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆσαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες
 ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδέϊαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορί-
 τῃ διανοία. συναλγῇ τε καὶ συνῆδεται μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ·
 πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρὺν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οἷα
 30 ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὲ πρὸς
 αὐτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπεικεῖ, κτλ. δι'
 τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ φίλος
 ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ
 φίλοι οἷς ταυτ' ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ ποτερον ἐστὶν ἢ
 οὐκ ἐστὶ φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· διῆκει δ' ἂν

καὶ τὸ συγχάρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν, καὶ μία δὲ ψιχη, καὶ τὸ μὴ
 δεῖναι ἀνέν ἀλλήλων μὴδὲ ζῆν, ὅλα συναισθηθῆσαι· οὕτω γὰρ
 ἔχει δ' εἰς, καὶ ἴσως ὁμιλεῖ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τῷ ἀγαθῷ
 ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὐτόν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ποιητῇ συμφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀκαταί-
 καὶ διὰ τούτου δοκεῖ καὶ ἑχθρὸν ἐνδέχασθαι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι· ἢ δ' εἰς καὶ
 ἀδιαίρετος, ὁρεκτός αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτος δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ κατ' ἐπεὶ
 φίλος, ἐπεὶ ὁ γὰρ μοχθηρὸς οὐκ εἰς ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας
 ἕτερος καὶ ἐμπληκτός. ὅσπερ καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία ἀνάγεται ἐκ
 τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὅτι γὰρ πῃ ὁμοιοῦ καὶ εἰς καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός

ἀλλ' ὥν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν, 'representing
 just what he is,' καὶ αἰεταὶ πάντ'
 ἔχειν. A will not accept bliss on
 condition of becoming it. It is
 nothing to A that B is blessed.

§ 5 συνδιώγειν τε κ.τ.λ. The third
 φιλοῦν.

μνῆσαι. I prefer this, the reading of
 K¹, to the more commonplace μνήμαι.
 The poeticus color is quite in place
 here. Cf. 1165 b. 33.

συναλγῇ τε κ.τ.λ. The first φιλο-
 κῆν.

ἀμεταμέλητος. Zinzindus compares
 Epicharmus (fr. 280 Kaibel, οὐ μετα-
 νοεῖν ἀλλὰ τρῶσιν χρῆται τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν

σοφόν.

τῷ δὲ ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ. The con-
 tinuance of the argument. Men's views
 of the characteristics of φίλος are
 entirely covered from the good man's
 relation to himself. His relation to
 himself is transferred to his relation
 to himself, for he treats himself as
 himself, and that a way men regard the
 points emphasized as false.

§ 6 πρὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι κ.τ.λ. This is
 introduced as an entirely fresh point.
 We have seen that our view of a
 friend's relation is based upon the good
 man's relation to himself; can we put
 it the other way and say that the good

ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ἥ ἐστὶ δυο ἢ πλείω [ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέ- 35
νων] καὶ ὅτε ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιοῦ· 1166^b
7 ται. φαίνεται ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν.
καί περ οὐσι φαίλουσι. ἀρ' οὖν ἢ τ' ἀρίσκειν αὐτοῖς καὶ
ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν;
ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαίλων καὶ ἀποσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθ' 5
8 ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οἶδε τοῖς φαύ-
λοις· διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦ-
σιν ἄλλα δε βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἰρουῦνται γὰρ
ἀντὶ τῶν δυσκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδία βλα-
βερὰ ὄντα· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἡργίαν ἀφίστανται 10

ταύτῃ οὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος καὶ ὁρεκτής· φίλος δὲ ταυτοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὁ κτηνός
παρὰ φίλων. ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς οὐθ' ἄμα λυιδυρῆται ἑαυτῷ, ὥς περ ὁ ἀκρατής,
οὔτε ὁ ὑστερος τῷ πρότερον, ὥς περ ὁ μεταμελητικός, οὔτε ὁ ἐμπροσθεν
τῷ ὑστερον, ὥς περ ὁ ψεύστης. ὅλως γε εἰ δαί ὥς περ οἱ σοφισταὶ
διαρίζουσιν, ὥς περ τὸ Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος σπαυδαῖος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ

man loves himself? This is precisely
parallel to the question in Book V
whether a man can wrong himself.

ἥ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω. This has been
taken in two ways, (1), 'in so far as
he is two or more,' (2) 'in so far as
two or more of the characteristics
mentioned are present.' With regard
to (2) I would ask why 'two or more'
are mentioned. Surely the good man
has them all and the bad man lacks
he has. F.F. 1740 a, 17 and loc.
c1' p. 409 seems to me decisive in
favor of (1). We have there τῷ το
μέρῃ ἔχω τὰς πρὸς ἄλλα τὰ τῆς
ψυχῆς, and below α, 10 ἥ δὲ δυο
παι αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ. ἐπὶ τῶν τῶν ταύτα.
This is an authoritative explanation.
Eudemus also (loc. cit.) refers to
the parallel question τότερος ἀνέχεται
ταυτὸν εἶναι ἢ οὐ. If we follow
this hint and turn to 1138 b, 5,
we find τὰς μεταφορὰς καὶ ὁμοιότητας

ὅστις αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν διακίω ἀλλὰ
τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς. Here as there we
have a reference to the Platonic view.
This Aristotle regards as a metaphor,
so we may be sure that the argument
here is still purely dialectical.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. Bywater (Cmtr.
p. 63) puts a comma before ἐκ τῶν
εἰρημένων to show that it goes closely
with δόξαι δ' αὖ. I do not see how it
follows from what has been said, and
prefer to believe the words have crept
in from the paraphrase. We see from
the next sentence that τὸ εἰρημένον
most naturally means the φίλος which
have been enumerated, and it is there-
fore likely that they are introduced
here to support the interpretation we
have rejected.

ἥ δὲ ἐτέρων μὲν κ.τ.λ. Observe
that the διαφορά is entirely in the
ὁρεκτικόν, not between δοξῆν and
διδόναι.

- τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἰοῦνται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτεστα εἶναι. οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσί τι αἷον μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνδιημερεύουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς ἐκφεύγουσιν·
- 15 ἀναμνησκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν καὶ τοιαῖς ἑτέρα ἐλπίξοισι καθ' ἑαυτούς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων δ' ὅτε ἐπιλανθάνονται. οἷδεν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οἷδεν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οἷδε δὴ συγκαίρουσιν αἰεὶ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ ταιούται ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ,
- 20 καὶ τὸ μὲν δια μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενον τιναν, τὸ δ' ἡδέσται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκείσε ἔλκει ὥσπερ διασπώντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἶον τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδεσθαι, 10 ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρὸν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἦσθη, καὶ οἷα δὲ ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ
- 25 οἱ φαῦλοι γέμνουσιν. οὐ δὲ φαίνεται ὁ φαῖλος οἷδε πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακείσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν· αἱ δὲ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἀθλιον, φευκτικὸν τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμινῶς καὶ πειρατέον ἐπικειῖται· οἷτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρω φίλος γένοιτο.

ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον σπαιδαῖον αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἐγκαλέωσι αὐτοῖς, ἀποκτανίσουσιν αὐτούς· ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πῶς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀγαθός. ζητεῖ βεῖ ὁ ἀπλῶς ὦν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι ζῶ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ εἰ φύσει βούλεται εἶναι φίλος καὶ διασπασαὶ ἀδύνατον. διὸ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου μὲν δικεῖ ἑαυτὸς αὐτῷ αὐτῷ φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οὐκ, οἷον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ * *, οὐκ ἔστι φίλος. ἀλλ' αἷδε τὸ παιδίον, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡδὴ ἔχη προαίρεσιν· ἡδὴ γὰρ τότε διαφανεῖ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. δοκεῖ δ' ἡ φιλία ἢ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ κατὰ σὴν γένειαν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς λύσαι, ἀλλὰ κῆν διαφέρειται, ὅμως οὗτοι μὲν ἐπὶ συγγενεῖς, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ αἷς, ἔως αἱ ζῆ.

καὶ μισοῦνται, and who hated (the relative cannot be repeated in Greek), καὶ φεύγουσι, 'actually shun.'

φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν, opp. ζῆν βούλεται ἑαυτὸν (1:66 n, 17).

§ 3. ἑαυτοῖς δὲ φεύγουσιν, ὡς συμβαδῶν ἐν αὐτῷ βούλεται α + ζ (1:14 2, 25).

οὐδὲ δὴ συγκαίρουσιν καὶ λ. οὐ συναλγοῖ τε καὶ στασιάζει ἑαυτῷ (27).

V. Ἡ δ' εὐνοια φιλική μιν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία· 30
 γίνεταί γιὰρ εὐνοια καὶ πρὸς ἠγνώστας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φι-
 λία δ' οὐ. καὶ προτερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φί-
 λησις ἴσθιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διητασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει
 2 δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ
 δ' εὐνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἶον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστάς 35
 συμβαίνει· εὐνοίαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμ- 1167
 πράξαντες δ' ἂν οἶδεν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἶπομεν, προσπαίως εὐνοίαι
 3 γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαιῶς στέργουσιν. ἔοικε δὲ ἀρχὴ φιλίας
 εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ
 περσπθείς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οἶδεις ἐρᾶν, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἶδει οὐδὲν 5
 μᾶλλον ἐρᾶ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρου-
 σίας ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἶον τ' εἶναι μὴ
 εὐνοὺς γενομένους, οἱ δ' εἶνοι οἶδεν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βού-
 λονται γὰρ μῖνον τίγαθ' ὅτι εἰσιν εὐνοίαι, συμπραξίεν δ'
 ἂν οἶδεν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη 10

1166 b. 30. EE. 1340 b. 38 ποσοχῶς μιν οὖν τὸ φιλεῖν
 λέγεται, καὶ ὅτι πάντοι αἱ φιλαίαι ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην, δηλον δὲ
 τῶν εἰρημενων· οὐαῖον δὲ τῇ στείψει θεωρῆσαι καὶ περὶ ὁμοιοῦς καὶ
 εὐτελείας· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά, τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἀλλήλων.
 ἔστι δ' ἡ εὐνοια τῆς φιλίας οὔτε σπῆμπος ἑτερον οὔτε ταυτόν. διη-
 ρημέ ηἱ γὰρ τῆς φιλικῆς κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, οὗτ' ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὗτ' ἐν
 τῇ κατ' ἡδονὴν ἑστίν. εἴτε γὰρ ὅτε χρήσιμον, βούλεται αὐτῷ τὰγαθόν,
 οὐ ἐπὶ ἐκείνου ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτοῦ βούλοιστ' ἂν, δοκεῖ δὲ ὡς περ <τῇ φιλίᾳ> καὶ

V. § 1 καὶ πρότερον 1165 b. 31.
 We here begin an examination of
 correlative terms and denotations like that in
 Book VI., 1149 a. 31 seq.

διητασιν *involuntariness*. The
 word is originally a medical term.
 Cf. Plato, Rep. 407 c κεφαλῇ τινα
 διατάσσει, πηλαεῖται.

ἀκολουθεῖ. Cf. Ind. a. v.

§ 2 περὶ τοῦ ἀγωνιστοῦ Cf.
 Lat. /ator.

§ 3 ἀρχὴ φιλίας. Cf. EE. (10a

et.), which proves that ἀρχή here
 means simply 'beginning.'

τῇ ἰδέᾳ τῷ εἶδει. There is no
 difference of meaning

οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾶ 'is not in love for
 all that.

ἀπόντα ποθῇ, *absentem desiderat*,
 for πόθος (*desiderium*) is always τοῦ
 ἀπόντος, Plato, Krat. 420 a.

μεταφέρων, 'in a metaphor' (Cf.
 Ind. a. v.

τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρησιζομένης δὲ καὶ εἰς
 συτήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ
 χρησιμὸν οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οἷδε γὰρ εὐτοια ἐπὶ τα-
 τοῖς γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἂν εἴποιτο
 15 ἀπονεμει τὴν εὐνοίαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλευόμεν-
 τιν' εἰπραγεῖν, ἰλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οἷκ' εἰσὶ
 εὐνοὺς ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ὅλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οἷδε
 φιλικῇ εἰς θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διὰ τινα χρήσιν. ὅλως δ' ἡ εὐ-
 νοία δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιεικείαν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῷ φανῇ
 20 καλὸς τις ἢ ἀνδρείος ἢ τι τοιοῦτος, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.

VI Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται, διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν
 ὁμόδοξία· ταῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπαρξαι-
 ἂν· οὐδὲ τοῖς περὶ ἀπονοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φα-
 25 σιν, οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τῶν σέμναιων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν το περ
 τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τῶς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασιν, ὅταν
 περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονοῦσι καὶ ταῦτά προτι-

ἡ εὐνοία οὐκ αὐτοῖς εὐνοία τοῦ εἰσιζομένου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὐτοῖς· εἰ
 δὴ ἦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἡδὺος φιλίᾳ, κἂν τοῖς ἀψύχοις εὐνοοῦν. ὥστε ὁρίσας
 ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν φιλίαν ἡ εὐνοία ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν εἰσκόοιτο
 βούλεισθαι μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ δὲ φίλου καὶ πράττειν αὐτὸ βούλεται. ἐστὶ
 γὰρ ἡ εὐνοία ἀρχὴ φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εἶναι, ὁ δ' εὖναι σὶ
 πᾶς φίλος. ἀρχομένη γὰρ ἵσκειν ὁ εὖναι μόνον, διὸ ἀρχὴ φιλίας,
 ἀλλ' οὐ φιλία.

1107 a. 22. EE. 1241 a. 15 δοκῶντι γὰρ καὶ τε φίλιν
 ὁμονοεῖν καὶ οἱ ὁμοποῖσται φίλοι εἶναι. ἐστὶ δ' οὐ περὶ πάντας ἡ
 ὁμόνοια ἢ φιλική, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι, καὶ ὅσοι
 εἰς τὸ σὺν συντείνει, οὔτε μόνον κατὰ διανοίαν ἢ κατὰ ἄρεσιν (ἐστὶ
 γὰρ πάντῃ τὸ κινεῖν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥπερ ἐν τῷ ἀκρατὶ διαφαν-
 25 τούτο), οὐ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁμονοεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.

ἀργὴν. The metaphor is probably
 from fields that lie fallow or wastes
 that are uncultivated. Contrast *ἐργασία*,
 τὰ δίκαια δρῶν. He is *δικαίος* rather
 than *εὖναι*, in the proper sense.

VI § 1 ὁμόνοια, concordia, a
 political term.

περὶ ἀπονοῦν. As the *atticus* is
 MM says (1115 a. 15) we cannot call
 it ὁμόνοια in as far as with impediments
 about the elements. As *ἐκδομῶν* is
 it, it is neither *κατὰ διάνοιαν* nor *κατὰ*
κατὰ ἄρεσιν solely. Hence its relation to
προαίρεσις.

2 ρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δέξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ
 δη ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδε-
 χόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν 30
 πᾶσι δολῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετὺς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακε-
 δαιμονίοις, ἢ ἀρχεῖν Πιπτακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. ὅταν
 δ' ἐκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις,
 στοσιαζουσιν· οἱ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκότερον εἰνοεῖν
 εἰδήποτε, ἀλλὰ το ἐν τῷ αἰτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος 35
 καὶ οἱ ἐπισεικτοὶ τοὺς ἀριστοὺς ἀρχεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γί- 1167^b
 νεται οὐ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὲ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμό-
 νοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ ἐστι
 3 καὶ τὰ εἰς τὴν βίον ἀνήκοντα. ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ὁμόνοια· οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι ταῦτα προαιρουμένοι
 καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες βλάπτουσιν ἀλλήλους. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια
 οἷα ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ φιλία· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πρώτη καὶ
 φύσει σπουδαία, διὸ οὐκ ἐστὶ τοὺς φαίλους ὁμονοεῖν, ἑτέρα δὲ κατ'
 ἦν καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ὁμονοοῦσιν, ὅταν τῶν αἰτῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν
 ἐπιθυμίαν ἴχων. οὕτω δὲ δὲ τῶν αἰτῶν ἐρέγεσθαι, ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι
 ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχειν οὐ ἐρέγονται. ἀν γὰρ τοιοῦτον ἐρέγονται ὁ μὴ
 ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, μαχοῦνται· οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ' αὐτὸ μαχοῦνται· ἐστὶ δ'
 ἡ ὁμόνοια, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἡ αὐτὴ προαίρεσις ᾖ, μὴ
 τοῦ ἐλάτερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν αἰτόν. καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία
 πολιτικὴ.

§ 2. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ κ.τ.λ. There are three things to note in answering the question *περὶ πᾶσι*, (1) it has to do with *πρακτὰ*, (2) on a large scale, (3) in which it is possible for the desires of all parties to be satisfied. Cf. Eudemus loc. cit.

ἡ δοχὴν Πιπτακόν. The illustration is to the point, for (1) Pittakos was an elected tyrant (Pol. 1285a, 35), and (2) he resigned against the wishes of the citizens. Accordingly *ὁμόνοια* prevailed only during the period when he consented to rule (ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν).

οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις Eteokles and Polyneikes in Euripides. Cf.

"Was mein Bruder Karl will, das will ich auch."

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, "in the same person," οἱ ἐπισεικτοί. These are the same as οἱ ἀριστοί.

πολιτικὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the argument. If it has to do (1) with *πρακτὰ* on a large scale and (2) with things as to which the desires of all may be satisfied, it will be political.

καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται. 'Ὅμόνοια is used technically by Thucydides of agreement as to the constitution. So in viii. 93 *ἐν ἡμέραις ῥητορὴ ἀκκλησίας τοῖσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ δημοκρατίας*.

5 ἐν τοῖς ἐπεικείσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιοῦσι καὶ
 ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αἰτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἶπεν (τῶν τοιούτων
 γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οἱ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὐρυτοκί.
 βούλονται τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ
 καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίεσται. τοὺς δὲ φαίλους οὐχ οἷον τε ὁμοιοῦν
 10 πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας
 ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ τοῖς
 λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλούμενος ταῦτα
 τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούτων το κοι-
 νὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους
 15 μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια
 ποιεῖν.

VII. Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον
 φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὐ παθόντες τοὺς δρῶσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ
 λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαι-
 20 νεται ὅτε οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλονται· καθάπερ οἷν

1167 b, 17. EE. 1341 a, 34 περί μὲν οὖν ὁμοιοῦσας καὶ εἰσὶν αἰ
 εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα· ἀπορεῖται. δὲ διὰ τί μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν οἱ ποιήσαντες
 εὐ τοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες εὐ τοὺς ποιήσαντας· δοκεῖ δὲ δίκαιον
 εἶναι τοῦναντίον. τοῦτο δ' ἐπολάβει μὲν ἂν τις διὰ τὸ χρησίμον καὶ τὸ
 αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμον συμβαίνειν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ὀφείλεται, τὸν δ' ἀποδοῦναι.

§ 3. ἐν τοῖς ἐπεικείσιν, sc. ἐν ταῖς
 ἀγῶσις, opp. ἐν τοῖς φάσιν, without
 the poetical significance which the
 word has above (b, 1).

ἐπὶ τῶν αἰτῶν ὄντες, 'being of one
 mind.' The phrase ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ
 γνώμῃ εἶναι, γινέσθαι, μένει is
 common in Demosthenes, and can be
 separated by ἐπὶ τῶν αἰτῶν εἶναι,
 γινέσθαι, μένει in the same sense
 (see Rehdanz Ind. a.v.). There is no
 reference whatever to the proverb ἐπὶ
 τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμῶν.

ὥσπερ εὐρυτοκί. "Significantur hoc
 nomine omnia maris loca angustiora
 in quibus contrarii sunt fluctuum
 motus," Zell. For the simile cf.

Aeschines p. 66. 27 πλεονεξία
 μοι ἐστὶν τοῦ δικαίου παρ' ὅσον.

§ 4. τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει. Cf. the
 complaints of Demosthenes in the
 Philippics.

—VII. § 1. Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται κτλ.
 This passage too serves to show our
 some important points about φιλεῖν.

παρὰ λόγον, i. q. εὐλογον, opp. οὐκαὶ
 λόγον, εὐλογον.

τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις. This passage
 compares Thuc. ii. 40 περὶ πλείστον
 δρᾶσαι τὴν χάριν ὥστε ἀπελατμένον δ'
 αἰσίας ὃ δίδωκε σφίσι· ὃ δ' ἀποφαι-
 λω ἀμεινότεροι, εἰς αὐτὸν οἱ χεῖροι αὐ-
 τοῦ ὀφείλημα τὴν ἀμεινότητα.

ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς
 ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν
 ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἐργετήσαντας βού-
 λεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας,
 τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τα ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος 25
 μὲν οἶν τήχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς "ἐκ πονηροῦ
 θεωμένους," ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῶ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί,
 2 καὶ μᾶλλον εὐ πύσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται. δόξειε δ' ἂν
 φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οἷδ' ὁμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς
 δανείσαντας· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ 30
 σφίζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· αἱ δ' εὐ πεποιηκότες
 φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπειθότας καὶ μηδὲν ὥσι
 3 χρησιμοὶ μηδ' εἰς ὕστερου γένοιντ' αὐ., ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ
 μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθεῖν ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἰμψύχου γενομένου· 35

δαί. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυσικόν. ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια
 αἰρετικώτερον, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὃ δ' αὖ
 παθὼν ὥσπερ ἔργον τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος. διὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἡ περὶ τὰ
 τέκνα σπουδὴ ἔστι, καὶ τοῦ γεννησθαι καὶ «τὰ» γεννώμενα σφίζει. καὶ
 φιλοῦσι δὴ μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες τὰ τέκνα [καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων] ἢ
 φιλεῦνται· καὶ οὗτο, πάλιν τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ τοὺς γεννήσαντας, διὰ τὸ τὴν
 ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τὸ ἀριστον καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων, ὅτι μᾶλλον
 οἰοῦνται αὐτῶν εἶναι ἔργον τὰ τέκνα· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τῷ χαλεπῷ διο-
 ρίζουσι, πλείω δὲ λυπεῖται περὶ τὴν γένεσιν μήτηρ.

ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους Epicharmus
 fr. 246 Kaibel, where θεωμένους is
 restored. I do not think the in-
 terpretation given by Kovacs "as if
 from a bad man in the theatre" is
 adequate. It seems more likely that
 ἐκ πονηροῦ should be understood on
 the analogy of ἐκ δεξιῶν, ἐξ ἀμετροῦς,
 ἐξ ἐναντίας, so that the meaning will
 be "looking at the thing on the bad
 side" or, as we say, "the wrong side"
 (metaphor from tapestry). Cf. the
 Latin *ex majore parte*.

ἀνθρωπικῶ. Cf. 1111 b, 1 a.

§ 2 φυσικώτερον. Cf. 1147 a,
 24 n. In 1155 b, 8, 9 φυσικὰ ἀπορη-
 ματα are opposed to ἀνθρωπικὰ.

οὐδ' ὁμοιον, "is not even analogous."
 Cf. 1108 a, 26. Bywater (Conte p. 64)
 reads τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας, a
 decided improvement.

περὶ ἐκείνους, sc. τοὺς δανείσαντας,
 "there is no φιλία in them" (for
 their debtors)

τοῦ σφίζεσθαι βούλησις π.τ.λ. Cf.
 1155 b, 30.

κομιδῆς. Cf. κομίζεσθαι 1163 b, 39.

ἢ ἔλπει, τοῦ δὲ γεγεννημένον ἢ μνήμη· ἴδιόν τε δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητον ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πιπιοιηκότε 15 μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθοντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἢ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἡττον· ἢ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἢ μὲν φιλῆσις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πασχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πράξιν 20 ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικὰ. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γινόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, ὅλον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εἰ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητερες φιλοτεκνιότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἢ γίν- 25 νησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν. δόξεις δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκείον εἶναι.

VIII. Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινα. ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστα ὀγαπᾶσιν, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχυρῷ φιλαυτοὺς ἀποκαλοῦσι, δυκεῖ τε 30 ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσοῦτ' μᾶλλον—ἐγκαλοῦσι δὲ αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπικικῆς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλον ἔνεκα, 35 τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρῆσιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφανέ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν 1168^b μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλούμενος ᾧ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδαὶς εἴσται· ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστα αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πᾶσι τοῖς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ 5

καὶ ἢ μὲν φιλῆσις κ.τ.λ. For the sense cf. De An. 430a, 18.

§ 7. ὅλον καὶ τὰ χρήματα κ.τ.λ. Cf. above 1168a, 1 and Plato Rep. 330b.

VIII. § 1. Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. We now approach the question of φιλεῖν more directly. It is to this that the whole discussion has been tending.

οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, 'that he does

nothing of himself.' I do not see how the phrase can mean 'he does nothing without an eye to his own interest.' But the self-lover is emphatically the man who looks nothing unless he has to'. Cf. Dem. Chers. § 3 τὰ γ' ἀφ' ἑμῶν ἐτοίμ' ἐσάρχαμε ἀπ' αὐτῶν, Eur. Tro. 74 ἐτοίμ' εἰ βούλῃς τὰς' ἑμοῦ.

§ 2. ἀκείνου ἔνεκα. Cf. 1165 b, 31.

φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ
 πᾶσαι ὁμογενικοῦσαι, οἷον τὸ "μία ψυχὴ" καὶ "κοινὰ
 τα φίλων" καὶ "ἰσότης φιλότης" καὶ "γένει κινήτης ἔγγιον"
 πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστα ἂν ἐπέρχονται· μάλιστα
 10 γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ· καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλιστα ἑαυτὸν. ἀπο-
 ρεῖται δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεῶν ἐπισθαί, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων
 τὸ πιστόν. Ἰσως οὖν τοὺς τοιοῦτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν,
 καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἕκαστοι καὶ πᾶσι ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὲ
 λαβόμεν τὸ φίλαντον πῶς ἕκαστοι λεγόντων, ταχ' ἂν γένοιτο
 15 ἐῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὀνειδῶς ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι,
 τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλείον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς
 καὶ ἡδυναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀμ-
 γονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάζουσι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ κα-
 περιμύχνηται ἔστιν. οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται
 20 ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῇ
 ψυχῇ· τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία
 γεγέννηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος· δικαίως δὲ τοῖς
 οὕτω φιλαντοῖς ὀνειδίζεται. ὅτι δε τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὐταῖς
 ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθεσι λεγείν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οἳκ' αὖτ'
 25 λαν· εἰ γὰρ τις αἰεὶ σπουδάζει τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸν
 μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὅποιασιν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ
 τὰς ἀρετὰς, καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιεῖτο, οἷός τις
 ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαντον οὐδὲ ψεξεῖ. δοξαίε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος
 30 καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὸς, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ
 καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πειθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τοῦ κυρω-

μία ψυχὴ. Eur. Or. 1045 ἔχων
 ψυχὴν μ. αὐ.
 κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. 1139 b. 31.
 ἰσότης φιλότης. 1147 l. 36.
 γένει κινήτης ἔγγιον. Theokr. 211,
 18 ἀμυντέρια ἢ γένει κινήτης
 ποτέροις, 'which not of enderis.'
 This is a regular dialectical πρόβλημα.
 § 3. λαβόμεν, cf. 1123 a. 38 n.
 For the topics of τὸ πλεονάζειν λεγόμε-
 νον, cf. Top. 110 a. 23 sqq. It is

especially applicable to the case of
 φιλοποιεῖται. Cf. 1123 b. 24 n.

§ 4. οἱ πολλοί. For the existence
 of a word's application by the be-
 half of οἱ πολλοί, cf. 1143 b. 31.

§ 5. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς, 'as if
 the sovereign is bound to be obedient
 in the fullest sense, and in any case
 to the whole the ruling part is more
 to be the whole, so the ruled part is
 a man by the man.'

τατον μάλιστα' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σίστημα, οἷτω καὶ
 αἰθρῶπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ
 τοῦτω χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται
 τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ, ὡς τούτου ἑκαστου ὄντος· καὶ περὶ 35
 πράξεων δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγον μάλιστα. 1169·
 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦτο ἑκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἔδηλον, καὶ
 ὅτι ὑπερβολὴς μάλιστα τοῦτο ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστα
 ἂν εἴη καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶντος, καὶ διαφέρων
 τούτου ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὅρε- 5
 7 γασθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν
 περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδαζοντας πάντες
 ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμυλλωμένων πρὸς
 τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ καλλίστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ'
 ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δύναντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν 10
 ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιούτου ἐστίν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν
 δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πρὸς
 ταῦτα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσεται), τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ·
 βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοισι πάθεισιν
 8 ἐπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἡ δεῖ πράττειν 15
 καὶ ἡ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπικρῆς, ἡ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει·
 πῶς γὰρ νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ' ἐπικρῆς

τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ. For the construction cf. 1118 b, 25. This is not, of course, Aristotle's own theory. We are dealing with *ἐκδοχή*.

τούτου ἑκαστου ὄντος (cf. 1178 a, 2-7), 'implying that mind is each one of us.' The *ἐγκρατής* is *κράτειν* τὸν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, a phrase which implies that he himself is *νοῦς* and not *ἐπιθυμία*. We are not yet entitled to say that this is Aristotle's own view, but it certainly was Plato's. Here it is only inferred from an *ἐκδοχή*. τὰ μετὰ λόγον, i.e. τὰ προβαλλόμενα (1119 a, 16). The intellectual element is essential to *ἐκδοχή*.

ἢ μάλιστα. Now that the doctrine of *ἐκδοχή* is more positively stated, a correction is added.

κατὰ λόγον...κατὰ πάθος. Cf. 1095 a, 10 n.

καὶ ὁρέγεσθαι closely with τὰ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν. There is no difficulty in saying that the good man κατὰ λόγον ὁρέγεται τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. Some MSS., however, omit ἢ βέλτε τοῦ καλοῦ from a desire to avoid this. The meaning will then be 'as much as τὸ ὁρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ differs from τὸ ὁρέγεσθαι τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν.' But it is not true that ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν ὁρέγεται τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν, his *ὁρέξις* is surely τοῦ παρόντος ἡδέως.

§ 7. ἀποδέχονται. Cf. 1156 b, 28 a.

τοιούτου cc. ἀγαθόν.

§ 8. πῶς γὰρ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. Rainsauer quotes Rhet. 1362 a, 24 ὁγαθαῖα

πειθαρχεῖ τῷ ἐφ', ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν
 φίλων ἔνθα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κὰν ἐν
 20 ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· τροφίσται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὴ
 καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ
 καλόν· ὁλύρον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφοδρὰ μᾶλλον ἔλαι'
 ἢ ἢ πολὺν ἥρεμα, καὶ βιῶσαι καλῶς ἑμαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτι
 τεχνύταις, καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς
 25 καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει·
 αἰροῦνται δὴ μετὰ καλόν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προσῶν
 ἢ ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ
 μὴν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὲ μῆεν
 ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμῆς δὲ καὶ ἰσχύος οἱ
 30 αὐτοὶ τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα τροφίσται· κα-
 λὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν· εἰκυτος δὲ δοκεῖ σπιν-
 δαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἰρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδεύεται
 δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ
 αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς
 35 ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ τλιν
 1169^b νευμον. οὕτω μιν οὐκ ἐφίλουτον εἶναι διό, καθύπερ εἴρηται
 ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρῆ.

IX. Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τιν εἰδαιμία εἰ δεύσε-
 ται φίλων ἢ μή. οὐθὲν γὰρ φασὶ δεῖν φίλων τοῖς ματα-
 5 ρίοις καὶ αὐτῆρκεσιν· ὑπαρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰγαθὰ· αἰταρ-
 κεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι. τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἔτι μὲν
 αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ ἰδουνατεῖ· ὅθεν "ὅταν ὁ

1169 b, 3. LE, 1244 b, 1 συνεπτέιν δὲ καὶ περὶ νήταρκαίαι καὶ
 φιλίας, πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰς ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις. ἀποφασίσει γὰρ αἰ τις
 πότερον, εἰ τις εἴη κατὰ πάντα αὐτάρκης, ἔστιται τοῦτ' * * φίλος· αἰ
 κατ' ἐνδεῖαν ζητεῖται φίλος καὶ ἔστιται ἀγαθὸς αὐταρκέστατος, εἰ ὁ μὲν

δ' ἐστὶ) ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἀν ἐκείτῳ ἀποδοῖα,
 καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ νοῦς (i.e. ὁ
 ἐκείνου νοῦς) ἀποδοῖα ἐκείτῳ.

IX. § 1. Αμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ
 κ.τ.λ. This προβλημα brings us still
 closer to the question how φίλος is
 related to the self.

ἴτερον αὐτόν, cf. αἰωνος 1161 b, 20,
 1166 a, 32.

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων κ.τ.λ. ἐκταρκαίαι
 Οὐκ αἰται ὅτι

τοῖς φίλοις

ἐν τοῖς κειμένοις χρῆται τοῖς φίλοις ὡς φίλοις
 ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων εἰ δέχῃ, τοῖς θεοῖς φίλοις

- 2 δαίμων εὐδιδῶ, τί δέει φίλων; ὅμοια δ' αὐτότερον τὸ πάντ' ἀπονέμοντας τὰγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδίδουσι, 10 δοκεῖ τῶν εἰς τὰ ἀγαθὰ μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴτε φίλου μᾶλλον ἵσται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πᾶσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κἄλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀφειλόντων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται ποτερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, 15 ὥς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν 3 εὐτυχοῦντων οὐδ' εὖ ποιήσουσιν. ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακαρίον· οἶδεις γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εἰδαίμονι δὴ τοῦτ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φήσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει, δῆλον δ' ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιει- 20 κῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀφειλόντων καὶ τῶν τυχούτων συνημερεύειν. 4 δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εἰδαίμονι φίλων. τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους εἶναι τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μιν οὖν οἶδεν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τὰγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, 25 ἢ ἐπὶ μικρὸν (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίως ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς)· οἱ δεόμενοι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι

ἀρετῆς εὐδαίμων, τί ἂν δέοι φίλοι, οὔτε γὰρ τῶν χρησίμων δεῖσθαι αὐτάρκους οὔτε τῶν εὐφραυνόντων οὔτε τοῦ συζῆν αὐτὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ἰκανὸς συνεῖναι. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο φανερόν ἐπὶ θεῷ· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐδέποτε προσδεόμενος οὐδὲ φίλου δεήσεται, οὐδ' ἔστι αὐτῷ οὔτε μὴτεν ἰδεσπύτου. ὥστε καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος ἥκιστα δεήσεται φίλου, ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ὅσον ἀδύνατον εἶναι αὐτάρκη. ἀνάγκη ἄρα εἰλαχίστους εἶναι φίλους τῷ ἀρίστῳ ζῶντι, καὶ ἅς ἐλαττους γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ σπουδάζειν ὅπως ὥσι φίλοι, ἀλλ' ὀλιγυρεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν χρησίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ συζῆν αἰρετῶν. ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ τότε φανερόν ἂν εἶναι δεῖσθαι ὡς οὐ χρήσεως ἕνεκα ὁ φίλος οὐδ' ὠφελείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλος μόνος. ὅταν γὰρ μὴτενὸς ἐνδεὲς ᾖμεν, τότε τοὺς συναπολαυσόμετους ζητοῦσι πάντες, καὶ τοὺς εἰς πεισομένους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς

§ 2. μονώτην. Cf. above 1097 b, 9.
καθ' αὐτόν, here in its ordinary

sense "by himself," alone.

§ 4. οἱ πολλοί. Cf. 1168 b, 17 n.

φίλων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές. ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἰρηται-
 30 ὅτι ἡ εἰδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ἐνέργεια ἔηλον ὅτι
 30 γίνεταί καὶ οὐχ ὑπαρχει ὡσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εἶδαι-
 μονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέ-
 ργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδέια καθ' αὐτήν, καθυπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ
 εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκείου τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον
 τοῖς πέλαις δυνάμεσιν ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ
 35 τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων
 1170 ἡδέϊαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα).
 ὁ μακρὸς δὲ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσειται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προ-
 αιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπικεικῆς καὶ οἰκείας, τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ
 ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ἥτοις. αἰστανταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὴν εἰδαιμονίαν.
 5 μυνώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον καθ' αὐτὸν
 ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾶν ἔστα.
 5 οἶν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδέια οὖσα καθ' αὐτήν, ὁ δεῖ

ποιήσοντας. ἀμείνω δ' ἔχμεν κρίσιν αἰτάρκειαν ὥστις ἡ μετ' ἑνός, ὅτε μάλιστα τῶν συζῆν ἀξίως δεόμεθα φίλων.

περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης σκεπτασθαι, μή ποτε τὸ μὲν τε λεγέται
 καλῶς, τὸ δὲ λανθάνει διὰ τὴν παραβολήν. ἦλλον δὲ λαβοῖσι τι τὸ
 ζῆν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὡς τέλος. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι
 καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ
 συγγνωρίζειν ἰστί· ἰστί δὲ τὸ αὐτοῖς αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
 γνωρίζειν αἰρετικώτατον ἐκείνῃ, καὶ διὰ τούτου τοῦ ζῆν πάντες ἐμπίστοι ἢ
 ὅμοιοι τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεῖ τινὲς γινώσκιν τινα. εἰ οὖν τις ἀπιστεῖται καὶ
 ποιήσῃ τὸ γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ * * (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὴ
 λανθάνει, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται, τῷ μὲντοι πράγματι ἰστί καὶ
 λανθάνει), οὐδὲν ἂν διαφέρει ἢ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἄλλον ἀντ' αὐτοῦ. το δ'
 ὁμοίον τοῦ ζῆν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄλλον. εὐλόγως δὲ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι
 καὶ γνωρίζειν αἰρετικώτατον. δεῖ γὰρ ἅμα συνεθεῖται δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι
 1171 τὸ ζῆν [καὶ] αἰρετικόν, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ

§ 9. ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1098 a, 16
 ὡσπερ κτῆμά τι. Cf. the emphasis
 of χρῆσι ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς.
 ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1099 a, 21.
 τὸ οἰκείου, 'what is his own.' Cf.
 1126 b, 15 καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς αἱ ἀγαθοὶ φέει

καὶ ἀλλήλους ἐκείτω γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸν
 εἶναι αἱ αἰετικὴ πράξις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται,
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αἰετικὴ εἶδηται.
 ἀμφω, sc. τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ
 γνωρίζειν

περί τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σποῦδαῖος, ὃ σπουδαῖος ταῖς
κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι, χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραί-
νει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μελεσιν ἤδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ ¹⁰
7 τοῖς φαύλοις λυπείται. γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησις τις τῆς
ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θιογνίς
φησιν. φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φί-
λος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει μίρετός εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει
ἀγαθὸν ἐρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἐστὶ καθ' ¹⁵
αὐτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως,

† τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν. αἱ οὖν ἐστὶν αἱ τῆς τοιαύτης
συστοιχίας ἢ ἑτέρα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἵρετοῦ τάξει, καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ
αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶν ὡς ὅλως εἰπεῖν τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῆς ὁρισμένης φύσεως·
ὥστε τὸ αὐτοῦ βούλεσθαι κισθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι ταυνοῖ βούλεσθαι
ἐστ.· ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κατ' αὐτοῦ ἔσμεν ἑαυτὸν ταύτων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
μετάληψιν τῶν δυνάμεων ἐν τῷ αἰσθαιεσθαι ἢ γνωρίζειν (αἰσθανόμενος
μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸς γίνεται ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο, καθὰ προτερον αἰ-
σθάνεται, καὶ ἢ καὶ οὐ, γνωστὸς δὲ γινώσκων)· ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῆν
αἰεὶ βούλεται, ὅτε βούλεται αἰεὶ γνωρίζειν, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ
γνωστὸν. τὸ δὲ συζῆν αἰρεῖσθαι δοξεῖ μὲν ἂν εἶναι σκοποῦμένους πῶς
εὐθὺς (ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, οἷον τοῦ συνεσθῆναι
ἢ τοῦ συμπόειν)· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ πλησίον οὔσι ταῦτα συμβαίνειν ἢ
χωρὶς, ἂν ἀφέλῃς τὴν λόγον, ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖν ταῦ
τυχόντος ἑτερον τοιοῦτον ἕμα τε οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε μαρτυρεῖν τοῖς
αὐταρκείῃσι φίλοις οἷον τ.· μαρτυρεῖν μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔχει ὡς δεῖ,
διεπισκόντος δ' ὁ φίλος, ἢ δ' ὁμοιωμένη φιλία)· ἀλλὰ μὲν φαίνεται γε,
καὶ πάντες ἡδῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων κοινωνοῦμεν, καθ' ὅσον

§ 7 Θιογνίς, γ. 35.

Ἐσθλὸν μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεται,
ὃ δὲ κακοῦσι

συμμάχῃ ἀπαλεῖν καὶ τὸν ὅλον νοῦν.

φυσικώτερον κ τ λ. If we consider
this πρόβλημα in the light of φυσικὰ
πρόδοσις (cf. 1147 a, 24 n.), we are
landed once more in the psychology of
the Self, and this is in fact the real
motive of the inquiry. The argument
is intricately stated; but it may, I think,
be worked out as a series of syllogisms,

the first of which is supported by two
prosyllogisms. If these are disen-
tangled, the repetitions and paren-
theses can easily be referred to the
proper place in the argument.

τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται κ τ λ. Cf. De
An. 413 b, 2 τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν
ἀρχὴν τῶν ζῴων (sc. τὴν θνητὴν καὶ αὐ-
ξητικήν) ὁρᾷται τοῖς ζῴοις, τὸ δὲ ζῶν
διὰ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν πρῶτον. 414 b, 18
ἐτέρου δὲ (ὑπάρχει) καὶ τὸ διαπιστικὸν
τε καὶ σῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων.

ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ὥστε ἐν τῷ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν κατ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδίων· ὁρισμένοι γάρ, τὸ εἶ ὁρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ

ἐπιβάλλει ἕκαστον καὶ οὐ δύναται ἄριστον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτων τῇ μὲν ἡδονῇ σωματικῇ, τῇ δὲ θεωρίᾳ μουσικῇ, τῇ δὲ φιλοσοφίᾳ. καὶ τὸ εἶμα δεῖ εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ. διὸ φησι "μυχθος υἱὲ τηλοῦ φύλας," ὡς αὐτὸ δεῖ γενεσθαι ἐκ ἀλλήλων τοῦτον γινόμενον. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔρως δοκεῖ φιλικὸν ὁμοιον εἶναι· τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν δρέγεται ὁ ἔρως, ἀλλ' οἷός τ' ἢ μάλιστα εἶ. ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰσθησιν.

1170 a, 19. EE. 1245 a, 26 ὁ μὲν τοῖνυν λόγος ἐκεῖνός φησι διαπορῶν, τὸ δ' ἔργον οὕτω φηίνεται γιγνέμενον, ὥστε διχλόν ἐν παρικρουμένῳ πως ἡμᾶς ὁ διαπορῶν. σκεπτόντων ἔστιν ἀλλήτεις ὁ γὰρ φίλος βούλῃται εἶναι, ὥστε ἢ παροίμια φησὶν, ἄλλος Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλος αὐτός. διόψασται δὲ καὶ χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐφ' ἑνὸς γενέσθαι· ἀλλὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τὴν φύσιν τὸ συγγενέστερον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὁμοιοῦς ἑτέροις, ἄλλος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ τοῦτων κατὰ μόριον ἑτέρους ἑτέρον· ἀλλ' οἷόν

as τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται. For ἀνάγειν see 1113 a, 6. 'The capacity is referred to (or traced up to) the activity' as τὴ ἀρχή. For the ἐνέργεια as the ἀρχή (cf. *Met.* 1020 a, 8 sqq., and especially 1031 a, 24 τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα εὐρίσκειται). As a capacity is always a capacity of some activity, if a capacity is the differentia of a thing, that thing will be the corresponding activity.

τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, 'the primary ἀρχή,' 'that which makes the dominant what it is lies in the *ἐνέργεια* which is its final cause.' When applied to ἀρχή, τὸ κύριον is practically the same as τὸ πρῶτον (cf. Bonitz on *Met.* 1015 b, 11). We now have *Prosyllagma A*.

The differentia of human life is the capacity of Sensation and Thought.

Every capacity is referred to its activity as primary

∴ Human life is primarily the activity of Sensation and Thought.

ὁρισμένοι γάρ. This gives us the middle term of—

Prosyll. B

The determinate is good by nature
Life is determinate

∴ Life is good by nature.

For the view that the 'determinate' or 'limited' is good cf. 1104 b, 26. As we shall see later, this means the life is *telos* in that its form is complete & realized.

τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθόν κ.τ.λ. This gives us—

Synonym I.

Life is Sensation and Thought
(*Prosyll. A*)

Life is good by nature and therefore pleasant in itself to be good *simpliciter*
(*Prosyll. B*)

∴ Sensation and Thought are good by nature and pleasant in themselves to the good man.

8 τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηραν ζῆν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· αἰριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν
9 τοῖς ἔχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φαιερωτερον. εἰ δ' 25
αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὑρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους·
τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἰρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τοιῶν μακαριωτάτη
ζωή), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει
καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι 30
τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ἥσπερ αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι
αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ νοοῦμεν ἂν ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανο-
μεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἢν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ
νοεῖν), τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὐτό (φύ- 1170^b
σει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζῆν, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ
αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδὺ), αἰρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἡγα-

τε ἦντον βοῦλεται ὥσπερ αὐτὸς διαιετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος. τὸ οὖν τοῦ φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτοῦ πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φίλον γνωρίζειν τὸ αὐτὸν πως γνωρίζειν. ὥστε καὶ τὰ φορτικὰ μὲν συνιθεῖσθαι καὶ συζῆν τῷ φίλῳ ἡδὺ εὐλύγως (συμβῆναι γὰρ ἰκέειν ὅμα αἰσθησις αἰεῖ), μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θεωτάρας ἡδονὰς. αἰτίον δ' ὅτι αἰεῖ ἡδὺς ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐν τῷ βελτίονι ἀγαθῷ· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅτι μὲν

§ 8. ἐν τοῖς ἔχομένοις. In the first part of Book X we shall see that such lives do not fulfil the requirements of τὸ ἀριστόν. They are *ateles*, 'incomplete'.

§ 9. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has compressed the whole argument into one of his enormous prologues, the apodosis of which does not come till b, 8 ὅτι. We can disentangle first *Syllogism 11*.

Sensation and thought are good and pleasant in themselves to the good.

Self-consciousness is consciousness of sensation and thought.

∴ The Self-consciousness of the good is consciousness of something

good and pleasant in itself.

ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται κ.τ.λ. For this way of expressing what we call 'self-consciousness,' cf. *De An.* 435 b, 13 ἐπὶ δ' αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ ἢ τῇ ἀκοῇ. *De Somno* 455 a, 13 ἐστὶ δὲ τίς καὶ κοινὴ δύναμις ἀκούου-
θαι καὶ εἰδέναι, ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀκούῃ αἰσθάνεται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε εἴδει ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ. This consciousness of sensation as distinct from sensation is called by Euclides *συναισθησις*. We are not told here what it is that αἰσθάνεται ὅτι νοεῖ. We shall see that it is none itself in its highest function, *ἐν τῇ κορυφαίᾳ*.

θοίς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ—συναίσθανό-
 5 μνοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἡδοναί—ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν 10
 ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ
 φίλος ἐστίν· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰρετὸν ἐστὶν ἑκάστῳ.
 οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησιως, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἢ
 αἰρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθανεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος, ἢ ἐκ τοιαύτης
 10 αἰσθησῆς ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. συναισθύνεσθαι ὅρα δὲ καὶ τοῦ
 φίλου ὅτι ἐστίν, τοῖτο δὲ γίνετα' ἂν ἐν τῇ συζήν καὶ κοινωνίᾳ
 λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δάξαιε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῷ
 ἀνθρώπων λεγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βόσκηματων
 τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρε-

παθαι, ὅτι δὲ πρῶξι, ὅτι δὲ ἑτερόν τι· εἰ δ' αὐτὸν εὖ ζῆν, καὶ αὐτῷ
 καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῇ συζήν συνεργεῖν, ἢ κοινωνεῖν τῶν εἰς τέλος
 μαλιστα γε. διὸ «δεῖ» συνίστασθαι καὶ συνεπαχέσθαι, οὐ τὰ δια-
 τρηφὴν καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· αἱ τοιαῦται * * ἐπιλήτιοι ἡμεῖσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
 ὑπολήψεις. ἀλλ' ἕκαστος οὐ δύναται τηρεῖν τέλος, ἐν τούτῳ
 βούλεται συζῆν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων
 αἰρουῖνται μάλιστα.

συναίσθανόμενοι τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ
 ἀγαθοῦ κ.τ.λ. The verb *συναίσθανομαι* is very appropriate for the consciousness of sensation or thought as distinct from either. Just as from *σύνειδα* you we get *συνεῖδα ἑμαυτῷ*, we might get *συναίσθανομαι ἑμαυτῷ* from *συναίσθανομαι σοι* to express the meaning *αἰσθάνομαι ἑμαυτοῦ αἰσθανόμενος ἢ κοινωνῶν*. *Eudaimonia* already has the word *συναίσθησις* in the primary sense, and in the secondary it is technically used by Alexander.

§ 10. ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κ.τ.λ. This has been proved above (190 a, 3) (note how these apparently unconnected discussions fit in with one another) and agrees with the minor premises of

Sylvestrii III.

The good man is related to his friend as to himself.

The good man's consciousness of himself is good and pleasant.

· The good man's consciousness of his friend as well is good and pleasant in itself (9 b).

The doctrine is, then, in modern phrase, that the privacy of sympathy depends upon the presence of self-consciousness, that is, of a self which distinguishes itself from its sensations and thoughts and can therefore relate itself to the sensations and thoughts of a friend in the same way as to its own. It is this that *φιλία* widens the self.

ἐν τῇ συζήν The *συναίσθησις* τῶν φίλων can be fully realised only in intellectual communion. This follows from all that has been said, and is gradually leading us up to the idea of the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*.

εἰ δὲ τῷ μακαρίῳ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle feels the need of a clearer and more succinct statement of the argument.

οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἀρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' αἷς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῇ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλοὺς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὐρεῖν τοιοῦτους. 20

ΧΙ Ποτερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἳ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δύνανται ἐπικουρίαι, οἳ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὖς εὖ ποιήσουσιν· βουλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. ἀνυγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὰ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον 25 δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις διὰ καὶ τοῦς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τοῦτο γὰρ αἰρετώτερον εὐεργετῆν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διαίχειν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτῇ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυποίμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὰ κἔν ἀπορρήσειεν τις πότερον 30 ὥσπερ βίρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἢ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγῆν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται,

1171 a, 21. EE. 1245 b, 26 καὶ δὲ μὲν ἀπεῖναι εἰ πράττοντα τὸν φιλοῦμενον βουλόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ αἶμα βοῦλεισθαι εἶναι φιλικόν. ἐνδεχόμενον μὲν γὰρ αἶμα καὶ εἶ, τοῦτο πάντες αἰροῦνται· μὴ ἐνδεχομένου δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸν Ἡρακλῆ ἰσως ἐν ἡ μήτηρ εἴλετο θεὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα τῷ Εὐρυσθεῖ θητεύειν. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν εἴποιεν καὶ ἐν ὁ Λάκων ἰσχυρῶς, ἐπεὶ τις ἐκελευσεν αὐτὸν χερμαζόμενον ἐπικαλεσασθαι τοὺς Δικασκάρους. δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν φιλοῦντος τὸ ἀπεῖναι εἶναι τῇ συμμεθίσσει τῶν χαλεπῶν, τοῦ δὲ φιλουμένου τὸ βοῦλεισθαι συμμετέχειν, καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρω συμβαίνει. εἰλεγως. δεῖ γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ μὴ εἶναι οὕτω λυπηρὸν ὥς «μὴ» ἰδεῖν τὸν φίλον· δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι μὴ τὸ αὐτοῦ διὰ κωλύοντι συμμετέχειν· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθεῦντες, ἵνα μὴ φαίνωνται τὰ αὐτῶν υποποιῶντες καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι τὸ χαίρειν λυπομένου τὸν φίλου. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ κουφότεροι εἶναι μὴ μόνοι φέροντες τὰ κακά.

ἀγαπητόν. (Γ. 1094 b, 9.

ΧΙ. § 1. Ποτερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις π. τ λ. This πρόβλημα also bears on the relation of φίλος to the ideal life.

ἀνυγκαιώτερον μὲν. κάλλιον δὲ. C. 1155 a, 3 n.

§ 2. ὥσπερ βάρους. Victorinus

quotes Xen. Mem. ii, 7, 1 Σωκράτης Ἀρισταρχόν ποτε ἄρως πευθραπῶς ἔχοντα· Ἐοικας, ἔφη, βαρίως φέρειν τι· χρηρὲς δὲ τοῦ βαρίως μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἰσως γὰρ ἐν τῇ σὲ ἡμῶς κουφίσαιμεν.

- ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λιχθίν. τοιαυτὸς δ' 3
 35 ἡ παρουσία μακρὴ τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτοὺς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅτι
 1171^b τοὺς φίλους ἰδοί, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτρεχεῖντι, καὶ γίεται τις
 ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι—παρρηθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος
 καὶ τῇ ὀψεί καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐκιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον
 καὶ ἐφ' οὗ ἔλκεται καὶ λυπεῖται—τὸ δὲ λυποῦμενον αὐτὸς 4
 5 νεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρὸν· πᾶς γὰρ φανερὴ
 λύπης αἰτία εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. εἰς ὅσον οἱ μὲν ἀνδρωδεις τῆς
 φύσεως εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, καὶ μὴ
 ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυντῇ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γνωμένην λυπὴν οὐχ ὑπε-
 μένει, ὅπως τε συνιθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτοὺς
 10 εἶναι θρηνητικούς· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς σι-
 στένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσι ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦνται.
 μμεῖσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασιν δεῖ ὁρᾶν ὅτι τὸν βελτίονα. ἡ δ' ἐν 5
 ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τὴν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδέιστον
 ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἐννοίαν ὅτι ἡδοναὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς.
 15 διὸ δόξουσιν ἂν δοῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους
 προθύμως—εὐεργετικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν—εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυ-
 χίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἴκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν
 ὅθεν τὸ “ἄλλος ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν.” μάλιστα δὲ παραλελητῆς

ἐπεὶ δ' αἰρετὸν τὰ ε' εὖ καὶ τὸ ἅμα, ὁρᾶν ὅτι τὸ ἅμα εἶναι μὴ
 ἐλάττωτος ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετωτέρων πως ἢ χωρὶς μετὰ μεζούτοι. ἐπεὶ δὲ
 ἁπλῶς τὸ ποσὸν δοῦναι τὸ ἅμα, ἥδη διαφερόντως καὶ οἷοντι τι
 μετέχειν ἅμα πάντων φιλικόν, [κα] ὥστερ σιζοῖταιντι ἅμα φασὶ
 ἡδοναὶ ταῦτα ἔχοντες· οἱ δ' ἂν μέντοι οὐ βούλονται. ἐπεὶ δ' εἴ γε τις
 ὑπερβολὴς ποιῆται, * * * ὁμολογῶσιν ἅμα κακῶς πράττεσθαι σφ' ἑα ἢ
 εὐ σφοδρὰ χωρὶς. * * * παραπλησίον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ περὶ τὸς ἀτυχίας
 ὅτι μὲν γὰρ βουλήμεθα τοὺς φίλους ἀπείναι οἷος λυπεῖν, ὅταν κερὶ
 μέλλωσι ποιῆσαι πλείον ὅτι δὲ αὐτοὺς ἡδίστον παρῆσαι. τὸ δὲ τοῖς
 ὑπεραπαιτωσικῶς ταύτης καὶ μάλ' εἰλογοί. διὰ γὰρ τὰ προεφ' ἡμῶν εἶναι
 συμβαίνει, κα. ὅτι μὲν τὸ λυποῦμενον ἢ ἐν φαίλῃ ὄντα ἔχει τον φίλον
 θεωρεῖν φαίνομεν ὁπλῶς, ὥστερ καὶ ἡμῶς οἱ ἴσμεν, τὸ δ' ὅραν τὸν φίλον

§ 2. καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυντῇ.
 Τη. "even if he is not exceptionally
 incapable to pain."

§ 3. διαγωγὴν. Cf. 1177b, 31.
 τὸ "ἄλλος ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν" Vc &
 οὐκ ἐκὼν ὥστερ ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν.

ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθευτες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσκειν.
 6 ἔναι δ' ἀναπαλιν ἴσως ἄρμοζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας το
 ἄκλητον καὶ πρῶτον—φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ μάλιστα
 τοῖς ἐν χρεῖα καὶ μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφὸν γὰρ κύλλιον
 καὶ ἡδίων—εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μιν προθ' ἴμως
 —καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεῖα φίλων—πρὸς εὐπαθειαν δι' σχο
 λασίως· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελείσθαι. δεξάν 25
 δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίστε γὰρ
 συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία ἐξ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἰρετὴ
 φαίνεται.

XII Ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ἑρᾶν ἀγαπητότατον
 ἐστὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἰσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς, 30
 ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου,
 οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἰρετώτατον ἐστὶ τὸ συζῆν· κοινωνία
 γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν
 φίλον· περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἡ αἰσθησις ὅτι ἐστὶν αἰρετὴ, καὶ περὶ
 τὸν φίλον δὴ· ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, 35
 2 ἵσ' εἰσὶν αὐτῶς τούτου ἐφίευνται. καὶ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκαστοὺς τὸ 1172*
 εἶναι ἢ οὐ χάριν αἰροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φί
 λων βοιλοῦνται διαγεῖν· διόπερ οἱ μιν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ
 συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν

ἡδύ, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἡδίστων, διὰ τὴν εἰρημίνην νῆτιαν, καὶ μὴ
 κἀμνοντα, εἰ αὐτός· ὥστε ὁποῖον ἂν τούτων ἢ μᾶλλον ἡδύ, ποιεῖ τὴν
 ῥοπὴν τοῦ βούλωθαι πυρεῖναι ἢ μὴ. καὶ τούτο ἐπὶ τῶν χειρόνων
 συμβαίνει καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοτι
 μοῦνται τοὺς φίλους μὴ πράττειν εὖ μηδ' εἶναι ἀνάγκαι· • • αὐτοῖς
 κακῶς. διὸ ἐνίστε τοὺς ἐρωμένους συναποκτινύουσι. μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ
 οἰκτιροῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι νοσοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ μεμνημένος ὅτι πιστὴ εὖ
 ἐπραττε μᾶλλον, ἢ εἰ ὥστε δεῖ κακῶς πράττειν.

§ 4. *μη ἀξιώσαντας*. For the read
 ing see Bywater, *Contr.* p. 66.

XII. § 1. Ἄρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. The
 discussion is concluded by some
 remarks upon τὸ συζῆν which is
 the ἐνέργεια τῆς φιλίας and there
 fore the *eros* of all φιλικά. This

is really a summary of the whole
 argument.

περὶ αὐτόν=αὐτοῦ. Cf. *Ind.* a.v.
περί.

αὐτῆς, sc. τῆς συναίσθησιν (the
 phrase is used in *Ét. loc. cit.* p. 431).
 Aristotinus reads αὐτοῖς.

5 ἢ συμφιλοσοφούσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅτι
 περ μαλίστ' ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλευ-
 νοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τοιῶν κοινοῦσιν
 ὥς οἷόν τε [συζῆν]. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία 3
 μοχθηρή—κοινωνοῖσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μο-
 10 χθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιοιμένοι ἀλλήλοις—ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
 ἐπιεικῆς συναιξαγομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῖσι δὲ καὶ βελ-
 τίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάτ-
 τονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρσκοῦνται, ὅθεν "ἐσθλῶν
 μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλά· περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον 4
 15 εἰρήσθω· ἐπόμενον δ' αὖ εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

§ 2. ὥς οἷόν τε. I think this read-
 ing (that of K²) is established by F. E.
 1145 a, 20 καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβλέπει ἑαυτῶν
 καὶ οὐ δύναται ἀρίστων. When οἷόν τε
 became οἷοντι, συζῆν would be added
 as the most obvious verb.

§ 3. ἀπομάττονται. 'They take
 the measure of these things i.
 one another they are pleased with'

The verb is possibly used of war-
 taking the measure of a soul.

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ α. τ. λ. The text is
 'Εσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐσθλά μακροῦ
 ἢ ἐσθλῶν

συμμετρεῖ, ἀσφαλὲς καὶ τὸν ἐνταύθα
 ταῦτα μεθ' αὐτῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐσθλῶν καὶ ἐπὶ
 φήσιν

εἰ συμβουλευόμενοι ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις

BOOK X.

THE GOOD FOR MAN.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. We are now in a position to answer the question with which we started, but first we must clear up a point which we have left unsettled. In our discussion of the view that pleasure was bad we left it quite an open question whether it might not even be the highest good. This view has often been held, and its most recent and authoritative exponent is Eudæus who substituted Pleasure for the Platonic Form of the Good. The arguments directed against his position by Speusippus and other members of the Academy are altogether inadequate, and we must therefore come to some understanding on the point before we go any further.

What, then, is pleasure? Contrary to the view received in the Academy it is certainly not a motion. All motions are incomplete and pleasure is something complete in any given moment, just like vision. We can see the present and the perfect tense at once of it. There is not less pleasure in any moment of its presence than there is in its whole duration. It is completely present or not at all, and this shows that it is no motion, for every motion is incomplete till it reaches its end and then it ceases to exist as motion altogether. Pleasure then must be an activity or rather the completion of an activity. Pleasure is the completion of the activity of a subject at its best acting upon an object at its best.

§ 2. It is clear, then, that we can hardly distinguish the pleasure of the highest life from the highest life itself, and in this sense it is true that pleasure is the highest good. But this is not hedonism. Just because the pleasure and the activity which it

completes are so closely bound up together that they can only be distinguished by an effort of thought, it follows that pleasures must differ specifically just as the activities do which they complete. There is therefore no sense in saying that pleasure in the abstract is the end. There is no such thing as pleasure in the abstract; but only pleasures that are inseparably bound up with certain activities. We must therefore continue to look for human good in some form of activity, which will, of course, as we saw long ago, be essentially pleasant. And we must decline to separate the activity from its pleasure and discuss which of them is really the end of life.

§ 3. What activity, then, is it that constitutes human good? We know that it must be one which is sought for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, and therefore it cannot be the life of action, the life of the man who possesses goodness of character without anything higher. Of the "three lives" with which we started it can clearly be none other than the life of the onlooker, the disinterested spectator. Now there are at first sight two lives which seem to fulfil this character. There is the life of amusement and there is the life of the philosopher, the life of artistic, scientific or religious "contemplation." But though some people may make amusement their end this is not its proper function. Amusement is properly speaking a form of rest or relaxation and is a means to an end. We rest in order that we may be the better able to act. There remains, then, the "contemplative life," the life of the thinker. And this is in complete accordance with the results we have reached already, for we saw that, if there were more forms of goodness than one, the good life would be an activity in accordance with the highest and most complete of these. We have seen too that the highest and most complete form of goodness is *σοφία*, and from this it follows that human happiness consists in an *εὐδαιμονία κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν*.

§ 4. Such happiness is possible, however, for man only to a small extent, and is indeed not strictly speaking human but divine. The greater part of man's life belongs to the province of goodness of character. Our study of self-love has shown us, however, how these two are related. Self-love, in the sense of the love of that which is highest in us, is necessary and right, and so we see that the more properly human life which we live for the

most part, our everyday life, must be ordered with a view to making possible so far as may be the life of Thought which is in some sense the life of our true selves. Now we see what is the true "standard of the means" (*ὅρος τῶν μέσων*), or, as Eudemos calls it, the *ὅρος τῆς ἀλλοαγαθίας* (i.e. *τῆς ἡθικῆς ἀρετῆς*). It is the theoretic life which the *φρόνιμος* keeps in view when he determines the mean; for he knows that his own practical wisdom is only ancillary to the theoretical wisdom of the philosopher. Eudemos expresses exactly the same thought in a definitely religious form when he says that the standard which regulates goodness is *τὸν θεὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ θεωρεῖν*, 'to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever.'

§ 5. We now know what the good for man is, and we know also how it is to be produced. If we wish to attain to the blessedness of the contemplative life, we must first of all be good in the everyday sense of the word. And we become good by performing good acts. But our aim at present is not merely to secure this blessed life for ourselves even if that were possible. The object of our science is to secure the good for the citizens of a state so far as they are capable of it. How, then, are we to produce in our citizens the character from which good acts arise? Education is of course the only way to produce character, but the education of the family has too little authority to be sufficient. It is true that in the present state of things the state does not discharge this its most important function, and all that the father of a family can do is to become in some sort a domestic lawgiver, but this is clearly only a makeshift. What we have to do is to learn what constitution will really secure the performance of its function by the state, and to train ourselves to be lawgivers who can legislate with this end in view. The details of this constitutional legislation form the subject of the Politics.

K

Μετά δε ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἵσως ἐπεται διελθεῖν. μα-
 20 λιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συμφικεῖσθαι τῷ γίνεσι ἡμῶν, διὰ παιδεύουσι
 τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τρεῖς
 τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαιρεῖν οἷς δεῖ καὶ
 μισεῖν ἢ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παιτὸς τοῦ βίου, βο-
 25 πῆν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα
 βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φει-
 γουσιν· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δύξει παρτέον εἶναι ἢ
 ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἔχόντων ὑμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ

1 § 1 ἵσως ἐπεται διελθεῖν.

This formula of transition, for which cf. 1155 a, 3, is repeated at the beginning of Book X, though Book IX ends with the words ἐνόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς. So far as it goes, this fact favours the view that these transitions are a trace of editorial work.

μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ κτλ. The usual enumeration of more or less irrelevant reasons for the discussion.

συμφικεῖσθαι, 'to be most closely bound up with.' For the word cf. 1105 a, 1 ἐπὶ δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσι ἡμῖν σινεσθράττα. (sc. ἡ ἡδονή).

διὰ παιδεύουσι κτλ. (cf. 1104 b, 11 n). This seems to be the earliest instance of the metaphorical use of οἰακίζοντες (= κυβερνῶντες), though οἰαξ for the 'helm of government' occurs from Alcibiades onwards. The

same idea is expressed in Plato's usage (Laws 644 d αἰχμή of man as a "rudder of the gods" σπῆμα τῶν θεῶν, whose movements are controlled by the two strings (σμήρυμα) of pleasure and pain pulling opposite ways.

πρὸς. For μέγα πρὸς cf. 1171 a, 33

βοπήν ἔχοντα, cf. 1004 a, 13. προαιροῦνται. Since γ' ημετέρας this is the only use of ἀεόλαστα, but the word is doubtless used in a popular sense as equivalent to εὐδαιμονία.

§ 2 ὅπερ. Cf. 1096 a, 4 n. Here, by a characteristic overabundance, ἡμῶν παρτέον takes the construction of λιγέρος which it implies.

ἔχόντων ὑμφισβήτησιν, cf. 1001 n, 13 n.

οἱ μὲν οἱ δέ. The two parties are represented in the Ethics by εὐνοῖαν καὶ Σπενδαίον.

τάχαθ' ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομῶν φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ αἰόμενοι βελτίον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνουσιν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν 30 φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεῦν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοῦναντίον 3 ἀγῆναι· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν 35 διαφανῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τάλληδες προσαναμύουσιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὀφθαλμοὶ 1172^a ποτ' ἐφίεμενος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην 4 οἶσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. εἰοικασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συμφῶδοι γὰρ 5 ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνιέντας ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἵλις· τὰ δ' εἰρημέα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

II. Εὐδόξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάχαθ' ἡδονὴν φησὶ εἶναι διὰ τὸ

διὸ διὲν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1109 b, 4 seq. § 2. ῥήματα "It may be that..." Cratylus MT. § 269. From signifying 'it is to be feared that' ἢ ποτε came to mean 'perhaps'.

περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι κ.τ.λ., i.e. περὶ τῶν ἡδέων, cf. 1104 b, 16. The ἐν as usual (Ind. a.v.) indicates the place.

τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, i.e. τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς. Met. 1063 b, 3 οὐχ ὁμοία φαίνεται τὰ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις.

ὡς τοιαύτην οὖσαν ἅπασαν, sc. ἀγαθὴν implied in εἰσμένον.

II § 1. Εὐδόξος Eudoxos of Knidos, mathematician and astronomer, had belonged to the Academy. He was, it would seem, one of the most original of its members, and developed Plato's theories on lines of his own. The scholiast on 1^a tells us that he held τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνέκεια εἶναι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, which amounts

to saying that he identified it with the Form of the Good. Cf. Rep. 509 b ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν αἰδέαν τῆς εὐδίας προσβῆναι ὑπερχύοντες. In his sketch of Aristotle's life, von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf says "The geographer and astronomer Eudoxos is probably the only one of his associates who had a real influence on Aristotle. That he should take notice of his ethical doctrines, which after all are not of any great significance, can hardly be explained apart from some personal relation to him. Now Eudoxos was just the right man to introduce the natural science of the Ionians to Aristotle; and we certainly require some such intermediary when we look at Aristotle's life as a whole" (Ar. und Ath. 1, p. 333).

διὰ τὸ πάντ' ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ. This implies the definition of the Good as οὐ πᾶν ἐφίεσθαι (1094 a, 3).

- 10 πάνθ' ὅρᾳν ἐφιεμένα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πασι
 δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἐπικεκός, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κρῦτιστον·
 τὸ δὲ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτο φέρεσθαι μὴκιν ὥς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἔχ-
 στον ὄν—ἐκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εἰρρίκειν, ὥστερ καὶ
 τροφήν—τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθὸν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφέται, τὰτα
 15 θὰν εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡθοὺς ἀρετῆς
 μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτοὺς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σωφρων εἶναι
 οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως
 ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἥττον δ' ὥστ' εἶναι φανερόν ἐκ τῶ
 ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσι φεικτὸν εἶναι.
 20 ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦναντίον αἰρετόν· μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετὸν ὃ μὴ
 δι' ἕτερον μὴδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτον ἔ' ὁμελογον-
 μέως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῇ τίνος ἕνεκα
 ᾔδεται, ὡς καθ' αὐτὴν οὖσαν αἰρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. προστιθε-
 μένην τε ὁφείδον τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῇ

ἄλογα. Aristotle himself never
 uses this word for λόγον ἔχοντα, nor
 is it found in *Altit. περὶ ἔτα*. This
 makes it probable that *Grani* is right
 in his view that this is a quotation
 from Eudoxus. If so, the definition
 of τὸ ἀγαθόν at the beginning of the
 Ethics will be his. Cf. also *Top.*
 116 a, 19.

τὸ ἐπικεκός, i.e. τὸ ἀγαθόν

φρίσσει, an unusual word in this
 connexion, but natural in the mouth
 of an aristocrat.

τάγαθόν εἶναι. The argument is
 thus given by Alexander (*Top.* p. 5
 Wallies) ἂν λαμβανῇ ὅτι δ' τὰτα τὰ
 εἴδη αἰρεῖται ὁμοίως, λογιστὰ τε καὶ
 ἄλογα, τοῦτο μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν, τὸ
 δὲ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν τελειωτάτον,
 καὶ συλλογισμῶν ὅτι δ' πάντα τὰ εἴδη
 ὁμοίως, λογιστὰ τε καὶ ἄλογα, αἰρεῖται,
 τοῦτο ἔστι τελειωτάτως, εἴτι προσλα-
 βίμεν ἡνί τῇ δὲ ἡδονῇ πάντα ὁμοίως,
 λογιστὰ τε καὶ ἄλογα, αἰρεῖται [ὅτι ἡ
 ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν] ἰσάμεθα συλλογισμῶν
 μόνον.

§ 2. ἂν τοῦ ἐναντίου. For the
 τῶπος cf. *Top.* 117 b, 3 ἐν ἐκ τῶν

φίλων καὶ τῶν ἀπέναντι καὶ τῶν
 γινόμενων καὶ τῶν ἀπέναντι καὶ τῶν ἰσά-
 των· οὐ γὰρ τ' ἀπέναντι ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον
 φησὶν ὁμοίως, αὐτὸ ἀπέναντι.

ὁμοίως δὲ, i.e. κατ' αὐτὸν τρόπον.

μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετόν α. τ. λ.
 For this τῶπος cf. *Top.* 116 a, 19 καὶ
 τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν τοι δι' ἕτερον αἰρε-
 τοῦ αἰρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιανεῖν ἐν
 γ. μάλιστα θά.

οὐδένα γὰρ ἑτέρωθεν. This is
 τῶπος τῶπος cf. *Top.* 116 a, 19 καὶ

προστιθεμένην τι α. τ. λ. This is
 from the τῶπος of *Top.* 116 a, 19 καὶ
 cf. *Top.* 116 a, 19 καὶ ὅτι δ' ἐκ τῆς
 προσθέσεως. ἂν ἕτερος εἶναι ἑτέρου
 προστιθεῖν καὶ ἀγαθόν ἢ λειπόμεν, μὴ δὲ
 προτέρων λειπόμεν ἢ ἀγαθόν, τὸ προστιθε-
 ῖσθαι λειπόμεν ἢ ἀγαθόν αὐτὸν καὶ τι
 ὅτιον ποιεῖ. ἐν τῇ ὥστε τὸ ὑγιανεῖν
 [i.e. ἀγαθόν ἢ λειπόμεν, προστιθεῖν τι
 μάλιστα ποιεῖ τῶπος ὡς ὑγιανεῖν, καὶ
 αὐτὸ ἔστι τῶπος]. The τῶπος τῶπος
 is of course the same as *Altit.* 116 a, 19
 goes on to observe, it only proves
 that pleasure is a good, not that it
 is a good.

δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, αἰξέσθαι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ. 25
 3 εἰς κε δὴ οὗτος γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαί-
 νειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ
 αἰρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. τοιοῦτον δὲ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων
 ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τὰγαθόν· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι
 τοῦ ἡδύου βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρὶς εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτόν 30
 κρείττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθόν· οὐδενος γὰρ προστε-
 θέντος αὐτῷ τὰγαθὸν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ'
 ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὰγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετὰ τινος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ
 4 ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὐ καὶ
 ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. οἱ δ' ἐπιστά- 35
 μαι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λίγωσιν. ἂ
 γὰρ πᾶσι δικαί. ταῦτ' εἶναι φάμεν· ὃ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν 1173·

§ 3. πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου κατὰ
 Τορ. 1172 a, 16 ἐστὶ τὸ πλεον ἀγαθὸν
 τῶν ἐλαττωτέρων.

Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ Plu. ch. 60 d
 λέγειν εἰ τις ἀνὴρ πάσῃ ἡδονῇ καὶ
 τῇ βραχυτάτῃ ἐξέλκῃ· ἂν φρονήσει
 ἔχῃ μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ τινος ἡδονῇ, ἢ
 πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον
 ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὐτῷ τινος. —Οὐκ ἔσ-
 τω —Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε τέλειον καὶ πᾶσιν
 αἰρετόν καὶ τὸ παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν
 οὐδέντερον ἂν εὐρεθῇ εἴη; that is, the
 excellence of wisdom also makes it ca-
 sually better, and therefore neither is
 the good.

τὸ μικτόν. The phrase a Plato's
 Phaedr. 117 d' ἐν τῷ μικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ.
 27 d' ἐκώκυθα μὲν ἰδεμένῳ ποντὸν μικτὸν
 βίον ἡδονῇ καὶ φρονήσεως.

οὐδένος γὰρ κατὰ. 'There is no-
 thing the addition of which can make
 the good more worth having' I
 prefer the autopsy of L³ to the autopsy of
 K³. The good does not admit of
 πρόθεσις, for all other good things
 are ceased for the sake of it. This
 is given in the Τορὰ as an ἐνστασις
 (objection) to the τοποῖς ἀκ. προσθε-
 σεως. Cf. 1172 a, 16 ἐνστασις εἰ τοῦ
 καλύτερον κατέρον χάριν· οὐδὲν γὰρ

αἰρετώτερον πλ. ἀμφὶ τοῦ ἐνός, οἷον
 τὸ ἐνιάζεσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῇ ὑγιείᾳ,
 ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐνιάζεσθαι τῇ ὑγιείᾳ ἐπικαν
 αἰρουμένη.

τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν. Cf. 1097 b,
 16 καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θεῖα εἰς ἀν., ἡ
 ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μοιρομένη διέκεται, οἷον τὸ
 φρονεῖν καὶ ὄρεσθαι καὶ ἡδοναί τινος καὶ
 τιμαί. Even these we denote τῇ
 εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, and therefore εὐδαι-
 μονία + πλεονεξία is not more worth
 having than εὐδαιμονία alone.

§ 4. τοιοῦτον, κ. οἷον μὴ μετὰ
 τινος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώ-
 τερον γίνεσθαι, οἷον ἐν οὐδὲν ποῖον, μὴ
 συνεπιθρομύουσαν (1097 b, 17 a).

οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν. As
 Richter says, this is added to show
 that Aristotle does not mean to ap-
 prove of Plato's theory of the good,
 except in so far as the above argument
 goes.

ἐπιστάμενοι, Ἀν. I. c. 69 a, 37
 ἐπιστάμενοι δ' ἐστὶ πρότασις προτάσει
 ἀναρτία.

μὴ οὐθὲν λίγωσιν. See Kühner
 § 394, 6.

ἂ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκᾷ, κ. ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.
 There is no sense in saying a thing is
 not good if it is thought good by all.

πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἴσσι. ἥ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ὀρέγεται
 αὐτῶν, ἢν ἂν τι λεγόμενον, ἥ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόσιμα, παρὰ λέγεται
 ἂν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι [φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν]
 5 κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οὐκείου ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔστι
 δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ φασιν, εἰ
 ἡ λύπη κακὴν ἔστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικείσθαι
 γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μᾶλλον—λέγουται
 ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὲν ἐπὶ γε τῶν εἰρημέτων ἀληθεύοντες
 10 ἄμφω γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ εἶδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τὸ
 μᾶλλον δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τῆς
 μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακόν, τὴν δ' αἰρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω
 δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται. III. οἱ μὲν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων
 ἔστιν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τίς
 15 ὑπερτῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. λέγουσι
 δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὀρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀοριστον εἶναι, ὅτι

ἥ μὲν γὰρ κτλ. So Hywater for
 MS. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κτλ., cf. Contr. p. 66.
 The emendation had been anticipated
 by Michael.

ἔστι τι κτλ. Tharnt deleted *ἀγα-
 θόν*, which Michael does not seem to
 have had, and Hywater would delete
φυσικόν too. We cannot speak of a
φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν aiming at an *ὀλιγόν*
ἀγαθόν. For the thought cf. 1143 b,
 31. This is the *ὅλιγον* of 1143 b,
 31. Introd. § 95.

§ 6. οὐ γὰρ φασιν κτλ. The
 argument is that of Speusippus and
 has been discussed in Book VII
 (1143 b, 1 seq.) and the notes.

τῷ μᾶλλον. Stewart points out
 that this, the MS. reading, can be
 defended by Plato, Rep. 583 c ἡ καὶ
*δυνατὸν το μᾶλλον δε ἀμφοτέρω γί-
 γνεσθαι*.

ὄντων κακῶν. For another read-
 ing (*ὄντων <τῶν> κακῶν*) cf. Hy-
 water, Contr. p. 66.

τὸ μᾶλλον δὲ. This correction
 of MS. τῶν μᾶλλον δὲ is due to
 Professor Butcher. 'That which is

neutral ought to be (that) neither
 shunned nor sought or both alike

οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀντίκειται, 'so he
 antithesis in of the kind'

- III § 1. οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότη-
 των κτλ. From this it appears that
 the Platonists (Speusippus) regarded
 all good things as qualities. Aristotle
 held on the other hand, that *τὸ ἀγαθόν*
ἴσχυός *λέγεται* 'is said to be good'
 in all the categories' (Introd. A. 23.
 'Art. virtues according to goodness are
 virtues, and so these are *εὐδαιμονία*
ἑαυτοῦ. But Speusippus, who defined
εὐδαιμονία as *ἔξω τελεία*, of course
 regarded it as a *ποιότης*).

§ 2. τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀοριστον cf.
 1170a, 20 and the argument of Plato's
 Philebos 24 c *οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀσπερ-
 μάλλον το καὶ ἥσσον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ
 σφόδρα καὶ ὀλίγον διεχόμενα καὶ το καὶ
 καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα εἶδη, ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ
 ἀσπερ γίνονται καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄλλα τοια-
 ῦτα εἶδη*. 31 a *ἔστιν δὲ δυνατὸν το καὶ
 καὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἄσπερ καὶ ὀλίγον καὶ
 τέλει δὲ ταῦτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔχονται καὶ
 ἔσονται γίνονται*. The words *ἀοριστος*

- δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδισθοῦ
 τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς,
 καθ' ὅς ἐναργῶς φασι μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τοὺς ποιοῦνς ὑπάρ-
 χειν καὶ <πράττειν> κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἔσται ταυτό· δίκαιοι 20
 γὰρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ
 σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μὴ ποτ' οὐ
 3 λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὦσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμυγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί. καὶ
 τί κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὠρισμένη οὕσα δέχεται τὸ μάλ-
 λου καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὕτη 25
 συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις αἰεὶ, ἀλλ'
 ἀνεμμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ
 ἥττον. τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.
 4 τέλειόν τε τάγαθόν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέ-
 σεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνουσιν 30

however, is never used by Plato in the sense of *ἀπειρος*, and this makes it likely that Aristotle is criticising a contemporary form of the Platonic doctrine. With Xenocrates *ἀπείροτος* was the technical term.

δ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδισθοῦ κ.τ.λ. It does not follow from the fact that τὸ ἡδισθαι admits of το μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον that ἡ ἡδονή does so too. If it did, we should have to say that goodness also is *ἀπείροτος*, for people may be more or less good.

δ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, κ.τ.λ. τοῦτο κρίνουσι. We have seen above (1172 b, 11) that Speusippus, in making all pleasure a *χρῆμα* etc., ignored Plato's distinction between mixed and unmixed pleasures. In the same way he here ignores Plato's view that *ἀμετρία* was to be found in the mixed pleasures only, while the pure pleasures possessed *ἐμμετρία*. Cf. Philus. 31 c εἰσὶν οὖν μετρίως ἢ ὅττι διαμετρίμεθα χρεῖς τὰς τε οὐδάρως ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σφαλὼν ἀκαθάρτους ὁρῶντες λαχθεῖσιν, πλεονάζουσιν τῷ λόγῳ τὰς μὲν ἀφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοῦναντίον, ἐμμετρίαν.

§ 3. καὶ τί κωλύει. A fresh point. The reading τί γὰρ κωλύει has inferior authority and does not make the argument clearer.

καθάπερ ὑγίεια. For *ὑγίεια* as a *συμμετρία* cf. Top. 139 b, 21, where *συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν* is quoted as a definition obscure from its ambiguity. The illustration here is taken from Plato *Phileb.* 15 e.

ἐν πᾶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Masculine. The proportion of health varies in different persons and in the same person at different times.

ἀνεμμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός. Cf. 1170 b, 31 n. There is always some latitude in a *μετρώς*. We cannot distinguish (*κρίναι*) very minute intervals, and so a note may be flat or sharp and still be the same note. Aristotle is here fired of arguing against the abstract use of the formula of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον.

§ 4. τέλειόν τε κ.τ.λ. This is all from Plato's *Philebos*. Cf. especially 24 b 26' οὐδ' ἡδονή γὰρ ἔστω γένεσις ἐστίν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέμενη ὁρῶντες ἑφαρμοστέον

τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ
 σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὲ ἔσται τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλή-
 ρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἦδοιτο· τὸ 10
 σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή,
 ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἦδοιτ' ἂν τις, καὶ τε-
 μνόμενος λυποῖτο. ἡ δὲ οὖν αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ
 τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεὶς γὰρ γινο-
 7 μένους καὶ πολυπηθέντας ἡδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' 15
 οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλγους γάρ εἰσιν αἱ
 τε μυθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς
 ὀσφύσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα πολλὰ καὶ μῆμαι
 καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γεινέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενός
 8 γὰρ ἐνδεῖα γεγένηται, οὐ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. πρὸς δὲ 20
 τοὺς προφύροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν

in this way. Aristotle means the argument by pointing out that if ἡδονή is ἀναπλήρωσις, it must be in the body, not in the soul.

τεμνόμενος. Aristotle is probably referring to some passage in which surgical operations (τέμνειν καὶ εἶναι) were referred to as examples of violent alterations of the normal state. Cf. τρέφει τοὺς τῆς δὲ β, where αἱ εὐφροναὶ καὶ τοσαῦτα τοῦ σώματος αἰσ. given as examples of things which ἀταλλοτριπνοῦσι, λύρῃα and therefore cause great pain, while the recovery causes little pleasure because κατὰ μικρὰ μᾶλλον τε αἰσ. ταῦτα πάλιν ἐντοαῖς καθίσταται. The opposite class is represented by the pleasures of smell (εὐφροναί), the satisfaction of which is ἁρῶα, while the pleasure is not perceived. There is therefore no reason to conjecture κενοῦμενος (Sengel), δόμενος (Zeller) or ἐσέτης γεγόμενος (Hywater).

§ 7. ἄλγους γάρ εἰσιν κτλ. Cf. 1153 b, 36 ἐπὶ καὶ ἀπὸν λυπη καὶ ἐπαιρηματικῶν ἡδονῶν. Plato, however, also explained these as πληρώσεις, though the αἰσθησι preceding them

was gradual (κατὰ μικρὰ) and imperceptible (ἀνασθησι), while the κατὰ φύσιν in the normal state was ἁρῶα. Cf. the passage quoted in the last note as to εὐφροναί. See also Rep. 594 b ἐλ' ἐλκεῖ ἐκσῆσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς ἡδονὰς· αὐτὰ γὰρ οὐ πολυπηθίσαι, ἰθαυφῶς ἀμύχαναι τὸ μέγιστον γίγνεται· καυσόμεναι τε λύκην οὐδὲ μᾶλλον καὶ αὐλοῖται. Pl. Alc. 51 b (ἡδονὰς) τὰς περὶ τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰς ὁρμῶν τὰς πλείους καὶ τὰς τῶν φιλόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐκτελεῖ ἀνασθῆναι ἔχοντα καὶ ἄλγους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καθαρὰς λυπῶν καταδιδόναι.

§ 8. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς κτλ. Aristotle now turns to the argument given above 1151 b, so τὸν δὲ μὴ παρὰ σπουδαίαι, δὲ εἰσι καὶ αἰσθησι καὶ καταδιδόναι.

λέγοι τις ἂν. The first answer is simply the old one that culpable pleasures are not (φύσει) ἡδονὰι at all. For ἡδονὰς, γλυκεία, τιερα, cf. above 1153 a, 28—29, and for τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, see ib. 26 a.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδία· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις
 ἡδία ἐστίν, αἰσθητόν αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδία εἶναι τλήν τούτοις, καθάπερ
 οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ἡμεκὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οἷδ' αὖ
 25 λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμῶσιν. ἢ αὐτὰ λέγοι τις ὡς
 ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων, ὥσπερ
 καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὁποῖοις
 φαγόντι. ἢ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ 10
 ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσύχῃ
 30 τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ
 ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ 11
 δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κόλακος οὐκ οἶσαν ἀγαθὴν
 τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφέρειν εἶδει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰ γὰθὸν ὁμι-
 λεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὑπεριδίζεται, τὸν δ'
 1174· ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. οἷδης τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο ἕν 12
 παιδίον διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου ἡδόμενος ἐφ' ὅς τε τὰ ποιεῖς
 ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν,
 μηδὲποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλὰ τε σπουδῆς ποιῇ
 5 σαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαι ἐπιφέρει ἡδονήν, οἷον ὁρᾶν,
 μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς αἰρετάς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 ἔπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἐλοιμέθα γὰρ ἂν
 ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνουτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὅτι μὲν οἱ οὐτε 13
 τὰ γὰθὸν ἢ ἡδονή οὔτε πᾶσα ἀρετὴ δηλοῖ ὅτιον εἶναι, καὶ

§ 8. ἢ οὕτω κ.τ.λ. A second
 tentative answer. The pleasures are
 good in themselves, but not from
 those sources. For λέγοι τις ἂν see
 Bywater, *Contt.* p. 67.

§ 10. ἢ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν. The
 third answer. Here this is only shown
 dialectically, below (1175 a, 21 seq.)
 it is discussed *φυσικωτέρως*.

§ 11. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.
 The point seems to be this. The
 friend is not πρὸς τὰ γὰθὸν ὁμιλεῖν, the
 flatterer would ἡδονήν. I do suggest
prima facie that pleasure is not ἀγαθόν,
 or, if we must that the friend after
 all gives pleasure too, we must say
 that it is a different species of pleasure.
 If pleasure were *μορσιότης*, we could

not know any difference at all.

§ 12. οὐδέ τις ἂν εἰπὼν κ.τ.λ.
 1174-1215 b, 22 sq. τῷ. This again
 indicates that there is some difference
 in species. Simply as pleasure, a
 child's pleasure may be greater than
 a man's, and yet no one would wish
 to have it over age. So, again, to
 one would wish to have the pleasures
 of shameful conduct. Therefore, if plea-
 sure were *μορσιότης*, they would be
 just as much worth having as any
 others.

ἐπεὶ πολλὰ τε κ.τ.λ. This is the
 other side of the argument. We are
 coming to see that it is the character
 of the activities, and not the pleasure
 as such, that decides our choice.

ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς διαφέρειναι τῷ εἶδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἰδούσης καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθαι.

IV. Τὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποῖον τι, καταφανέστερον γίνοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γάρ ἡ μὲν ὁρασις καθ' ὄντινόν τι χρέον τελεῖαι εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον ἢ γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοιοῦτον δ' εἴκει καὶ ἡ ἰδούση· ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστὶ, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβει τις ἂν ἰδούνη ἥς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος· διόπερ αἰδὲ κίνησις ἐστὶν· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τελουσι τινὺς οἶον ἡ οἰκοδομία, καὶ τελεία ἔταν ποιήσῃ τοῦ ἔφιστα. ἡ ἐν ἄπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς

ἡ ἀφ' ὧν, i.e. ἡ τοῖς ἀφ' ὧν. Cf. 1117 b, 30 n.

IV. § 1. Τὶ ἡ ποῖον τι. For this formula cf. 1106 a, 13 n.

ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, almost equivalent to ἐκθεν in the sense explained 1125 b, 2 n. The phrase means practically φαινομενικὴν ἐκδομοσίν.

ἡ μὲν ὁρασις κτλ. Now regarded as the type of an ἐνέργεια which is complete in every instant as opposed to a κίνησις or 'process' which is ἀτελής. Aristotle's favourite way of expressing the completeness of an activity in any instant of it is by saying that the present and the perfect tense can be simultaneously used of it. If I look at a thing for some time, I can say both *ὄρω* and *ὥρασα* at any moment; but if I am building a house, I cannot say *οἰκοδομῶ* till the process *αἰετοῦμαι* is finished. Cf. 1041138 a, γ' ὁρ' ἐκδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ εἶμα ποιεῖν τε καὶ πεποιθέναι; οὐκ εἶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ γὰρ τὸ εἶμα καὶ ὥρασται καὶ αὐτὸ κατὰ ἀνάγκην. Met. 1043 b, 19 πάντα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ὡς οὐκ αὖτε μὴ κίνησις, βαδίζει οἰκοδομῶν· αὐτὰ δὲ κίνησις, καὶ ἀτελής γο. οὐ γὰρ εἶμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβήκει, οὐδ' οἰκοδομᾷ καὶ οἰκοδομηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονε ἢ κινεῖται καὶ πεποιθται.

ὥρασε θε καὶ ὥρ' εἶμα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πεποιθεν. τῆς μὲν οὖν τοιαύτης ἐνέργειας λέγω, κίνησιν δὲ κίνησις. 1066 a, το ἡ το αἰετοῦμαι ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τις, ἀτελής δέ. If we see a thing at all, we see it just as much one moment as the next; there is no process. So even if we feel the same pleasure for a time, it is no more a pleasure in one moment than another; it is complete in every *νῦν*. The essence of a process (κίνησις) is that it is completed in time; a complete ἐνέργεια is independent of time.

οὐ γὰρ ὥστω κτλ. and τὸ τίλητον is οὐ μὴδὲν ἐξω (Introd. § 17).

§ 2. οἶον ἡ οἰκοδομία. I agree with Professor Stewart's suggestion that the *ms.* reading *οἰκοδομῆς* is due to the following *καὶ* which has disappeared from all *ms.* but K^o. We do not want the art here, but the process.

ἡ ἐν ἄπαντι δὴ κτλ. 'A process, then, is complete either in the whole of the time it takes or in the instant that it attains its end.' L^o omits ἡ before *τοῦτῳ*, but this makes the connection awkward. Of course, strictly speaking, the process ceases to exist as a process in the same instant as it is completed.

οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῦ 1174^b
 οὐδαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὐτῇ ἐκείνης. δι' ἡκριβείας μιν οὖν περὶ
 κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται. δοκεῖ δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ
 τέλεια εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀποδείξεις καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῇ
 4 εἰδὲς εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν παῖ εἰδῶσιν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὅτῳ οὖν 5
 χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἴεν ἀλ-
 λήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. δοξίμῃ δ' ἂν
 τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδε-
 σθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ
 ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τῆς ἡδονῆς. οὐ γὰρ

any part of the race-course, and the crossing of each successive line brings the process of running nearer its completion. The crossing of each line is specifically different; for the differentia of *φορά* is *ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ* (*ἐν τῷ νῦν*), and the lines differ *κατὰ τόπων ἐν ἄλλοις*, i.e. in the *Physics*.

ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ, 'in any given time.' There can be no difficulty in taking this as equivalent to *ἐν ὅτῳ οὖν* above. The equivalence of *ἐν ἅπαντι* and *ὅτῳ οὖν* is normal, e.g. *ἐν τῷ φεγγάτι* (1173 b, 28) is the same as *παρὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ* (cf. 1149 b, 34), and *ἐν τοῖς* is the regular phrase for *ὅτῳ οὖν* (1108 a, 29 b.). Cf. also *ἐν τῷ πᾶσι* (1124 b, 9). I only mention this because some editors wish to read *ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι χρόνῳ*, adopting the interpretation of Michael, for which see next note.

αἱ πολλαί. This must surely mean 'the many motions' into which it may be cut up, *τὰ μέρη*. I do not think we can translate 'most motions,' i.e. all but the *ἐκείνη* *φορά* of the *πρώτης* *ώρας*, as Michael supposes. It is true, no doubt, that Aristotle regarded this as complete and *ἐν ἀδιαφορῇ* *κατ' εἶδος*, but this is irrelevant.

ἐν τῷ ἀδιαφορῷ. If the specific difference of *φορά* is *κατὰ τόπον* (*ἐν τῷ νῦν*), then each part of it will be in a

specifically different *τόπος*, and from a different *τόπος* to a different *τοῖ*.

§ 2. *ἐν τῷ μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι κ.τ.λ.* *Phya.* 134 a, 34 *ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐδὲν πεφικε εὐνοῖσθαι*. This is demonstrated from the indivisibility of *τὸ νῦν*. The conclusion is *ἀνάγκη* *ἀρα* καὶ *κινεῖσθαι* *τὸ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ* καὶ *ἡρακλῆς* *τὸ ἡρακλῆς*.

ἐν τῷ νῦν, *Phya.* 220 a, 14 *φανερὸν ἐστὶ οὐδὲν μέρος τοῦ νῦν τοῦ χρόνου...* *ὥσπερ οὐδ' αἱ στιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς*, 133 b, 33 *ἀνάγκη* *δὲ* καὶ *τὸ νῦν*, *ἀδιαφορῶν εἶναι*.

δῆλον καὶ. A fourth point. Not only is pleasure not a process, but we cannot even say there is a *γένεσις* or *γένεσις* of pleasure. I think the context requires *κατασκευὴ* *τῆς ἡδονῆς* (the *αἵμα* have *τῆς ἡδονῆς*). He compares it to the present *Phya.* 246 b, 11 *τὰ πρὶν τι οὐδ' αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἀλλοιώσεις, ὅτε αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἀλλοιώσεις* *οὐδὲ γένεσις* *οὐδὲ θλῆσι μεταβολή*.

ὅτ' ἂν πάντων κ.τ.λ. *Met.* 1044 b, 21 *ὅτι αὐτὸ γινώσκων καὶ φησὶν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ, εἰς αἱ στιγμαὶ, ὅτε αὐτὰ καὶ θλῆσι τὰ εἶδη καὶ αἱ μερῶν*. Nothing indivisible can strictly speak be said to come into being or pass away. A process implies that one part of the thing has changed while the rest remains in its original state. Now pleasure, as we have seen, is an indivisible whole, complete at every

- καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις, σπουδαῖς δὲ ταῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ 25
 7 ἰατρός [ὁμοίως αἷται ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν].—καθ' ἑαυτὴν δ'
 αἰσθῆσθαι ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον (φαρμὴν γὰρ ὁρίματα καὶ
 ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέειν). δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτε μηδιστα, ἐπειδὴν ἡ
 τε αἰσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργή· τοιούτων δ'
 8 ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰ ἐστὶν ἡδονή 30
 ἐπ'αρχούτως γὰρ τοῦ ποιήσαντος καὶ τοῦ πεισσομένου. τελειοί
 δε τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν ἡ ἡδονή οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἔξι ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ'
 ὥς ἐπιγινομενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ἡρε. ἔως
 ἀν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ υἱὸν δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρίνον ἢ
 θεωροῦν, ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ 1175 *

ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρός,
 i.e. τελειοί. Health is the formal cause
 and the doctor the efficient cause of
 being healthy. The two are therefore
 illustrative of the difference between
 αἰσθῆσθαι and αἰσθῆτον, not of the
 difference between cause and pleasure.
 The parallelism is exact, for, just as
 it is the form of the object that makes
 actual the potentiality of it in the soul,
 so it is the form of health in the
 physician that is the efficient cause
 of health in his patient. Cf. Met.
 1025 b, 30 το αἰσθῆτον ἐν τῷ αἰσθ
 ἵκασται τὸ εἶδος ὑγίεια γὰρ πῶς ἡ
 ἰατρική, καὶ οἷα εἶδος ἡ αἰσθομένη.
 Neither ὑγίεια nor ἰατρική illustrates
 the way in which pleasure completes
 the activity, the illustration of that
 is effected by the characteristically
 awkward parenthesis and retranslation
 καθ' ἑαυτὴν τοῦ πεισσομένου. We
 must I think, bracket ὁμοίως αἷται
 ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, which confuses
 the argument.

§ 7 καθ' ἑαυτὴν κ.τ.λ. This
 parenthesis gives the root of what
 was said 1174 b, 20-23.

πρὸς τοῦτον κ. πρὸς το κρατίστην,
 ποιήσαντος, πεισσομένου. The αἰσθ
 ῆτον νοεῖ, the αἰσθησις νοεῖται.
 The ὑγίεια may be analysed into
 action and reaction but it is really
 one and complete. Cf. Phys. 155 a

34 διὰ δ' ὅτι ὅτι τοιοῦτον καὶ τὸ
 παθητὸν ὡς, γίνεται ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ
 δυνατὸν.

§ 8. τελειοί δὲ κ.τ.λ. Note the
 awkward resumption.

οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἔξι ἐνυπάρχουσα, 'not
 like the unmanifest formal cause'. The
 ἔξι here must correspond to ὑγίεια,
 and it is parallel to the form which is
 made actual in the soul by αἰσθῆσθαι.

ὡς ἐπιγινομενόν τι τέλος, 'as a
 anticipated completion' or 'perfec
 tion.' It is not like health, but like
 the bloom of youth, something which
 supervenes upon the activity when the
 action and reaction are both at their
 best. The illustration is now com
 plete, and the parallelism may be
 exhibited thus—

Formal Cause	ὑγίεια	αἰσθησις
Efficient Cause	ἰατρική	αἰσθῆτον.
Supervenient	ἡρε	ἡδονή.
Perfection	ὡς	ἡδονή.

τὸ κρίνον ἢ θεωροῦν, i.e. τὸ αἰσ
 θανόμενον ἢ νοεῖν. In An. Post. 99 b,
 33 αἰσθησις καλεῖται δυνατὴν εὐφροσύνην
 κριτική. Hitherto we have been
 speaking of αἰσθησις, but of course all
 that has been said applies equally to
 νοεῖν. We shall see that the ἐνεργεία
 of soul is the highest.

ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων κ.τ.λ. The agent
 and patient, the action and reaction,
 are similar and similarly related in

πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ
 καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφικε γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὐτ' αἰεὶ
 συνεχῶς ἔξεται, ἢ κάμνει· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀν-
 5 νατὶ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται εὖν οἷδ' ἡδονή· ἐπεται γὰρ
 τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἕκαστος δὲ τέλει καὶνὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οἷχ' ὀδῶναι
 διὰ ταῦτά· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διαταραχή,
 διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν αἱ
 ἐμβλέποντες, μετὰ ταῦτα δ' οἱ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνεργεσία ὅλως
 10 παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. ὀργισθῆναι δὲ
 τῆς ἡδοῆς οἰηθεὶς τις ἂν ἔπαυται, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἔπαυται
 ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνεργεσία τίς ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα
 καὶ ταύτους ἐνεργεῖ ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγάπη, οἷον ὁ μὲν μυστικὸς
 τῇ ἑκῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τα-
 15 θεορήματα οὔτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος· εἰ δ' ἡδονὴ ταῦτα
 οἱ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἔῃ, οὐ ὀργίζονται. εἰλόγως οὖν καὶ
 τῆς ἡδοῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοὶ γὰρ ἰκίστηι τὸ ζῆν, αἰρετοὶ ὅτι
 ποτερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἰροῦμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν
 ἡδοκὴν, ἀφείσθη ἐν τῇ παρίοντι. συνεχέσθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα

νόημα and αίσθησις is the same result
 as, below.

§ 9. πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. (variant quoted
 Met. 1020 b, 13) οὐ αὖ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλως
 καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ
 φοβερὸν μὴ ποτε στήθ' ἐφαισθῆναι αἱ
 στήθ' φησὶν· αὐτὸν εἰρησίου τοῦ
 οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δυναμὴν τῆς ἀντιφασίας
 αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῦ φθορῶντος, ἢ ἀνθρώπου,
 ὥστε ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τῆς συνεχείας τῆς
 κινήσεως ἢ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ὅλη καὶ δυναμὴ
 ὅσα, οἷον εἰλόγως αὐτὸν τοῦτου.

οὐ γίνεται, i.e. συνεχῶς, which can
 easily be κ.τ.λ. and mean what precedes.
 παρακέκληται, 'the mind is stirred
 up.' Cf. I. 1020 b, 23 a τὰ οὐ
 παρακαλῶντα τὴν νόησιν ἐκείνην φησιν.
 ἱσχυαίοντες ἀγαστὶ ἐκείνην παρακαλῶν
 and προσημασμένην ἀν' ἐνέργειαν.

οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, 'as when people
 look and do not merely see.' Cf. I
 1020 b, 23 a, meaning,

τοιοῦτη, κ.τ.λ. διατεταμένη.

ἀμαυροῦται, 'is dimmed.' Cf.
 A. 1020 b, 23 a, meaning, 'as when
 the mind is dimmed.' Cf. I. 1020 b, 23 a
 meaning, 'as when the mind is dimmed.'

§ 10. ὀργισθῆναι δὲ κ.τ.λ. The
 fact in which each man is stirred up
 that all men are stirred up, is not
 pleased. It is really like, i.e. as when
 they are all, and the pleasure is
 τελειωσις.

καὶ τοῦτοις, 'and with these two
 facts' as shown by the statement of
 1020 b, 23 a. The pleasure
 each man possesses is not a pleasure
 but that which is the satisfaction
 of the activity which is not
 in pleasure.

§ 11. ποτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. The
 question has now become more
 complicated. Cf. I. 1020 b, 23 a, 16
 συνεχέσθαι. Cf. I. 1020 b, 23 a, 16

φαίνεται καὶ χαρισμὸν οἱ δέχασθαι· ἀνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οἱ 10
 γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνεργεῖαν τελειοὶ ἢ ἡδονή. V. ὅθεν
 δοκεῖσιν καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει ὑφ' ἑτέρων
 οὐ μέγα τελειοῦσθαι—οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ
 τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ξύα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γρηψή καὶ ἀγαλμα
 καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς διη- 15
 2 φερουσας τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι δια-
 φέρονσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθησεις καὶ
 αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι ἐξ ἡδοναί.
 φανερὴ δ' ἔν τούτῳ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνεκτιώσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκ-
 στήν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ τελειοί. συναίξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ 30
 οἰκείαν ἡδονή· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξηκριβοῦσιν
 οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαί-
 ροντες τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἕκαστα μᾶλλον,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλομουσοὶ καὶ φιλοκοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλ-
 λων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδύασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκείον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ 35

χαρισμὸν οἱ δέχασθαι. Cf. 1175 b, 15 διὰ το αὐτὸ χαρίζεσθαι. Cf. 1101 a, 10 ἀρχήματα πεφυκότα and the note there.

V. § 1. ὅθεν δοκεῖσιν κ.τ.λ. We now see what is meant by saying that pleasures differ specifically. Aristotle has to deal with the view that pleasures are pleasures of the same thing though from different sources, for which cf. Plato, *Phileb.* 12 d εἰσι μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ὁμοίων, ὃ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ πραγματίζων, αὐτὸ μὲν πότερ γε ἀλλήλοις θανάτου τὸ γὰρ θάνατος κ.τ.λ. As Alexander puts it (*Πθ. προλ.* 120, 4 sqq. Bruns) αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνεκτιοῦνται τοῖς ἐνεργήμασι.

φαίνεται, sc. τελειοῦσθαι. Nature produces like animals or trees are reared when they have reached their full development of size and structure; the products of art are reared when they have been finished so far as to serve the end for which they are made.

§ 2. αὐταί, 'these in turn,' i.e. the

pleasures of thought and the pleasures of sense differ specifically among themselves as well as from one another. Cf. below 1176 a, 3 καὶ ἐκείνας ἀλλήλων.

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνεκτιώσθαι, 'from their adaptation.' Cf. 1161 b, 11. Not only do the pleasures differ specifically τῷ εἶδει διαφερόμεναι γίνεσθαι ἐνεργείας, but also in their own nature as being related to the objects of which they are pleasures (Alexander loc. cit.).

συναίξει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1177 b, 11. That the specific difference between pleasures is intrinsic and not due solely to their association with certain objects is shown by the fact that the *ἐνέργεια* is increased by its objects *ἡδονή*. The latter must, then, have some specific character of its own. Ad this depends upon Aristotle's theory of growth, cf. *Gen. Corr.* 312 a, 26 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον θανάτου ποσὴ σῶσις, ταῦτα μὲν αὐξητικὸν σώματος κ.τ.λ.

συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοιτα οἰκεία τοῖς
 1175^δ ἑτέροις δὲ τῇ εἰδῇ καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἕτερον τῇ εἰδῇ. ἐπεὶ ἐκ 3
 μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέραν ἡδονὰς ἔμπε-
 δίους ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς
 λόγοις προσέχειν, εἰαν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῖτος. μᾶλλον χει-
 5 ροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἢ κατὰ τὴν αἴλη-
 τικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴν τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνεργεῖαι φθίρει. ὁμοίως 4
 δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἕνα περὶ ἐν-
 ἐργῆν· ἢ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει. πᾶν πολὺ ἐσω-
 φέρη κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον ὥστε μὴδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ
 10 τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὀτρύνου σφῖδρα οὐ πᾶν ὀρώμεν
 ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἥρεμα ἀριστούμενοι οἶον
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεατροῖς οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῖλαι οἱ
 ἀγωνιζόμενοι ᾧσι, τότε μάλιστα αὐτο ὀρώσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν 5
 οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακρῖθαι τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρυσωτέραις καὶ
 15 βελτίους ποιεῖ. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται. ὅλην ὥς πολὺ
 διεσπᾶσιν. σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ τοιοῦσαι ὥστε αἱ
 οἰκείαι λυπαί· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκείαι λίπη
 οἶον εἴ τῃ τὸ γραφεῖν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυνον ἢ τὸ λογιζέσθαι·
 ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γραφεῖ, ὁ δ' οὐ λογιζεται, λυπηρὰς οἴσης τῆς
 20 ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπο-
 τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκείαις δ' εἰσὶ αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ
 ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἰδοὺ αἱ εἰρη-
 ται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λίπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γὰρ
 πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικέως 6
 25 καὶ φαιλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἰρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν

§ 3. ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροκλείου εἶναι.
 Alexander (loc. cit.) ἐπὶ εἰς αἱ ἀπ'
 ἄλλαις ἐνεργείαις ἡδοναὶ ἑμποδίζονται
 τὰς ἐν' ἄλλαις γινόμεναις εἴτε ἀν-
 ἡδοναὶ ἡδονῶν φθαρτικαί, αἱ δ' εἰσὶν
 ὁμοειδέι, ἔχουσιν γὰρ τοῦτο πρὸς ἀλλήλας
 ὅ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλας.

§ 4. ἡμεγῆ. 1170 a, 14 n.
 ἐκκρούει. 1 f. 1119 b, 10. 1134 a,

27

§ 5. πολὺ διεσπᾶσιν. They are like

evanescence, as Alexander says, and a
 fortiori they must be εἰδὲς ἑνός, i.e.
 evanescence as the εἰδὴ ἵθαλ are the same
 sort in any genus.

καθ' αὐτὴν This being and be-
 coming of nature the pleasures are
 not attached to the activities in an
 accidental way, they are causa
 the pleasures of the activity. The
 therefore different pleasures are mixed
 with each other so that they are not
 separated by the nature of the activities.

τῶν δ' οἰδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἐκαστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν αἰκία ἡδονὴ ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ αἰκία ἐπισκεψήσεται, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαίλῃ μαχθρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίες τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχροῦν ψεκταί. οἰκισιότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐκ αἰταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὁρέ· 30
 ξων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σίνεργος ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχουν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτον ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ.
 7 οὐ μὴν οἰκίε γὰρ ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οἷα αἰσθητικῶν—ἄισπον γὰρ—ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται τισὶ ταύτου. 35
 ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ὅτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἀφ' ἧς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοή καὶ ὁσφρησις γένεσως· 1176^a
 ὁμοίως δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν
 8 ἐνάτοιαν, καὶ ἐκύτεραι, ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἐκαστῇ ζῶντι

§ 6 τῶν ὁρέων. τὴν the up-
 reaches, from which they arise.
 Αἰκία (Luc. cit.) and γὰρ of πλὴν
 ἀφ' ἧς τὸ φερέσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίας
 τῶν αἰκίας, ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος
 καὶ οὐκ αἰκίας, εἴη ἂν αἱ ἐπιθυμίας
 πλὴν ἀφ' ἧς τῇ ἡδονῇ τῇ ἐνερ-
 γείᾳ, ἀφ' ἧς ἡ ἡδονή. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φερέσθαι
 τῶν ἡδονῶν τῇ ὁ ἐνέργειᾳ οὐκ ἐστὶν
 ἡδονή καὶ παρακαλεῖται ὥστ' αἱ αἰ-
 κίας ἐπιθυμίας σιωπαῖονται αἱ ἡδοναί,
 πολεῖ ἢ μάλιστ' αἱ ἐνέργειαι σιω-
 παῖονται.

αἱ μὲν γὰρ, sc. αἱ ὁρέεις. Desire
 is both antecedent in time and differ-
 ent in its nature from the activities.
 It is the efficient cause (Μοι, Αἰ.
 700 b, 33 ὅ δ' ἐρεῖται καὶ τὸ ἐρετικὸν
 ἀποφύκειται αὐτῇ), while pleasure is the
 unimpeded possession of the activity
 itself.

§ 7. διάνοια... αἰσθητικῶν. The ty-
 pical ἀφ' ἧς. It is said that this is
 ἀφ' ἧς (Luc. cit.) and γὰρ of πλὴν
 ἀφ' ἧς τὸ φερέσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίας
 τῶν αἰκίας, ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος
 καὶ οὐκ αἰκίας, εἴη ἂν αἱ ἐπιθυμίας
 πλὴν ἀφ' ἧς τῇ ἡδονῇ τῇ ἐνερ-
 γείᾳ, ἀφ' ἧς ἡ ἡδονή. ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 φερέσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν τῇ ὁ ἐνερ-
 γείᾳ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡδονή καὶ παρακα-
 λεῖται ὥστ' αἱ αἰκίας ἐπιθυμίας
 σιωπαῖονται αἱ ἡδοναί, πολεῖ ἢ
 μάλιστ' αἱ ἐνέργειαι σιωπαῖονται.

and it is not necessary to go further
 for the purpose of the argument there.
 Here we have a further step but no
 necessitation.

καθαριότητι. The argument is be-
 cause of 1175, bearing and touching are
 interperceptions of contact which are
 a form of touch. Cf. De An. 414 a,
 14 αἱ γὰρ ὅλως αἰσθητικῶν ἡ ἐνέργειαι
 αἰσθητικῶν, οἷον ὁσφρησις ὅψις ἀκοή
 435 a, 24 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα... πάντα... τῇ δὲ
 ἐνέργειᾳ αἰσθητικῶν αἰσθητικῶν
 καὶ διὰ τὸν μεταξὺ, ἡ δὲ ἀφ' ἧς αὐτῶν
 ἀφ' ἧς ἐστὶν. Further (ib. 445 b,
 17) ἀφ' ἧς ἀφ' ἧς διδύκεται ὅτι ἀφ' ἧς
 τῶν εἶναι ζῶντος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων αἰσθητικῶν
 ἐστὶν... αὐτὸ εἶναι ζῶντος ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὅτι.
 In other words, touch and taste are
 ἀφ' ἧς, the rest are καλῶν. We
 have found already that ἀφ' ἧς αἰ-
 σθητικῶν in the proper sense have to
 do only with ἀφ' ἧς and γένεσις.

αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, i.e. αἱ τῇ
 διάνοιᾳ (Ind. a. v. περὶ) ἡδοναί.

καὶ ἐκύτεραι ἀλλήλων. Cf. 1175 a,
 17 καὶ αὐτῶν ἀλλήλων. The pleasures
 of each class (pleasures of sense and
 of intellect) differ among themselves.
 This has already been shown of the

καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἡμέ-
 ραν. καὶ ἐφ' ἐκείτῃ δὲ θεωροῦνται τοῦτ' ἂν φαίνεται· ἕτερο
 γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κινὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡρακλεί-
 τος φησιν ὄναι σῆματ' ἂν εἰσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἦτοι
 γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφή οἷσι. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἶδει
 διαφέρουσιν εἶδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδιαίφρους εὐλογεῖ εἶναι
 10 διαλλάττουσι ἔ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ
 αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπεῖται
 καὶ μισητά ἐστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκίων
 δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρόττοιτι
 καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ
 15 ἐνέκτικῳ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ
 δ' ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις εἶναι το φαίνεμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ.
 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐλαστον
 μέτρον ἢ ἄρετή καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἢ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶναι
 ἂν αἱ ταύτῃ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷ, οὗτοι χαίρειν. τα δὲ
 20 τούτῃ δυσχερὴ εἰ τῇ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οἷδὲν βανμαστίαν· πολ-
 λαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐ
 ἔστιν ἀλλὰ ταῦτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις, τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμο-
 λογουμένως αἰσχροὺς ἔηλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι πλη-
 τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπικεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν πόσει ἢ
 25 τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι· ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνερgetικῶν ὅλην
 ταύταις γὰρ ἔπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' αἶν μίαν ἐστίν ἢ τε πλείους
 αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακρρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τολεούσας, ἢ ἄν

pleasures of sense, and it is equally true that the pleasures of sense are higher than other pleasures of intellect.

§ 8 ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον (l. 1057-8, 24-27)

ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν, i.e. ἡδονὴ οἰκία ἐκείτῃ. It is the ἔργον which determines what is the object of pleasure of sense, cf. Pol. 1253 a. 23 πάντα τῶν ἡμετέρων.

καθάπερ Ἡρακλείτης φησιν (l. 51) Eryxter σπέρματι τῶν χοίρων Ἡρακλείτης λέγει Michael

διαφέρους, i.e. ὡς εἶναι ἡδονὰς τεχνικὰς ἐπὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα, i.e. οἰκία.

§ 9 διαλλάττουσι (l. 1059) At this point we do find that some of the pleasures of sense are common to all, but we do not find that some of the pleasures of sense are common to all.

ὅτι γλυκίων καὶ τ.λ. (l. 1062) ἢ 20 δοκεῖ δ' καὶ τ.λ. (l. 1062) ἢ 25 μέτρον ὁ ἀγαθός. Cf. 1062 a. 4

ναὶ κυρίως λέγονται· ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

VI. Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ 30 ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὲ τὰ προει-
2 ρημένα συντομώτερον ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. εἴπομεν δ' ὅτι οἷα ἔστιν ἔξις· καὶ γὰρ τῇ καθυέδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχει ἢ φυ-
τῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τὸ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα 33 μὴ ἀρίσκει, ἀλλὰ μάλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθά· 1176^b
περὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταὶ αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, διήλον
ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸν καθ' αὐτὰς αἰρετῶν τινα θετεον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτῇ 5
3 κη. καθ' αὐτάς δ' εἰσὶν αἰρεταὶ ἀφ' ἧν μηδεὶ ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρε-
τὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τὸν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδέϊαι· οὐ γὰρ δι'
ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἰροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μάλλον 10 ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγῇς τῶν εὐδαιμονι-
ζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν

§ 11 δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, 'in a secondary and even a far lower degree' Cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 44 c οὐκ αἰ τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποβλέπειν.

VI § 1. περὶ εὐδαιμονίας. We are at last in a position to explain the real meaning of our ἀρχή, the definition of Happiness.

§ 2. ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξις. The doctrine of *Speusippos* dismissed 1098 b, 31 sqq.

καθεύδοντι...φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον. Cf. 1093 b, 31 sqq., 1098 b, 31 sqq. EE. 1115 a, 3.

τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα, c κ τῷ βλαπτομένῳ τῶναι περιττόν τι 8101 a, 6. Cf. 1100 a, 8. 1100 b, 18.

ἐν τοῖς πρότερον, 1098 a, 3.

αἱ μὲν...ἀναγκαῖαι, sc. ἐξ ὁποθί-
σεως i.e. those which have some
ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν (cf. 1094 a,
3), which are the conditions and mea-
sure of something higher.

τῶν καθ' αὐτάς...τῶν δι' ἄλλο. Of course there are some things αἰρετά καθ' αὐτά and also δι' ἄλλο (1096 b, 17), but εὐδαιμονία belongs to the class of things which are οὐδένων δι' ἄλλο.

οὐδένων...ἐνδεῆς, i.e. τέλει. Cf. 1097 a, 30 sqq.

§ 2. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δι' π.τ.λ. It is necessary to discuss the claims of amusement to be the end of life for the *τεκνον* given in Book I.

παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις. Cf. 1095 b, 17. 1158 a, 17.

αἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράτελαι· ὡν γὰρ ἐξίενται
 15 ἐν τοῖς παρεχούσι σφᾶς αἴτουε ἡδεῖε δύνανται ἐν τιε-
 των δοκεῖ μιν εἶν εὐδαιμονικά ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἐν
 δυναστείαις ἐν τοῖς ἀποσχολάζειν, οἳ δὲν δ' ἴσως σφαιρίων
 οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οἷδ' ὁκοῖν,
 ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνεργεῖαι· οἳ δ' εἰ ἀγενεστοὶ οὔτω δύναι
 20 ἡδονῆς εὐκρινούς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τῆς σωματικῆς κατα-
 φεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἷοντιον ἀρετωτέρων εἶναι· καὶ
 γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κρείτιστα οἶσται
 εἶναι. εὐλογον δὲ, ὥσπερ παῖσι καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἑτέρα φαί-
 νεται τιμῆ, οὔτω καὶ φανλοῖς καὶ ἐπικρίσειν. καθαυτῶν οἷν;
 25 πολλὰς εἴρηται, καὶ τίμα κα. ἡδία ἐστὶ τὴ τῷ σποιδαιφ
 τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἐκάστω δ' ἡ κατὰ τῆς οἰκίας ἐξιν αἰρετω
 τάτῃ ἐνεργεῖα, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίφ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετῆς. οἷα
 ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι
 παιδιάν καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακωπαθεῖν τὸν βίον
 30 ἅπαντα τοῖ παῖζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέροι
 ἔνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὐτῆ
 σποιδάζειν δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἡλίου φαίνεται καὶ
 λαν παιδικόν. παῖζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδαζῇ, κατ' Ἀναξαρχοῖ
 ὁρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδεία, ἀδυνα-
 35 τούντες δὲ συνεχῶς ποιεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δύνανται. οἳ δὲ τέλος
 1177 ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἔνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ο
 εὐδαιμονία βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· αὐτός ἐστι μετὰ σπουδῆς
 ἀλλ' οἷκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λεγομένη τῇ σπουδαίᾳ τῶν
 γελῶν καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος αἷι καὶ
 5 μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέρων τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν· ἡ δὲ τῇ
 βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικότερα ἴδη. ἀπολαύσει
 τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀετράποδοι οἷχ

ἐφίενται, sc. οἱ πόρνοι

§ 4. τοῖς ἐν δυναστείαις, 1093 b.

21 a.

§ 5. πολλὰς εἴρηται, 1062 a.

1177 a, 1113 a, 35 514, 1224 a, 36,

cic

§ 6. ἡ ἀνάπαυσις On the theory
 of ἀνάπαυσις (ἀναπαύσει τῆς ψυχῆς) see

above 1127 b, 33 1120 b, 27

It will not seem strange to us in
 Aristotle's words we naturally say the
 truth that ἀνάπαυσις is not the en-
 d of life if we take it and the word
 is a term of ἀσπασμα and whatever
 has to be confused with ἀνάπαυσις
 Cf. Phil. 1337 b, 33.

ἥττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εἰδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ὑδραπόδω μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εἰδαιμονία. ἄλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεαῖς καθάπερ καὶ το πρῶτερον εἰρηται.

VII. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εἰδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι ὃ εἴη κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἐννοῖαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θνητῶν ἔτε θνητῶν ἐν 15 καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν το θειότατον, ἡ τοῦτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εἰδαιμονία. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ εἰρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δε τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρῶτερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ 20 τῶν γνωστώων, περὶ ὃ οὐκ. ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν 3 γὰρ διενέμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν, οἷόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παρορμεῖσθαι τῇ εἰδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δε τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογούμενος ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστάς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν 25 καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαιοῖ, εὐλογον δε τοῖς εἰδούσι τῶν ζη- 4 τοῦντων ἡδῶν τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. ἡ τε λεγμένη αὐταρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀνυγκαίωτον καὶ σφικτὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δε τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχυρηγημένον ὃ μὲν δίκαιον δεῖται 30

§ 7. εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον. The slave, being an ἀνθρώπου ὄργανον (1161b, 41, has no βίος of his own. He is the instrument of another's life. Cf 1101, 1180 a, 32 δουλὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶντων οὐκ ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ σοφία διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εἰδαιμονίας μηδὲ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ πρῶτον.

καὶ πρῶτερον εἰρηται. Cf. 1098 a, 12.

VII § I εἰρηται. Strictly speaking it has not been said, though it is perhaps implied in 1098 a 14 1099 a 14 other lives than the θεωρητικὴ βίος are shown to be inadequate while his consideration is reserved

(1098 a 41). In any case it follows at once from the proof given in Book VI that σοφία is the highest form of contemplation.

§ 2 τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν. Cf. 1178 b, 3 n. θεωρεῖν. διενέμεθα συνεχῶς. The reason is that θεωρία is the ἐνέργεια of a δόξα which is so high as to be almost an ἐνέργεια. The question why it is not continuous is that it is still a δόξα, not the ἀληθὴς γνώμη of νόησις. Met 1074 b 14 εἰ μὴ νόησις ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δόξα, εὐλογον ἐπιτοῦτον εἶναι τὸ συνεχῶς εἶναι τῇ νόησει.

§ 4, κεχυρηγημένον, cf. 1101 a, 12.

πρὸς οἷς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὑμῶς δὲ καὶ ὁ σόφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφικὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτοῦ ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσοι ἂν σοφώτερον ἢ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε
 1177^b αὐταρκέστατος. δοῦξαι τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μοῖναι δι' αὐτὴν ἀγατὲς ὅσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίγνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, οὐ
 δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλείον ἢ ἑλάττω περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πράξιν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχο-
 5 λούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ τυλεμούμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικαῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἢ ἐνέργεια, αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσι
 ἀσχολοὶ εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται το πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕκκα, εἰς
 10 παρασκευάζει πλεμον· δοῦξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μισαιφρονεῖς τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοίτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γινοιντο. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἡσυχυλόν, καὶ παρ' αὐτὰ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δύναστας καὶ τιμὰς ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν
 15 οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς ἢ καὶ ζητοῦμεν ὅλον ὡς ἑτέραν οἶσαν· εἰ δὲ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς προξενῶν αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προίχουσιν, αὐταὶ δ' ἀσχο-
 λοὶ καὶ τέλους τιμὸς ἐφικνται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν.

συνεργοὺς ἔχων. Cf. 1170 a, 3. From the beginning Greek science was organized on cooperative principles (early Greek Philosophy, *Introduction*), and the Peripatetic itself was so in a high degree. The Greek thinks of scientific inquiry as the giving and taking of independent minds (*διαλεκτική*). But of course it is possible for the wise man to commune with himself.

§ 8. οὐδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. At the beginning of the *Metaphysics* it is shown that science arises after every being necessary to life has been secured. Its origin is in Wonder and it serves no end but the satisfaction of our

natural desire to know. Cf. 982 a 24 ὅλος ὡς ὅτι δι' ὁδοῦ καὶ ὡς ἡγομένην χρὴται ἑτέρω· ἀλλ' ὥστε ἀβελήπως φασιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ ἄριστος ἔσθαι καὶ μὴ ἄλλω ὥς, ὡς καὶ αὐτὴ μοῖναι ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη μόνη γὰρ αὐτῇ ἑαυτῇ δόξαν ἔχει διὰ καὶ διακίως ὡς οἷα ἀβελήπως νομίζοιτο αὐτῇ ἡ ἀλήθεια.

§ 6. δοκεῖ τε κ.τ.λ. This is the point which illustrates the personal view that arrangement is the end of life. Εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἔστι ἐν τῇ ἀφ᾽ ἀπολαύσεως, though it is not without pleasure (1171) as Aristotle remarks.

§ 7. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The argument begins at 1172 a 14 ἢ τέλος δὲ.

ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικῇ
αἴσῃ, καὶ πυρὶ αὐτὴν οἰδινος ἐφίσσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν καὶ
οἰκείαν—αὕτη δὲ συνιᾷ τὴν ἐνέργειαν—καὶ το αἵταρκες
ἐῖ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτριτον ὡς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα
τῷ μακαρίῳ ὑπονέμεται, τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν
φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὲ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ὑν-
θρώπου, λαβούσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστὶ 25
τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ
κατ' ἀνθρώπου· οἱ γὰρ ἢ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ'
ἢ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ σεν-
θαιτον. τοσοῦτω καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν.
εἰ δὲ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος 30
θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παρρι-
νούντας ἀνθρωπῖνα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπου ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν
εὐνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν
πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ
τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρὸν ἐστὶ, ὀννίμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μάλλον 1178
πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ

σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν, sc. τῶν ἐν
σχολῇ, e.g. τῶν παιδιῶν.

συνιᾷ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Cf. 1175 a,
30.

μῆκος βίου τέλειον, 109^a a, 15 n.

§ 8. τοῦ συνδύτου, 'man as a com-
posite being.'

ἀνθρωπῖνα φρονεῖν. Cf. Naeck
ITG, p. 690 where we have the
verb.

ἀνθρώπου ὄντα δεῖ φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπου.

In Rhett. 1394 b, 24 Aristotle quotes—
θανάτῃ χρὴ τὴν θνητόν, ὥς ἀθάνατα
ἐν θνητῷ φρονεῖν.

Sc. Pindar, Ismian v, 20 θανάτῃ θνατοῖς
πρὶν, S. p. 140. Tercius si 313
θνητῷ φρονεῖν χρὴ θνητὴν φρονεῖν. Arist.
Eth. Nic. 1177 a, 31 ἡ θνητὴ
εἰ δυνατόν θνητῷ καὶ φρονεῖ.

ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν
Aristotle I did not believe in an immortal
immortality. Noth alone is immortal
and it is not immortal, but by

identifying ourselves so far as may be
with it we escape to a certain extent
from mortality. The thought was
originated by Plato in the Phaedo,
and remained in one form or another
to the end. Cf. Tim. 90 b τῷ δὲ
περὶ φιλομάθειαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθείας
φρονήσεις ἐκπαίδευσίς· παρὰ ἀνάγκη
παν, καὶ ὅσον δ' αὐτὸ μετασχέιν ἀνθρω-
πίνῃ φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτου
μήτεν μέρος ἀπολλύμεν. Cf. also the
division τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν of
Theat. 176 b.

τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ. Cf. 1128 b, 7 n.

τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρὸν. Lippmann com-
pares Soph. El. 183 b, 22 μέγιστον
γὰρ ὥς ἀρχή... ὅς γὰρ κράτιστος τῷ
διωκεῖν, τοσοῦτω μικρότατος δὲ τῷ
μεγίστῳ χαλεπωτάτος ὅστις ἐφύηται.
Cf. compare the expression is figurative.
§ 8. εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο. Cf.
1160 a, 2

εἴπερ τὸ κύριον. Cf. 1108 b, 31.

τὸ κήριον καὶ δμεικον. ἀποπον οἶν ῥίτοις' ἄν, εἰ μὴ του
αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθῆν τε πρῶτα
5 ρον ἀρμόσει καὶ εἶν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκτεῖον ἐκίστην τῇ φύσει κρα-
τιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἐστὶν ἐκίστην· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν ὃ κατὰ
τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ
εὐδαιμονέστατος.

VIII. Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· αἱ γὰρ
10 κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί. εἰκαῖα γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττουσιν
ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρεῖαις καὶ πράξισι πανταίαις ἐν τι-
τοῖς παθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκίστην· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι
φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἐνία δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπο
15 τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνῆκειώσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν
ἢ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετῇ· συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ
ἥθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρο-
νήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικὰς εἰσιν ἀρετὰς τὸ δ' οὐκίον
τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συννητημέναι δ' αὖται καὶ
20 τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρι-
ταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί· καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαι-
μονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη τασούτων γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς
εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μείζιν τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστὶν
δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτος χορηγίας ἐπιμεκρὸς ἢ ἐπ' ἑλαττονα
25 δεῖσθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεια
καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἐστὼ, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπορεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ο

τὸ λεχθῆν τε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. Here
we see the real sequence of the whole
argument. For φάλα in the highest
form is the love of the highest good,
and it is good, as shown above
1120 a 33-34, for it is just the real
concomitance of the activity of thought
(νόησις σπουδαιώτατος).

VIII § 2. Δευτέρως δὲ κ.τ.λ. As the κήριον in man is rational, his
human life will be a rational soul-soul
κατὰ τὸν νοῦν (cf. 1125 a 30-31). But we must also take the σύνθετον
into account.

§ 2. ἐνία δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1144^b,

§ 419.

§ 3 συνέζευκται. Cf. 1123 a, ο
ἐπερ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1146 a, 21 περὶ
τὸ ὀρθόν, i.e. the ἀρετὴν cf. 112
ὁρθὸς λογισ.

αὐταί, κ. αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί.
περὶ το συνθέτου, i.e. τοῖς συνθέτοις
cf. 1144 c v περ.

διακριβῶσαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This
is a note on the fact that the premises
have to furnish the ἀναγκαῖον καὶ εἶναι.

§ 4 δοξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. It is possible
that this section can also refer to 1125 a 33-34.
But that is no reason for overlooking
1.

πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα—μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρῃ—
 πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διαίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ
 ἐδήσει χρημίταιν πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ
 δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἀῶλοι, 30
 προσποιῶνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν),
 τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμει, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν
 ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλον ἔσται ἢ
 5 οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται τε πότερον κυριώτε-
 ρον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν 35
 οὔσης τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ 1178^b
 τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσα ἂν μέζους ὦσι καὶ
 6 καλλίους, πλείονων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οἰδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων
 πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνεργειαν χρεῖα ἄλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιόν ἐστι
 πρὸς γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἢ δ' ἀνθρώπος ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι σιζῇ, 3
 αἰρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεήσειται οὖν τῶν τοιού-
 7 των πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἢ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶ θεωρη-
 τικὴ τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανερῇ. τοὺς θεοὺς
 γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπεκλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι·
 πράξεις δὲ ποίας ὑποκείμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δι- 10
 καίας; ἢ γελοίοι φανοῦνται, συναλλαττοντες καὶ παρακατα-
 θηκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους*
 ὑπομένοντες τὰ φοβερά καὶ κινδυνεύοντες ὅτι καλόν; ἢ
 τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ ὀψοῦσιν; ἄσπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται
 αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιούτου. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; 15
 ἢ φορτικός ὁ ἔπαινος ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας;
 διεξιούσι δὲ παντὰ φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὸ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὸν
 καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπεκλήφασιν
 αὐτούς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν
 Ἰνδουμίωνα. τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ 20

ἐξουσίας, ac. τοῦ ἀπολασταιναι
 (Koiac).

§ 8. ἀμφισβητεῖται τι κ.τ.λ. EE.
 1258 a, 15.

§ 7. ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους; ac. ἐπὶ
 ζῆσι. I read ὑπομένοντες w th K^b and
 ἀνδυνεύοντες. The accusatives of our
 other authorities seem due to assimila-

tion to ἀνδρείους. Some such words
 as ἀλλ' ἄνθρωποι seem to have fallen out
 before ὑπομένοντες.

οἱ γὰρ δὲ καθεύδουσιν, Met. 1074 b,
 17 αἵτις γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ (δ' αὐτοῖ), τί ἂν
 εἴη τὸ σκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ δὲ
 καθεύδουσιν.

μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν βιαιότης, ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ
 εἰργασία, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα θεωρητικῇ ἂν εἴη· καί
 τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτη συγγενεστάτη εἰδαιμονικωτάτη
 σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας δ
 25 τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐσπερημένα τελείας· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
 θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις ἐφ' ὅσον
 ὁμοίωμα τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων
 ζῶων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδ' αὖ κοινῶς θεωρίας, ἐφ'
 ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλ
 30 λον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εἰδαιμονεῖν οὐ κατὰ συγγε
 νηὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῆς θεωρίας· αἴτη γὰρ καθ' αἴτην τιμῶν
 ὥστ' εἴη ἢ ἡ εἰδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

Διήσκει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπων ὅτι· οὐ γὰρ ἡ
 αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ καὶ το σῶμα
 35 ὑναιῖναι καὶ τροφήν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν
 1179· οἱ μὲν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εἰδαι
 μονήσοντα εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἰσχυρῶν μακίαν
 εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὰ αὐτάρκεις οἷδ' ἡ πρῶξις
 δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἀρχοντα ἔχει καὶ θαυμάτιος πράττειν 10
 5 τὰ καλὰ· καὶ γὰρ ἀπο μετρίων δύναται· ἂν τις πράττειν
 κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, τοῦτο δ' ἴσται ἰδίῳ ἰσχυρῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδού
 ται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἥττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπικεικὴ πράττειν
 ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦτα ὑπάρχειν ἔσται γὰρ
 βίος εὐδαιμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργούντος καὶ Σόλως 11
 10 δὲ τοὺς εὐδαιμόνας ἴσως ἀπεφαινέτω καλῶν, εἰπὼν μετρίως
 ταῖς ἐκτὸς κορηρηγμένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ καλλίστα· ὡς
 ἦστο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνους· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέγισ

§ 8. τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις κ.τ.λ. Cf. Met. 1074 b, 14 διαγωγή δ' οὐκ ὅσον ἡ ὀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν

§ 9. εὐημερία Cf. 1099 b, 3 n

§ 10. τοσαῦτα ὑπάρχειν. sc. μετρία.

§ 11. καὶ Σόλων δὲ κ.τ.λ. I. Ionia Herod. 1, 39 Cf. expressly Τέλλω τοῦτο μὲν ἐπὶ πόλει εὐ ἡκούσθη παῖδες ἦσαν καὶ αὐτὸν τε εὐχάρων, καὶ σφαι εἶδε ἅπασι τέκνα γενόμενα καὶ πάντα

καταμεινόμενα τοῦτο δὲ τοῖς βίαιον ἦσαν, ὡς τα γὰρ εἶπε, τελευτῶν το βίον λαμβανόμενον ἐπὶ τῶν καλῶν γὰρ ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἔστιν ἡμεῖς ἐν Ἑλλάδι, βεβιωκότας τὴν τρυφήν ποιήσαι τῶν καλῶν ἐπὶ πόλιν καλλίστα, καὶ μὴ Ἀθηναίων ὁμοίως τὴν βίον αὐτοῦ τῇ τρυφῇ καὶ τῇ καλῇ μετρίως

κεκτημένους πρίττειν ἃ δεῖ. ἔοικεν δε καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ
πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυναστὴν ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι
οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσιεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανεῖη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οἷτοι 15

- 12 γὰρ κρινουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθαιόμενοι μόνον. συμφυ-
νεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰκάσιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δοξαί. πίστιν
μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαυτὰ ἔχει τινά, το δ' ἀληθινὰ ἐν τοῖς
πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τουτοῖς
γὰρ το κύριον σκοπεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα χρηρὲς ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα 20
καὶ τὸν βίον φέρωντας καὶ συνεπιδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις
13 ἀπυδεκτέον, διαφνουμένων δε λόγους ὑποληπτέον. ὁ δὲ κατὰ
νοῦν ενεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα
καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρω-
πίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὖλο- 25
γον χαιρεῖν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ—τούτο
δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς—καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τούτο καὶ
τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὥς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους
καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πρίττοντας· ὅτι δε πάντα ταῦτα
τῷ σοφῷ μάλιστα ὑπάρχει, οἷκ ἄδηλον θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. 30
τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἴη
ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

IX. Ἀρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δε
καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἰκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος

Ἀναξαγόρας. Cf. EE 1114 b, 6
(p. 19) and DL II, 7 πρὸς τὸν
εἰσάγοντα ἰσοῦν οὐ μὲν τῆς πατρίδος,
Ἐλέφρου, ἔφη, ἔμοι γὰρ καὶ σφίερα
μέλει τῆς πατρίδος, δείξαι τὸν οὐρανόν.

§ 12. συμφυνεῖν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Cf.
1064 b, 9 sqq. and Int. cl. § 25.
The words here are the dialectical
arguments, *deontic* (εἰς λόγους ἐπὶ
πράξεσιν), and these are said to be in
harmony with τὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς δοκούντα,
which form *ideal* *πρακτικῶς*. They
must further be tested by the facts of
life (4, 21) and if they do not stand
this test, they are to be regarded as
mere λόγους.

§ 13. ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν κ.τ.λ. Cf.

has been objected to this passage (1)
that it breaks the connection of ideas,
(2) that it is inconsistent with Aris-
totle's view of the relation between
God and Man. Both objections are
false, but neither is a sign of spontane-
ousness. The words *δοκεῖ* and *εὖλογον*
show that this is merely a new *ἐνδοξον*.

IX. § 2. Ἀρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ. We
have now discovered what *εὐδαιμονία*
is, and we have seen how a man
may attain it for himself, but our
task is not complete. We have still
to ask how the *νομοδότης* is to produce
it in the state.

τοῖς τύποις. Cf. *Introd.* § 26.

35 ἔχειν οἰητόν τὴν προαίρεσιν; ἡ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν
 1179^a ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος το θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γινῶναι, ἀλλὰ
 μᾶλλον τὸ πρῆττειν αὐτά· οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰκαίον το
 εἶδναι, ἀλλ' ἔχει καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατικῶν, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλαν
 ἀγαθοὶ γινώσκουσιν, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἴσαν οἱ λόγοι πύττειν πρὸς
 5 τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπισκεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἐν-
 καίως ἔφερον κατὰ τοῦ Θιογενν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους προτρέ-
 σθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι
 τῶν νῦν τοὺς ἐλευθερίου ἐσχύειν, ἡδὴ τ' εὐχόμενοι καὶ ἐκ
 ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιστον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς.
 10 τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς πένοντα πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι
 οὐ γὰρ πεφύκεισιν αὐτοὶ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φυβῆναι, οὐδ' ἀπέ-
 4 χεσθαι τῶν φούλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχροὺν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμαίρας·
 πιθεῖ γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκίας ἡδονὰς δῶκοισι καὶ εἰ ἂν
 αὐταὶ ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένης λύπας τῶν
 15 δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἐννοίαν ἔχουσι, ἀγνο-
 σται οὐτε, τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσει; οἱ δ'
 γὰρ οὐκ οἶον τε ἢ οὐ βραδίον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἔθνεσι κατελ-
 λει-

τὴν προαίρεσιν. Here the phrase is
 practical, i.e. equivalent to the practical
 or methodical, cf. 1074 a, 3 n.

καθάπερ λέγεται, 1103 b, 26

§ 2. οὐδὲ ἰκανόν τόλμῃναι. Cf
 1105 b, 2. 1161 a, 5

ἔχων καὶ χρῆσθαι, i.e. to have the
 knowledge and to use the knowledge. Cf
 1008 b, 31 f.

§ 3. κατὰ τὸν Θιογενν, v. 432—434
 εἰ δ' ἂν ἐλεγετο αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι δῶκε
 θεός,

ἵσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρὰ φέρειν
 ἀνδρῶν,
 πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους
 ἔφερον.

The quotation is suggested by Plato,
 Meno 93 c, where, after quoting the words
 μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἴσθαι (172 a, 13), he goes
 on to say ὅτι ἐν τοῖς τοῖς διδασκῶν οὐδὲν
 τῇ ἀρετῇ λέγει, —φαίνεται γε.— In
 ἄλλοι δὲ γε ὄλγον μεταβάλλει, "εἰ δ'

ἦν ποιεῖν," φησι, "καὶ ἴσθαι ἐκ
 αὐτοῦ," λέγει πως δὲ "οὐκ ἔστιν ἂν
 μισθὸς καὶ μέγας δῶκεν."

νῦν δὲ φαίνονται ἰσχύειν, i.e.
 getting

προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι
 ἀν' ἑαυτοὺς τὸ καλόν.

κατοκώχιστον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, i.e.
 to be the most perfect or the most perfect
 of the good by the use of the good. Cf.
 1008 b, 31 f. 1009 a, 26.

§ 4. αἰδοὶ φοβῆναι. For the ex-
 pression cf. 1115 a, 31.

οἱ δ' ἀπέχεσθαι κ.τ.λ. This is the
 rejected and unimproved style of the
 in the style of the ancient.

§ 5. μεταρρυθμίσει, an Aeschylean
 also used by Xenophon. The Aeschylean
 equivalent of μεταρρυθμίσει is

καταληγμένη, "brought to an end"
 or "ended." The text is probably a
 medieval error for in Greek ἀπορ-
 ρύπτει.

αὐτὰ καὶ ἐδίδασθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμαθ' ἂν νομο-
 και ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τοῦ βίου· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀναγερ-
 5 μλλον ἢ λόγῳ παιδαρχοῦσι καὶ ζῆμασι ἢ τῷ κυλῶ. διότι
 οἴονται τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν εἰς τὴν
 ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν ὡς ἐπακουσόμενοι
 τῶν ἐπεικῶν τοῖς ἔθεσι προσημύμεν, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀπει-
 στέροις αἰσι καλᾶσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοῖς ἔ-
 10 ἀνόμοις ὅλως ἐξαρτῆν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπεικῇ πρὸς το καλὸν
 ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ παιδαρχήσιν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἰδούσης ἐμ-
 γόμενον λύπῃ κολαζέσθαι ὥσπερ ἱποζύγιον. διὸ καὶ φασὶ
 δεῖν τοιαύτας ἔρεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἱ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται
 ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδέσασιν. εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τίς
 15 ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶν δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπικαιροὶ ἦν καὶ μὴτ' ἄκουσα μὲθ'
 ἐκόντα πρὸς τὰ φαῖλα, ταῖτα δὲ γίνεσθ' ὅν βιωμένους
 κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ ταξιν ὁρθῆν, ἔχουσιν ἰσχύν· ἢ μὲν εἰς
 20 πατριῇ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον,
 οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἢ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός, μη βασιλείως ὅστις ἢ τινος ἐκ-
 οὔτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὸν ἔχει δέταμιν λόγος ὡς ὑπο-
 τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀβρώπων ἐχθιμότες
 τοὺς ἐναντιούμενους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, καὶ ὁρθῆν αὐτὸ δρώσιν· ὁ δὲ

αἰνέ. *Σωκράτης* ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀντα, while *Kocher* points out that *Mozel* means to have read ἄλλα.

§ 10. οἴονται τινες The reference seems to be to Plato's remark in the *Law* 713 d seq. that all laws should begin with a promise of a punishment and promise of chastity.

τὸν δ' ἀνόμους ἐφάρξιν *Εἰς* *Πλάτωνα* 713 d seq. ὅτι ὁ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὸν καὶ ἐπικαιρὸν, καὶ ἀκούσας τοῦ νόμου ἐκόντα καὶ ἐθισθῆναι ὁ ἀνόμους.

διὸ καὶ φασὶ κ.τ.λ. cf. 1104 b, 1105 a.

§ 11. κατ' ἀκούσας μὲθ' ἐκόντα. We must not miss the *ἐκόντα* in the phrase κατ' ἀκούσας μὲθ' ἐκόντα, which is a phrase of the *Law* 713 d seq.

βουνοῦται *ἄνθρωπος* πρὸς τὸν νόμον, but he has a good idea of the law. This is one of the reasons why the law is so important, and why it is so difficult to change. The law is the only thing that can be changed, and it is the only thing that can be changed by the law.

§ 12. λόγος ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου. The law is the only thing that can be changed, and it is the only thing that can be changed by the law. The law is the only thing that can be changed, and it is the only thing that can be changed by the law.

- 13 νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθῆς τάττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ
 Λακεδαιμονίῳ πολεῖ <ἢ> μετ' ὀλέγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν 25
 δοκεῖ πεποιτῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς
 πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἤ
 ἕκαστος ὥς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύειν παίδων ἢ δ'
 14 ἡλόχου, κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν
 καὶ ὀρθὴν [καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι]· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων 30
 ἕκαστῳ δοξεῖεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέραις τέκνοις καὶ φί-
 λοις εἰ, ἀρετὴν συμβυλλεσθαι, * ἢ προαιρεσθαι γε, μᾶλλον
 ὃ ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δοξοῖεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικοῦ
 γενομενοί. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νό-
 μων γίνονται, ἐπιεικεῖ δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων· γεγραμ- 35
 μένουν δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, ἵπδεν ἂν δοξοῖεν διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' αὐν 1180^b
 εἰς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ἢ
 γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
 ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τα ἥθη οὕτω καὶ ἐν
 οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθνη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ 5
 τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προκυρροῦσι γὰρ στίρ-
 15 γοντες καὶ εὐπειθείς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφύρουσιν αἱ
 καθ' ἕκαστου παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς· κα-
 θελου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία
 τινὲ δ' ἴσως οὐ, ὃ τε πυρετικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην 10

§ 13. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ κ.τ.λ. (I. Pol. 1337 a, 31 ἀπαυτῶσι δ' ἐν τῇ παρὰ τῷ Λακεδαιμονίῳ καὶ γὰρ πλείστην πολεῖται εἰσὶν περὶ τοῦ πολεῖν καὶ τοῦ πολεῖν (I. 1330 1105 κ. 10)

ἢ μετ' ὀλέγων The addition of ἢ is due to Professor Bywater. Aristotle means the Cretans and the Carthaginians. (I. Pol. 1373) b, 14

κυκλωπικῶς, Od. ix, 114 [of the Cyclopes] θεμιστεύειν δὲ ἕκαστος καὶ δὲ δὲ ἀλόχου, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν. Bywater Aristotle uses this expression to describe the patriarchal state of society. (I. Pol. 1272) b, 27 τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ βασιλεύειν ὑπὸ τοῦ προση-

τάτου καὶ τοῦ ἔστιν δ' λέγει Ὀμηροί κ.τ.λ.

§ 14. καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι. Professor Bywater's suggestion that these words should come after συμβυλλεσθαι would certainly improve the sentence.

γεγραμμένων ἀγράφων. This famous antithesis is only mentioned here because the laws of the domestic legislator will as a rule be unwritten.

§ 15. ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς. I. f. 1097 a, 21.

μάχην περιτίθων is a strange phrase. Stahl conjectures μελέτην for μάχην and νέωσιν παρατίθων for περιτίθων.

τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἡ οὐχ ὁμοίαν φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων: ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε διεισμεῖς παραδιδόντες καὶ εἰεργαῶντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν οἷον ἱατροὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, 35 πρῶττοι δ' αὐτῶν οἰδεῖς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δοξαῖεν 1181^a ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται· καίτοι καίλλων ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημογραφικούς—οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικούς πεποιηκότας τοὺς σφε- 39 τέρους υἱεῖς ἢ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων· εὐλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἂν, οἷθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι πρόξιον· ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. οὐ μὲν μικρὸν γε δοῖσκον ἢ ἐμπειρία συμβῆλλασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς 40 πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἐπικουρίαν. τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάσκειν. ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρῳ ἐτίθεισαν, οὐδ' ἂν ὥντο 45

ἡ οὐχ ὁμοίαν π.λ. This whole passage is an echo of the well-known complaints of Plato in the *Meno* (91 a-100 e) and *Protagoras* (319 d-320 b) that the citizens of Athens have not taught any one their art, not even themselves.

ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων. Cf. 109a, 2 10 b, 4.

§ 20. τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ. The history of the Greek word *ῥήτωρ* and its everyday use at Athens led to this identification the criticism of which forms the last subject of Plato's *Gorgias*. But, as Sprague saw, Isocrates is more immediately a model. Cf. e.g. *Antid.* § 80 νόμους μὲν θεοὶ μύριοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων ἱκανοὶ γυγνάσκον, ἐπειὶ δὲ περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἀμείνως τῇ πόλει

καὶ τῇ Ἑλλάδι οὐκ ἂν πολλοὶ διηγοῖεν. ὡς ἔπειτα τοὺς ἔργους ποιούμενοι τοὺς τοιοῦτους λόγους εὐρίσκουσιν τοσούτω χρηρὴ περὶ πολιτικῆς καὶ εἰσθεῖαι τῶν τοῦ νόμου ποιητῶν, ἀφ' ὧν οἱ αὐτοὶ σπουδαιότεροι καὶ χαλεπώτεροι καὶ ψυχρῆς φρονιμωτέραι δέκονται τυγχάνουσιν, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ εἶναι.

οὐδ' ἐν ὥντο π.λ. Here the reference is quite plain (*Cf. Antid.* § 82 εὐνοῖα δ' ἐπαινεῖται προσληγόμενον ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰρημόνοισι καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς ποιημένους ἀνακρίμψαντες εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν νόμων ἐπαινεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀρχαιοτάτους, τῶν δὲ λόγων τοὺς καιροσώτεροις, οὐκ ἐπὶ αὐτῇ διακρίσει λόγους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς νόμοις τιθέσθαι προαφροσύνησι προεργὸν γέγονε τὸ πλεῖστος τῶν κειμένων, οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ῥητῶν διὰ ἑτέροισι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς

ῥαδίον εἶναι το νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοῖς εἰδοκιμοῦντας
 τῶν νόμων· ἐκλίσσασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρ' ὅτους, ὥστερ οὐδὲ
 τῇ ἐκλογῇ οἶσαι συνίτεται καὶ τὸ κρίναι ὀρθῶς μάλιστα
 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικῇ. οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα
 20 κρίνουσιν ὁρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συν-
 ἰᾷσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποιοῖν συνῴδεται τοῖς δ' ὑπεροῖν ἀγχιπτεῖ
 τῇ μὴ διαλαυθῆναι εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποιήται τὸ ἔργον, ὡ-
 περ ἐπὶ γραφικῇ. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργου εἰκόμασιν·
 1181^b πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γίνετο ἂν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους
 κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἰατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμά-
 των γίνεσθαι· καίτοι πειρώμενται γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θηρα-
 πειμματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖν ἂν καὶ αὐτῶν δεῖ θεράπειαν
 5 ἐκαστους, διεσπόμενοι τὰς ἐξαι· ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις
 ἀφίλημα εἶναι δεκτὴ, τοῖς δ' ἀμπιστήμοσιν ἀχρηῖα. ἴσμεν
 οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συμαγνητα. ταῖς
 μὲν δυναμένους θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρίναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς
 καὶ ποῖα ποιοῖς ἀρμοττεῖ εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' αὖτε
 10 ἐξέως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιούσι τὸ μὲν κρίναι καλῶς οἷα ἂν

para τοις ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦνται ποιεῖν
 ὅτινα παραγαγεῖν, ὁ ῥαδίον ὅστις ἐκ
 οὖν βουληθεὶ ποιήσει καλ. Ἀπὸ
 τοῦ εὖ words are a direct quotation
 from this

ἔργον εἰκόμασιν. The point is that
 the laws are to ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης, not ἡ
 τέχνη. If the criterion of the rhe-
 torical speaking of the orator and the poet,
 which claims to be giving their pupils
 knowledge to learn by heart. (Cf. K. IX. 2)
 οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ
 τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδείαν ὁρεῖται
 ἔσθαι ὥστερ αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν ἐπιστήμην
 φασιν παραδιδόναι. τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα
 τοῖς πάλαι, εἴτε σκυτοτομικῇ μὲν μὴ
 διδάσκει, μὴ δὲ διδασκῆται τομίζεσθαι
 τὰ τεκνίοντα, οἷα δὲ πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς
 ὑποδημάτων, αὐτοὶ γὰρ περὶ τῶν
 μὲν πρὸς τὴν χροίαν, τέχνην δ' οὐ
 παραδιδόναι.

§ 21. ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων. We
 see from the context that this is an

argumentum a fortiori. Men and women
 are more capable of than of making
 laws, and yet the doctor would not be
 own judgment.

ὥστε οὖν καλ. Cf. K. IX. 1. 20
 30 χρῆματι δὲ πρὸς τὴν νομοθεσίαν τὸ
 μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ τῇ τῇ τελεῇ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ
 ἐν τῇ παρεληλυθότῃ θεωροῦν. ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τῇ ἐξέξει εὐδοκίαν. αἱ
 ποῖα τοῖς ποῖα ἀρμοττεται. ὥστε
 δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν
 τῆς γῆς περιδοῦν χρῆματι· ἐπεὶ δὲ γὰρ
 λαβὴν ὅταν τοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν πάλαι
 πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβῇ λόγος
 τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐξαις γραφέντων νο-
 μῶν· ἀπὸ τῶν δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν αἱ
 οὐ μὲν τῶν ἐργῶν ἐστίν.

ἀπὸ τῶν. This is the ma-
 terial and is a statement of a fact
 other () without the fact is a word
 by experience and practice, or
 without experience as a fact is a
 δικτική. Neither of which is

APPENDIX A

De Anima 433 a. 9 377.

Φαίνεται δὲ γε δύο ταῦτα κινεῖσθαι, ἡ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἰ τις τῶν φαντασιῶν εὐθείᾳ ὡς νόησιν τινα· πολλά γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλοις ζήσας οἱ νόησις αἰνολογισμός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. ἄμφω ἅμα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ ἑαυτὰ, νῦν καὶ ὄρεξις, νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἐνικὰ τοῖς λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός, διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τελει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἐνικὰ του πασα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως ὥστε εὐλόγηται ταῦτα δύο φαίνεται τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ὄρεξις καὶ δυνάμει πρακτικῇ τὸ δρεκτον γὰρ κινεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ δυνάμει κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αἰτῆς ἐστὶν τὸ δρεκτόν· καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν καὶ ἡ, οὐ κινεῖ ἀνεν ὄρεξεως ἐν ᾗ τι κινεῖσθαι τὸ δρεκτικόν· εἰ γὰρ δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, φαίνον, κατὰ αὐτὸ αὐτὰς φαίνον εἶδους, νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νῦν οὐ φαίνεται κινεῖσθαι ἀνεν ὄρεξεως—ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις—ὅταν δὲ αὐτὸ τὸν λογισμὸν αἰσῆται καὶ αὐτὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται· ἡ δ' ὄρεξις κινεῖ παρὰ τον λογισμὸν· ἡ γὰρ ἐνικὰ ὄρεξις τις ἐστίν· νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ἠρθικός· ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. διὰ αὐτὸ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ δρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· οὐ πᾶς δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν ἀγαθόν πρακτόν ὃ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχει.

Ὅτι, μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ κτελευτήσῃ ἔργον φανερόν· ταῖς δὲ διακρίνει τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἀπὸ τὰς ἀναγκαῖα διακρίσει καὶ χωρίζωσι, πάμπαν γίνεται ἡρετικῶς, αἰσθητικοί, νοητικοί, βουλευτικοί, εἰτε δρεκτικόν ταῦτα γὰρ πᾶσι διαφέρει ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν καὶ θυμικόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὄρεξις γίνεται ἐναισθητικῶς ἀλλήλων τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία ᾖσι, γίνεται δ' αὖ τὰς χρόνον αἰσθητικῶς ἔχουσι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλου ἀντιλαμβάνεται, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τοῦ ἡδονῆς φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἡδονῆς καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς, ἡ δὲ μὴ ἡδονῆς τὸ μέλλον—οὕτως μὲν εἰς αὐτὴν

κινήτων τὸ ὁρακτικόν, ἢ ὁρακτικόν, πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὁρακτόν—ταῦτα γὰρ κινεῖ οἱ κινούμενοι τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι—ἀμφοῖν δὲ πλείω τὰ κινούμενα. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐστὶ τρία, ἐν μὲν τὸ κινεῖν, δεύτερον δ' ὃ κινεῖ, ἐν τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον· τὸ δὲ κινεῖν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ κινούμενον· ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτόν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὁρακτικόν—κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ ὁρεγόμενον ἢ ὁρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὁρεξις αἰσθησίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ ἐέργεια· τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῶον· ὃ δὲ κινεῖ ὁργανον ἢ ὁρεξις, ἥδη ταῦτα σωματικόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινῶς σώμασι καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργου θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῖς. νῦν δὲ οἷς ἐν κεφαλῇ εἰπείν, τὸ κινεῖν ὁργανικῶς ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖν ὁ γιγγλυμός ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτόν καὶ τὸ κῆλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ' ἀρχή· διὸ τὸ μὲν ἡμέμει τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα, μεγέθει δ' ὁχώριστα· πάντα γὰρ ὥσει καὶ ἔλξει κινεῖται· διὰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐν κύκλῳ μένειν τι, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχισθῆναι τὴν κίνησιν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἰρηται, ἢ ὁρακτικόν τὸ ζῶον, ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ κινήτικόν· ὁρακτικόν δὲ οὐκ ἄνεν φαντασίᾳ φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ. ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα μετέχει.

Σκεπτόμεν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν τί τὸ κινεῖν ἐστίν, οἷς ἀφ' ἑνὸς μόνου ἐπέχει αἰσθησις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν ταύταις, ἢ οὐ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. φαντασία γὰρ λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνάγκη, φαντασία δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐνεῖ; ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῖται ἀριστως, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐνεῖται μόν, ἀριστως δ' ἐνεῖται· ἢ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἰρηται, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ζῴσις ὑπάρχει, ἢ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικαῖς· πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμῷ ἥδη ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐν μετρίῳ· τὸ μετρίον γὰρ διώκει· ὥστε δύναται ἐν ἐκ πλείονων φαντασμαμάτων ποιεῖν καὶ αὐτὸν τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, οἷς τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐκείνη· διὸ τὸ βουλευτικόν οὐκ ἔχει· ἢ ὁρεξις· νικᾷ δ' ἐνίσταται καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν· ὅτι δ' ἐκείνη ταύτην, αὐτὴ δ' ὥσπερ σφαῖρα ἢ ὁρεξις τὴν ὁρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκράσια γανθται· φύσει δὲ αἰεὶ ἢ ἀνω ἀρχικιστερον καὶ κινεῖ· ὥστε τρεῖς φορὰς ἥδη κινεῖσθαι· τὸ δ' ἐπιστημονικόν οὐ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ μένει· ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπολήψεις καὶ λόγοι, ἢ δὲ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα—ἢ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ εὖν τοιούτων τὸ τοιούτου πράττειν, ἢ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τοίνυν τοιόνδε, καὶ γὰρ δὲ τοιούτου ἥδη αὐτὴ κινεῖ ἢ ὁρεξις, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου· ἢ ἀμφω, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ἡραμοῦστα μᾶλλον, ἢ δ' οὐ.

APPENDIX B

De motu animalium 701 a 7 23q.

Πᾶς δὲ νοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν πρῶται, ὅτε δ' οὐ πράττει, καὶ κινεῖται, ὅτε δ' οὐ
κινεῖται; ὅπως παραπληροῦς συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τῶν θεωρητῶν διανο
ομενοῖς καὶ συλλογιζομένοις. ὁ δὲ καὶ μὲν θεωρητῶν τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν ἡ
τὰς δύο πρωταίσεις νοήσῃ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνέηκε καὶ συνεῖηκεν—ἐπὶ τοῦ
δ' ἐκ τῶν δύο πρωταίσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται ἢ πρῶτις οὕτως ὅτι τοῦ
ὅτι παντὶ βαδιστεῖν αἰθρῶν, αὐτὸς δ' αἰθρῶν, βαδίζει εἰς τὴν, ἀν' ὅ
οἶδεν βαδιστέον ἐπὶ αἰθρῶν, αὐτὸς δ' αἰθρῶν, εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὴν
ἡμέραν πράττει, ἀν' μὴ τι κωλύῃ ἢ ἀναγκάζῃ. ποιητὴν μὲν ἀγαθὸν καὶ
ἀγαθόν, ποιεῖ οὐκ αἰθρῶν σκεπάζματος δόγμα, ἡμετέρων δὲ σκεπάζμα
ἡμετέρων δόγμα. εἰ δόγμα ποιητῶν, ἡμετέρων δόγμα, ἡμετέρων ποιητῶν
καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἡμετέρων ποιητῶν, πρῶτις αὐτῶν πράττει δ' ἀν'
ἀρχῆς. εἰ ἡμετέρων ἐστὶν, ἀνάγκη τοῦδε πρῶτον, εἰ δὲ τῶν, τῶν καὶ τοῦ
πράττει εἰς τὴν. ὅτι μὲν εἰν ἢ πρῶτις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν ἐστι ἢ
πρωταίσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ διὰ δύο εἰδῶν γίνονται, διὰ τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ
τοῦ δυνατοῦ. ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτώμενων εἶναι, οὕτως τὴν ἐτέραν πρωταί
σιν ἀγαθὴν αἰθρῶν ἢ διάνοια ἐφιστάται σκεπάζμα οὐκ αἰθρῶν εἰν αἰ
τοῦ βαδιστέον ἀγαθὸν αἰθρῶν, ὅτι αἰθρῶν ἀνθρώπος οὐκ ἐνδιστρέφει. διὰ καὶ ὅτι
λογισάμενοι πράττομεν, ταχὺν πράττομεν. ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐν τῇ ἐν τῇ
αἰθρῶν πρὸς τὸ οὐκ αἰθρῶν ἢ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἢ τῇ ἐν τῇ οὐκ αἰθρῶν εἰς
ποιῶν. ἀν' ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἢ νοήσεως ἢ τῇ ἀρέσει γίνονται. ἐκ τῶν
ποῖν μοι, ἢ ἐπιθυμία λέγει, τοῦδε δὲ ποῖν, ἢ αἰθρῶν εἰς τῇ ἢ φαντασίᾳ
ἢ ὁ νοῦς, εὐθὺς πᾶσι. οὕτως μὲν οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν τοῦδε
ἀρμῶν, τῇ μὲν ἐσχατῇ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας, ταῦτα δὲ
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NOTE.—I have not thought it necessary to give an index to the Text, as those of Grams, Sumsmit, and Hyndman are amply sufficient. The references are to the pages of this volume.

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